Bread riot fears reach Iran’s hardline establishment as prices surge

Bushra Shaikh, who was in Tehran for the state-backed 22 Bahman rally marking the anniversary of the 1979 revolution, wrote on X that she walked through the gathering without wearing a headscarf and faced no interference.

“Yes, I walked the entire rally in Tehran without a hijab and guess what happened? Absolutely nothing,” she wrote. “There is evidently more of a relaxed tone around hijab—I experienced it for myself.”

Critics said her experience reflected selective tolerance, pointing out that she had to wear a headscarf when appearing on Iran’s English-language state broadcaster.

Community notes attached to her posts added context, stating that hijab remains legally mandatory in Iran and that enforcement has been widely documented by human rights organizations.

In her posts and interviews, Shaikh also challenged Western coverage of Iran, arguing that the government enjoys broad public support and that sanctions—not hijab laws or political repression—are the public’s primary concern.

She further accused Israel’s Mossad and its alleged agents of killing civilians and security forces during unrest to inflate casualty figures.

Her comments prompted widespread condemnation online. Many Iranian users said her reporting echoed official narratives and ignored the risks faced by Iranian women who defy compulsory veiling.

One user wrote that Shaikh’s ability to appear unveiled at the rally was the result of sacrifices made by protesters. “

The same Bushra Shaikh, who today is reporting without hijab in Revolution Street for Western eyes in praise of freedom of dress, is the result of the blood of hundreds of youths who died right here three years ago,” the post said.

The controversy unfolded as state media aired interviews with several unveiled women at the rally—an unusual sight at official events. Government outlets presented the interviews as evidence of broad public support, including among women who do not adhere to strict dress codes.

Amjad Amini, the father of Mahsa (Jina) Amini, whose death in morality police custody in 2022 sparked nationwide protests, responded by reposting an image of one such interview.

“They killed my innocent daughter over a few strands of hair, and no one was held accountable,” he wrote on Instagram. “And now they film girls with bare heads … at official ceremonies and broadcast it, and no one cries out that Islamic rules have been broken. Strange times.”

Hijab enforcement in Iran has shifted unevenly since the Woman, Life, Freedom protests of 2022 and 2023, which forced authorities into a partial retreat in the face of widespread defiance. Increasing numbers of women now appear unveiled in public spaces, particularly in major cities.

But compulsory hijab remains law, and enforcement continues in institutional settings, including government offices, schools and universities.

Responding to Shaikh’s posts, US-based women’s rights activist Atieh Bakhtiar wrote on X that her experience did not reflect reality for most Iranian women.

“If thousands hadn’t died … the Islamic Republic would’ve arrested her and beaten her,” she said. “Instead, she’s their mouthpiece now.”

Crude oil loadings from Iran’s Persian Gulf terminals fell to below 1.39 million barrels per day in January, a 26 percent drop from a year earlier, according to data from commodity intelligence firm Kpler reviewed by Iran International.

The decline extends a steady downward trend since October, suggesting sustained pressure rather than a temporary disruption.

The slowdown is most visible in China, Iran’s primary—and effectively only—major oil buyer under sanctions. Daily discharges of Iranian crude at Chinese ports fell to 1.13 million barrels per day last month, down from an average of around 1.4 million barrels per day in 2025.

Unsold Iranian crude is also accumulating at sea. The volume of oil stored on tankers has nearly tripled over the past year to more than 170 million barrels, a sign that shipments are becoming harder to sell or deliver.

Keeping that oil afloat is costly. Chartering a Very Large Crude Carrier typically costs more than $100,000 per day, and tankers carrying sanctioned Iranian oil command even higher rates due to legal and insurance risks. Analysts estimate that roughly one-fifth of Iran’s oil revenue is effectively consumed by these transport and storage costs.

Much of the oil remains stranded in Asian waters. About one-third of Iranian tankers are anchored offshore, while others move continuously or conduct ship-to-ship transfers to evade sanctions enforcement—tactics that have become standard within Iran’s so-called shadow fleet.

Sanctions are increasingly targeting those networks. According to Kpler, 86 percent of the tankers transporting Iranian oil over the past year have themselves been sanctioned by the United States, highlighting the expanding scope of enforcement.

The pressure has forced Iran to offer steep discounts to maintain sales. Iranian crude is currently priced about $11 to $12 per barrel below comparable benchmarks, up from a discount of roughly $3 per barrel early last year, significantly reducing Tehran’s net income.

The decline extends beyond crude oil. Exports of petroleum products such as fuel oil fell to about 350,000 barrels per day in January, down from 410,000 barrels per day a year earlier, with China and the United Arab Emirates among the main buyers.

Additional pressure may be coming. President Donald Trump recently signed an executive order imposing a 25 percent tariff on trade partners of Iran, a measure that could further deter companies and countries from handling Iranian oil.

The mounting economic strain provides important context for renewed indirect talks between Washington and Tehran.

For Iran’s leadership, easing sanctions remains the most direct path to stabilizing oil revenues and relieving fiscal pressure. But deep differences over Iran’s nuclear program, missile development, and regional activities make an agreement unlikely unless one side decides to compromise on core demands.

Taken together, the data suggest that Iran’s ability to sustain oil exports under sanctions—long a cornerstone of its economic resilience—is becoming more constrained.

Under the new arrangement, companies that import staple goods will be introduced by the Agriculture Ministry to the Oil Ministry to receive oil shipments, which they will sell in order to finance their imports, he said.

“One of the good methods of supplying goods is barter with oil, and we have increased the ceiling for oil barter with basic goods imports,” Nouri Ghezeljeh said, according to IRIB.

He said the value of oil bartered for basic goods imports this year had been raised from $1 billion to $1.5 billion by year-end. The share allocated to basic goods and animal feed imports will increase further next year, alongside changes in the implementation method.

Previously, the Oil Ministry provided cargoes to oil traders, who sold the shipments and then arranged imports. From next year, importers themselves will be introduced to receive oil cargoes directly, he said.

Iran has increasingly relied on barter arrangements to secure essential goods amid US sanctions restricting its access to the global financial system.

The understanding, reached during talks on Wednesday, would form part of a renewed “maximum pressure” campaign running alongside indirect nuclear negotiations with Tehran, according to two US officials briefed on the discussions.

“We agreed that we will go full force with maximum pressure against Iran, for example, regarding Iranian oil sales to China,” a senior US official said.

China buys more than 80% of Iran’s oil exports, making it Tehran’s main source of crude revenue. Any significant reduction in those purchases would sharply increase economic strain on Iran and could affect its calculations in nuclear talks with Washington.

An executive order signed by Trump earlier this month allows the administration to expand economic measures against Iran. The order authorizes the secretaries of state and commerce to recommend tariffs of up to 25% on countries that conduct business with Iran.

Such steps could further complicate already tense US-China relations. Beijing said on Sunday that “normal cooperation between countries conducted within the framework of international law is reasonable and legitimate, and should be respected and protected,” when asked about the reported discussions.

US officials said the pressure campaign would proceed in parallel with diplomacy and a US military buildup in the Middle East, as Washington prepares contingency plans in case negotiations fail.

Behind closed doors, Trump and Netanyahu agreed on the objective of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capability, one US official said. However, they differed on strategy.

Netanyahu argued that it was impossible to secure a reliable agreement with Iran and that Tehran would not abide by any deal, the official said.

Trump said he believed there was still a chance to reach an agreement.

“We’ll see if it’s possible. Let’s give it a shot,” Trump said, according to the official.

Trump has tasked advisers Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner with leading the talks. The two are scheduled to meet Iranian officials in Geneva on Tuesday for a second round of negotiations, after earlier contacts mediated by Oman.

A US official said Witkoff recently conveyed messages to Tehran through Oman’s foreign minister and that Washington expects an Iranian response at the Geneva meeting.

“We are sober and realistic about the Iranians. The ball is in their court. If it is not a real deal, we will not take it,” one US official said. Another said he believed there was “zero chance” that either side would accept the other’s core demands.

US and Iranian diplomats held indirect talks through Omani mediators last week in an effort to revive diplomacy over Iran’s nuclear program.

The tensions erupted most visibly on Wednesday, when Pezeshkian angrily confronted the head of state television during a cabinet meeting, accusing the broadcaster of refusing to show his administration’s progress.

The exchange was being aired live before the broadcast was abruptly cut off.

During a visit to Golestan Province the following day, Pezeshkian became embroiled in a heated argument on live television with a provincial commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) over the military’s role in development projects.

This time, the cameras kept rolling. The commander looked directly into the lens and declared that the IRGC had fulfilled its duties—and that the government had not.

Together, the incidents offered a rare public glimpse into the president’s inability to control institutions that shape both policy and public perception in the Islamic Republic.

Moderate and reformist outlets have rallied to Pezeshkian’s defense, portraying the clash as a sign of the broadcaster’s unchecked power.

“For state TV, news is not the priority; controlling the narrative is,” read a commentary on Rouydad24. If the president’s message does not align with the broadcaster’s preferred narrative, the report said, “it will either ignore him or cut the broadcast.”

An editorial on Khabar Online added that the network’s decision to cut Pezeshkian’s speech reflected “a kind of intoxication with power” and an exaggerated sense of confidence.

“Even if the highest executive authority in the country takes a position against this broadcaster, it feels powerful enough to ignore it entirely,” the editorial said.

Clashes between Iranian presidents and state television are not new. Every president except Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, whose brother ran the broadcaster during much of his presidency, faced friction with the organization.

Mohammad Khatami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Hassan Rouhani all had public disputes with IRIB, the Islamic Republic’s state broadcaster. Rouhani barred a former IRIB chief from cabinet meetings, while Ahmadinejad withheld the network’s allocated budget to punish its managers.

But Pezeshkian’s confrontations come at a moment of growing public dissatisfaction and economic strain, weakening his ability to assert authority. He had promised salary increases of 21% to 43% for government employees, but with inflation running at 60%, even those raises would leave workers falling behind rising prices.

At the same time, Pezeshkian has publicly acknowledged the emotional toll of recent unrest, saying he “can hardly sleep at night” after January’s bloody crackdown. Yet his government’s inability to improve economic conditions or assert control over powerful institutions has reinforced perceptions of weakness.

What much of the media avoids stating openly is that Iran’s state broadcaster answers only to the Supreme Leader. As long as he approves of its conduct, no other authority—not even the president’s—can compel it to change course.

The result is a system in which the elected president can be openly challenged, contradicted, or even silenced by unelected institutions.