Lebanon becomes a test of Trump's Iran diplomacy

Iran’s conservative establishment appears to be pushing back against its own ultra-radical fringe after a hardline lawmaker accused President Masoud Pezeshkian of bypassing the Supreme Leader over the April ceasefire with the United States.

Some Iranian hardliners now appear to be distancing themselves from the “extremist” ultraconservatives who have spent recent weeks attacking the president and the nuclear negotiating team.

Two prominent conservative figures with longstanding ties to Iran’s security establishment have publicly condemned hardline MP Kamran Ghazanfari after he accused Pezeshkian of undermining the authority of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.

The fallout from these interventions, and from the incident itself, points to a visible fracture inside Iran’s right wing. It highlights the growing fragmentation of the hardline camp and the marginalization of its far-right fringe, a dynamic that may inadvertently provide the embattled president with some political breathing room.

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Some Iranian hardliners now appear to be distancing themselves from the “extremist” ultraconservatives who have spent recent weeks attacking the president and the nuclear negotiating team.

Two prominent conservative figures with longstanding ties to Iran’s security establishment have publicly condemned hardline MP Kamran Ghazanfari after he accused Pezeshkian of undermining the authority of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.

The fallout from these interventions, and from the incident itself, points to a visible fracture inside Iran’s right wing. It highlights the growing fragmentation of the hardline camp and the marginalization of its far-right fringe, a dynamic that may inadvertently provide the embattled president with some political breathing room.

In a video clip that went viral last week, Ghazanfari accused the president of bypassing the Supreme Leader, demanding: “Why did you accept the ceasefire without Khamenei’s permission?”

He claimed that the Leader’s silence in public messages signaled disapproval and alleged that Pezeshkian had similarly accepted an unauthorized ceasefire during a previous 12-day conflict.

Ghazanfari argued that by halting military operations, Pezeshkian had effectively “saved America and Israel from the crushing blows of Iran’s missiles and drones” just as they were facing destruction.

Ghazanfari's remarks were criticized by hardline commentator Abbas Salimi Namin in an interview with the pro-reform Rouydad 24 website, and by Abdollah Ganji in an editorial in the IRGC-linked Javan newspaper.

The reactions represented unusually sharp internal pushback from within the broader conservative, or principlist, spectrum.

Their target is the extreme and destabilizing fringe of their own camp.

Salimi Namin warned that “extremism damages the system from within.” He argued that the presence of ultra-radicals like Ghazanfari in the parliament is a disaster that alienates the public and degrades political discourse. He also accused radical hardliners of weakening the Supreme Leader’s authority rather than defending it.

“The presence of people like Ghazanfari in the Majles is a disaster,” Salimi Namin said, adding that such statements, “before being an accusation against Pezeshkian, are an insult to the leadership and the armed forces.”

Ganji, who previously served as managing editor of Javan before moving to Hamshahri, made a similar argument in an editorial titled “The Reckless Ghazanfar(s).” The headline used “Ghazanfar,” a colloquial Persian term for a clumsy teammate who scores an own goal, as a pointed play on the MP’s name.

Ganji reminded the “rogue” ultraconservative lawmaker that under Article 110 of the Constitution, decisions on war, peace and major strategic shifts rest with the Supreme Leader and the Supreme National Security Council, not the president.

He described Ghazanfari’s outbursts as “a psychological pathology rather than legitimate political criticism.” He also accused him of exploiting parliamentary questioning as a legal loophole to smear opponents with labels such as “spy,” “Bahai” or “secular.”

Ganji urged “revolutionary youth and elites” to break their silence and “push back against these reckless figures who drive people away from the revolution.”

He characterized Ghazanfari’s accusations as “so disgusting, illogical, insulting, and slanderous… that at first, I thought it was generated by artificial intelligence.”

Both articles unequivocally condemned Ghazanfari’s conspiratorial attacks on Pezeshkian. They argued that although Ghazanfari claims to defend the Revolution and the Leader, his logic ultimately insults the Leader by implying that a president could easily bypass his authority on matters such as striking Israel or agreeing to a ceasefire.

Both warned against mistaking such toxic behavior for revolutionary zeal.

Together, these interventions expose a major structural tension in Iranian politics: how the system manages a reformist or moderate president operating within a conservative-dominated state.

Pezeshkian entered office on a platform of consensus-building, direct engagement with the West to ease sanctions, and domestic de-escalation. The recent criticism of Ghazanfari suggests that mainstream institutional conservatives recognize that, for the system to function, the president must retain at least a basic level of legitimacy.

By attacking the president over core security decisions, the ultra-radicals disrupt the carefully calibrated systemic harmony engineered by the leadership.

The fact that high-profile conservatives are publicly rebuking an ultra-hardline MP indicates that, at this moment, the establishment is prioritizing state stability over factional purity.

One of the clearest indicators has come from Iran’s real-estate market, traditionally viewed as one of the safest destinations for capital during periods of uncertainty. According to Tehran-based media, a growing number of property listings have been withdrawn in recent days.

Estate agents told local newspapers that many owners have instructed them to pause sales, believing that easing tensions and the possibility of a diplomatic opening could push prices higher. Similar behavior has been reported in parts of the rental market.

Sharq reported that some owners had previously hesitated to sell amid conflicting signals from Washington and uncertainty surrounding President Donald Trump’s statements, fearing renewed volatility.

Financial markets have also responded. Reports from both sides about a possible memorandum of understanding have helped lift sentiment on the Tehran Stock Exchange.

Expectations were further fueled after chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Central Bank Governor Abdolnasser Hemmati traveled to Doha, where Tehran hopes to secure access to billions of dollars in frozen assets.

At the same time, some analysts have begun debating the structure of a potential agreement as though its broad outlines are already taking shape.

Former diplomat Kourosh Ahmadi argues that while a deal could benefit Iran, particularly if it results in sanctions relief without major additional nuclear concessions, the two-stage format reportedly under discussion carries significant risks.

He warned that a phased agreement could prolong the uncertainty that has weighed on Iran’s economy for years because the success of an initial understanding would depend on reaching a later nuclear settlement.

Ahmadi said a more effective approach would have been “a single, comprehensive package negotiated over a defined period as a final settlement that ends 25 years of uncertainty for Iran and its people.”

He also contended that the emerging framework suggests Trump’s primary objective remains Iran’s nuclear program rather than broader issues such as missiles or regional alliances.

Whether such assessments prove correct or not, they have contributed to a growing perception that a narrower agreement may be more achievable than previously thought.

The government’s recent decision to lift the 88-day internet blackout has also been interpreted by many activists, technology analysts and political commentators as a sign that officials expect a period of reduced tension.

Some critics argue, however, that the move is intended to ease public frustration at a sensitive political moment, while others see it as preparation for possible concessions in negotiations with Washington.

Still, among many politically engaged Iranians, the restoration of connectivity has been viewed less as a technical decision than as a political signal. In a political environment where even minor policy shifts are closely scrutinized, the move has reinforced perceptions that officials believe the country may be entering a less confrontational phase.

Whether those expectations prove justified remains unclear. What is clear is that many Iranians are increasingly behaving as though a diplomatic opening may be approaching—even if few are ready to assume it is guaranteed.

The documents, obtained by the hacker group Prana and shared with Iran International, suggest Chinese entities also played a role in facilitating the transactions through a network of companies designed to navigate US sanctions.

The documents also link the deadly explosion at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas on April 26, 2025, to a shipment of sodium perchlorate, a chemical used in solid missile fuel production.

According to the documents, the blast and existing sanctions made it increasingly difficult to find vessels willing to transport such cargo to Iran.

Central to the network described in the documents is Haokun Energy, a company that for years acted as an intermediary in the sale of IRGC oil to Chinese refineries and was sanctioned by the United States four years ago for financing the IRGC's Quds Force.

A source familiar with the matter told Iran International that the company still owes the IRGC more than $1 billion in oil revenues.

In one document, Haokun refers to an agreement with a company called Golden Globe Demir Celik (GDCP) concerning the supply of chemical products for special equipment. The document states that, to preserve confidentiality, export-related permits were issued through classified channels.

In another section, Haokun says it established a company called Mosta to obtain bank guarantees. The company is reportedly controlled by GDCP because, for sanctions-related reasons, no Iranian national can serve on its board of directors.

Haokun says that, in coordination with Chinese customs authorities, activities were conducted through confidential channels and requested that its Iranian counterpart prevent any disclosure of information.

Elsewhere, Haokun says it planned to ship 2,000 tons of sodium chlorate and 10,000 tons of sodium perchlorate to Iran through GDCP. The documents indicate that quantity would be sufficient to produce solid fuel for roughly 2,500 ballistic missiles. The shipment was valued at $43 million.

GDCP is registered in Turkey, but leaked emails from the company were signed by an Iranian national, Mohammadreza Sadr. In its correspondence, Haokun identifies GDCP as belonging to the Islamic Republic. One of the leaked emails included a Haokun letter addressed to “Commander Mohammadzadeh.”

The individual appears to be Ahmad Mohammadzadeh, the former deputy coordinator of the IRGC Navy and a former governor of Bushehr under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

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Iran International previously reported that he was among the key figures in the Pourjafari Headquarters, an IRGC oil-sales network that used a complex structure to import gold in exchange for oil exports.

The documents also link GDCP to other figures associated with the IRGC’s commercial and procurement networks. According to the documents, the company is responsible for procuring raw materials used in ballistic missile fuel and for selling oil on behalf of the IRGC.

One document shows GDCP preparing to sell two million barrels of oil from Kharg Island to Fortune Company in the United Arab Emirates. Another records a transfer of roughly $3 million in cryptocurrency to GDCP, while a separate document indicates the funds were deposited into an account at the Borj-e Aseman branch of Tourism Bank in Tehran.

According to the documents, a significant portion of oil-sale revenues is being used to purchase sodium perchlorate from China. Haokun, which brokers the transactions, is attempting to repay hundreds of millions of dollars owed to the IRGC through the sale of weapons, missile-fuel materials and other goods.

A year ago, the Iranian Labour News Agency (ILNA) reported that, as part of an oil-for-goods barter arrangement, Haokun sold two Airbus A330 passenger aircraft to the Islamic Republic for $116 million, despite their market value being estimated at roughly $60 million.

Reports of sodium perchlorate shipments from China to Iran have surfaced repeatedly over the past year.

On March 7, The Washington Post reported that two sanctioned vessels linked to the Islamic Republic had departed China's Gelaowan Port bound for Iranian waters carrying sodium perchlorate, a key component in solid missile fuel. On April 3, The Telegraph reported that five ships carrying sodium perchlorate had arrived at Iranian ports.

Neither Beijing nor Tehran has publicly confirmed such shipments. The documents reviewed by Iran International provide what appears to be the clearest documentary evidence to date linking Chinese entities to efforts to supply the IRGC with materials used in ballistic missile fuel production.

On May 12, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accused China of assisting the IRGC in acquiring components used in ballistic missiles. China rejected the allegation.

A week later, US President Donald Trump said that China's president had assured him that no weapons would be supplied to Iran.

In the letter sent on Sunday, Pezeshkian stressed that the president and the government have effectively been excluded from major and vital decision-making processes in the country, and that the vacuum created by this situation has enabled hardline factions within the IRGC to take control of affairs, the source said.

Pezeshkian added that under such circumstances he is unable to run the government and carry out his legal responsibilities, and for that reason has requested to step down immediately.

It is not yet clear whether Mojtaba Khamenei will accept the president's resignation, but the contents of the letter point to a deep and unprecedented rift at the highest levels of power.

This comes after months of tensions between the government and the Islamic Republic’s military-security institutions. Iran International previously reported that the IRGC had gradually restricted many presidential powers and effectively taken control of key parts of the government.

According to informed sources, the situation has left Pezeshkian’s administration trapped in a political and executive deadlock, preventing diplomatic negotiations from moving forward and the completion and implementation of desired changes to the cabinet structure.