Iran's internet is back, but still broken

Despite continued uncertainty over the outcome of the Iran-US talks, signs that some Iranians are positioning for a possible diplomatic breakthrough are emerging in markets, public debate and government-linked circles.

One of the clearest indicators has come from Iran’s real-estate market, traditionally viewed as one of the safest destinations for capital during periods of uncertainty. According to Tehran-based media, a growing number of property listings have been withdrawn in recent days.

Estate agents told local newspapers that many owners have instructed them to pause sales, believing that easing tensions and the possibility of a diplomatic opening could push prices higher. Similar behavior has been reported in parts of the rental market.

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One of the clearest indicators has come from Iran’s real-estate market, traditionally viewed as one of the safest destinations for capital during periods of uncertainty. According to Tehran-based media, a growing number of property listings have been withdrawn in recent days.

Estate agents told local newspapers that many owners have instructed them to pause sales, believing that easing tensions and the possibility of a diplomatic opening could push prices higher. Similar behavior has been reported in parts of the rental market.

Sharq reported that some owners had previously hesitated to sell amid conflicting signals from Washington and uncertainty surrounding President Donald Trump’s statements, fearing renewed volatility.

Financial markets have also responded. Reports from both sides about a possible memorandum of understanding have helped lift sentiment on the Tehran Stock Exchange.

Expectations were further fueled after chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Central Bank Governor Abdolnasser Hemmati traveled to Doha, where Tehran hopes to secure access to billions of dollars in frozen assets.

At the same time, some analysts have begun debating the structure of a potential agreement as though its broad outlines are already taking shape.

Former diplomat Kourosh Ahmadi argues that while a deal could benefit Iran, particularly if it results in sanctions relief without major additional nuclear concessions, the two-stage format reportedly under discussion carries significant risks.

He warned that a phased agreement could prolong the uncertainty that has weighed on Iran’s economy for years because the success of an initial understanding would depend on reaching a later nuclear settlement.

Ahmadi said a more effective approach would have been “a single, comprehensive package negotiated over a defined period as a final settlement that ends 25 years of uncertainty for Iran and its people.”

He also contended that the emerging framework suggests Trump’s primary objective remains Iran’s nuclear program rather than broader issues such as missiles or regional alliances.

Whether such assessments prove correct or not, they have contributed to a growing perception that a narrower agreement may be more achievable than previously thought.

The government’s recent decision to lift the 88-day internet blackout has also been interpreted by many activists, technology analysts and political commentators as a sign that officials expect a period of reduced tension.

Some critics argue, however, that the move is intended to ease public frustration at a sensitive political moment, while others see it as preparation for possible concessions in negotiations with Washington.

Still, among many politically engaged Iranians, the restoration of connectivity has been viewed less as a technical decision than as a political signal. In a political environment where even minor policy shifts are closely scrutinized, the move has reinforced perceptions that officials believe the country may be entering a less confrontational phase.

Whether those expectations prove justified remains unclear. What is clear is that many Iranians are increasingly behaving as though a diplomatic opening may be approaching—even if few are ready to assume it is guaranteed.

A video from inside the cafe on Tehran’s Valiasr Street was also released, which appeared to show men and women seated around tables during a live music performance.

In the footage, some audience members could be seen clapping, filming with phones and moving their heads to the music as a performer performed near a microphone and music stand.

The report said Tehran’s public venues police acted after receiving reports about the cafe’s activities.

Authorities accused the cafe of holding Western music events and providing a setting for what officers described as “deviant sects,” involving young men and women.

They also said customers at the cafe had been seen making “strange and unusual movements.”

In May 2024, police arrested over 260 people at an underground rock music festival, branding the event a “satanist gathering.”

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  Iran Labels Rock Music Fans Satan Worshippers in Mass Arrest

That debate is becoming increasingly urgent as Washington and Tehran move closer to a potential agreement that could extend the current ceasefire and launch a new phase of negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program.

President Donald Trump has suggested a deal may be within reach, while officials on both sides have signaled progress despite major unresolved disputes.

For supporters of the military campaign, the logic is straightforward: Iran entered the talks weaker than it has been in years. For critics, the concern is that diplomacy could give Tehran breathing room just as years of economic pressure, domestic unrest and military setbacks had left it vulnerable.

Speaking to Eye for Iran, former US Treasury official Miad Maleki and national security expert Thomas Juneau offered different answers to the same question: what exactly did the war achieve?

A Regime under pressure

While the two experts differ on what should happen next, both agree that the Islamic Republic emerged from the conflict significantly weakened.

"They've never been so weak. They've never been so vulnerable that they are today, militarily, politically, economically," Maleki said.

The Islamic Republic, he argued, faces mounting economic pressure at home while struggling to maintain the image of strength it has projected for decades. Tehran’s military infrastructure has suffered significant damage, senior figures have been killed, and the economy was already under strain before the conflict began.

Juneau reached a similar conclusion, though from a different angle.

"The regime was clobbered," he said.

Beyond the military and economic damage, Juneau argued that one of Tehran’s core strategic assumptions collapsed during the conflict.

For decades, Iran invested heavily in Hezbollah, Hamas and other regional allies as part of what officials often described as a forward defense strategy. The idea was that any direct attack on Iran would trigger retaliation across the region, deterring adversaries from striking the country itself.

"That failed," Juneau said.

Maleki argues that the regime's losses go beyond military hardware.

The conflict exposed weaknesses in Iran’s air defenses, damaged key infrastructure and further strained a system already struggling with economic collapse, inflation and public discontent. In his view, Tehran entered negotiations not from a position of strength, but because it had few alternatives.

Victory, leverage or lifeline?

Where the two experts diverge is over what happens next.

For Maleki, the central question is why negotiations are taking place now, at a moment when many observers believe the Islamic Republic is under greater pressure than at any point in recent years.

He pointed to growing frustration among some Iranians who believe the conflict exposed vulnerabilities that could have accelerated political change.

"There's some level of disappointment that the fact that the US is negotiating with this regime is bad for the future of a free Iran," he said.

The concern is not that Iran emerged stronger from the war. Rather, it is that Tehran survived a period of extraordinary pressure and may now receive economic or diplomatic relief before those pressures fully take effect.

Juneau sees a different risk.

While acknowledging that the regime has been weakened, he argues that ordinary Iranians may ultimately bear the greatest cost.

"The Iranian people have been thrown under the bus," he said.

The economy, already battered by sanctions, corruption and years of mismanagement, now faces the additional burden of reconstruction. At the same time, Juneau warns that a weakened regime does not necessarily become a more moderate one.

In fact, he believes future protests could face even harsher repression than previous waves of unrest.

"This is a regime now that will have even less tolerance for any kind of popular protests in the future," he said.

The disagreement reflects a broader uncertainty surrounding the talks themselves.

If the objective of the war was to weaken the Islamic Republic’s military capabilities, there is broad agreement that it succeeded. Iran’s regional posture has been damaged, key infrastructure has been hit and some of its most senior figures are gone.

But if the objective was to fundamentally alter Tehran’s behavior, improve conditions for ordinary Iranians or create a pathway toward meaningful political change, the answer remains far less clear.

Maleki believes the conflict became unavoidable as Iran expanded its missile, drone and regional capabilities.

"The conflict was unavoidable. It was coming sooner or later," he said.

Juneau is more cautious.

Asked whether the war was ultimately worth it, he declined to offer a simple yes-or-no answer.

"The negative implications of the war outweigh the positive implications," he said.

That may ultimately be the central dilemma facing policymakers in Washington and the region.

The war weakened the Islamic Republic. Few dispute that.

The unanswered question is whether the diplomacy now taking shape will build on that weakness or alleviate it.

Many of the nightly gatherings – known in Iran’s political and media sphere simply as “the street” – began as collective mourning ceremonies for Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who was killed, in squares and streets across Iranian cities before gradually evolving into highly organized political events.

Speakers, most of them from the hardline camp, describe Iran as the victor of the war and oppose negotiations with the United States in many of these events.

The rallies were initially large, but as their rhetoric became more radical attendance gradually declined. Witnesses say most now attract between 100 and 200 people at a time.

Slogans and placards at the anti-negotiation rallies focus on “fully observing the leader’s conditions” and avenging Ali Khamenei and others killed in US and Israeli attacks.

Speakers have branded not only moderates such as former Foreign Minister Mohammad-Javad Zarif but also some conservatives, including Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, head of the negotiating team and an ally of President Masoud Pezeshkian, as “advocates of surrender.”

Social media users say those who favor negotiations and an end to the war do not feel safe attending the rallies or expressing their views there.

The hardline outlet Raja News recently wrote: “The experience of the negotiating team’s mistakes in the Islamabad talks, and the (current) Supreme Leader’s wise decision to halt that flawed process, proved that not ‘unconditional support for negotiators’ but ‘standing firm on the Supreme Leader’s conditions and red lines’ is the people’s primary duty in the arena.”

Amir-Hossein Sabeti, a hardline member of parliament who frequently attends and speaks at the rallies, dismissed negotiations with the United States as futile in a Telegram post on Wednesday.

“The continuation of public gatherings in the streets and demands on officials to preserve the Supreme Leader’s red lines will certainly be influential and will affect officials’ decisions,” he wrote.

He added that lawmakers appear in squares and streets to voice “the people’s demands and the Supreme Leader’s red lines so that no one can easily act against them.”

Journalist Saeed Maleki, reacting to the burning of an effigy of Zarif at one rally in the city of Gorgan earlier this week, described the act as an attempt to break national unity and deepen social divisions.

“How long are we supposed to tolerate this small minority in the streets? If Zarif has committed treason, deal with him. And if he hasn’t, confront this minority before another sedition erupts,” he wrote.

Political analyst Ruhollah Rahimpour told Iran International television that empty streets during a crisis create “a sense of fear and anticipation of disaster.” For that reason, he said, the Islamic Republic attempts to fill public spaces with ceremonies that project a narrative of power.

State media promotion

Television channels run by Iran’s state broadcaster, which is largely controlled by hardliners, have extensively covered the rallies and promoted attendance.

Even so, Mohammad-Hossein Kashkouli, director of Ofogh TV, recently said during a speech at one gathering that the broadcaster was under pressure not to air demonstrators’ slogans and banners.

“Despite the pressure, as long as you remain in the streets, we will stick your placards before their eyes and we will not silence your voices, because the Supreme Leader places hope in your voice,” he said. He added that people would remain in the streets until the Leader himself asked them to leave.

Emphasis on diversity among participants

State and pro-government media have repeatedly emphasized the diversity of participants at the rallies. If a participant appears with looser hijab or an appearance outside the conventional image of government supporters, photos and videos of them are widely circulated.

Images from the gatherings show women and girls without hijab, or wearing forms of hijab that would not normally be accepted in government offices, chanting slogans, waving Islamic Republic flags and even participating in motorcycle parades — despite the government still refusing to issue motorcycle licenses to women.

Many social media users argue that this tolerance reflects not a genuine policy shift but hypocrisy.

Carnival atmosphere

Especially after the ceasefire, many of the gatherings have taken on a carnival-like atmosphere, with families attending alongside children.

Booths and tents set up around streets and squares distribute balloons, ice cream and snacks, reportedly funded voluntarily by participants. Missile mock-ups displayed to attract children are sometimes painted pink. Children’s war-themed drawing activities are also organized.

Since the ceasefire, wedding ceremonies have also become common at the rallies. Clerics perform marriage ceremonies before crowds of spectators. One event in Tehran’s Imam Hossein Square, where 110 couples were married, was broadcast on television.

Weapons training

Recently, some rallies have also included firearms training for participants, including children.

One citizen, in a message sent to Iran International, said: “In Kashan, they’ve set up tents at every intersection and square and are teaching women and children how to shoot and use guns. They are exploiting children who should be kept away from these things.”

The rallies also include registration drives for civilians volunteering to defend the country. Volunteers, both male and female, and of all age groups, are given the title “Janfada,” meaning someone willing to sacrifice their life. State media say there are more than 30 million such volunteers.

Complaints from residents

Many social media users complain about the noise created by participants, who often block streets late into the night with cars and motorcycles while playing religious mourning songs on loudspeakers.

One user on X wrote: “It’s becoming really hard for me to tolerate these flag-waving crowds in the streets. From unnecessary traffic and noise pollution until midnight to the anger caused by discrimination — discrimination in the right to occupy the streets and express opinions, which they enjoy, but not us. For the authorities, we are second-class citizens.”