Tehran’s oil lifeline shows signs of strain under tightening sanctions

Under the new arrangement, companies that import staple goods will be introduced by the Agriculture Ministry to the Oil Ministry to receive oil shipments, which they will sell in order to finance their imports, he said.

“One of the good methods of supplying goods is barter with oil, and we have increased the ceiling for oil barter with basic goods imports,” Nouri Ghezeljeh said, according to IRIB.

He said the value of oil bartered for basic goods imports this year had been raised from $1 billion to $1.5 billion by year-end. The share allocated to basic goods and animal feed imports will increase further next year, alongside changes in the implementation method.

Previously, the Oil Ministry provided cargoes to oil traders, who sold the shipments and then arranged imports. From next year, importers themselves will be introduced to receive oil cargoes directly, he said.

Iran has increasingly relied on barter arrangements to secure essential goods amid US sanctions restricting its access to the global financial system.

The understanding, reached during talks on Wednesday, would form part of a renewed “maximum pressure” campaign running alongside indirect nuclear negotiations with Tehran, according to two US officials briefed on the discussions.

“We agreed that we will go full force with maximum pressure against Iran, for example, regarding Iranian oil sales to China,” a senior US official said.

China buys more than 80% of Iran’s oil exports, making it Tehran’s main source of crude revenue. Any significant reduction in those purchases would sharply increase economic strain on Iran and could affect its calculations in nuclear talks with Washington.

An executive order signed by Trump earlier this month allows the administration to expand economic measures against Iran. The order authorizes the secretaries of state and commerce to recommend tariffs of up to 25% on countries that conduct business with Iran.

Such steps could further complicate already tense US-China relations. Beijing said on Sunday that “normal cooperation between countries conducted within the framework of international law is reasonable and legitimate, and should be respected and protected,” when asked about the reported discussions.

US officials said the pressure campaign would proceed in parallel with diplomacy and a US military buildup in the Middle East, as Washington prepares contingency plans in case negotiations fail.

Behind closed doors, Trump and Netanyahu agreed on the objective of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capability, one US official said. However, they differed on strategy.

Netanyahu argued that it was impossible to secure a reliable agreement with Iran and that Tehran would not abide by any deal, the official said.

Trump said he believed there was still a chance to reach an agreement.

“We’ll see if it’s possible. Let’s give it a shot,” Trump said, according to the official.

Trump has tasked advisers Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner with leading the talks. The two are scheduled to meet Iranian officials in Geneva on Tuesday for a second round of negotiations, after earlier contacts mediated by Oman.

A US official said Witkoff recently conveyed messages to Tehran through Oman’s foreign minister and that Washington expects an Iranian response at the Geneva meeting.

“We are sober and realistic about the Iranians. The ball is in their court. If it is not a real deal, we will not take it,” one US official said. Another said he believed there was “zero chance” that either side would accept the other’s core demands.

US and Iranian diplomats held indirect talks through Omani mediators last week in an effort to revive diplomacy over Iran’s nuclear program.

President Trump’s backing of Iranian protesters has revived debate in Washington over how far the US should go. As some advisers warn against another Iraq- or Afghanistan-style intervention, one can point to the 1991 Iraqi uprising as a cautionary lesson.

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Since then, the US military presence around Iran has expanded steadily, and many Iranians openly call for American military action against the Islamic Republic.

Yet some of Trump’s advisers draw cautionary parallels between a potential strike on Iran and the US invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, warning against another protracted and costly war.

There is, however, another Middle Eastern precedent—one that both Iran and the United States would be wise to examine closely: the 1991 Shia and Kurdish uprising in Iraq. It was a revolt sparked in part by American encouragement but crushed after the United States did not intervene on behalf of the protesters.

US call for uprising

On Feb. 15, 1991, President George H.W. Bush called on “the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside.”

His message was broadcast into Iraq via television and radio. Coalition aircraft dropped leaflets urging Iraqi soldiers and civilians to “fill the streets and alleys and bring down Saddam Hussein and his aides.”

The call came weeks after the US-led coalition had launched its campaign to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Shia communities in southern Iraq and Kurdish groups in the north rose up against Saddam.

The uprisings were fueled by deep public anger over Saddam’s military adventurism — from the long war with Iran to the invasion of Kuwait — which had imposed immense human and economic costs on Iraqi society.

Protests began in Basra and quickly spread to Najaf, Karbala and Nasiriyah. Shia rebels and defecting soldiers attacked security forces and government buildings. Baath Party offices were seized, officials were killed, prisoners were freed.

Within roughly two weeks, 14 of Iraq’s 18 provinces were effectively outside the central government’s control.

It was a dramatic advance — but it did not last.

The collapse of the uprising

The rebellion ended in one of the bloodiest crackdowns in modern Iraqi history. Its failure stemmed from a combination of factors: American hesitation to intervene, Saddam’s extensive use of force and deep divisions among the opposition — a combination that could, in a different form, reappear in Iran.

Despite overwhelming military superiority in the Persian Gulf, the Bush administration chose not to enter a new confrontation with Saddam. There were fears of “another Vietnam,” with American troops drawn into a prolonged deadly conflict.

Bush publicly called for Saddam’s removal but remained wary of what might follow. One concern was the “Lebanonization” of Iraq — the prospect of the rise of Iranian-backed Shia forces in Baghdad.

Meanwhile, opposition groups inside Iraq — Shia factions, Kurds, nationalists and others — failed to unify under a coherent command structure. The opportunity to conquer Baghdad slipped away.

The Gulf War ceasefire allowed Saddam breathing room. A regime many believed was on the brink of collapse recovered quickly. Relying on the Republican Guard — which had remained in the war largely intact — Saddam launched a counteroffensive.

Although parts of Iraq were placed under no-fly zones, Saddam exploited a loophole: helicopters were not barred. He used them to attack rebels, and coalition forces did not intervene to stop those assaults.

The Republican Guard shelled residential neighborhoods indiscriminately, conducted house-to-house arrests and carried out mass executions. Chemical weapons were used against some rebel-held areas. Even those who sought refuge in religious shrines in Najaf and Karbala were not spared.

Estimates suggest that between 30,000 and 60,000 Shia in the south and around 20,000 Kurds in the north were killed. Roughly 2 million people were displaced.

Lessons for the US and Iran

The Iraqi uprising offers several lessons for policymakers in Washington, and for Iranians.

First, the international community often underestimates a regime’s capacity for internal violence. Military weakness abroad does not necessarily translate into fragility at home.

A government that perceives its survival to be at stake may show restraint toward foreign adversaries while unleashing far harsher tactics domestically. Even an army battered in external war can regroup internally, close ranks and act with renewed intensity.

Saddam’s regime had been defeated by an international coalition, yet it retained loyal security structures, a functioning chain of command and the willingness to use extreme force against its own citizens.

At such moments, any external concession or diplomatic maneuver can be repurposed as an instrument of internal consolidation.

A deal with Iran could give the ruling elite a chance to regroup and unleash a new wave of repression against its own people.

For opposition movements, strategic cohesion matters. Agreement on minimum political goals, unity of command and preparation for a potential power vacuum can be decisive.

Victory does not arrive simply because a regime appears weakened. In Iraq, rebels went so far as to appoint local governors in areas they controlled — but the new order collapsed swiftly. Divisions within the opposition ultimately strengthened the existing power structure at a decisive moment.

At the same time, global leaders should recognize that threats alone are insufficient. If a foreign power seeks to alter the balance of power, it must understand that displays of force without the intention to use it can carry profound and unintended consequences.

Netanyahu’s sudden trip to Washington on Tuesday is not routine diplomacy. It reflects his deep concern that renewed US–Iran talks in Oman could drift toward a narrow nuclear agreement that would stabilize Tehran rather than confront it.

Recent statements by President Trump have focused almost exclusively on the nuclear file. After the meeting on Wednesday, he said he told Netanyahu that he prefers a negotiated settlement with Iran and hopes Tehran is more reasonable than it was in 2025.

For Netanyahu, this signals a familtiar danger: pressure within the United States to settle for a deal that curbs uranium enrichment while leaving Iran’s missile arsenal, regional network of proxies, and broader strategic posture intact.

Netanyahu appears to believe this moment is unique—that Iran is weaker than it has been in years: economically strained, internally divided, and strategically exposed after recent regional confrontations. In his assessment, a limited agreement would squander a rare opportunity to alter the regime’s trajectory, particularly at a time of unprecedented US military presence in the region.

As in past confrontations with US administrations, Netanyahu is expected to arrive armed with intelligence briefings and a historical argument tailored to Trump himself. The message is likely to be direct: presidents are remembered for moments when they reshape history, not defer it. This, he will argue, is such a moment.

Netanyahu will also push for broadening negotiations to include Iran’s ballistic missile program—a threat not only to Israel but to US forces and regional allies.

Tehran is unlikely to accept such terms. Iranian officials have asserted this many times. Yet from Netanyahu’s perspective, that refusal would strengthen the case for a tougher American response. If Tehran accepts expanded terms, its capacity to project power would be significantly reduced.

There is also a domestic dimension.

Netanyahu seeks to reinforce his image as the leader most capable of confronting Iran while maintaining close ties with the US. That positioning carries particular weight after earlier claims that Israel had neutralized key Iranian threats—claims now tempered by recognition that deterrence alone may not suffice.

Underlying this approach is a broader strategic conclusion: Israel can manage Iran’s proxies, but it cannot indefinitely manage the regime itself. Only a fundamental shift in Tehran, whether through internal collapse or decisive US-led military pressure, would transform Israel’s long-term security equation.

Netanyahu’s decision to engage Trump directly also reflects skepticism toward the president’s diplomatic circle, particularly advisers who favor a pragmatic nuclear arrangement that stabilizes tensions in the short term while leaving the core challenge unresolved.

From Netanyahu’s standpoint, the risk of a narrow agreement is clear. Economic relief for Tehran could dilute international urgency and complicate future coalition-building against Iran while constraining Israel’s freedom of action.

Yet this strategy carries risks of its own.

Netanyahu may underestimate the resistance his approach could encounter within the United States, especially among segments of the MAGA movement increasingly skeptical of foreign entanglements. While Trump himself has shown openness to assertive uses of power, much of his political base is wary of being drawn into another Middle Eastern confrontation.

Historical memory also shapes the landscape. Netanyahu’s 2002 congressional testimony supporting military action in Iraq—and the subsequent costs of that war—still resonates in Washington. Advocacy framed as preventive or regime-targeting military action inevitably triggers those comparisons.

Israel could face heightened scrutiny and erosion of political goodwill should US–Iran tensions escalate in ways perceived domestically as externally driven or strategically avoidable.

In seeking to shape US policy at a pivotal moment, Netanyahu is pursuing what he sees as strategic necessity. But in doing so, he risks complicating Israel’s long-term standing within an increasingly divided American political landscape.