Iran International
Iran’s conservative establishment appears to be pushing back against its own ultra-radical fringe after a hardline lawmaker accused President Masoud Pezeshkian of bypassing the Supreme Leader over the April ceasefire with the United States.
Some Iranian hardliners now appear to be distancing themselves from the “extremist” ultraconservatives who have spent recent weeks attacking the president and the nuclear negotiating team.
Two prominent conservative figures with longstanding ties to Iran’s security establishment have publicly condemned hardline MP Kamran Ghazanfari after he accused Pezeshkian of undermining the authority of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.
The fallout from these interventions, and from the incident itself, points to a visible fracture inside Iran’s right wing. It highlights the growing fragmentation of the hardline camp and the marginalization of its far-right fringe, a dynamic that may inadvertently provide the embattled president with some political breathing room.
In a video clip that went viral last week, Ghazanfari accused the president of bypassing the Supreme Leader, demanding: “Why did you accept the ceasefire without Khamenei’s permission?”
He claimed that the Leader’s silence in public messages signaled disapproval and alleged that Pezeshkian had similarly accepted an unauthorized ceasefire during a previous 12-day conflict.
Ghazanfari argued that by halting military operations, Pezeshkian had effectively “saved America and Israel from the crushing blows of Iran’s missiles and drones” just as they were facing destruction.
Ghazanfari's remarks were criticized by hardline commentator Abbas Salimi Namin in an interview with the pro-reform Rouydad 24 website, and by Abdollah Ganji in an editorial in the IRGC-linked Javan newspaper.
The reactions represented unusually sharp internal pushback from within the broader conservative, or principlist, spectrum.
Their target is the extreme and destabilizing fringe of their own camp.
Salimi Namin warned that “extremism damages the system from within.” He argued that the presence of ultra-radicals like Ghazanfari in the parliament is a disaster that alienates the public and degrades political discourse. He also accused radical hardliners of weakening the Supreme Leader’s authority rather than defending it.
“The presence of people like Ghazanfari in the Majles is a disaster,” Salimi Namin said, adding that such statements, “before being an accusation against Pezeshkian, are an insult to the leadership and the armed forces.”
Ganji, who previously served as managing editor of Javan before moving to Hamshahri, made a similar argument in an editorial titled “The Reckless Ghazanfar(s).” The headline used “Ghazanfar,” a colloquial Persian term for a clumsy teammate who scores an own goal, as a pointed play on the MP’s name.
Ganji reminded the “rogue” ultraconservative lawmaker that under Article 110 of the Constitution, decisions on war, peace and major strategic shifts rest with the Supreme Leader and the Supreme National Security Council, not the president.
He described Ghazanfari’s outbursts as “a psychological pathology rather than legitimate political criticism.” He also accused him of exploiting parliamentary questioning as a legal loophole to smear opponents with labels such as “spy,” “Bahai” or “secular.”
Ganji urged “revolutionary youth and elites” to break their silence and “push back against these reckless figures who drive people away from the revolution.”
He characterized Ghazanfari’s accusations as “so disgusting, illogical, insulting, and slanderous… that at first, I thought it was generated by artificial intelligence.”
Both articles unequivocally condemned Ghazanfari’s conspiratorial attacks on Pezeshkian. They argued that although Ghazanfari claims to defend the Revolution and the Leader, his logic ultimately insults the Leader by implying that a president could easily bypass his authority on matters such as striking Israel or agreeing to a ceasefire.
Both warned against mistaking such toxic behavior for revolutionary zeal.
Together, these interventions expose a major structural tension in Iranian politics: how the system manages a reformist or moderate president operating within a conservative-dominated state.
Pezeshkian entered office on a platform of consensus-building, direct engagement with the West to ease sanctions, and domestic de-escalation. The recent criticism of Ghazanfari suggests that mainstream institutional conservatives recognize that, for the system to function, the president must retain at least a basic level of legitimacy.
By attacking the president over core security decisions, the ultra-radicals disrupt the carefully calibrated systemic harmony engineered by the leadership.
The fact that high-profile conservatives are publicly rebuking an ultra-hardline MP indicates that, at this moment, the establishment is prioritizing state stability over factional purity.
The poster, announcing a memorial ceremony at the Abdol-Azim shrine in Rey, south of Tehran, lists Zahra Sadat Haddad-Adel, Boshra Hosseini Khamenei, Mesbah al-Hoda Bagheri and Zahra Mohammadi Golpayegani as among the dead.
Each name connects the Khamenei household to one of the families or institutions that have shaped the Islamic Republic’s political, cultural and administrative elite for decades: the parliament, the Supreme Leader’s office, the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, Imam Sadegh University and the network of institutions around the leader’s office.
The ceremony itself is religious and familial. But the names on the poster point to something larger: a closed circle of family relationships through which access, influence and institutional power have long moved inside the Islamic Republic.
The Haddad-Adel connection
One of the most recognizable names is Zahra Sadat Haddad-Adel, wife of Mojtaba Khamenei and daughter of Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel.
Haddad-Adel served as speaker of Iran’s seventh parliament from 2004 to 2008 and is known as the first non-clerical speaker of the Islamic Republic’s parliament. He also served as a lawmaker in several parliamentary terms and remains head of the Academy of Persian Language and Literature.
His influence extends beyond parliament. He is a member of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, an adviser to the slain Supreme Leader and founder of the private Farhang school, which critics have described as one of the symbols of special educational access for families close to the ruling system.
For critics, Haddad-Adel’s presence across political, cultural and educational institutions, combined with his family tie to the Khamenei household, reflects the concentration of power within a limited circle of families close to the state.
His name also appears on the US Treasury Department’s sanctions list.
Imam Sadegh University and the Bagheri Kani family
The name Mesbah al-Hoda Bagheri draws attention to another powerful network: the Bagheri Kani family and the institutions around Imam Sadegh University.
Mesbah al-Hoda Bagheri Kani was the husband of Hoda Khamenei, Ali Khamenei’s daughter, and the son of Mohammad-Bagher Bagheri Kani, an influential cleric who served in the Assembly of Experts and headed Imam Sadegh University.
The same family also includes Ali Bagheri Kani, a senior diplomat who has held key posts in Iran’s foreign policy establishment, including political deputy foreign minister, acting foreign minister, senior nuclear negotiator and senior positions in the Supreme National Security Council.
Their uncle, Mohammad-Reza Mahdavi Kani, was one of the Islamic Republic’s most influential clerics. He served as head of the Assembly of Experts, secretary-general of the Combatant Clergy Association, briefly as prime minister in 1981, and for decades as head of Imam Sadegh University.
Imam Sadegh University expanded after the 1979 revolution and became one of the main training grounds for state managers. Many officials in Iran’s political, security, media and diplomatic institutions are graduates of Imam Sadegh University.
Through these links, the Bagheri Kani family connects the Khamenei household to one of the Islamic Republic’s most important pipelines for training and placing loyal officials in diplomacy, security, politics and state administration.
The Supreme Leader’s office
Another name on the poster, Zahra Mohammadi Golpayegani, points directly to the Supreme Leader’s office.
The 14-month-old child was connected to two of the most influential families in the Islamic Republic. On one side, she was the granddaughter of Mohammad Mohammadi Golpayegani, the longtime head of Ali Khamenei’s office. On the other, she was a granddaughter of Ali Khamenei.
Mohammad Mohammadi Golpayegani headed the Supreme Leader’s office since 1989, the year Khamenei became leader. He is one of the most influential but least publicly visible figures in the Islamic Republic’s power structure.
Because of his position, Golpayegani has played a central role in the messages, decisions and administrative machinery of the leader’s office. The US Treasury sanctioned him in 2019 over his role acting on behalf of that office.
His family link to Khamenei, as reflected in the name of Zahra Mohammadi Golpayegani, shows how the leader’s office is not only an institution but also part of a wider web of personal and familial ties.
Boshra Khamenei
The poster also lists Boshra Hosseini Khamenei, Ali Khamenei’s eldest daughter.
Unlike some other members of the Khamenei family, Boshra Khamenei has rarely appeared in public, and little information has been published about her personal life or activities.
In recent weeks, state media have referred to her as “martyr Boshra Khamenei.” Some reports have mentioned her educational background and interest in literature.
Tabnak, in a report framed as a student’s note for “martyr Boshra Khamenei,” referred to her as “Ms. Hosseini” and described her connection to education and literature.
Her presence on the poster alongside the other names brings the focus back to the Khamenei family itself, a household that has remained mostly shielded from public life while remaining central to the structure of power.
A compressed image of power
The memorial poster is striking because it brings together four names that would otherwise appear in different corners of the Islamic Republic’s elite: the Haddad-Adel family, the Bagheri Kani family, the Mohammadi Golpayegani family and the Khamenei household.
Together, they form a compressed image of how power has been organized around the leader’s family and its closest allies.
For critics of the Islamic Republic, the connections point to a familiar pattern: influence concentrated among a small circle of trusted families whose proximity to the leader’s office can open paths across the state.
The memorial in Rey is therefore more than a family or religious ceremony. It offers a glimpse of how, at the top of the Islamic Republic, family names often double as signs of political access, institutional reach and long-standing power.
