Iran International
The rise of Mojtaba Khamenei is not an unexpected deviation within the Islamic Republic—it is the logical outcome of a system carefully engineered over nearly four decades by Ali Khamenei.
What appears, at first glance, as a dynastic shift is in fact the continuation of an ideological and institutional project: the consolidation and reproduction of Khameneism.
The central argument is straightforward: Mojtaba Khamenei does not represent a new phase in the Islamic Republic. He represents the success of a long-term process of “rail-laying”—a deliberate restructuring of power that ensures continuity regardless of who formally occupies the position of Supreme Leader. In this sense, the system no longer depends on individual authority; it reproduces a predefined ideological and political logic.
This transformation was made possible by the way Ali Khamenei maximized the latent capacities of the Islamic Republic’s constitutional framework. The constitution already concentrates extraordinary power in the office of the Supreme Leader. However, Khamenei did not merely operate within these limits—he expanded and operationalized them. Over 37 years, he systematically turned flexible or ambiguous mechanisms into rigid and enforceable structures, embedding his ideological preferences into the institutional fabric of the state.
One of the clearest examples of this process is the evolution of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution. This body, notably absent from the constitution, was gradually transformed under Khamenei into a central pillar of ideological control. What began as a mechanism for purging universities in the early years of the revolution became a highly structured institution with dozens of sub-councils, extending its reach across education, culture, media, and social policy. It evolved into a powerful instrument for shaping and policing societal norms—without ever requiring formal constitutional legitimacy. This is Khameneism in practice: the ability to formalize control without formal law.
A similar trajectory can be observed in the transformation of the Guardian Council. Originally conceived as a supervisory body overseeing legislation and elections, it was reengineered into a decisive mechanism for controlling political outcomes. Through expanded vetting powers and systematic disqualification of candidates, the council moved from oversight to orchestration. Over time, it became capable not only of influencing elections but effectively determining their results in advance. This shift—from supervision to engineering—was not incidental; it was a key step in institutionalizing Khameneism.
These developments were not isolated. They formed part of a broader strategy to eliminate unpredictability from the system. Independent political actors were sidelined, reformist currents neutralized, and institutional autonomy steadily eroded. What emerged was a tightly controlled ecosystem in which all meaningful levers of power—political, judicial, cultural, and economic—were aligned with a single ideological framework.
Within this context, the emergence of Mojtaba Khamenei as a central figure becomes comprehensible. His lack of traditional religious credentials or broad political legitimacy is not a contradiction—it is a consequence of the system’s evolution. Years of institutional engineering, including the careful management of the Assembly of Experts and the systematic removal of potential obstacles, made such a transition possible. The “selection” process itself reflects the culmination of Khamenei’s long-term restructuring: a system in which outcomes are preconfigured rather than contested.
More importantly, Mojtaba’s rise demonstrates that Khameneism has achieved a critical threshold—it can now sustain itself without its original architect. The ideology has been embedded so deeply within the system that any successor, regardless of personal inclination, is compelled to operate within its parameters. The structure dictates the outcome.
This is why the question of leadership succession is, in many ways, secondary. Whether it is Mojtaba Khamenei or another figure, the current institutional configuration leaves little room for deviation. The mechanisms of control, the networks of power, and the ideological priorities—particularly the emphasis on regime preservation, anti-Western positioning, and hostility toward Israel even at significant national cost—are all structurally entrenched.
Khameneism, therefore, is no longer simply an ideology associated with one leader. It is a system of governance—self-reinforcing, expansive, and resistant to change. The Islamic Republic has, through decades of deliberate restructuring, lost its capacity to generate alternative political paths from within.
In this sense, Mojtaba Khamenei is not the beginning of a new chapter. He is the continuation of a trajectory that has been decades in the making.
And perhaps more significantly, this continuity underscores a deeper reality: the Islamic Republic has reached a point where change from within has become structurally improbable. The very mechanisms designed to preserve the system have also eliminated its flexibility.
Khameneism, as both ideology and structure, may ultimately define not only how the system survives—but how it ends. It sustains the Islamic Republic by centralizing power, eliminating dissent, and enforcing ideological conformity across all institutions. Yet those same mechanisms steadily erode the foundations of long-term stability: public trust, institutional adaptability, and economic resilience. A system built to prevent deviation becomes incapable of reform; a state designed to suppress a crisis becomes dependent on perpetual coercion to manage it.
In this sense, Khameneism transforms survival into a self-consuming process. Each cycle of repression narrows the regime’s options further, raises the cost of governance, and deepens the gap between state and society. The tools that once ensured control—security dominance, ideological rigidity, and exclusion of alternative voices—gradually become liabilities, locking the system into a path where it can neither evolve nor retreat.
As a result, Khameneism may determine not only the durability of the Islamic Republic, but also the form of its eventual breakdown: not a sudden collapse, but an accumulated exhaustion. A system that endures by sacrificing its capacity to renew itself ultimately reaches a point where continuation itself becomes unsustainable.
The strongest reaction has come from people in cities where the forces have reportedly been seen, especially in the southwest.
Viewers who contacted Iran International said the arrival of Hashd al-Shaabi fighters in Abadan had made the city feel “unsafe and frightening,” and said residents were worried about their children.
One viewer described the forces as “terrorists” and said their entry into Iran, particularly in Ahvaz, Khorramshahr and Abadan, was aimed at “another massacre of the people.”
Another message asked: “Hashd al-Shaabi convoys entered Iran with armored vehicles. Why are Israel and America not targeting them?”
A message from Abadan said: “I’m sending this message from Abadan. The presence of these forces with flags and military uniforms has made the city frightening.”
Another viewer said: “These forces have come to kill people. We have not forgotten the January killings, when the government used them to help kill people.”
Anger was also directed at the cost of hosting such forces at a time of economic hardship.
One viewer wrote: “In these terrible economic and inflationary conditions that people are facing, why should the Islamic Republic pay for Hashd al-Shaabi terrorists and even house and feed their families for free?”
Other messages sent to Iran International suggested a wider pattern of deployment.
One said Hashd al-Shaabi forces had gathered in warehouses belonging to the Arvandan company in Dehloran county in Ilam province.
Another said the forces had been stationed since the previous day at the Persian Gulf Hotel in Genaveh, Bushehr province.
A more detailed message from Abadan said: “Around 1:30 a.m. on March 30, Hashd al-Shaabi forces arrived with several Hilux vehicles at the Basij base opposite the City Center to be stationed there, and along the route there were several checkpoints with a large number of IRGC forces inspecting people so they could not film.”
The reports followed footage circulated this week showing a convoy of Iran-backed militias in Iraq moving toward Iran.
Iran International audiences also reported on Sunday that Iraqi militias had been housed in residential units belonging to Revolutionary Guards personnel on Otobusrani Street in Bandar Abbas.
Dadban, a legal advisory and training center for activists, warned this week that the purpose of deploying Hashd al-Shaabi forces inside Iran was “participation in repression.”
According to its report, Iraqi militias crossed into Iran and entered Abadan and Khorramshahr in Khuzestan province, where they were received by officials of the Islamic Republic.
Dadban said the organized and armed presence of foreign forces inside the country, without going through a legal process, had no legal basis and pointed to Article 146 of Iran’s constitution, which bars the establishment of foreign military forces in Iran.
It also warned that using foreign forces to suppress domestic protests would amount to an escalation in violations of citizens’ fundamental rights, including the right to assembly and personal security.
Reaction on social media echoed many of the concerns raised in messages sent to Iran International.
Users described the presence of Hashd al-Shaabi as a violation of national sovereignty and a sign that the authorities were preparing for a harsher phase of internal repression.
One user, referring to reports of their presence in Khorramshahr, wrote: “God freed Khorramshahr, and with the help of the disgraceful Islamic Republic it has been occupied again.”
Another wrote: “Hashd al-Shaabi terrorists have officially entered Iran. This is the invasion of Iranian soil by a foreign ground force. We must stand against it completely.”
Another user mocked pro-government rhetoric by writing: “What happened to the people who said domestic problems must be solved inside the family? Is Hashd al-Shaabi family too? Here, a foreign force is acceptable? But if we ask for help, we are traitors?”
Another post said the government knew “the final battle will be decided on the streets of the big cities, especially Tehran,” and argued that Hashd al-Shaabi had been brought in to help defend the state at that front.
Together, the messages and online reactions suggest that for many Iranians, the issue is not only the arrival of an allied militia, but what its presence may signal about the Islamic Republic’s readiness to use outside forces to intimidate and suppress people at home.
Iraqi criticism of support for Iran
The backlash has not been limited to Iran.
In an exclusive interview with Iran International, Sheikh Abdullah al-Jughayfi, a member of the Security and Defense Committee and adviser to the Anbar governorate, confirmed that “Hashd al-Shaabi forces in recent days have transferred financial and non-financial aid to Iran.”
He said the aid had been sent over the past three days “with Hashd al-Shaabi flags raised.”
Al-Jughayfi criticized the move and warned that “this action could further complicate Iraq’s relations with the United States and increase the likelihood of new sanctions.”
At the same time, Jalil al-Lami, deputy head of the Iraq Center for Strategic Affairs, told Iran International from Baghdad that the move amounted politically to “a clear alignment by Iraq” and warned that it effectively ended Baghdad’s balancing policy between Washington and Tehran.
He added that “the presence of Hashd al-Shaabi forces inside Iran could expand the range of targets inside Iraq, whether through direct attacks or indirect escalation, pushing the country toward an open atmosphere of confrontation.”
In response to Operation Epic Fury, Tehran turned to asymmetric leverage, relying on its capacity to disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and drive up global oil prices.
Anticipating market volatility, the US Treasury issued a targeted sanctions waiver designed to stabilize oil markets while preserving financial pressure on Tehran.
Yet as the waiver framework evolved from an India-specific mechanism into a more generalized policy, it continued in practice to serve Indian refiners, redirecting sanctioned crude away from China and toward India.
The Russian test case
On March 5, Treasury issued a waiver allowing Indian refiners — IOC, BPCL, HPCL, and Reliance Industries — to purchase already-produced Russian crude cargoes that were on the water.
When Treasury expanded the waiver on March 12–13, Indian refiners remained the only significant buyers of the authorized Russian barrels. The expansion continued to apply only to cargoes already on the water, did not restore formal banking channels, and did not lift underlying sanctions.
Miad Maleki, a former US Treasury official, described General License U as authorizing “the commodity transaction; it says nothing about payment.” The license permits the sale of oil but does not restore banking access or create a formal payment channel. That distinction allowed trade in physical barrels while preserving financial pressure.
The Iranian extension
The March 20 application of the same waiver model to roughly 170 million barrels of Iranian crude floating offshore replicated the policy — and once again, India remained the only swing buyer.
Reliance Industries, the largest Indian public company, purchased 5 million barrels of Iranian crude at a $7 premium to Brent. The same Indian refiners, IOC, BPCL, and HPCL, reportedly plan to resume purchases.
Homayoun Falakshahi, head of crude oil analysis at Kpler, said Iranian crude often remains unsold until reaching Asian discharge zones such as Singapore or Malaysia. Because many cargoes were already produced but waiting for buyers, releasing them under the waiver had immediate supply effects. He added: “Now that India has entered as a competitor, the price in China will most likely increase.”
In effect, India’s participation disrupted China’s near-monopsony over sanctioned Iranian crude — reshaping pricing leverage without formally lifting sanctions.
Before 2019, Indian refiners imported roughly 450,000 barrels per day of Iranian crude under contracts with National Iranian Oil Company. They retain the technical configuration and commercial familiarity to scale quickly within short waiver windows. That institutional memory gives Washington a ready-made alternative buyer base whenever it chooses to recalibrate supply pressure.
India’s strategic ascent
India’s admission into the Pax Silica, formalized on February 20, placed it within the US-led supply-chain initiative focused on reducing dependence on China in semiconductor and AI production. As Under Secretary Jacob Helberg said: "Pax Silica is really not about China, it is about America. We want to secure our supply chains. We view India as a partner to help de-risk and diversify those supply chains."
Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Israel on February 25–26, where the two countries elevated ties to a “special strategic partnership.” Two days later, Operation Epic Fury began.
The new world order
Early in President Trump’s second term, Washington sought to reshape the global order. India was expected to become a counterweight to China, and Iran was given a chance for realignment. Neither objective materialized at the outset. India’s role remained limited, negotiations with Iran collapsed, and a 12-day war followed. Trade and tariff disputes further complicated the restructuring effort.
Washington’s tactical support of India’s energy role may carry implications beyond temporary oil supply management. Pax Silica realigns industrial supply chains; the waiver framework redirects sanctioned energy flows. Together, they position India within the technological and commodity axes of great-power competition.
This suggests a second, more structured attempt to reshape the global order. With India onboard, the decisive variable becomes whether Operation Epic Fury generates sufficient leverage to push Iran away from its long-standing partnerships with Beijing and Moscow. A realignment toward Washington could be the tipping point in the consolidation of this new order.
