Senior Research Analyst, NUFDI
A reported order by Iran’s supreme leader to end the state of “neither war nor peace” may signal a turn towards diplomacy. But a closer reading suggests Tehran is offering no concessions, only restating its longstanding demands for ending the confrontation with Washington.
On Tuesday, Iranian state media announced that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had received Maj. Gen. Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and ordered an end to “the war and the ‘neither war, nor peace’ conditions.”
Abroad, that was read as Tehran wanting out. It wants nothing of the sort. Read the whole sentence, and the “order” is the same demand the Islamic Republic has made since the shooting stopped in April: the stalemate ends when Washington capitulates.
The news cycle started with a readout released by Mojtaba’s official website, which was reproduced word for word across the domestic press. The item is a summary, not a transcript. Every line attributed to Mojtaba is in reported speech, without a single direct quotation.
He is said to have called for “exerting control over the Strait of Hormuz,” declared the enemy “desperate,” bound Iran’s “interests” to those of its regional allies in the “Axis of Resistance,” and called for an end to the war “through realization of the conditions set out by the country’s officials.”
That last clause is the whole message, and the conditions it refers to are no secret. Rezaei himself set them out in September: an end to the war on all fronts, Lebanon included; the release of Iran’s frozen funds; an end to the US naval blockade of Iranian ports; and guarantees against renewed strikes.
Earlier versions added compensation for war damages, the lifting of sanctions and recognition of Tehran’s control over the strait. In short: Tehran keeps its grip on Hormuz, its regional allies stay in place, and Washington concedes. Then, and only then, the stalemate ends. Not one condition softened, not one position moved.
Now consider what the readout is not. It is not independent evidence that a meeting took place. It carries no date and no place. Under Ali Khamenei, the leader’s office opened such items with “this morning” or “this afternoon” and named the venue, usually the Imam Khomeini Hussainiya in Tehran. That convention has quietly disappeared.
The readout carries no image, either. No independently verified new photograph, audio or video of Mojtaba Khamenei has surfaced since the February strike that killed his father. The same was true of the four earlier meetings state media has reported for him, twice with the president, once with the parliament speaker and once with the chief justice.
Eight months in, the authorities have offered only written accounts of these meetings, without independently verifiable visual or audio evidence. When and where they took place, and whether the official accounts are accurate, remain unverified.
Some have nonetheless read the announcement as significant, on the grounds that Mojtaba called for an end to the war. The record says otherwise: the conditional clause simply restates Tehran’s standing terms.
A call to end the stalemate with no change in terms is the oldest tactic in the Islamic Republic’s repertoire: stall, buy time, rebuild; when the pressure rises, flirt with peace; and when an opening appears, strike.
The readout did not specify when or where the meeting took place. Although it was published Tuesday, a day after Saudi, Turkish and Pakistani envoys visited Tehran, the text does not establish that the meeting occurred that day or that it was connected to the diplomatic visit.
What Tehran is actually telegraphing
What “neither war, nor peace” means in the mouth of a Khamenei, the family’s own usage helps explain.
In August 2018, Ali Khamenei told a public audience that there would be no war and no negotiation with the Trump administration, because talks would end to Tehran’s detriment. The government daily Iran bannered it the next morning: “there will be no war, and we will not negotiate.” In May 2019, he called negotiation “poison” and declared the nation’s choice to be “resistance.” The limbo was Tehran’s own posture, and a boast.
After the twelve-day war of June 2025, he flipped the phrase. Addressing the cabinet on September 7, he said hope and productivity had to prevail over the “neither war, nor peace state that the enemy wants to impose on us” as part of its “psychological war.” His remedy was self-reliance: “don’t wait for external developments.” The limbo was now the enemy’s doing; the answer was still not to talk.
President Masoud Pezeshkian has leaned on that speech ever since, most recently on October 24, when he said, “Many are struggling for their evening bread” because of the war and the stalemate, adding, “One cannot plan in limbo... The martyred Leader ordered us to go and finish the job.”
The IRGC’s press corps answered within a day. Javan headlined that exiting the stalemate “will not come through negotiation” but through “changing the enemy’s calculations.” Fars News presented the phrase as the doctrine of the “martyred Imam,” with negotiation a “strategic trap.”
Tuesday’s readout appears to settle that argument in the IRGC’s favor. The son inherits the father’s phrase and makes it a condition for ending the confrontation: the stalemate is over when the other side accepts Tehran’s terms.
Three uses of one phrase, one underlying position. Refuse talks in 2018. Blame the enemy for the stalemate in 2025. Demand an end to the stalemate on Tehran’s terms in 2026. At no point has “ending neither war nor peace” meant Tehran moving an inch.
Meanwhile, the authorities continue to announce meetings involving a leader who has not appeared publicly in independently verified images or recordings. This is not an order to end the stalemate. It is the stalemate, restated as a demand.
The IRGC-linked Tasnim news agency has set out the case for Iran to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), adding to a renewed debate over Tehran's nuclear strategy as the region remains caught between diplomacy and war.
In a commentary published Wednesday, Tasnim argued that the treaty had failed to protect Iran's interests and questioned the benefits of remaining a member after successive wars with Israel and the United States.
The intervention comes as Qatar promotes a diplomatic framework reportedly linking the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, sanctions relief and efforts to reduce tensions involving Yemen's Houthis.
It also follows signals from Tehran that its leadership wants to end the current diplomatic and military stalemate.
Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Mohsen Rezaei said Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had told him during a meeting on Tuesday that it was time to end the state of “no war, no peace.”
President Masoud Pezeshkian said Wednesday that his government would do everything it could to fulfil the leader's wishes.
Tasnim's commentary, titled “Why Should Iran Leave the NPT?”, highlights divisions over how Tehran should respond to international pressure on its nuclear program.
The case for withdrawal
Hardline politicians have repeatedly raised the prospect of leaving the NPT during periods of nuclear negotiations, arguing that the treaty has failed to protect Iran's interests.
Tasnim identified three central objectives of the treaty: preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, encouraging nuclear-armed states to disarm and protecting members' right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
The agency argued that the treaty had failed on all three counts.
It accused the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of abandoning its role as an impartial technical body and becoming politically aligned with the United States and Israel.
The agency had failed to defend Iran's rights when its nuclear sites were attacked, so withdrawal would be a legitimate option for Tehran, Tasnim argued.
Tasnim maintained that withdrawal would not necessarily mean developing nuclear weapons. Some lawmakers, however, have explicitly linked the two.
On Tuesday, MP Abolfazl Aboutorabi called for Iran to withdraw from the NPT and begin building a nuclear bomb.
Other hardline figures, including members of the ultraconservative Paydari Front, have advocated withdrawal, arguing that continued membership has failed to prevent attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities despite their being subject to international safeguards.
Divisions within the establishment
The calls have met resistance from other establishment-aligned media, reflecting disagreements over the potential costs of withdrawal.
Khabar Online, a pragmatic-conservative outlet, sharply criticized the campaign in an October 25 report, singling out the Paydari Front and questioning the political judgment of those advocating departure from the treaty.
Its headline described the proposal as a radical demand dating back two decades, with “neither head nor tail.”
The reformist Arman Melli newspaper has also taken a position against withdrawal, broadly reflecting the Pezeshkian administration's preference for maintaining Iran's existing treaty commitments.
Nour News, which is close to the SNSC, adopted a more cautious approach in its own October 25 analysis.
It argued that neither withdrawal nor continued membership could guarantee Iran's security and that dissatisfaction with the IAEA did not, by itself, justify abandoning the treaty.
The outlet also warned that withdrawal from the NPT would create further political and diplomatic complications, while remaining in the treaty would still allow Tehran to restrict aspects of its cooperation with the IAEA.
Withdrawal, it concluded, should not be considered without a clear plan for what would follow.
A consequential decision
Leaving the NPT would have implications beyond Iran's relations with the IAEA.
Under Article X of the treaty, a state party may exercise its right to withdraw if it determines that extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme interests. It must give three months' notice to other treaty parties and the UN Security Council, explaining the events behind its decision.
Withdrawal could further complicate Tehran's relations with Western governments and raise questions about the future of international monitoring of its nuclear activities.
Despite the calls from hardline lawmakers and media outlets, Iran has announced no decision to leave the treaty.
The government continues to maintain that its nuclear program is peaceful, and neither the SNSC nor Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has publicly endorsed withdrawal.
The competing arguments underscore a debate within Iran's political establishment: whether abandoning the treaty would strengthen Tehran's position after repeated military attacks or leave it more isolated and vulnerable as regional powers seek a diplomatic settlement.
Iranian lawmakers are reviewing a new internet regulation bill that could expand authorities' powers to restrict online access, raising concerns over further controls after months of nationwide internet shutdowns.
The proposed Cyberspace Regulation Bill is being examined by a parliamentary committee, but its official text remains unpublished, Iranian news outlet Jamaran reported.
Parliament received the proposal on August 3, but lawmakers reviewing it have declined to disclose its provisions.
"A decision has been made not to publicize the details of the Cyberspace Regulation Bill for the time being," Rouhollah Abbaspour, spokesman for the parliamentary committee, said.
An unofficial 12-article draft circulating online resembles the controversial Internet Protection Bill, known as the Sianat plan, which stalled in the previous parliament. However, a committee member told local media that the version under review differs from the circulating text.
Lawmakers divided over restrictions
The proposal has drawn criticism within parliament, with some lawmakers questioning the need for additional controls when international internet access is already heavily restricted.
Mostafa Pourdehghan, a member of parliament's Industries and Mines Committee, criticized repeated attempts to restrict international connectivity and expand domestic alternatives, citing existing filtering, poor internet quality and rising costs.
Pourdehghan warned that further restrictions during wartime could increase public anxiety, particularly among young people, and predicted the bill would meet the same fate as the earlier so-called Protection Plan.
Lawyer warns of sweeping powers
Lawyer Kambiz Norouzi warned that the proposed legislation could give the Supreme Council of Cyberspace extensive authority while weakening government oversight.
In an editorial published by Shargh newspaper, Norouzi criticized Article 1 of the circulating draft, which designates the council as the highest authority for internet policymaking.
Article 6 would also allow internet access to be suspended or restricted on orders from judicial authorities or other competent bodies, without clearly identifying those additional authorities.
"This provision amounts to creating unlimited and unregulated power to violate fundamental freedoms and is certainly unconstitutional and illegitimate," Norouzi wrote.
Norouzi also argued that the bill would concentrate decision-making in an institution whose proceedings are largely closed to public scrutiny.
The official parliamentary text has not been published, leaving uncertainty over whether these provisions appear in the version under review.
Months of shutdowns and previous restrictions
The proposal follows months of internet disruption affecting millions of Iranians.
Authorities imposed a nationwide blackout on January 8, 2026, during anti-government protests. Connectivity was only partially restored before another near-total shutdown began on February 28 following the outbreak of war involving Iran, Israel and the United States.
The second blackout lasted 88 days, with international connectivity beginning to return on May 26.
Restrictions disrupted businesses, education and communications. Iran's Chamber of Commerce estimated direct economic losses at $30 million to $40 million daily, with indirect losses potentially doubling that figure.
The legislation follows years of attempts to expand state control over online communications.
The earlier so-called Protection Plan sought greater oversight of foreign platforms but stalled following public opposition.
In July 2025, President Masoud Pezeshkian's administration also withdrew a separate cyber censorship bill following criticism over its potential impact on free expression.
Authorities have continued developing the National Information Network, which allows selected domestic services to operate independently of international connectivity.
The Supreme Council of Cyberspace, established by former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in 2012, already plays a central role in internet policymaking.
For now, lawmakers remain divided over the proposal's prospects, while the refusal to release its official text has left its scope, legal implications and potential impact on internet access unclear.
Iran's acting oil minister Hamid Bovard is facing questions over his role in recovering billions of dollars in oil revenues and allegations of his brother's involvement in senior appointments, news outlet Rouydad24 reported on Wednesday.
The report follows the resignation of Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad on October 4 and Bovard's appointment as caretaker minister, despite his previous responsibility for overseeing oil operations as managing director of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).
The controversy has intensified following a debate hosted by the Revolutionary Guard-affiliated Fars news agency over billions of dollars in outstanding oil revenues, the performance of Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company and the circumstances surrounding Paknejad's departure.
The debate raised questions about Bovard's appointment as acting oil minister, given his previous responsibility for overseeing oil sales as head of the National Iranian Oil Company, and whether he should also be held accountable for the failure to recover export revenues.
The criticism centres on the failure of intermediaries, commonly known in Iran as trustees, to transfer proceeds from oil exports back to the country.
Reports have put the outstanding revenues at several billion dollars, including an estimated $4.7 billion associated with sales during Paknejad's tenure.
Questions over family influence
Rouydad24 also raised questions about the possible involvement of Bovard's brother, Javad Bovard, in recent management appointments across the oil sector.
The outlet cited unverified reports and rumours suggesting that Javad Bovard may have influenced personnel decisions.
The National Iranian Oil Company has previously denied allegations that family connections were being used to secure business advantages, saying certain contracts dated back to the previous administration.
Among the appointments highlighted was Mohammad Salehi Dolabi's selection as managing director of Oil Exploration Operations Company (OEOC), an upstream oil services company.
Rouydad24 questioned the limited publicly available information about his technical qualifications and previous experience in exploration and drilling, saying the lack of transparency had contributed to concerns over the selection process.
Uncertainty over permanent minister
Bovard's appointment as caretaker minister does not guarantee that he will become the permanent head of the ministry.
Under Article 135 of Iran's constitution, President Masoud Pezeshkian has three months to nominate a replacement minister for parliamentary approval.
Rouydad24 identified several potential candidates, including former economy minister Masoud Karbasian, former minister Mohammad Shariatmadari and former Social Security Organization chief Mostafa Salari.
The report suggested Bovard could face competition from candidates with greater ministerial or managerial experience.
The unresolved oil revenues and questions surrounding senior appointments have placed the ministry's leadership under renewed scrutiny, with the government yet to announce its nominee for the permanent post.
Iran’s budget planners are considering oil at $130 per barrel for the next Iranian year even as the conflict driving global prices higher has severely restricted Tehran’s ability to export crude.
The scenario, reported by the IRGC-linked Fars News Agency, would put the assumed price at more than twice the $55 used in the previous budget and highlights an increasingly difficult calculation for Tehran.
Plan and Budget Organization chief Hamid Pourmohammadi said Sunday that Iran’s Economic Council had approved the directive for drafting the budget for the year 1406, which begins in March 2027, and that the bill would be submitted to parliament within a month.
He did not disclose the baseline oil price the government intends to use. Fars reported separately that the PBO was considering a scenario based on oil reaching $130 per barrel.
An agreement with Washington could ease restrictions on Iranian exports but push global oil prices lower. Continued conflict could keep prices elevated while making Iranian oil even harder to sell.
A $130 scenario
Global oil prices have risen sharply since the war involving Iran, the United States and Israel and the regional conflicts that followed, climbing from around $70 to roughly $117 per barrel.
Some Iranian oil-market commentators say prices could reach $130 if the conflict continues and Tehran and Washington fail to reach an agreement.
But Iranian budgets have traditionally used more conservative oil-price assumptions to reduce the risk of revenues falling short.
Tehran’s Haft-e Sobh newspaper described the $130 figure as a “shock,” while the economic news website Faraz Energy also reported that it was under consideration.
Iran’s ability to sell crude has been severely constrained by the US naval blockade and sanctions. The higher global price therefore does not necessarily translate into higher revenues for Tehran.
Disputed export figures
Iranian officials insist that oil continues to leave the country despite US efforts to stop exports.
Mohsen Zanganeh, a member of parliament’s Planning and Budget Committee, said Iran earned more than $11.5 billion from oil during the first four months of the year and achieved 85% of its projected oil revenue.
He also claimed that Iran continued to export at least 600,000 barrels of crude per day despite the blockade and sanctions.
The US military’s Central Command presents a sharply different picture, saying its blockade of Iranian ports has prevented at least $25 billion in crude exports and that no goods other than humanitarian supplies have moved by sea.
The competing claims from parties to the conflict have not been independently verified.
Iran’s oil infrastructure has also suffered serious damage during the war, while the government has resorted to rationing and other austerity measures to curb domestic energy consumption.
Risk of a shortfall
Hossein Selahvarzi, a former head of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce, warned in comments published by the economic daily Donya-ye Eghtesad that the greatest danger would be to prepare the 1406 budget as though Iran were facing a normal year.
Such an approach, he argued, could combine optimistic revenue forecasts with existing spending commitments, producing a deficit that would fuel inflation and discourage investment.
The uncertainty surrounding both prices and export volumes makes the eventual assumptions particularly important.
If $130 becomes the government’s baseline rather than merely one scenario, and either prices or export volumes fall short, Tehran would have to find other ways to close the revenue gap.
Those could include borrowing from the National Development Fund, selling government bonds or relying indirectly on financing from the Central Bank—measures that could add to inflationary pressure and further weaken the rial.
The government has yet to disclose which oil price or export volume it will ultimately use. But the $130 scenario illustrates the unusual calculation facing Tehran: the conflict that has made oil more valuable has also made Iran’s considerably harder to sell.
A visit to Tehran by senior Saudi, Turkish and Pakistani officials has exposed divisions among Iranian commentators, with some hailing it as recognition of Iran's influence and others warning that the visitors may be seeking concessions over Yemen and in talks with Washington.
The four-way meeting ended with a cautious statement committing the participants to continued dialogue on regional peace and security, without announcing specific agreements on the war involving Iran, the United States and Israel, the Strait of Hormuz or Iran's nuclear program.
Reuters reported, citing a Pakistani official, that Pakistan's army chief, Asim Munir, had presented Tehran with a proposal to end hostilities that had the approval of US President Donald Trump.
According to the official cited by Reuters, Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar would act as guarantors if Iran accepted the proposal.
The prospect of regional powers helping broker an agreement has raised a question among Iranian commentators: whether the visitors came to offer Tehran a way out of the confrontation or to press it into concessions.
Recognition or pressure?
The state-run Iran newspaper chose the headline "Without Iran, Never" for its Tuesday report on the meeting, arguing that the presence of senior officials from three major regional powers demonstrated that no regional security order could be established without Tehran.
Abdollah Ganji, a hardline commentator and former editor of the IRGC-affiliated Javan newspaper, went further, describing Iran as the center of an emerging regional security arrangement.
"Iran is the axis of security creation in West Asia," he wrote on X, adding that a new "anti-Zionist bloc" was taking shape.
Former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif proposed a broader West Asian security network based on non-aggression, confidence-building and shared prosperity.
"Regional security cannot be imported; it must be built together by the people of this region," he wrote.
But many hardliners were considerably less enthusiastic.
"It is far too early to judge the results of this meeting, but it does not seem that trust has replaced mistrust or cooperation has replaced competition," hardline commentator Mostafa Najafi wrote on X.
"In today's Middle East, meetings are more about managing crises and tensions, or avoiding their consequences, than resolving them."
Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, a former chairman of parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, argued that Yemen remained a more immediate concern for the visiting countries than Iran's confrontation with Washington.
"As long as the Yemen issue remains unresolved, the Iran issue will not be put on the agenda," he told Khabar Online.
Yemen at the heart of the mistrust
The Houthis' attacks on Saudi Arabia and regional shipping have made Yemen a major security concern for Riyadh. But Tehran's relationship with the group is also regarded by hardliners as an important source of Iranian influence.
Hossein Shariatmadari, managing editor of the hardline Kayhan newspaper, questioned the purpose of the meeting in a commentary titled "Tehran Summit: Water or Mirage?"
He warned that cooperation with countries involved in the Mecca defense pact could lead to pressure on Iran to distance itself from the Houthis, insisting that Tehran would not abandon the group.
Hardline lawmaker Mahmoud Nabavian portrayed Saudi Arabia's difficulties in confronting the Houthis as a reason for Riyadh's participation in the talks.
"Let the Saudis know that as long as the unjust blockade against the oppressed people of Yemen continues, Ansar Allah's attacks will continue, and assistance from other countries will be of no benefit to them," he wrote on X, using the Houthis' official name.
Hardline journalist Fereshteh Sadeghi was equally suspicious, interpreting the visit as an attempt to warn Tehran over Yemen.
"Iran would have to be foolish to accept their words and warnings," she wrote, arguing that the Houthis would continue acting independently even if Tehran came under pressure.
The disagreement illustrates a central obstacle to regional diplomacy: measures Saudi Arabia might seek to protect itself from Houthi attacks could be viewed by Iranian hardliners as concessions that undermine Tehran's regional influence.
Can regional powers guarantee a deal?
Beyond Yemen, the meeting has also prompted debate over whether Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan and Qatar could help provide assurances against another US or Israeli attack on Iran.
Tehran has sought guarantees that any agreement with Washington would prevent renewed hostilities, an issue that has become central to discussions about reviving diplomacy.
Maryam Salari, diplomatic editor of the state-run Iran newspaper, argued that the possibility of regional guarantees showed that the principal issue was no longer simply what Iran might concede over its nuclear program.
"The question is not whether Iran should make concessions on the nuclear issue now," she wrote. "It is what guarantee there is that war will not break out again if it makes concessions."
She suggested that the visiting officials had come to Tehran to address that concern.
Reformist journalist Farid Modarresi also saw an opportunity for diplomacy, arguing that Saudi Arabia and Turkey could bring greater regional influence to mediation efforts previously led by Pakistan and Qatar.
But the contrasting reactions among Iranian hardliners show how difficult that effort could prove.
For some Iranian hardliners, the visit signals recognition of Tehran's regional influence. For others, it raises the prospect of being asked to surrender some of that influence in exchange for peace.
