Why were ‘Baal’ statues burned at Iran’s revolution anniversary rallies?

UN spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric told Iran International that the message, sent on Iran’s national day, followed a decades-long protocol applied uniformly to all UN member states.

According to the spokesperson’s office, each country receives an identically worded letter on its national day. The messages are prepared in advance and do not signal any shift in the United Nations’ position toward a particular government.

“The letter should not be interpreted by anyone who receives it as an endorsement of whatever policies that government may be putting in place,” Dujarric said during the UN’s daily noon briefing.

The clarification came as Iran faces renewed scrutiny over crackdowns, arrests and reports of repression.

In recent weeks, families across the country have mourned losses, while human rights groups have documented detentions and what they describe as heavy-handed security measures.

News of the letter triggered backlash from activists and members of the Iranian diaspora, who argued that even if the message followed established administrative practice, its timing appeared insensitive given the political tension and public grief inside Iran.

They said the congratulatory tone risked being seen as disconnected from the reality faced by many Iranians demanding accountability and political change.

State-affiliated media in Iran widely amplified the letter, portraying it as a sign of international legitimacy. The coverage further fueled criticism from those who say such messaging can be instrumentalized for domestic political purposes.

The United Nations has repeatedly raised concerns about Iran’s human rights record, including through reports by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and discussions at the Human Rights Council and General Assembly.

UN officials maintain that diplomatic protocol operates separately from the organization’s human rights monitoring mechanisms.

Still, the episode underscores the tension between institutional diplomatic practice and the sensitivities surrounding governments facing sustained domestic unrest and international criticism.

This keeps it firmly in straight news territory, sharpens the opening, clarifies the backlash, and tightens the language without shifting tone.

The signals of flexibility were buried beneath the usual chants of defiance and confrontational theatrics at the annual rally marking the foundation of the Islamic Republic. Coffins bearing photos of US officials were paraded through the streets. An effigy of Jeffrey Epstein was set on fire.

The messaging unfolded as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met President Donald Trump at the White House—a meeting that could reinforce calls in Washington for a harder line on Tehran.

Two dozen Western reporters were in Tehran. Some appeared delighted to meet Iranian schoolchildren speaking fluent English; others were charmed by Persian cuisine and elderly men eager to shake hands. Few seemed inclined to recall that, just four weeks earlier, thousands of protesters had reportedly been killed in those same streets.

Away from the orchestrated celebrations and from the state-approved “fixers” guiding journalists through carefully staged displays of loyalty, senior officials blended familiar defiance with cautious hints of compromise.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said Iran was ready for talks about the level of enrichment and even the extent of its stockpile of enriched uranium.

“If the negotiations are meant to bear results, there needs to be some kind of compromise,” he added, acknowledging that “this is the difficult part of the job.”

Ali Larijani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, struck a similarly measured tone, telling Al Jazeera that talks in Oman had been positive while reiterating Tehran’s position that conflicts with Washington’s demand for stricter limits.

“There is no talk of zeroing out enrichment,” he said. “We need it in the fields of energy and pharmaceutical manufacturing.”

The comments followed Larijani’s visits to Oman and Qatar, where he reportedly delivered a red folder that some analysts suggested could contain Khamenei’s response to a message from President Trump.

Photographs show him handing a letter to the Sultan of Oman and later presenting a red envelope in Doha, despite aides’ denials that any formal message was conveyed.

In an interview with Oman’s state television, Larijani offered an unusually restrained assessment of US policy, saying Washington’s framework “has become more realistic.”

Whether these tonal shifts signal a durable change in Iran’s messaging or a tactical adjustment on a symbolic day remains unclear.

Another unusual development added to the speculation. For decades, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has marked the anniversary by meeting a delegation of Iranian Air Force officers, echoing a similar gathering with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979.

This year, he skipped the meeting and instead sent the officers to pay their respects to Hassan Khomeini, the founder’s grandson and presumed heir—a gesture that reignited the never-ending whispers of succession.

The annual commemoration of the 1979 Islamic Revolution has long served as a showcase of mass loyalty. This year, however, it unfolded under the shadow of what critics describe as a deepening crisis of legitimacy following the January bloodshed.

In Tehran, security forces and Basij units maintained a visible presence as supporters gathered in Azadi Square. State media broadcast images of families and children waving flags, and highlighted what it portrayed as festive participation across the country.

Among the more striking displays were symbolic coffins bearing the names and photos of senior US military officials, including US Army Chief of Staff Randy George and CENTCOM Commander Brad Cooper. Cooper was part of the US delegation that recently held talks with Iranian officials in Oman.

American and Israeli flags were also burned during the rally.

The imagery of defiance came as Iranian officials engage in renewed diplomatic contacts with the United States. The juxtaposition reflected a dual message: confrontation abroad and consolidation at home.

President Masoud Pezeshkian, addressing the rally, repeated the government’s narrative about the recent unrest, accusing protesters of sabotage and violence and saying “no Iranian takes up arms to kill another Iranian.”

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He acknowledged widespread dissatisfaction but said the government was prepared to “hear the voice of the people,” while emphasizing loyalty to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and adherence to his “red lines” in diplomacy, a tacit reference to Iran’s uranium enrichment, missile program and support for regional militia groups.

State television placed particular emphasis on images of children and families at the rallies, a move that analysts say may reflect efforts to soften the government’s image after weeks of reports about civilian casualties.

Rights advocates have long criticized the use of minors in political events, arguing that it instrumentalizes children for propaganda purposes.

The commemorations took place roughly a month after a violent suppression of protests that erupted in late December.

The editorial board of Iran International said earlier this month that more than 36,500 people had been killed in a targeted crackdown ordered by Khamenei.

Even as the government staged its anniversary spectacle, dissent surfaced in other forms. On the eve of 22 Bahman, residents in multiple neighborhoods of Tehran – including Narmak, Ekbatan, Majidieh and Naziabad – shouted slogans such as “Death to Khamenei” and “Death to the dictator” from rooftops and balconies. Similar chants were reported in cities including Mashhad, Arak, Qazvin, Kermanshah and Shahriar.

Videos circulating online showed nighttime fireworks lighting the sky as anti-government slogans rang out.

In one clip from Arak, residents could be heard chanting against Khamenei in response to mosque loudspeakers broadcasting the traditional “Allahu Akbar.”

In Tehran, one resident said the fireworks were so loud “we thought America had attacked.”

In isolated incidents, pro-government speakers appeared to inadvertently repeat anti-Khamenei slogans during live broadcasts, prompting abrupt cuts in coverage.

One state reporter in Sistan and Baluchestan was heard listing “Death to Khamenei” among rally chants before the feed was interrupted.

Political analyst Iman Aghayari told Iran International that the anniversary had become “an arena of confrontation between the government and the people,” adding that unlike in previous years, authorities seemed less concerned with demonstrating broad public backing and more focused on asserting control.

“This time,” he said, “the regime is not trying to prove people are with it. It is simply declaring that it rules.”

As Iran navigates renewed diplomacy abroad and mounting pressure at home, the 22 Bahman (February 11) anniversary appeared to reflect a widening gap between official displays of unity and the anger that continues to surface beyond the state’s stage-managed events.

The report released on Monday, titled “Tightening the Net: China’s Infrastructure of Oppression in Iran,” traces cooperation dating back to at least 2010 and says Chinese firms supplied or supported equipment and know-how used for internet filtering, deep packet inspection, centralized traffic management, and mass surveillance.

It named companies including ZTE, Huawei, Tiandy, and Hikvision, and describes how Iran built out a tightly controlled “National Information Network” designed to function as a domestic intranet while progressively limiting access to the open, global internet.

“In its pursuit of total control over the digital space, Iran borrows directly from the Chinese digital authoritarian playbook,” Michael Caster, head of ARTICLE 19’s China program, said in the report.

The organization said Tehran’s embrace of Beijing’s “cyber sovereignty” concept – the idea that governments should have near-total authority over online information flows within their borders – has helped normalize censorship and surveillance in international forums.

“Emulating China’s infrastructure of oppression helps Iran entrench power, sidestepping accountability and exercising full control over the information environment. That way, dissent is not just silenced, it is prevented from ever surfacing,” said Mo Hoseini, the head of the group’s Resilience department said.

ARTICLE 19 said the technology and institutional alignment have become more visible during major crackdowns, including the recent wave of protests that began late December.

The group said authorities responded with widespread violence and arrests, and then escalated to nationwide network interference on January 8, 2026, followed by broad disruption of internet, phone, and mobile networks by January 11, cutting off communications as security forces moved to suppress dissent.

The report said the latest blackout showed a level of centralized control that reached beyond social media and messaging, affecting essential services including banking, healthcare, and emergency response.

It added that Iran has repeatedly used shutdowns during earlier periods of unrest, including during the 2022 “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests and demonstrations in 2019-2020, but argued the 2026 disruption was broader and more aggressively enforced than previous episodes.

ARTICLE 19 said Iran also intensified efforts to restrict satellite connectivity. It said Starlink traffic was heavily disrupted during the crackdown and that the sophistication of the disruption suggested military-grade capabilities.

The report said authorities also seized satellite equipment door-to-door and imposed harsh penalties under a 2025 law criminalizing the possession of satellite internet terminals.

While the group said China’s direct role in the specific Starlink disruption was not confirmed, it argued that Chinese assistance has been central to the foundations of Iran’s internet control architecture, and that Beijing continues to provide a template for the state’s approach to “digital authoritarianism.”

The report describes Iran’s Supreme Council of Cyberspace – established in 2012 and chaired by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei – as structurally similar to China’s Cyberspace Administration of China, with both bodies overseeing centralized filtering, restrictions on foreign platforms, and the expansion of state-approved domestic alternatives.

It said Iran’s National Information Network increasingly mirrors features associated with China’s “Great Firewall,” including embedded surveillance and mechanisms to compel service providers to share data or throttle traffic.

The organization said the spread of surveillance and censorship tools risks entrenching repression inside Iran while eroding broader norms of internet freedom.

It also called for stronger export controls and sanctions enforcement targeting suppliers of surveillance and filtering technologies, greater corporate transparency, and increased support for secure circumvention tools and resilient connectivity options for Iranians during shutdowns.

The detentions, which have targeted senior members of the Reform Front of Iran and figures associated with President Masoud Pezeshkian, come as the Islamic Republic remains shaken by the deadliest crackdown in its history.

The protests, which gained momentum after a call by exiled Prince Reza Pahlavi, were crushed by the Islamic Republic’s live fire, leading to the massacre of at least 36,500 people.

The arrests also come at a time when Tehran’s theocracy is deeply uncertain about the trajectory of diplomacy with Washington.

Officials have framed the arrests as a response to “coordination with enemy propaganda” and efforts to undermine national cohesion—language that signals heightened sensitivity to any challenge to the state’s narrative at a time of external pressure.

With talks with the United States back on track, Iran’s leadership appears intent on closing ranks at home, moving to eliminate deviations from the official line, particularly among figures who until recently were tolerated as part of a tightly managed political spectrum.

Public statements by judicial and security bodies have offered little ambiguity. Those detained have been accused of promoting “surrenderism” toward the United States and acting in the interests of Israel.

The hardline daily Kayhan, whose editor is appointed by the supreme leader, described those arrested as extremists who had aligned themselves with “overthrowists,” effectively placing even moderate critics beyond the pale.

The detainees

Those detained include senior figures from the Reform Front and its largest constituent party, the Union of Islamic Iran People Party. Among them are Azar Mansouri, head of the Reform Front; Javad Emam, its spokesman; former diplomat Mohsen Aminzadeh; and the veteran politician Ebrahim , the leader of radical students who stormed the US embassy in 1980.

One case appears to reflect a clearer red line.

An audio recording that circulated online captured remarks by Ali Shakouri-Rad, a senior party figure, who rejected the official account of the recent protests and accused security forces of manufacturing violence.

“Security institutions in Iran, in every protest, have injected violence to use it as a pretext for repression,” he said. “It has been like this from the beginning, and it has gotten worse day by day.”

Yet for much of Iranian society—still grieving the mass killing of protesters in January—this confrontation within the political elite has the feel of an argument unfolding in a parallel universe.

The protests, which began over economic hardship and rapidly escalated into nationwide calls for the overthrow of the Islamic Republic, were met with overwhelming force. Tens of thousands were killed in a matter of days, according to internal assessments reviewed by Iran International.

In the aftermath, Pezeshkian and the moderate camp from which he emerged broadly aligned themselves with the state’s narrative, avoiding public confrontation with the security establishment.

That alignment proved decisive. For many Iranians, Pezeshkian’s election in 2024 represented a final, tentative wager on incremental change from within the system. His conduct during and after the crackdown extinguished that hope.

Against that backdrop, the latest arrests appear less a dramatic rupture than a belated narrowing of a political space that had already collapsed in the public mind.

The exception lies with a small group of activists who crossed a line the system still treats as inviolable. Several of those detained were linked to a January 2 statement signed by 17 political and civil figures declaring the Islamic Republic illegitimate and calling for a peaceful transition of power.

Unlike most reformist figures, the signatories explicitly rejected the framework of the existing order, underscoring where the authorities continue to draw their true red lines.

Figures associated with the 2009 Green Movement have also been swept up, including advisers and relatives of its leaders, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi. Mousavi, under house arrest for more than a decade, recently described the killing of protesters as a “black page in Iran’s history” and called on leaders to step aside.

As negotiations with the United States resume amid warnings of war, the leadership is signaling that internal discipline will take precedence over political pluralism — even of the carefully managed kind once associated with reformism.

For most Iranians outside the corridors of power, however, the arrests change little. Few still see themselves reflected in the state’s internal disputes.