Persian poet and scholar Omar Khayyam's mausoleum in Neyshabur, Iran
A hardline cleric’s call to demolish the monument of Persian poet and scientist Omar Khayyam sparked widespread backlash this week, with many seeing it as an assault on Iran’s national identity by religious hardliners.
The controversy erupted after a preacher, identified only by his last name, Robati, claimed in a sermon that Khayyam’s monument was deliberately built to overshadow an adjacent Shia shrine where he was speaking. His comments came just a day after large crowds gathered at the mausoleum in Neyshabur on March 21 to celebrate Nowruz, the Persian New Year. Some in the crowd also chanted anti-government and pro-monarchy slogans in favor of the last ruling dynasty, including “Reza Shah, bless your soul.”
The cleric was initially mistaken for the Friday prayer leader of Neyshabur, but later reports clarified that he was a local preacher speaking at the shrine of 9th-century Shia saint Muhammad ibn-e Husayn, known as Emamzadeh Mahruq.
The remarks sparked swift condemnations, with critics accusing hardliners of attempting to erase Iran’s historical and cultural heritage. “Destroying historical memory by demolishing national symbols is one of the most dangerous and costly acts of ignorance that threaten a country’s national security,” wrote academic and political analyst Mehdi Motaharnia on X.
Shrine of Imamzadeh Mahruq, Neyshabur, Iran
Amid the growing backlash, several government officials, including the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance Abbas Salehi, the President’s Executive Deputy Jafar Ghaempanah, and prominent reformist politician Azar Mansoori, criticized the attack on national symbols and warned about its consequences.
“Juxtaposing religious symbols with Iran’s national and historical heritage, whoever it benefits, is a massive mistake,” Mansoori posted on X.
Khayyam is celebrated not only for his philosophical quatrains (rubaʿiyat), remarkably secular for their time, but also for his contributions to mathematics, astronomy, and the development of the Jalali calendar, which remains Iran’s official calendar. His poetry, popularized in the West through Edward FitzGerald’s 19th-century translations, has earned him global recognition, while his scientific achievements have left a lasting impact. In Iran, his legacy is deeply ingrained in the culture, with many knowing at least a few of his verses by heart.
Thousands of Iranians flocked to the monuments of Iran's national poets Omar Khayyam in Neyshabur, Ferdowsi in Mashhad, and Hafiz in Shiraz, as well as historical sites such as Persepolis, on March 21 to celebrate the Persian New Year with music and dancing. At some gatherings, people also chanted anti-government slogans.
In the wake of the Nowruz celebrations, authorities in Khorasan-e Razavi Province shut down the mausoleums of both Khayyam and Ferdowsi, Iran’s other literary giant, citing the coincidence with Shia mourning days.
There was a dispute over the boundaries of Khayyam’s mausoleum and the adjacent shrine between the Religious Endowments Organization and the Cultural Heritage Organization for several decades.
The current monument, designed by renowned architect Hooshang Seyhoun, was inaugurated in the 1960s under the Shah. Khayyam was originally buried in a small structure beside the shrine in 1131, his bones were exhumed and reburied in the new monument built at a distance from the shrine.
The Shia shrine is several centuries old. An older shrine on the site is believed to have been destroyed during the Mogul invasion of Iran in the 13th century. The current building is believed to be from the 16th century. Many additions, including the tile work, date from later periods.
A senior adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader urges the government to cede more economic control to the people, arguing that this is necessary to address sanctions, soaring inflation, and a rapidly depreciating currency.
By some estimates, 80% of Iran’s economy is controlled directly and indirectly by the state or affiliated religious foundations operating under Ali Khamenei’s orders.
Ali Larijani, a senior adviser to Khamenei, told the Eco Iran website that “what Iran’s economy needs is security, and that does not mean control by security institutions,” a clear jab at the influence of the IRGC and other forces.
Criticizing the involvement of security organizations in the economy, Larijani, a former parliamentary speaker, said Iran’s economy should be controlled by the people rather than the government. He also called for administrative reforms, global engagement, and resolving Iran’s nuclear issue through dialogue.
Larijani emphasized that "the government controls some 85 percent of Iran's industries and mines," but argued that it lacks the efficiency to manage these sectors effectively.
He also stressed the need for the government to ensure security for the private sector by passing relevant laws and persuading the Supreme Leader to support the move.
Speaking on Iran's foreign policy and negotiations with the United States, Larijani stated, "If the Americans had acted wisely, they could have changed the course of Washington's relationship with Tehran." He argued that US sanctions have hindered Iran’s economic development, emphasizing that economic prosperity is unattainable under such restrictions.
Washington imposed oil export and international banking sanctions on Iran after President Donald Trump withdrew from the JCPOA nuclear deal in 2018. Iran’s already struggling economy, burdened by inefficiencies, immediately sank into a prolonged recession, while its currency depreciated 25-fold.
Regarding the future of nuclear negotiations, Larijani stated, "Everything depends on US behavior. There is a gap between what the United States declares and what it actually does." He also emphasized that Iran should pursue its national interests in both the East and the West.
Meanwhile, in an interview with a Tehran-based website, Iranian economist Ali Ghanbari, addressing the current financial crisis, noted that some Iranian politicians appear to overlook the fundamental principle that every country must prioritize its own national interests.
Ghanbari stated, "Realistically speaking, it is unlikely that the country's economic situation—regarding inflation, poverty, and unemployment—will improve significantly compared to last year, as Iran's economy remains constrained by structural issues in foreign policy that are beyond the government's control."
The economist added, "We cannot expect any improvement in the country's economic situation as long as sanctions pressure continues." He noted that this is in addition to the broader issue of insufficient domestic and foreign investment in Iran.
Ghanbari stressed that the defining characteristic of Iran's economic policy is "confusion," a problem that has become even more evident following the impeachment and dismissal of the former Minister of Economy.
As a way forward, Ghanbari suggested that Iran should abandon the idea of indirect talks and engage in direct negotiations with the United States, arguing that intermediaries only complicate the process.
He also urged the government to prioritize its employees to safeguard its social capital. At the same time, he emphasized that if Iran is serious about easing tensions and sanctions in the coming year, it must carefully select its strategic partners, a veiled reference to Tehran’s preference for close ties with China and Russia.
While both Larijani and Ghanbari emphasized the need to address foreign policy challenges to resolve Iran’s economic woes, analyst Hamid Aboutalebi suggested that a new path for dialogue with the United States may have emerged. Writing on the conservative Nameh News website in Tehran, he pointed to recent conciliatory remarks by Trump’s Middle East adviser, Steve Witkoff, as a potential opening.
Aboutalebi further argued that the Iranian government should move away from propaganda campaigns against Washington and pursue direct negotiations to de-escalate tensions.
Reverence for the Shi'ite messiah, or Mahdi, has played a central yet contested role in Iran’s Islamic theocracy—bolstering the legitimacy of its two leaders while also fueling subtle power plays by hardline zealots.
Iran’s system of clerical rule broadly considers the Supreme Leader to be the representative of the Mahdi, the twelfth Imam in Shi'ite Islam, who is destined to return and rule over a period of divinely-inspired justice just ahead of the end times.
The Islamic governance theory developed and institutionalized by the founder of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, is based on the belief that a paramount Islamic scholar (Vali-ye Faqih) should lead the country with ultimate authority over state and religious affairs.
A major early critic of this view was the Hojjatiyeh Society, originally a Mahdist faction animated by contempt for the Baha'i religious minority in the run-up to the 1979 Revolution.
Khomeini later banned the group for opposing political involvement and theocratic rule. Although officially dissolved in 1983, its influence persists within certain conservative religious circles, where some followers argue that only the Mahdi himself can usher in true Islamic rule and a period of chaos will precede his return.
What is Mahdism and who is Mahdi?
Mahdism is the belief in the second coming of Imam Mahdi, a messianic figure in Islamic eschatology, especially in Twelver Shi'ite Islam.
Born in 868 CE, Mahdi is believed to have gone into occultation at the age of six after his father, the Eleventh Imam, was allegedly poisoned on the orders of the Sunni Abbasid ruler.
According to Twelver Shi'ite doctrine that is Iran's official religion, he communicated with his followers through four deputies until 941 CE, after which no direct contact has occurred. He is expected to reappear at the end of times to establish justice, defeat tyranny, and bring global peace under Islamic rule.
In contrast, most Sunni sects believe the Mahdi is a righteous leader from the Prophet Muhammad’s family who will appear before the Day of Judgment to restore justice and uphold Islam. Unlike Shi'ite beliefs, Sunnis do not consider him infallible or divinely appointed.
The Politicization of Mahdism
While various factions within the Islamic Republic acknowledge Mahdism, some have politicized and institutionalized it, elevating it to a cult-like ideology.
The now ostracized ‘Ahmadinejad Circle’, ultra-hardline Paydari (Steadfastness) Party, and its ally, Jebhe-ye Sobh-e Iran (MASAF), are the most influential among the political groups that promote Mahdism as a political ideology.
Former Tehran mayor and perhaps Iran's most strident critic of the West as president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made frequent references to the Mahdi while in office. Out of favor with Khamenei, he now never appears alongside him.
These factions wield significant influence within the Revolutionary Guards and its Basij militia, state-funded Shi'ite seminaries, and numerous governmental institutions.
The groups emerged from the circle of the followers of the late Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, a radical cleric who strongly emphasized Mahdism and theocratic rule.
Mesbah-Yazdi initially supported Ahmadinejad but later withdrew his backing due to conflicts with Supreme Leader Khamenei. This led to a split, with Ahmadinejad’s supporters forming their distinct brand of Mahdism.
Many consider ultra-hardliner Ayatollah Mohammad-Mehdi Mirbagheri, who endorsed ultra-hardliner Saeed Jalili in last year’s snap elections, as Mesbah-Yazdi’s successor. Mirbagheri teaches that fighting and overcoming infidels is a prerequisite for the return of the hidden Imam.
Ahmadinejad’s Mahdist agenda
During his 2005–2013 presidency, Ahmadinejad and his allies strongly promoted Mahdism, often hinting at having a direct connection with the Mahdi.
His administration allocated substantial funds for Mahdist propaganda and policies aimed at hastening Mahdi’s return.
Ahmadinejad’s government also significantly expanded the Jamkaran Mosque, a small historical site near Qom associated with Mahdist traditions.
Since the late 1990s, Jamkaran has evolved into a grand complex and a major pilgrimage destination, symbolizing the Islamic Republic’s ideological commitment to Mahdism.
Some religious scholars have debated the historical legitimacy of Jamkaran's connection to Mahdi, but Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has visited Jamkaran Mosque multiple times, effectively giving it his official blessing.
Hardline-dominated clerical institutions and the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) actively encourage visits to Jamkaran.
In September 2024, Iran’s armed forces held a joint ceremonial morning assembly at the mosque to renew their allegiance to Mahdi on the anniversary of his assumed leadership as the Twelfth Imam. The IRGC Commander-in-Chief, Hossein Salami, addressed the ceremony.
Mahdism and modern geopolitical conflicts
Political hardliners and the Ahmadinejad Circle often view modern geopolitical conflicts in the Middle East region through an eschatological lens.
In Shi'ite beliefs on the end times, certain events and conflicts in Syria and Yemen are believed to be signs preceding the emergence of Imam Mahdi from occultation.
These prophecies are derived from hadiths or sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad and the Imams, including the prophesies of the rise of a tyrannical and brutal leader in Damascus (Sufyani) and his invasion of Iraq and a righteous leader (Yamani) who emerges in Yemen and supports Mahdi.
A prominent political commentator in Tehran has suggested that the best way for Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to break the current deadlock is to hold a national referendum on the question of war or peace with the United States.
In two speeches delivered in the opening days of Nowruz, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appeared to indirectly respond to US President Donald Trump's letter proposing a new deal.
In his first address, a pre-recorded message aired on state television, Khamenei blamed the United States for instability in the region. In the second, delivered live, he denied commanding Iran’s regional proxy forces but warned Washington of a strong response to its military actions in the region.
Tehran has yet to issue an official response to Trump’s letter, as few details of its contents have been made public. In a New Year’s Eve interview with state TV, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said the letter included “many threats and a few opportunities.” He added that Tehran is still evaluating the message. Meanwhile, US media reported that Trump gave the ayatollah two months to consider before replying.
Perhaps in an attempt to ease the pressure on Khamenei, Reformist commentator Ahmad Zeidabadi suggested in a tweet that the Islamic Republic should hold a referendum to determine the will of the people.
Given the widespread concerns expressed on social media and in call-ins to Persian-language TV channels based in Europe and the United States, it's clear that the economy—and its impact on daily life—is the top priority for most Iranians. It would not be difficult to predict the likely outcome of such a referendum.
Iranian political commentator, Ahmad Zeidabadi
In a post on X, Ahmad Zeidabadi wrote that Iran has two months to choose between war and an agreement with the United States. “Tehran must make a decision while its officials are unprepared for either option,” he said, adding, “They believe an agreement would bring humiliation, while a war could be devastating. Hence, the indecision.”
Zeidabadi warned that some are exploring a so-called third path—one that could ultimately lead to both humiliation and destruction. He noted that the current situation was foreseeable and, in fact, some politicians had predicted it, but their warnings went unheeded.
He also pointed out that while referenda are mentioned in Article 59 of Iran’s Constitution as tools to resolve difficult political, economic, social, and cultural issues, they have never been clearly defined or seriously pursued within the Islamic Republic’s framework.
Khamenei, however, has consistently rejected the idea of holding a referendum on any issue, dismissing proposals even from well-wishers like former presidents Hassan Rouhani and Mohammad Khatami on multiple occasions.
Yet, a referendum could offer him a way to resolve the current impasse—allowing him to shift the burden of any potential compromise with the United States onto the people. Still, many who commented on Zeidabadi’s post on X argued that no meaningful referendum is possible under current conditions. They noted that without a free press, functioning political parties, and open public debate, a genuine vote would be impossible. They also called for an end to the imprisonment of political activists, the unblocking of social media platforms, and guarantees for freedom of expression and assembly as prerequisites for any credible referendum.
Some analysts believe the mix of threats and defiance in Khamenei’s recent speeches suggests he is thinking aloud, searching for a way out of the current impasse. As he acknowledged in his first address, Iran’s main challenge is its struggling economy, severely weakened by US sanctions. While he is unwilling to appear submissive to his archenemy, America, the only viable path to economic relief may lie in accepting Trump’s conditions—an option that would be especially difficult for a leader known for his uncompromising stance.
Others pointed out that the government has consistently ignored public opinion in the past and holding a referendum now would be shifting responsibility onto the people for any potential compromise. Some expressed skepticism that even after a referendum, the Iranian government would truly respect the people’s will.
One commenter remarked that, as usual, Iranians would be left choosing between “bad and worse.” Still, some speculated that Zeidabadi may be hoping a referendum would give like-minded reformists an opportunity to participate more freely in the political process.
Iran’s health system faces an uphill battle filling vacancies, the country's medical regulatory body warned on Monday, citing shortages of doctors and nurses as the most pressing challenge in the year ahead.
“The three main challenges in the new year will be staffing, financing, and supplies,” the spokesman for the Iranian Medical Council Reza Laripous said, according to state-affiliated news agency ILNA .
Healthcare cannot function without trained workforce, Laripour warned, no matter how many new hospitals are built or expensive equipment brought in.
“Personnel—especially physicians and nurses—are the core users of medical resources and thebackbone of effective care,” he said.
The Iranian government strictly regulates medical fees and annually announces chargeable rates for private general practitioners, specialists, and dentists.
In early April, for instance, doctor's fees for general practitioners and specialists were set at 1.26 million rials ($20) and 1.89 million rials ($30), respectively, for the next twelve months. The medical community argues that these tariffs for medical services do not align with inflation and has strongly objected to them.
Since August, nurses in dozens of cities across Iran have been staging ongoing protests againstharsh working conditions and the government’s failure to pay wages consistently.
Laripour cited unfair tariffs, heavy workloads, and unequal resource distribution as key drivers behind dissatisfaction, leading many to leave their profession.
These pressures, he added, could push skilled staff to leave Iran or shift away from clinical work altogether.
He called for urgent government intervention, including better funding and attention to both thenumber and variety of healthcare professionals.
Without meaningful action, he said, rising inflation and poor economic planning will make it “irrational to expect effective care under current tariff structures,” leaving both providers and patients to bear the costs.
Iranian medical have repeatedly warned in the past few years about the inevitable deterioration of the healthcare system and its possible collapse if the same trends continue.
Government officials have never offered concrete figures on the number of doctors, midwives, and nurses who have left the country for better jobs in neighboring countries including the United Arab Emirates and Oman, as well as elsewhere in the world.
Steve Witkoff’s suggestion that he or another member of President Donald Trump’s team could potentially visit Iran for talks has received widespread coverage in Iranian online media.
At the end of an interview with Tucker Carlson on Friday, President Trump’s special envoy to the Middle East expressed hope that he or someone else from the administration might visit Tehran, as Carlson had suggested. Witkoff acknowledged the complexity of the Iran issue due to its nuclear dimension and the need for technical expertise. “I’m going to welcome that opportunity if I’m involved,” he stated.
So far, there has been no official Iranian reaction to Witkoff’s remarks. However, Nour News, a media outlet close to Iran's Supreme National Security Council, said in a tweet in English on Sunday that Witkoff’s tone “won’t clear up misunderstandings as no behavioral changes have occurred,” referring to US policies toward the Islamic Republic. Nour News added that the US is still pursuing talks while exerting pressure on Tehran. “If Washington wants a new nuclear verification process, it must first present real evidence of Iran's intent to obtain nukes!”
The lack of more commentary in online publications may be due to limited resources during the Nowruz holidays. Some public figures, however, have also commented on the interview via social media, where high engagement suggests significant public interest.
Throughout the lengthy interview, Witkoff reiterated that President Trump was open to negotiating a resolution with Iran, allowing the country to reintegrate into the global economy without the burden of sanctions. He emphasized Trump’s preference for diplomacy over military action and suggested that a verification program could be established to ensure Iran’s nuclear program remains peaceful.
Speaking on Fox News on Sunday, Witkoff reinforced the administration’s message to Iran, urging diplomatic engagement to resolve ongoing tensions. “And if we can't, the alternative is not a great alternative,” he warned, stressing that the U.S. would not allow Iran to develop nuclear weapons.
Diverging perspectives within the Trump administration
Witkoff’s remarks—particularly his focus on controlling Iran’s nuclear program through verification—contrast with statements from President Trump and other senior officials, who have called for the complete dismantling of Tehran’s nuclear program. White House National Security Advisor Michael Waltz reiterated on Sunday that the Trump administration seeks the full dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program in a transparent manner that satisfies the international community.
Reactions from Iranian figures
“Dear friends in the Foreign Ministry, Witkoff has expressed interest in visiting Iran!” wrote Nosratolah Tajik, a relatively moderate politician and former diplomat, in a brief post on X on Saturday. He suggested that Tehran should invite Witkoff before formally responding to President Trump’s letter to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—both as a gesture of diplomatic goodwill and a display of political savvy, while also helping to deflect public criticism.
“It’s not just me saying this—former senior diplomats from the Foreign Ministry also advise against rejecting Witkoff’s expression of interest in visiting Iran,” wrote senior reformist journalist Mohammad Sahafi, referencing Tajik’s post.
An expatriate dissident, Akbar Ganji, echoed this sentiment, advocating for direct talks between Iran and the US, starting with a meeting between Iranian officials and Witkoff and eventually progressing to a summit between the Iranian and US presidents to finalize an agreement.
Former Reformist diplomat and political editor Abdolreza Raisi also backed the idea of hosting Witkoff in Iran. “How can we refuse to host him now that he’s expressed interest in visiting, especially to verify such claims and put the ball in their court?” he wrote in a post on X.
Skepticism from US analysts
Jason Brodsky, Policy Director at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), suggested in a post on X that certain Iranian officials and regime sympathizers may be attempting to exploit perceived divisions within the Trump administration. According to Brodsky, these figures are bypassing Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Advisor Mike Waltz while engaging with officials they believe are more receptive to negotiations.