Iran International
As debate over a ceasefire and renewed talks with the United States intensifies, the absence of a clear supreme arbiter in Tehran appears to be giving Iran’s hardliners more room to shape the narrative and to hinder any eventual agreement.
Under former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, ultraconservative factions were often allowed to rage in public, attack moderates and mobilize supporters in the streets. But when necessary, he could impose discipline.
Even on the 2015 nuclear deal, which he later criticized publicly, the system moved quickly once it was understood he had given at least tacit approval.
Then-speaker Ali Larijani famously pushed the JCPOA through parliament in a matter of minutes, effectively silencing opposition by invoking the Supreme Leader’s authority.
Today, who truly leads Iran—whether one man or a shifting collective—is anyone’s guess. What is clearer is that the political vacuum appears to be rewarding the loudest and most uncompromising voices.
Iranian hardliners’ arguments for continuing the war with the United States have come to dominate state television, media reports and billboards across major squares in Tehran.
Many frame negotiations as a betrayal of “red lines,” accusing “accomplices of America and Israel,” “liberals” and those intimidated by Washington of undermining the country.
Those so-called red lines are often justified through selective interpretations of new leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s April 9 message, former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s past speeches rejecting negotiations and claims by individual hardliners citing unnamed “reliable sources.”
One prominent example is ultraconservative MP Amir Hossein Sabeti of the Paydari Party, who has repeatedly warned that negotiators may be crossing the Supreme Leader’s red lines.
In a post on X, he claimed to have “the most definite information” that negotiating with the United States on the nuclear issue was prohibited and demanded that Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi publicly deny reports of talks on suspending enrichment or diluting uranium.
He implied consequences if they did not.
State television has amplified such voices while giving nightly exposure to rallies calling for the war to continue until “final victory.”
The constant need to fill airtime has also elevated more extreme or theatrical voices, including members of the public eager for their moment on air.
Meanwhile, moderate voices arguing for negotiations appear to have lost even the limited channels they once had to plead their case to the country’s highest authority.
Iranian academic Sadeq Zibakalam, speaking to the reform-leaning Fararu website, questioned why some factions remain so insistent on continuing the war despite the economic devastation already inflicted.
“Do these gentlemen know what forty days of war has done to our economy, how many production units have run into trouble, and how many have laid off their workers?” he asked.
He said it was striking that hardline revolutionaries inside Iran, opposition groups seeking regime change and Israeli officials all appeared to share an interest in prolonging the conflict.
Views such as Zibakalam’s were once represented within inner circles of power by figures like former president Hassan Rouhani, who had direct access to Ali Khamenei, even if he rarely got his way.
President Masoud Pezeshkian has no such standing as the veteran Rouhani. And whatever limited influence he might have enjoyed under Khamenei Sr. appears to have diminished further under Khamenei Jr., who—even if in good health—remains almost certainly beyond the reach of civilian leaders.
In the absence of a clear authority to impose discipline or bless compromise, political competition in Tehran increasingly appears to favor the fiercest factions.
