Iran International
US Vice President JD Vance’s letter to Iran’s national security chief, Mohsen Rezaei, has fueled speculation that Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf is being sidelined as Tehran’s chief negotiator, while officials deny any change in the negotiating structure.
Ghalibaf, who also serves as parliament speaker, has in recent months been identified as the head of Iran’s negotiating delegation. However, following the delivery of Vance’s letter to the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, ultra-hardline media outlets said that Rezaei had replaced him in negotiations with Washington.
The speculation intensified after Ghalibaf was absent from an unprecedented meeting last week involving the Pakistani army chief, Saudi Arabia’s defense minister and the head of Turkey’s intelligence service (MIT), representing three members of the Mecca Pact. Rezaei and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi attended.
Ghalibaf’s supporters have argued that the so-called Tehran Summit was unrelated to negotiations with the United States and instead concerned Iran’s possible accession to the Mecca Pact.
Similar rumors that Ghalibaf was being removed from Iran’s negotiating team emerged in May before being officially dismissed.
Officials insist Ghalibaf remains in charge
Iranian officials have maintained that Ghalibaf continues to lead the country’s negotiating team.
Araghchi told Al Jazeera on Saturday, October 31, that Tehran still regarded Ghalibaf as its chief negotiator and that Rezaei fully supported this arrangement.
Describing the American initiative to establish contact, the foreign minister said: “The American side’s attempt to open the door to dialogue and understanding more broadly is a positive step.”
However, he warned: “If Washington’s goal in sending this letter is to stir up discord, it would be yet another mistake to add to its previous ones.”
Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said Monday that Ghalibaf remained Iran’s chief negotiator and that the country's diplomatic process was managed through the Supreme National Security Council.
Manouchehr Mottaki, a member of parliament’s National Security Commission who is aligned with conservative hardliners, also dismissed reports that Ghalibaf had been excluded from decision-making.
Speaking to the reformist Ensaf News website on Monday, he said: “Ghalibaf’s significant role in decision-making after Rezaei’s appointment demonstrates that he continues to play an effective part in this process.”
Hardliners welcome Rezaei’s growing role
Despite official assurances, Vance’s letter has prompted some hardline outlets and supporters of the Paydari Front to welcome Rezaei’s growing role and the prospect of diminished influence for Ghalibaf.
Raja News, a website close to the Paydari Party, wrote on October 29 that recent developments demonstrated that “the center of gravity of foreign policy during wartime has shifted from the negotiating team to the secretariat of the Supreme National Security Council”.
The website also drew a distinction between two recent meetings with Iran’s Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei. It said that during his meeting with Ghalibaf, Khamenei had emphasized resolving people’s livelihood problems through parliament and the government, as well as advancing relations with strategic partners. By contrast, it said, discussions with Rezaei had focused on “fulfilling Iran’s seven new conditions” in negotiations with Washington.
Nobonyad, another news website associated with radical conservatives, reported on October 30 that the media committee for the Islamabad negotiations, which consisted of associates and advisers of the parliament speaker, had been dissolved on the orders of a “senior security official”.
Raja News subsequently published an article titled “Why Does Support for Rezaei Anger Ghalibaf’s Supporters?”, accusing Ghalibaf’s supporters of portraying backing for Rezaei as a political maneuver motivated by satisfaction among his rivals over Ghalibaf’s diminishing role in wartime diplomacy.
The website also leveled a series of accusations against the parliament speaker. It alleged that he had accepted a ceasefire without the Supreme Leader’s authorization, falsely claimed in a Supreme National Security Council statement that the United States had fully accepted Iran’s conditions, entered nuclear negotiations in Islamabad contrary to the Supreme Leader’s instructions, and used the issue of Lebanon’s rescue as a pretext for traveling to Switzerland and continuing direct negotiations with representatives of US President Donald Trump.
Raja News wrote that Ghalibaf and his political allies could have enjoyed the same support from revolutionary forces as Rezaei, particularly under wartime conditions. However, it said they had chosen to place their personal views above the Supreme Leader’s principles and consequently became the target of what it described as “one of the harshest reprimands in the history of the Islamic Republic,” referring to Mojtaba Khamenei’s June 18 message in which he said he had held a different view on the agreement with the United States but authorized it after the president, on behalf of himself and other members of the Supreme National Security Council, gave assurances and accepted responsibility for it.
The website also criticized Araghchi’s recent statement that Tehran was still giving diplomacy an opportunity to succeed.
It described the foreign minister’s remarks as a “special gift to Trump on the eve of his electoral defeat” and a “direct signal of military weakness to the Pentagon and Tel Aviv operations rooms”.
“It is regrettable that Seyed Abbas Araghchi’s behavior at this critical juncture is exactly like that of someone who enters the scene whenever the enemy is on the verge of collapse and facing danger, in order to protect its interests,” it wrote.
Moderates reject claims of a power struggle
Ghalibaf and his close associates have not directly commented on the issue. However, the moderate conservative website Khabar Online described Raja News’s support for Rezaei as “superficial”, arguing that the website was using its support for Rezaei’s positions as a means of undermining and weakening Ghalibaf.
In a commentary published on Monday under the headline “The Duality That Never Materialized: Ghalibaf and Rezaei on the Same Side”, the moderate Asr-e Iran website argued that if the American letter had been intended to create divisions within Iran’s decision-making structure, that objective had effectively failed.
It added that even if Washington had no such intention, some domestic political factions had attempted to exploit the development to manufacture a rivalry between the two officials, despite their public rejection of such a division.
According to Asr-e Iran, Rezaei’s message in a television interview on Saturday was clear: an expanded role for the Supreme National Security Council, or the decision to address its secretary directly, did not mean that he was competing with the head of the negotiating team.
The website argued that although foreign governments could choose whom to address in their correspondence, they could not dictate Iran’s internal decision-making structure.
“The Vance letter could have become an issue for polarization. Some domestic factions also tried to create this duality. But the coordinated positions of Rezaei, Araghchi and Baghaei demonstrated that attempts to manufacture divisions among officials, at least in this case, face a serious obstacle: a division of responsibilities is possible, and differences in language are natural, but Iran’s final decision is one,” Asr-e Iran wrote.
Calls to revise Iran’s nuclear doctrine and build an atomic bomb are gaining prominence on official platforms after gathering momentum in hardline circles, although the country’s top security official says no policy change has been approved.
Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said on Saturday, October 31, that neither the government nor the broader establishment had made a new decision on changing the country’s nuclear doctrine. However, he acknowledged discussion of whether Iran should retain its existing policy if war resumes.
Rezaei said attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities had prompted public demands for reconsidering the policy. He argued that Iran had cooperated fully with International Atomic Energy Agency inspections.
“When people see this, they ask us why we should continue with this situation,” he said.
On September 19, Rezaei had also said that US and Israeli actions gave Iran grounds to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
In recent days, hardliners have increasingly called on Mojtaba Khamenei to overturn his father Ali Khamenei’s religious decree prohibiting the production of nuclear weapons and declare their manufacture permissible.
Ahmad Naderi, a hardline member of parliament, told Khaneh Eqtesad in October that circumstances had changed and Ali Khamenei’s decree on nuclear weapons could be reconsidered.
“From Mojtaba Khamenei’s behavior, my understanding is that his fatwa will be different,” Naderi said.
Tasnim news agency reported on Saturday that Mojtaba Khamenei had instructed senior military commanders during a meeting to respond to any threat immediately and effectively, and “without geographical limitations”.
Before details of the meeting were published, hardliners on social media had expressed hope that he had ordered the development of nuclear weapons. The published account did not announce such an order.
Supporters of developing nuclear weapons have also cited remarks Ali Khamenei made during a meeting with students in November 2024. At the time, students called for a change in Iran’s nuclear doctrine. Responding to their demands, Khamenei said that whatever was necessary to confront the enemy would certainly be done.
An analysis published on Saturday by Khorasan newspaper, which is close to parliament speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, argued that changing the nuclear doctrine would not contradict the late leader’s guidance.
“Contrary to what some people are saying from certain platforms, changing the nuclear doctrine not only does not conflict with the wisdom and leadership of the martyred leader, but is actually a move along the path that he himself had laid out,” it said.
A commentary published by the Revolutionary Guards-affiliated Tasnim on Saturday raised another possibility besides a complete change of nuclear doctrine.
It argued that, with the leader’s approval, Iran could instead deepen its existing doctrine without formally changing it. This would involve enriching uranium to levels suitable for producing a nuclear weapon while stopping short of manufacturing one.
Calls for a nuclear bomb from official platforms
The demand for a change in nuclear policy has increasingly featured in official speeches and Friday prayer sermons.
Mohammad-Javad Haj Ali-Akbari, Tehran’s interim Friday prayer leader, said on Friday that calls to review the country’s nuclear doctrine reflected national awareness rather than a hasty or emotional reaction to American bad faith.
Ahmad Alamolhoda, the influential representative of the supreme leader in Razavi Khorasan province, has gone further, saying that anything necessary to intimidate the enemy, including possessing nuclear weapons, is religiously “obligatory”, according to Khorasan newspaper.
Citing statements by Tehran’s Friday prayer leader, Alamolhoda and the late Ali Khamenei, Khorasan argued that Iran’s security circumstances had changed and that acquiring nuclear weapons had become a demand aimed at strengthening deterrence.
Mohammad-Taghi Naghdali, an MP representing Khomeini Shahr, said on Sunday that the slogan among pro-government demonstrators had changed from “Nuclear energy is our indisputable right” to “Nuclear warhead is our indisputable right.”
Speaking to ChandSanieh news website, Ahmad Bakhshayesh, a member of parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said that if Iran decided to change its nuclear doctrine, it should first build a bomb and then withdraw from the NPT.
“Withdrawing without building a bomb would eliminate the [current] benefits of IAEA oversight,” he said.
Claims of public support
Proponents of revising Iran’s nuclear doctrine have presented the proposal as a popular demand. Haj Ali-Akbari said on Friday that unspecified polls had shown more than 70% of Iranians supported reconsidering the doctrine. The report of his remarks did not provide details of those polls or their methodology.
Mahmoud Nabavian, a hardline member of parliament, said in a post on X on October 29 that he had called on the supreme leader to authorize the production of an atomic bomb during a pro-government gathering in Qom. He said the crowd welcomed his request.
Such gatherings have continued in different parts of the country since the outbreak of the recent war.
IRGC-affiliated media outlets, particularly Fars and Tasnim, have also extensively covered calls for nuclear weapons in recent days, prominently highlighting them as popular demands.
Fars has promoted calls on its My Fars online platform for Iran to build nuclear weapons and increase the range of its missiles to 13,000 kilometers.
Opponents of the proposal, including reformist politician Mostafa Hashemitaba and social media users, have challenged claims of widespread public support and called for a referendum.
In September, Hashemitaba said that if media outlets such as Kayhan believed their position enjoyed popular support, they should endorse holding a referendum.
Warnings against political pressure
The campaign has also prompted warnings against putting political pressure on nuclear decision-making.
Nour News, a website close to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, published an article on Saturday titled “Reviewing the Nuclear Doctrine: How and Through Which Path?” warning against reducing the complex implications of changing the doctrine to a simple division between supporters and opponents.
Referring to the issue being raised in Friday prayer sermons and at nightly pro-government gatherings, the article argued that decision-makers should be able to examine all available options without political pressure, temporary emotions or expectations that had already been created.
“People’s voices should be heard, but the voices of crowds should not be turned into a substitute for expert assessment and national decision-making,” Nour News wrote.
The issue has also received extensive coverage in reformist and moderate media, which have warned about the consequences of giving prominence to calls for nuclear weapons.
The moderate conservative website Asr-e Iran accused hardliners of using provocative issues to maintain cohesion within their own ranks and control the domestic political atmosphere. It warned that raising the prospect of building an atomic bomb could have serious consequences for Iran’s international standing.
“This will only become an excuse to legitimize the war-mongering scenarios of Iran’s enemies and seriously undermine the country’s peaceful image, which it has spent years trying to establish,” the website said.
Javad Emam, spokesman for the Reformist Front, also responded to the Tehran Friday prayer leader’s remarks in a post, warning that the issue went far beyond political slogans.
“Changing the nuclear doctrine and raising the issue of building an atomic bomb is not a simple decision that can be reduced to slogans. The country’s security, economy, national interests and future are at stake,” he wrote, adding: “Can one speak on behalf of the nation without evidence and impose the costs of such a decision on the people?”
Divisions within Iran's political establishment over how to end the country's prolonged state of neither war nor peace are coming into sharper focus as mediators race to secure an agreement with Washington amid preparations for possible renewed US-Israeli strikes.
Qatari mediators held talks in Tehran for at least 12 hours on Friday while maintaining contact with the White House, Axios reported. The diplomatic push comes amid reports that Washington and Israel are preparing for possible military action after next week's US midterm elections.
The competing approaches have emerged in the wake of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei's call to end the impasse.
According to an official account of a meeting with Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei, reportedly held on October 27, Khamenei called for an end to the war and the current uncertainty, while insisting that Iran's conditions for an agreement be met.
Advocates of diplomacy have seized on his remarks to press for renewed negotiations with Washington, while conservatives emphasise military deterrence, economic resilience and maintaining Tehran's demands. The disagreement is less about whether to negotiate than the terms on which Iran should do so.
President Masoud Pezeshkian, who has repeatedly warned about the economic consequences of prolonged uncertainty, pledged a day after the account was published to fulfil Khamenei's instructions.
"You cannot plan in a state of indecision," Pezeshkian said on October 24, recalling that the late supreme leader Ali Khamenei had also called for an end to the impasse.
"But I still believe we should go [to negotiations] and move beyond the neither-war-nor-peace situation," he added.
Reformist and moderate politicians have argued that prolonged uncertainty is discouraging investment, delaying economic decisions and deepening public anxiety.
Mohammad Ali Abtahi, a former vice-president under Mohammad Khatami, has advocated "dignified negotiations", while former lawmaker Mansour Haghighatpour, a moderate conservative close to Ali Larijani, said Iran faced a choice between renewed war and an agreement.
"National interests dictate that we choose a path through which we can achieve our objectives with the least possible cost and damage," Haghighatpour told Donya-e Eqtesad, urging Washington to return to negotiations in Islamabad.
Javad Youneszadeh, a member of Pezeshkian's media team, went further, arguing that negotiations were compatible with the supreme leader's emphasis on resistance rather than a retreat from it.
In a commentary published on the president's website, he said both Ali Khamenei and his successor had authorised talks with Washington despite what he described as repeated American breaches of commitments.
"The Islamic Republic of Iran still wants to return to the Islamabad memorandum of understanding, even assuming that the enemy has disrupted everything," he wrote.
Former Iranian diplomat Kourosh Ahmadi also urged de-escalation, warning that refusing to show flexibility could lead to renewed fighting, a prolonged naval blockade and further economic pressure.
Conservatives and hardliners, meanwhile, have interpreted Khamenei's remarks as a call to strengthen Iran's position rather than soften its demands, arguing that ending the uncertainty requires military preparedness and economic resilience alongside diplomacy.
Fada-Hossein Maleki, a hardline member of parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, told the newspaper Iran that resolving the impasse required a new strategic framework involving the government, parliament and armed forces.
He said the framework should strengthen Iran's defence capabilities, address economic problems and prepare the country for both negotiations and military confrontation.
Maleki stressed that Khamenei's call should not be taken as a signal that Tehran was moving towards war or was prepared to accept peace at any price.
Conservative political activist Alireza Khojastehpour similarly told IRNA that stronger military deterrence could help translate Iran's battlefield achievements into diplomatic gains while reducing the economic costs of prolonged uncertainty.
The Mehr news agency also called for preparations to withstand sustained external pressure, citing warnings from Pezeshkian and Rezaei about the economic consequences of a prolonged blockade.
"From these statements, it can be understood that the country's decision-makers are planning economically and militarily to resist external pressure," Mehr wrote, while acknowledging the costs imposed on Iranian households.
The competing interpretations suggest that Khamenei's call to end the impasse has done little to resolve the underlying disagreement over how to achieve it. While advocates of diplomacy see negotiations as a way to ease economic pressure, conservatives emphasise deterrence and resistance, leaving unanswered the question of what Tehran is prepared to concede, if anything, to secure an agreement.
Qatari mediators returned to Tehran on Friday, barely a day after leaving the Iranian capital following the reported rejection of their latest peace proposal, as Washington and Tehran remained divided over which side should make the first concessions.
The delegation's swift return suggested that diplomatic efforts were continuing despite reports by Iranian news agencies that senior officials had rejected key provisions of the Qatari-mediated proposal.
On Friday, as the Qatari delegation, led by a senior adviser to Qatar's prime minister, held talks with Iranian diplomats headed by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, Tehran's Friday prayer leader, Mohsen Haj Ali Akbari, poured cold water on the prospect of a breakthrough with Washington.
He said past experience showed Washington's offers of talks could coincide with more serious threats than its public military warnings suggested.
More notably, he lent weight to calls for a revision of Iran's nuclear doctrine, arguing that they were neither a fringe position nor merely an emotional reaction.
On Thursday, Araghchi said Tehran remained committed to the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) as the basis for further negotiations.
He rejected proposals requiring Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz as a unilateral confidence-building measure before the verified lifting of naval restrictions and the release of $24 billion in frozen Iranian assets.
‘War is certain’
The disagreement over which side should act first remains a central obstacle to negotiations, even as regional mediators continue efforts to prevent another round of fighting.
A separate diplomatic initiative by US Vice President JD Vance has also yet to produce a formal Iranian response.
Iranian media have confirmed receipt of a letter from Vance to security chief Mohsen Rezaei, but officials have not commented on its contents, insisting instead that Tehran's conditions for an agreement remain unchanged.
Former parliamentary national security committee chairman Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh offered a far more pessimistic assessment of the renewed mediation efforts.
"The mediators' visits to Tehran are a sign that war is certain, not that diplomacy is being revived," he wrote on X on Friday, arguing that only a regional agreement involving the United States and China could now prevent a fourth war.
Economic costs
In an article published Thursday, the reformist newspaper Shargh also expressed grave concern about the diplomatic deadlock..
It warned that celebrating mine attacks and escalating regional tensions while Iran's economy faced severe shortages of essential inputs could prove a potentially fatal mistake.
The conservative newspaper Khorasan offered a more measured assessment of the diplomatic difficulties, while supporting Araghchi's rejection of proposals requiring Iran to de-escalate before Washington lifted restrictions on shipping.
While some commentators warn that prolonged confrontation is deepening Iran's economic problems and increasing the danger of war, others argue that making concessions under military and economic pressure would weaken Tehran's position in any eventual agreement.
Who moves first?
The discussions appear to be focused on establishing a framework for renewed negotiations rather than resolving every outstanding issue in a comprehensive peace agreement.
Vance's letter, according to US media reports, sought to restart talks with Iran's nuclear program included from the outset. Tehran, meanwhile, insists that steps to ease the naval blockade and release frozen assets must precede substantive nuclear negotiations.
The disagreement is reflected in a proposed seven-day framework. Washington wants nuclear discussions to begin on the first day, while Tehran insists they should begin on the seventh, after other measures have been implemented.
Although the proposed timetable separates the two positions by six days, the dispute is about more than timing. Each side wants the other to demonstrate its commitment before taking what it considers a significant political risk.
The stakes remain high. US officials have warned of possible renewed military operations after the November 3 midterm elections, while Tehran continues to reject proposals it regards as requiring unilateral concessions.
For now, the return of the Qatari mediators shows that diplomatic contacts remain active. Whether those contacts can prevent another round of fighting depends on finding a sequence of steps that both Washington and Tehran are prepared to accept.
Iranian media have highlighted Benjamin Netanyahu's weakened position following Israel's election, but analysts in Tehran say his departure would be unlikely to change Israel's approach to Iran, even if it weakened its ability to pursue the confrontation.
Reports by the Tasnim and Fars news agencies, both affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), as well as state radio and television, have focused on the failure of either of Israel's two main electoral blocs to secure a governing majority, raising the prospect of prolonged political deadlock.
These outlets have also devoted considerable attention to gains by Arab parties and the possibility that their increased representation could help bring about Netanyahu's removal as prime minister.
They have largely avoided discussing whether the election outcome could increase or reduce the risk of further escalation in the war with Iran.
Senior Iranian officials have yet to comment on the result. Before the vote, Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said Tehran did not care who led Israel, stressing that Iran was at war and would not hesitate to defend itself.
Netanyahu or Eisenkot?
Iranian analysts have generally argued that the election outcome could affect the timing, scope or objectives of potential Israeli military action, but would not fundamentally change Israel's approach to Iran's nuclear and missile programs or its regional influence.
Masoud Asadollahi, a Middle East expert and university professor, told Nour News, an outlet close to Iran's Supreme National Security Council: “From a military and security perspective, one cannot simply conclude that the mutual threats or strategic differences between Iran and Israel will disappear because a prime minister leaves office.”
He said Netanyahu's opponents differed from him mainly in how they would manage the war and make strategic decisions, rather than in their fundamental approach to Iran.
The conservative Khorasan newspaper addressed the question in a Thursday article titled “Which Is Better for Iran: Netanyahu or Eisenkot?”
It argued that Netanyahu's removal should not be equated with the end of the Israeli threat to Iran. Gadi Eisenkot, it said, was neither an outsider to Israel's political establishment nor opposed to confrontation with the Islamic Republic.
“The experience of coalition governments and political disagreements in Israel has shown that diversity within the cabinet can increase the costs of decision-making,” the newspaper wrote.
Khorasan argued that Netanyahu's departure could benefit Iran by weakening the political and diplomatic capacity he had accumulated during the confrontation, even if his successor pursued similar policies.
But it also acknowledged that internal political rivalries could produce more aggressive policies.
“Sometimes removing one player does not end the game, but it can make the game more difficult for the other side,” the newspaper wrote.
Other analysts warned that political uncertainty could itself increase the risk of military escalation.
Morteza Makki, an international affairs analyst, told the Iranian Labor News Agency (ILNA) that delays in forming Israel's next government could work to Netanyahu's advantage by giving him a potential window to attack Iran.
Makki said the uncertainty could also affect the prospects for coordination with the United States in any such operation.
“Overall, the likelihood of war is high, and one cannot judge whether war will or will not occur solely on the basis of which political camp wins the election, because both camps are inclined toward war,” foreign policy analyst Alireza Komeili told the conservative Nameh News website.
Hardliner claims Iran drove Israeli turnout
Ali Akbar Raefipour, an ultra-hardline political figure, claimed in a social media post that concerns about Iran were behind the high turnout in Israel's election.
“The highest voter turnout in Israel's elections in the past 28 years has been recorded so far. And the main reason for it is Iran alone. Yes, Iran,” he wrote on X.
His claim drew responses from Iranian social media users who contrasted Israeli participation with low turnout in Iranian elections.
“We have influence over elections all over the world, and the results of elections everywhere in the world affect our lives, except for the results of our own elections,” one user wrote.
The prospect of another US-Iran war has fuelled debate over whether Washington is preparing for a prolonged campaign of military and economic pressure or whether diplomacy can still avert a wider conflict.
The debate comes amid continuing attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, warnings from Tehran that it is better prepared for another confrontation, and fresh revelations about Iran's efforts to circumvent sanctions and the US naval blockade to import military equipment.
Iran's Revolutionary Guards said Thursday that three tankers had struck naval mines in the strait over the previous 24 hours. Vice President Mohammadreza Aref said Tehran was managing the strategic waterway and that its defensive readiness had improved since the 12-day and 40-day wars.
Analyses published in Iranian newspapers in recent days offer differing assessments of the likelihood of another confrontation and the prospects for a negotiated settlement.
The economic daily Donya-ye Eghtesad said war was not inevitable, pointing to continuing backchannel contacts despite deep disagreements between the two sides.
Political analyst Rahman Ghahramanpour told the paper that another conflict would be unlikely to end after only a few days, warning that even limited US military action could become part of a sustained campaign combining strikes and sanctions.
Ghahramanpour described a possible eight-to-twelve-month strategy aimed at weakening Iran's ability to resist US demands.
War: disastrous but not inevitable
Reuters investigation published Thursday revealed how Iran has used a network of more than 5,000 military-linked agencies to import at least $2 billion worth of equipment, explosives and heavy-duty trucks since January 2025, circumventing Western sanctions and the US naval blockade.
The findings shed light on Tehran's efforts to sustain its military capabilities despite the pressure campaign.
Former diplomat Kourosh Ahmadi challenged predictions that another war was imminent, arguing that the remaining disagreements between Tehran and Washington might not be substantial enough to justify the costs of a new conflict.
Writing in the reformist daily Shargh, Ahmadi said President Donald Trump's statements should not be treated as evidence that he had decided to attack Iran, while warning that another war could have devastating consequences.
He identified three broad options available to Washington: pursue a diplomatic settlement, continue economic and military pressure to weaken Iran, or undertake another military operation.
Diplomacy remained possible, Ahmadi argued, because the dispute concerned the sequencing of concessions more than fundamentally incompatible objectives.
Cost of stalemate
The moderate news website Fararu examined the damage already being inflicted by the prolonged stalemate.
Former diplomat Fereydoun Majlesi argued that Iran's state of “neither war nor peace” was itself becoming a major economic burden, with uncertainty prompting businesses to hold on to cash and avoid investment.
Such decisions weaken production, employment and economic growth over time, he said, even without another military confrontation.
Both sides, Majlesi said, continued to define an acceptable agreement primarily in terms of their own interests while resisting the concessions necessary to bridge the gap.
He warned that prolonged uncertainty could make an eventual settlement more difficult as economic pressure and mutual distrust intensified.
For Ghahramanpour, the question was not simply whether Washington might strike again, but whether military pressure could secure political concessions without triggering a wider war.
