Iran International
Escalating war rhetoric from Iran, the United States and Israel, coupled with military movements across the region, has heightened fears of another conflict, as Iranians debate online whether war could bring political change or deepen the country's crises.
Iranian social media users are closely following statements by US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, as well as diplomatic and military movements across the region.
Many view the developments as possible signs of an impending US-Israeli attack.
A central debate is whether another war could bring down the Islamic Republic or simply inflict further damage on Iran.
Those supporting military action describe war as a necessary evil to end the political system, arguing that previous attempts to bring about change have failed.
Opponents warn that another conflict could destroy energy infrastructure and refineries, deepen economic hardship and leave Iranian society in an even worse position.
“We are inside Iran and face all kinds of financial, security and social problems, but we are willing to pay the price to end this nightmare,” one user wrote.
Another user wrote: “This uncertainty is really a thousand times worse than war. We cannot even plan a trip, let alone make decisions about work, education or running a business.”
Others strongly rejected that view.
“War brings destruction, chaos, disease and so many other problems,” one user wrote. “The outcome will not necessarily be what you imagine. It could be much worse than things are now.”
Another highlighted the vulnerability of people without secure salaries, who could lose their livelihoods if fighting disrupted economic activity.
One user summed up the conflicting attitudes they had encountered.
“I have seen many people in Iran waiting for an attack so that things can finally be settled… and others who wanted an agreement to be reached,” the user wrote. “Feelings differ, but everyone is tired of this situation.”
Some are urging others to stock up on water, food and medicine and keep cash on hand. Others warn people living near military or government facilities to consider leaving.
Users have also expressed concern for elderly people, those with illnesses and people living alone.
Hardliners push for confrontation
Ultra-hardline voices have also expressed enthusiasm for military confrontation, but for very different reasons.
They argue that negotiations with Washington have merely given Iran's adversaries time to regroup and prepare for a stronger attack.
Some have sharply criticized officials who pursued diplomacy and called for Iran to launch a pre-emptive strike if war appears imminent.
“Why shouldn't Iran start the war this time instead of always waiting to be caught off guard?” one user wrote.
Another argued that Iran did not need nuclear weapons to inflict serious damage on its adversaries.
“We don't even need an atomic bomb to retaliate,” the user wrote, arguing instead for strikes on nuclear power plants in Israel and the United Arab Emirates.
The calls for confrontation reflect a very different political outlook from anti-government users hoping outside military action could bring down the Islamic Republic.
But both illustrate how repeated rounds of fighting and failed diplomacy have led some on opposing sides of Iran's political divide to see another war as preferable to the current uncertainty.
Parents prepare for the worst
Parents' concerns about children's safety have intensified following the deaths of more than 100 schoolchildren in a US attack on Minab at the beginning of the recent war.
Some are urging families to keep children home from school if the likelihood of an attack increases. Others are discussing plans to collect children from schools and move them to safer locations as quickly as possible if fighting resumes.
An Instagram post featuring a firefighter has attracted particular attention. The firefighter said that while inspecting safety arrangements at a girls' high school, a school official told them instructions had been issued to prepare identification tags for students.
On Friday, an Education Ministry spokesperson denied that such measures were being implemented and accused “enemies or ignorant individuals” of spreading fear.
One user said they had checked with relatives in Tehran and concluded that the reports were accurate, claiming families they contacted had requested identification tags and were awaiting their delivery.
Fear of another internet blackout
The prospect of another shutdown of international internet access is adding to the anxiety.
Users fear authorities could cut international connectivity immediately if hostilities resume. The prospect is particularly troubling after previous shutdowns made it difficult to contact relatives and access reliable information.
One user recalled that during the war in June last year, the internet was cut several days after fighting began. When war broke out again at the end of February, the shutdown came within hours.
“Now, instead of checking the news in the morning, I open Google's domain to see whether it loads,” the user wrote, “so I can find out whether the war has started.”
The United States is tightening economic pressure on Iran to bolster efforts to reach a diplomatic solution and can sustain its naval blockade for the foreseeable future, the US Ambassador to the UN said, as President Donald Trump weighs renewed strikes after midterm elections.
Mike Waltz told the Financial Times that Washington still wanted Tehran to return to negotiations and reach what he called a “meaningful agreement” on its nuclear program, but acknowledged the standoff could continue without a deal or a return to prewar shipping levels through the Strait of Hormuz.
“The president and the US Navy can maintain this blockade for the foreseeable future,” Waltz said, adding that the administration was continuing to tighten economic pressure.
He said the US would not consider its objectives achieved until Iran’s highly enriched nuclear material had been dealt with and an agreement reached over domestic uranium enrichment.
Trump considers renewed strikes after midterms
The comments come as Trump is considering several days of renewed strikes against Iran after the midterms, The Atlantic reported, citing officials and people familiar with the discussions.
Potential targets include Iran’s missile and drone arsenal, energy infrastructure and nuclear facilities, according to the report. One outside adviser told the magazine that US economic pressure was working and that additional strikes could push Iran closer to collapse.
An official and another person familiar with the talks said Trump had initially hoped Tehran would return to negotiations before the election, but that had not happened.
US officials stressed that no decision had been made on whether to resume strikes after November 3. The Atlantic said some officials also saw uncertainty over Washington’s next move as a way of keeping Tehran under pressure.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had pushed for another round of strikes before Israel’s election, according to the report, but Trump has so far declined to authorize a new attack before the US vote.
Washington and Tehran trade competing Hormuz messages
The military pressure is unfolding alongside sharply different accounts from Washington and Tehran over control of the Strait of Hormuz.
Trump said on Thursday that more oil had moved through the strait over the previous week than at any point before the war, attributing the increase to the US blockade.
“More oil came out of the Hormuz Strait over the last week than at any time previous, including before the war,” Trump told a campaign rally in Iowa. “That’s because of the blockade.”
He said the blockade had stopped Iran from exporting its own oil and again argued that US military action had destroyed Tehran’s nuclear enrichment capacity.
IRGC says US pushed away from the strait
Iran, however, presented a very different picture on Friday.
IRGC Navy commander Ali Ozmaei said US forces had been pushed hundreds of kilometers away from the Strait of Hormuz and no longer had a place there.
“Today, the Americans are not present in the Persian Gulf and have moved 600 to 700 kilometers away from the Strait of Hormuz,” Ozmaei said. “America no longer has a place in the Strait of Hormuz.”
The competing statements underscore how control of shipping and access through Hormuz have become central to both sides’ strategy, as Washington seeks to pressure Tehran economically while keeping open the possibility of renewed military action.
Turkey will host the foreign ministers of seven countries on Friday for talks on the Iran-US war, security in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab, developments in Yemen and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
For the first time, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan will meet Britain, France and Germany for security-focused talks. The meeting comes as attacks on ships and regional energy infrastructure continue and oil prices have reached their highest level in five months.
The Istanbul meeting could mark a shift from regional consultations toward broader security coordination. It follows months of efforts by regional states to build cooperation against threats from the Islamic Republic, particularly attacks by the Iran-backed Houthis.
Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan — the three members of the Mecca defense pact — will all attend and have committed to using their military capabilities to defend Saudi Arabia. Egypt is also considering military support for Riyadh.
The three European powers are now joining the talks with concerns of their own, particularly over energy.
The platform could lead to a form of division of labor in the Iran war, operating in parallel with US and Israeli military pressure on the Islamic Republic and focused primarily on containing the Iran-backed Houthis.
From regional consultations to defense cooperation
Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have held regular consultations since March following Houthi threats in Bab al-Mandab. The grouping has become known as the R4.
The four countries have emphasized direct regional involvement in resolving crises and in recent months have adopted common positions on the Iran war, Palestine and Saudi security.
Alongside these diplomatic efforts, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have expanded defense cooperation through the Mecca pact. Under the agreement, an external armed attack on one member is considered an attack on all three.
Officials from the three countries agreed on August 31 to establish a joint secretariat and expand defense cooperation. Their defense committee decided on October 5 to make agreed forces and military capabilities available for rapid deployment to Saudi Arabia.
The four R4 countries also condemned Iran-backed Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia in an October 11 statement and backed Riyadh’s measures to counter the threats.
Turkey is meanwhile pursuing parliamentary approval of the Mecca pact, while Egypt’s parliament is due to decide on Monday, October 26, whether to deploy forces in military support of Saudi Arabia. Egypt is not a member of the pact, but the prospect of it joining is being seriously considered.
Despite these developments, the countries continue to emphasize a diplomatic solution to the Iran-US war, and some remain in contact with Tehran.
While seeking to prevent the war from spreading, they are also moving closer to joint defensive action against Iran-backed Houthi attacks. These parallel efforts could help contain the crisis and pave the way for a new regional security arrangement, but could also draw the countries deeper into the war and create domestic political tensions.
Containing the Iran-backed Houthis on a parallel track
Protecting critical infrastructure is a central priority for Saudi Arabia in its cooperation with Turkey and Pakistan.
Iran-backed Houthi attacks on Saudi economic and military facilities and insecurity in Bab al-Mandab have caused direct damage while putting pressure on the kingdom’s energy exports and investment plans.
Strengthening Saudi Arabia’s defensive capabilities could reduce some of that vulnerability. But the impact of the new cooperation may extend beyond protecting Saudi facilities.
Saudi defenses against such attacks currently depend on direct US support. A greater role for Turkey and Pakistan, combined with coordination among the four regional countries, could reduce that dependence and allow Washington to devote more resources and attention to the Iran war.
From this perspective, two parallel tracks are taking shape. The United States and Israel are pursuing direct military pressure on Iran, while the countries represented in Istanbul are cooperating to contain the regional consequences of the war.
The two tracks, however, do not constitute a single coalition. Despite their political and security ties with the United States, the regional countries have avoided joint arrangements with Israel, preventing the two approaches from becoming fully integrated.
Cooperation with Washington does not necessarily mean participation in Israel’s strategy. These countries can oppose an expansion of the war against Iran while acting to contain threats arising from it, particularly Houthi attacks.
The practical result could be a form of division of labor even without a formal agreement between the US-Israel camp and the R4.
Iran’s leverage and the risk of diminished influence
The emerging arrangement has particular significance for Iran. If the cooperation succeeds and takes on a military dimension, it would amount to action against an ally of Tehran.
For now, Iran is seeking to raise the cost of continuing the war for the United States and regional countries by leveraging its geographic position in the Strait of Hormuz and its support for the Houthis. Tehran has also promised to respond to actions against its interests.
Alongside maintaining these forms of leverage, Tehran is using diplomacy in an effort to turn them into political gains.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has said a seven-day proposal for restoring normal shipping through the Strait of Hormuz was conveyed through Qatar, with implementation conditional on Tehran’s demands being met.
On Yemen, he has said Iran is prepared to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Ansarullah while rejecting the assertion that the Houthis take direct orders from Tehran.
The two positions indicate that Tehran wants to preserve its ability to turn regional pressure into political leverage. Continued pressure, however, could produce a different outcome.
Governments facing attacks on infrastructure and disruption to maritime routes are moving toward closer defense cooperation to reduce their vulnerability, potentially increasing their capacity to confront Iran.
Crucially, reducing the impact of regional pressure does not necessarily require the military defeat of Iran-aligned forces.
If Saudi Arabia can better protect its infrastructure with help from new partners and the threat to shipping in Bab al-Mandab diminishes, part of Tehran’s bargaining power would be reduced.
Its leverage in the Strait of Hormuz would not be directly affected by these arrangements and would remain in Tehran’s hands, though it could become more fragile than before. Much will depend on Tehran’s response to actions taken by the countries participating in the platform.
Ansarullah, however, is an actor with demands of its own, and ending the Yemen war would require a separate agreement.
Continued contacts between Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt and Tehran also indicate that these governments still see a role for the Islamic Republic in reducing tensions. Anadolu Agency has reported that Pakistan’s army chief asked Tehran to use its influence to halt Houthi attacks on Saudi infrastructure.
Europe and the future of regional security
The involvement of Britain, France and Germany could broaden the scope of this emerging cooperation.
Their involvement reflects concerns about the wider consequences of the war, disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and, above all, energy supplies.
The European countries are joining the R4 states in an effort to address those concerns, but their involvement would also increase NATO’s presence in the region and could potentially lead to an expanded military role.
For Turkey, hosting the meeting provides an opportunity to strengthen its position in regional diplomacy. Saudi Arabia can combine the defensive support of regional partners with broader European consultations.
The European countries, meanwhile, are engaging governments that cooperate with the United States while maintaining political access to Tehran, allowing them both to maintain channels with Iran and signal their opposition to its actions.
Continued European engagement with the R4 could produce a multilayered structure linking political cooperation among the four regional countries, the defense commitments of three of them and diplomatic coordination with Europe.
Such a structure would not immediately replace the US presence and would not necessarily align with Israel’s strategy, but it could give regional countries a larger role in managing crises — a role Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has strongly pursued.
From this perspective, the Istanbul meeting may signal an emerging division of labor between two parallel tracks: US and Israeli military pressure on Iran on one side, and efforts by regional countries, with European participation, to contain Tehran’s regional proxies on the other.
While such cooperation could help reduce tensions, it also carries the risk of widening the war — a shared concern that has made all sides cautious about taking major military action.
Iran’s options for financing trade are narrowing under a US maritime blockade that is squeezing oil revenue, while efforts to freeze Iranian cryptocurrency funds are putting alternative channels for moving money under pressure.
The freezing of some $350 million in Iranian cryptocurrency and a US maritime blockade that Washington says has prevented at least $25 billion in Iranian oil exports highlight the pressure on Tehran’s finances.
Cryptocurrency offers only a limited alternative for financing trade, former US Treasury official Miad Maleki said in an interview with Iran International.
“Cryptocurrency is not really a method for a central bank or for a country’s trade,” said Maleki, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and former executive at the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control.
Maleki said cryptocurrency was better suited to relatively small transactions and transfers, while blockchain transactions could be traced.
“You can see on the blockchain where it came from and where it went,” he said.
Iran has turned to cryptocurrency as economic pressure has narrowed its options, Maleki said, adding that such transactions can be traced and the funds blocked.
Oil revenue dries up
The larger problem for Iran is the loss of oil revenue.
US Central Command commander Admiral Brad Cooper said Thursday that the maritime blockade had prevented Iran from exporting at least $25 billion worth of crude oil over 100 days.
Iran initially continued selling oil that had left the Strait of Hormuz before the blockade and remained aboard tankers in international waters.
Those floating reserves were depleted by mid-October, the Wall Street Journal reported Wednesday, citing analysts at commodity-data firm Kpler.
“There’s no more oil to discharge to China anymore,” Kpler’s head of crude oil analysis Homayoun Falakshahi told the Journal.
“The economic clock of the Islamic Republic has basically stopped,” Maleki said, arguing that Tehran no longer has access to the oil income it previously used to finance imports.
Imports pose the next test
Some goods now entering Iran were paid for earlier, while other imports are continuing through land routes, Maleki said.
The greater pressure will come when Tehran has to finance new purchases and transportation costs without the oil revenue it previously relied on, he said.
“When they can no longer pay the cost of buying and transporting the goods they are now importing over land, that is when the problems will become much more difficult for the Islamic Republic,” Maleki said.
He cautioned that it was difficult to determine how quickly that point would be reached.
“I can’t give you a number of days or weeks,” he said.
Border closures and transit disruptions involving Pakistan, Iraq and Turkey are raising fears that Iran’s remaining trade routes could be further restricted, deepening the impact of US maritime and air restrictions.
Although Washington has not declared a land blockade of Iran, the closure of crossings with Pakistan and Iraq and continued disruption to freight traffic at the Turkish border have raised alarm in Tehran.
Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, acknowledged in an interview with Drop Site published Thursday that Iran would suffer from a prolonged blockade.
“Anyone who says otherwise is not being realistic. Families will pay the price, investment will suffer, and maintaining some sectors of the economy will become more difficult,” he said.
But Rezaei argued that economic pain did not amount to strategic defeat and that Washington was wrong to believe worsening conditions would force Tehran to accept US demands.
Agence France-Presse reported Wednesday that the United States was pressing Iran’s neighbors to close border crossings, following a maritime blockade in southern Iran and air restrictions that have grounded most Iranian flights.
President Masoud Pezeshkian has said the maritime blockade has halted trade through southern sea routes, which previously accounted for 75% to 80% of Iran’s trade.
Pakistan: transit disputes
Iran has responded cautiously to Pakistan, which has been mediating between Tehran and Washington.
Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei attributed the suspension of operations at border crossings to “technical problems” on the Pakistani side and said the two countries were discussing reopening them.
After the US maritime blockade took effect, Iranian traders increasingly used Pakistani ports as alternative routes.
But tighter requirements for electronic bills of lading and difficulties transferring money have complicated trade, according to Peyman Sanandaji, a senior official at the Tehran Chamber of Commerce.
Pakistan closed the Rimdan–Gabd and Taftan crossings on Tuesday during a visit to Tehran by Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir, citing security concerns and efforts to prevent smuggling.
Iranian officials said Munir ordered the crossings reopened during his visit, but the latest reports indicated Pakistan was allowing only Iranian gas tankers and perishable fruit and vegetable shipments to pass.
Fada-Hossein Maleki, head of the Iran-Pakistan parliamentary friendship group, warned Thursday that Iran could close its border if Islamabad continued preventing trucks from crossing.
Such a move could also hurt Pakistan, which uses Iranian territory to move some exports toward Turkey, Central Asia and the Caucasus and receives millions of liters of Iranian gasoline and diesel through official trade and smuggling.
Iraq: conflicting signals
Iraq has not announced a general closure of its border with Iran. But Al Jazeera reported that the Chazabeh–Al-Shaib crossing was closed Wednesday on the direct orders of Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi and that further crossings were expected to shut.
Abdul Amir Taiban, an adviser to Iraq’s prime minister, said Thursday that Chazabeh had been closed to prevent the entry of drugs and counterfeit dollars and dinars.
He accused Iran of undermining Iraq’s economy, smuggling drugs and violating Iraqi sovereignty.
Iran and Iraq have 13 official border crossings, several of them major routes for exports and commercial traffic, particularly with central and southern Iraq.
Iraq temporarily closed its crossings with Iran a month earlier after a drone attack on Saudi Arabia’s east-west pipeline from Iraqi territory was attributed to Iran-aligned groups. The crossings reopened several days later.
Iran has reacted more openly to Iraq’s latest move than to Pakistan’s restrictions.
Deputy Interior Minister Ahmad Zeynivand said Thursday Tehran had sent Baghdad an official note seeking clarification, while claiming trade in essential goods through maritime routes and northern borders continued without disruption.
Turkey: long delays
Turkey is Iran’s third-largest trading partner, with formal and informal bilateral trade estimated at between $23 billion and $30 billion.
The Bazargan crossing in West Azerbaijan province is Iran’s most important land gateway for trade with Turkey and access to European markets.
Iranian media have reported delays of as long as 20 days at Bazargan in recent months. Although Turkey has capacity to receive 1,000 Iranian trucks daily, it has reportedly allowed only 200 to 300 through, while around 600 Turkish trucks enter Iran each day.
The bottleneck threatens a crucial alternative to Iran’s restricted maritime routes even without a formal closure of the Turkish border.
Alternatives remain limited
Iran shares land borders with seven countries, but the remaining routes offer only limited alternatives to its major trade corridors.
Crossings with Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Armenia remain open, providing routes toward Central Asia, Russia and the Caucasus. Afghanistan also remains open, but inadequate infrastructure and chronic congestion limit its usefulness as an alternative transit corridor.
Iran had increasingly looked to road and rail links through Central Asia after restrictions on maritime and air transport. Further border closures would therefore leave Tehran with progressively fewer ways of moving goods.
The disruptions have prompted some hard-line government supporters to call for retaliation against neighboring countries, including restrictions on Iranian electricity exports and internet transit to Iraq.
But several land routes remain open, and there is no declared land blockade. Limited capacity and existing bottlenecks mean those routes cannot readily replace maritime trade, leaving further closures capable of intensifying pressure on an economy already struggling with the effects of the US blockade.
Repeated economic and political crises are eroding Iranians' belief that their lives can improve, with official figures showing declining social capital, widespread perceptions of injustice and deepening distrust of the government.
Sara, a 40-year-old graphic designer, says she was satisfied with her personal life and optimistic about the future until a year or two ago. But losing her job after the 12-day war in June 2025, followed by January crackdown and another round of war have left her deeply pessimistic.
“Thinking about the future and planning for it causes severe anxiety not only for me but also for many people I know,” she said. “There is no hope because everything is extremely unstable, and any good news can be denied moments later.”
The sense of despair is also reflected in public commentary. Sociologist Amin Parvin wrote on X that repeatedly seeing expectations go unmet had replaced “the pleasure of being hopeful” with “living in despair.”
Economic uncertainty has become a persistent feature of everyday life. People with savings or assets worry about losing their value, while others struggle with the rising cost of food, rent and services.
Foreign currency exchange rates, gold and car prices—cars being widely regarded as investment assets in Iran—frequently rank among the most-read topics on Iranian news websites, sometimes attracting more attention than reports about war and negotiations.
Food prices, which fluctuate alongside exchange rates, are another major focus.
Inequality grows
At a recent seminar on social hope in Iran, Mehdi Malmir, a sociology professor at Shahid Beheshti University, presented figures indicating a substantial decline in public satisfaction over the past two decades.
According to Malmir, social satisfaction stood at about 76% in 2000, while 15% expressed absolute dissatisfaction. By 2023, satisfaction had fallen to 49.8%, while dissatisfaction had risen to nearly 40%.
Indicators relating to welfare, the economy and what he described as the moral condition of society had also declined, he said.
Malmir warned that growing poverty and inequality could further undermine hope. People need to see their circumstances improving and believe upward mobility remains possible, he said, adding that available statistics offered little evidence this was happening.
At the same meeting, sociologist Ensieh Jalalvand pointed to repeated protests, declining electoral participation and the spread of emigration across increasingly broad sections of society.
People need to see that their concerns are heard and can lead to tangible change, she said. “The issue is establishing a genuine mechanism through which people can be heard and acknowledged.”
The reformist newspaper Shargh similarly argued that hope depends on people seeing the future as at least partly predictable, believing rules apply equally and trusting that their efforts today can improve their lives tomorrow.
Official figures
The 2025 National Social Capital Report, prepared by the Interior Ministry's Social Affairs Organization and published in June, found that Iran's social capital index fell from 43.5% in 2015 to 36.6% in 2025.
The report found that 75% of respondents were dissatisfied with what they perceived as a lack of justice in society. Three-quarters felt they lived amid discrimination, inequality and the preferential distribution of opportunities through patronage.
The survey covered the period from early 2025 until the outbreak of the 12-day war in June of that year.
Sixty percent of respondents said they had no hope that conditions would improve, while the same proportion said they could no longer tolerate additional economic pressure, according to the findings cited by the Rouydad24 news website.
Rouydad24 said the consequences included the mass emigration of skilled workers, capital flight and a shift from productive activity toward short-term speculation.
The report also pointed to widespread dissatisfaction with the country's political direction. Seventy percent of respondents said changes to the country's overarching policies were necessary to improve their satisfaction.
Mohammad Bat’haei, a deputy interior minister and head of the Social Affairs Organization, described the findings as a serious warning.
The decline in social capital at the national level, reflecting citizens' trust in the country's governing system and institutions, was more pronounced than declines at intermediate and local levels, Bat’haei said.
For Sara, such questions are less abstract. Having once expected her life to improve, she now finds planning for the future itself a source of anxiety.
