Iran International
Mohsen Namjoo mocked the Quran, ridiculed religious figures and crossed political red lines that have brought severe punishment for others in Iran. Now back in the country, his return contrasts sharply with restrictions still imposed on female singers.
The contradiction is hard to miss. A government that has demanded ideological conformity from Iranians appears willing to overlook Namjoo’s past transgressions at a time when the Islamic Republic is under extraordinary military, economic and domestic pressure and is openly seeking to encourage some prominent Iranians abroad to return.
Rather than a sign of moderation, his return may reveal how flexible the Islamic Republic can become when its own rules are no longer useful.
Siavash Rokni, an expert on Iranian popular culture, and historian Shahram Kholdi told Iran International’s Eye for Iran that the apparent opening serves several purposes. It can distract from executions and political prisoners, project an image of a more tolerant Iran and send a message to the diaspora that even former critics may be able to return — although the state still decides who gets through the door.
“Diversion. I’m going to make this quite simple,” Rokni said.
Kholdi questioned whether the rules were really changing at all.
“Are they bending their own rules and principles?” he asked. “Or are they temporarily deactivating them?”
Namjoo is an extraordinary figure around whom to test that question.
The Mashhad-born musician left Iran in 2007 and was later sentenced in absentia to five years in prison for “insulting sanctities” over his use of Quranic verses in his music. It remains unclear publicly what became of that sentence before his return. Outside the country, he continued to ridicule religious and political symbols, including former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
He has also faced multiple allegations of sexual misconduct and abuse, which he denies.
And yet he has been allowed home.
His return was also highlighted by Iranian state media, which praised what it described as his “patriotic” opposition to US and Israeli attacks. Namjoo himself said he had encountered considerable kindness since returning.
Who gets to break the rules?
The contrast is particularly stark when Namjoo’s treatment is compared with that of female musicians inside Iran.
Singer Parastoo Ahmadi drew international attention after performing without the compulsory hijab in an online concert in 2024. She was briefly detained after the performance. In June 2026, she and members of her production team were reported to have been sentenced to 74 lashes, along with two-year bans on travel and artistic activity.
Rokni also pointed to Hiva Seyfizadeh, another female singer who was arrested during a live performance in Tehran in 2025.
The juxtaposition gets to the heart of the controversy surrounding Namjoo. A male musician known for ridiculing symbols the Islamic Republic considers sacred — and who has faced sexual misconduct allegations abroad can return, while women continue to face state pressure over their clothing and their voices.
“Why are female singers not able to sing and an alleged sexual abuser is back, is invited back to the country?” Rokni asked. “What is this double standard happening in this country?”
Namjoo’s return has generated precisely the kind of attention such a contradiction might be expected to produce. Iranians have argued over his decision to return, his past and what his presence in Tehran means.
That noise may itself be useful.
Rokni described the use of popular culture as part of a sophisticated communications strategy capable of shifting attention away from far more damaging issues for the state — among them executions, political prisoners, economic hardship and the repression of women.
“Namjoo is not, in my opinion, an important subject of conversation,” he said.
The point is not that his return is insignificant. It is that the spectacle surrounding one musician can swallow up the conversation about thousands of people who do not have the luxury of choosing whether to engage with the Islamic Republic.
An invitation with conditions
Namjoo’s homecoming also carries a message beyond Iran.
If someone who mocked the Quran and the country’s former supreme leader can return, other members of the diaspora may reasonably wonder whether the rules have changed for them too. That question is no longer hypothetical. Culture Minister Abbas Salehi has said his ministry compiled a list of more than 100 cultural, artistic and intellectual figures abroad whose return it wants to facilitate.
But the door does not open equally.
“Returning to one’s country has become a game of preferential treatment,” Rokni said.
The Islamic Republic effectively retains the power to determine which Iranians can come home, which critics can be forgiven and what compromises are required to make that possible.
History gives reason to be wary of assuming that an open door will remain open.
Kholdi recalled the experience of writer and dissident Saidi Sirjani, a prominent critic of the Islamic Republic. Following the death of its founder, Ruhollah Khomeini, Sirjani believed a different political era might be emerging and encouraged other Iranian intellectuals abroad to consider returning, Kholdi said.
Sirjani was arrested in 1994 and died in custody later that year under circumstances that remain disputed.
Kholdi also pointed to Iranian-Canadian scholar Ramin Jahanbegloo, who was arrested in Tehran in 2006 and detained for months before eventually leaving the country.
“I would not consider such moves a sign of the fact that they have become more moderate,” he said.
The history even gives Kholdi reason to worry about Namjoo himself.
“As a human who deserves the security and safety of life like any other normal person, I am worried for his safety,” he said.
Today’s welcome, in other words, does not guarantee tomorrow’s protection.
The power of an open door
That uncertainty carries particular weight for millions of Iranians abroad who still have family, professional and emotional ties to the country.
Kholdi said he was warned as a young academic that outspoken criticism of the Islamic Republic could cost him access to Iran, its archives and the field research needed for his career.
The threat did not have to be explicit. Access itself became leverage.
The same calculation can apply to artists, journalists, academics and ordinary diaspora Iranians who want to see parents or relatives. The state controls the door, and the possibility of losing access can shape behavior long before anyone attempts to cross the border.
Namjoo’s return makes that door appear wider.
It also gives the Islamic Republic a useful image to present to the outside world: a former critic who once violated some of its most sensitive taboos is back in Iran. How intolerant can the system be if someone like him is allowed to return?
Kholdi warned that there is another side to that calculation. Iran has repeatedly detained dual and foreign nationals who later became subjects of negotiations or prisoner exchanges, a practice critics of Tehran describe as hostage diplomacy.
The same state that can invite people in retains the power to prevent them from leaving.
That is why Namjoo’s return matters less as a story of one controversial musician coming home than as a glimpse of how the Islamic Republic behaves when under pressure.
It can enforce religious morality against a woman who sings without a hijab while overlooking the past of a man who mocked the Quran. It can imprison critics while advertising the return of another. And it can present selective tolerance as evidence of change without surrendering the power to reverse that tolerance later.
Namjoo’s return also appears to be part of a broader effort to selectively reopen the door to prominent Iranians abroad while the state retains the power to decide who may return and under what conditions.
The Islamic Republic’s red lines have not disappeared.
What Namjoo’s return exposes is that those lines were never equally rigid for everyone and that when the regime sees an advantage in moving them, even the principles it calls sacred can suddenly become negotiable.
Saeed Karami, deputy for cultural and political affairs at the Office of the Supreme Leader’s Representative in Universities, said the directive had been drafted and would soon be issued by the ministries of Science and Health, which oversee most universities and medical schools.
Karami told the semi-official Mehr news agency that existing regulations on hijab were “very good” and only needed renewed attention.
Asked whether universities would receive a “hijab charter,” Karami said “directive” was a more appropriate term. He did not give details of the measures it would contain or specify when they would take effect.
“We will certainly not witness the bitter incidents that we sometimes see on the streets at universities,” he said, without elaborating.
The planned directive comes amid a renewed push by hardline officials, clerics and government supporters to strengthen enforcement of compulsory hijab, four years after the death of Mahsa Jina Amini in morality police custody triggered the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising.
Women appearing in public without headscarves have since become commonplace in Tehran and other major cities, making rejection of compulsory hijab one of the most visible social changes to survive the 2022 protests.
Pressure has increased in recent weeks as hardliners demand implementation of the stalled Hijab and Chastity Law and criticize President Masoud Pezeshkian’s government for what they describe as a retreat on the issue.
Hardline lawmaker Mohammad-Taghi Naghd-Ali said Tuesday the government had backed down over hijab and accused it of failing to implement the legislation, describing compulsory veiling as one of the “foundations of the revolution.”
The more sweeping Hijab and Chastity Law remains suspended after the Supreme National Security Council instructed parliament not to promulgate it, Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf disclosed last year. The decision was widely seen as reflecting fears that aggressive enforcement could trigger renewed unrest.
Other signs of renewed pressure have appeared across Iran. The commander of the Revolutionary Guards in North Khorasan said this week that groups tasked with verbally warning women over their clothing were being revived, while pro-government gatherings demanding stricter hijab enforcement have been held in Qom, Birjand and Isfahan.
Iran International found last month that authorities had sealed at least 42 cafés, restaurants, shops, sports clubs and other businesses in 17 cities within three weeks over alleged violations of hijab rules and other Islamic norms.
Authorities have increasingly used business closures, judicial warnings and economic pressure rather than relying solely on the large-scale morality police patrols associated with enforcement before the 2022 uprising. Reports from inside Iran have nevertheless also pointed to renewed street warnings and patrol activity in several cities.
Universities have long been a particular focus of hijab enforcement and political control. Campuses became major centers of protest during the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising, and female students were among those who openly removed their headscarves in defiance of the state.
In April 2023, the Science Ministry said universities would not be required to provide educational, welfare and other services to students who refused to comply with hijab regulations. Female students were subsequently barred from campuses, summoned to disciplinary committees and in some cases suspended or expelled from dormitories.
At the University of Tehran, authorities later deployed women with seminary backgrounds to monitor students’ clothing, while students at several other institutions reported being photographed, having their student IDs recorded or being denied entry over their clothing.
At Tehran’s Amir Kabir University of Technology, students boycotted classes in 2024 after reports that more than 200 students had been barred from campus amid stricter dress-code enforcement. Similar pressure was subsequently reported at Tehran North Islamic Azad University.
Signs of renewed tension have emerged again this year. The Student Basij at Iran University of Science and Technology recently protested the presence of unveiled female students at an event attended by senior officials from the Science Ministry.
Despite successive enforcement campaigns, many Iranian women continue to appear without mandatory hijab in streets, cafés, shopping centers and other public spaces, maintaining a form of civil disobedience that has persisted since the Woman, Life, Freedom protests.
Messages, videos and accounts sent to Iran International described deployments of police, special units and Basij forces in Tehran, Mashhad, Shiraz, Karaj, Isfahan, Tabriz, Birjand, Khorramabad, Khomein, Abadan and Qeshm.
Reports of slower internet connections also emerged from several cities, including Tabriz and Babol.
Petrol prices doubled on Monday for drivers buying fuel outside their monthly subsidised quota, rising from 50,000 to 100,000 rials a litre, about 2.3 to 4.5 US cents. The government announced the increase two days earlier.
Monthly subsidized allocations remain unchanged. Motorists can buy 60 liters at 15,000 rials per liter, about 0.7 cents, and another 50 liters at 30,000 rials, about 1.3 cents.
The dollar figures are negligible. The wages are the point. Average monthly pay in Iran is around 250 million rials, about $113 at Tuesday's rate, and many workers earn closer to 200 million, or roughly $90 a month.
Security forces gather around fuel stations
Several residents of Mashhad told Iran International that security forces appeared around petrol stations on Sunday, hours before the new price took effect.
“On Monday evening, I passed three gas stations. Several police vehicles were stationed outside each one, and at one station there were large numbers of Basij motorcyclists and special unit forces,” one resident said.
Another Mashhad resident described police and special units positioned at fuel stations across the city.
Video sent to Iran International from Khorramabad in western Lorestan province showed security personnel, vehicles and motorcycles deployed around the city, including what appeared to be a mounted machine gun.
Fuel supplies had already faced disruptions over the previous three weeks in areas including Razavi Khorasan, South Khorasan, Tehran and Alborz provinces.
Citizens in early September reported station closures, long lines, restrictions on purchases and waits of about two hours to obtain 10 liters of gasoline.
A Birjand resident said some filling stations had closed and displayed notices blaming “technical problems,” while police were positioned at others.
Similar deployments were described in Shiraz, where a local reported a large security presence around Maali-Abad early Tuesday, and in Karaj, particularly Fardis, Gohardasht and Mehrshahr.
A resident of Khomein in Markazi province also described a long line and numerous police officers at a fuel station on Shohadaye Daneshjoo Street.
Special units deploy in Tehran
Several Tehran residents reported increased security deployments from Monday evening, including in Shahr-e Rey and Salsabil neighborhoods.
“The station was heavily secured. Special units and the Basij were constantly moving around, and the streets were crowded,” a resident who visited a fuel station near Ferdowsi Square in central Tehran around midnight said.
Another who went to a station on Pirouzi Street in the east described long vehicle lines with special units positioned nearby.
People in Isfahan and Abadan also reported armed police at filling stations. In Qeshm, a resident said armed personnel were deployed around major squares on Monday evening and that a confrontation occurred at the entrance to a filling station in Dargahan.
Two messages from Tabriz described a large security presence alongside deteriorating internet service.
“The city of Tabriz is full of special units. The forces are armed, and heavy equipment can also be seen,” one said.
A Babol citizen also reported slower mobile and fixed internet connections, though the reason for the disruption could not be established.
Gasoline prices carry particular political sensitivity in Iran. A sudden increase and rationing in November 2019 triggered demonstrations across dozens of cities that quickly expanded into nationwide anti-government protests.
Security forces killed around 1,500 people during the crackdown, according to a Reuters tally at the time. Thousands were arrested and authorities imposed a nationwide internet shutdown.
Government defends higher gasoline price
First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref defended the new rate, arguing that even 100,000 rials per liter remains far below the government's cost of importing gasoline.
Imported gasoline costs the government more than 700,000 rials per liter, equivalent to about 30 cents, Aref said. Imported fuel would gradually be sold at prices closer to its cost, he added.
The government's figures for what petrol costs to produce have not held up well to examination. In November 2025, after officials put the cost at 340,000 rials a litre, about 15 cents at current rates, Iran International went through the refineries' own financial statements. They showed operating costs, excluding the value of the crude going in, of around 35,000 rials a litre, roughly 1.6 cents, a tenth of the official figure.
Economist Mousa Ghaninejad has estimated actual gasoline consumption inside Iran at about 70 million liters a day and argued that much of the remainder recorded as consumption is smuggled out of the country.
Iranians warn of knock-on price increases
Thousands of people responding to an Iran International question about the fuel increase focused on its potential impact beyond filling stations, warning that transportation costs could push up food prices, fares and other everyday expenses.
“100,000 rials for a liter of gasoline may just be a number for some people, but for people it means another step toward making life harder,” one respondent wrote.
Another said petrol was not the problem on its own, and pointed to food. A five-liter container of cooking oil that used to cost 22 million rials, about $9.90, now sells for 40 million, roughly $18.
On a monthly wage of 200 million rials, that is a fifth of a month's pay for one container of oil.
“We buy everything at expensive dollar-linked prices, but our base salary is only $100. Where in the world can you see something like this?” one person wrote.
Another said wages would have to rise alongside prices, since households could not absorb repeated increases on incomes that had barely moved.
For younger respondents the loss was smaller and more particular. "The feeling of going on a trip is gone. Going out for a 10-minute drive is gone. We young people said goodbye to small pleasures a long time ago," one wrote.
Minister of State Stephen Doughty said the government was introducing legislation to tighten financial and trade restrictions, widen powers to sanction ships linked to Iran and bar Iranian aircraft from landing in the UK unless exemptions apply.
“Today we are laying legislation which will tackle Iranian nuclear activity and other hostile Iranian activity,” Doughty said in a written statement to parliament.
Focus on nuclear program
Doughty said Iran had expanded its nuclear program in ways that had no credible civilian justification and pointed to its stockpile of more than 400 kg of uranium enriched to 60%.
“Iran is the only country without nuclear weapons to enrich uranium to this level,” he said.
Britain restored UN sanctions on Iran in October 2025 after the snapback mechanism was triggered and also designated 71 people and entities linked to Iran's nuclear program, including financial institutions and energy companies.
Wider trade and financial restrictions
The new rules expand restrictions on goods, technology and services tied to sectors including energy, software, metals and gold, as well as shipping, insurance and banking.
They also ban exports of additional goods and technology that Britain says could support Iran's conventional weapons and nuclear capabilities.
Doughty said the financial measures would “further reduce the Government of Iran’s ability to access the UK financial system and raise funds in support of its nuclear programme.”
Shipping and aviation targeted
Britain will also gain broader powers to sanction ships that it says enable or facilitate Iran's nuclear program or other destabilizing activity.
Iranian aircraft will be barred from landing in the UK unless exemptions apply, following Britain's termination of bilateral air service arrangements with Iran in 2024.
The legislation includes exemptions to allow continued operations at the Shah Deniz gas field in Azerbaijan, which supplies energy to European countries.
Doughty said Britain remained committed to diplomacy, saying a negotiated outcome was “the only long-term solution” to the dispute over Iran's nuclear program.
The strikes targeted civilian and economic sites in Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jizan and Najran, according to Turki al-Maliki, spokesperson for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. He said women and children were among those injured.
Yahya Saree, the Houthi’s military spokesman, also said that the group launched a “broad military operation” deep inside Saudi territory with drones and ballistic missiles to target Saudi energy sites belonging to oil giant Aramco.
Saudi Arabia’s Energy Ministry said the attacks caused fires at several energy facilities and utilities, temporarily halting some operations. Emergency crews were working to extinguish the fires, secure the affected sites and assess the damage.
“The coalition will take all necessary operational measures to deter this terrorist militia,” Maliki said, pledging a firm response.
The attacks came after Iranian officials warned that energy infrastructure across the Persian Gulf, including US oil and gas interests, was vulnerable following renewed exchanges of attacks involving vessels around the Strait of Hormuz.
Houthi attacks helped push oil prices to their highest levels in more than six weeks, according to Reuters. Shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea has already slowed amid threats to commercial vessels and uncertainty over access to the two critical waterways.
The Houthis, who control Yemen’s capital and much of the country’s north, declared a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia in July and have since attacked vessels in the Red Sea and targets inside the country.
The GCC denounced the strikes, describing them as a threat to regional security and backing measures taken by Riyadh to protect its territory and population. Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Egypt and Jordan also issued separate condemnations.
The attacks mark a further escalation in the war that began with US and Israeli strikes on Iran on February 28. Repeated missile and drone strikes, along with attacks on shipping and energy infrastructure, have punctuated lulls in the fighting.
US President Donald Trump said on Monday that oil prices would fall sharply once the United States won the war, adding that “Iran will never have a nuclear weapon.”
