Senior visiting fellow, George Mason University
US attacks on Iranian oil tankers could make it far harder and more expensive for Tehran to keep selling its crude, but the strategy carries a potentially much larger cost: turning the Persian Gulf’s energy infrastructure into an expanding battlefield.
The latest US strikes on three Iranian oil tankers mark a significant escalation in Washington’s economic campaign against Tehran, moving beyond sanctions and blockade to the physical destruction of vessels used to export Iranian oil.
US forces on September 5 disabled two tankers near Kharg Island and Jask and destroyed a third in the Gulf of Oman, according to US Central Command, which described the vessels as part of a “multibillion-dollar shadow network” supporting the IRGC and its regional partners.
The strikes followed Iranian ballistic missile attacks on US naval forces that caused no American casualties. CENTCOM commander Adm. Brad Cooper warned Washington was prepared to impose an “even higher economic cost” on Tehran.
The significance of the strikes lies less in the loss of three ships than in the change in tactics. Washington has spent years trying to make Iranian oil harder to sell through sanctions, restrictions on financial transactions and pressure on buyers and shipping networks. Since mid-July, the US naval blockade has added a physical barrier.
Now, the vessels themselves are becoming targets.
From financial to physical risk
The shift comes as Iran’s oil exports are already under severe pressure.
Ship-tracking data indicated Iranian crude loadings fell to roughly 220,000–255,000 barrels per day in August, from about 740,000 bpd in July and peaks close to 2 million bpd before the conflict.
For weeks, no meaningful Iranian crude cargoes were able to reach China through the Strait of Hormuz, leaving more oil in floating storage inside the Persian Gulf.
Iran has spent years building a shadow shipping network capable of operating around Western sanctions, relying on opaque ownership structures, reflagging, manipulation of vessel-tracking systems and ship-to-ship transfers to move crude, particularly to China.
Those methods are useful when the main challenge is avoiding financial sanctions or detection. They offer far less protection if the vessels themselves become military targets.
Sanctions forced Iran to find ships willing to evade Washington. The new strategy may force it to find ships and crews willing to risk being attacked.
That could make the shadow fleet more expensive and difficult to operate. Many of its tankers are aging vessels already working outside conventional Western insurance and maritime-service networks.
If owners, crews and operators come to regard Iranian-linked voyages as carrying a serious risk of attack, some may demand greater compensation or decide the trade is no longer worthwhile.
Washington cannot, however, simply eliminate the shadow fleet overnight. The network is dispersed and adaptable. Ships can change names, flags and ownership structures, while Tehran can alter loading patterns or move ship-to-ship transfers farther from areas dominated by US forces.
But every vessel lost imposes another cost. Iran must replace it, find another operator willing to accept the risk or leave more crude stranded in storage.
Floating storage offers only temporary relief. Oil held offshore does not generate revenue until it reaches a buyer, and prolonged disruption can eventually force producers to cut output as storage fills.
The question is therefore not whether three tanker strikes can dismantle Iran’s export system. They cannot. It is whether repeated physical losses can gradually undermine the commercial network that has allowed Tehran to keep selling oil despite years of sanctions.
A wider energy battlefield
That strategy carries an obvious risk: once Washington treats Iran’s oil-export system as a military target, Tehran has a stronger incentive to widen the energy battlefield.
Iran has already used attacks and threats against maritime traffic as a means of imposing costs on its adversaries. The Strait of Hormuz remains central to that strategy because of the enormous volumes of oil and liquefied natural gas that normally pass through it.
Further reducing Iranian export revenues could weaken Tehran’s ability to finance the IRGC and allied armed groups while increasing the economic cost of continued confrontation.
But direct attacks on tankers could also reinforce the Iranian leadership’s argument that compromise will not end US pressure and that imposing costs on regional energy flows is one of Tehran’s remaining forms of leverage.
That matters well beyond Iran.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have invested heavily in export routes that partially bypass Hormuz, including Saudi pipelines to the Red Sea and the UAE’s link to Fujairah. But those alternatives cannot fully replace normal flows through the Strait, while Kuwait and Iraq remain particularly dependent on the waterway.
Even without major damage to regional infrastructure, greater insecurity can raise war-risk insurance premiums, freight rates and other costs for commercial operators.
The tanker strikes therefore strengthen Washington’s leverage only if they can impose additional costs on Tehran without triggering a broader contest over the region’s energy infrastructure.
Physical attacks may hurt an Iranian oil-export system that has spent years learning to circumvent sanctions. But they also give Tehran stronger incentives to retaliate against the system through which its neighbors export their own energy.
The strategic gamble for Washington is therefore not simply whether tanker strikes can further squeeze Tehran’s oil revenues. It is whether Iran can be made to bear those costs without deciding that its adversaries’ energy exports should bear them too.
“There’s probably only about 30 million barrels of Iranian crude oil left that China hasn’t bought,” Bessent said. “So that will run out soon, and there will be no problem with China buying because they have no product.”
Bessent described the pressure campaign, dubbed “Operation Economic Outcast,” as the largest effort to isolate a country economically and said Washington intended to “asphyxiate” Iran’s ruling establishment.
“The blockade is working like nothing we’ve ever seen, and the combination - everyone says sanctions don’t work - but I can tell you, blockade and sanctions are one of the most powerful one-two punches in the history of economic isolation,” he said.
Asked about his prediction that the Strait of Hormuz would become irrelevant to the oil industry within two years, Bessent said oil-producing countries around the Persian Gulf were developing “alternative pipeline routes that will no longer entail oil going through the Strait of Hormuz.”
Bessent also rejected the suggestion that Iran controlled the waterway.
“The Iranian chokehold, to the extent they have one - and I can tell you, they do not have one - we are in control of the strait,” he said. “To the extent that they can threaten their neighbors, once we leave, that will not exist anymore.”
Iran’s Economy Ministry has established an “economic war” command center to coordinate and accelerate responses to economic problems caused by the conflict, deputy economy Minister Morteza Zamanian said on Sunday.
He acknowledged that higher energy prices caused by the conflict were affecting Americans but predicted that the shock would end and wage growth would continue.
“This war will end, and those will turn into real wage gains,” Bessent said.
He added that the administration expected the conflict to leave Iran unable to develop a nuclear weapon.
“I think we are going to get to the other side of this Iran conflict with a safer world, with an Iran that cannot have a nuclear weapon,” he said.
The United States imposed a naval blockade in July alongside expanded sanctions aimed at restricting Iran’s oil exports and cutting a key source of government revenue.
Iran’s Economy Ministry has, meanwhile, established an “economic war” command center to coordinate and accelerate responses to economic problems caused by the conflict, Deputy Economy Minister Morteza Zamanian said on Sunday.
The center will initially focus on problems affecting businesses, trade and financing within the ministry’s authority, while using government economic bodies to coordinate responses across agencies, he added.
The apartments are at 3a Palace Green, an exclusive development overlooking Kensington Palace and close to the official London residence of the Prince and Princess of Wales. Both properties include staff accommodation and private roof terraces, according to the report.
One is a five-bedroom duplex covering 3,944 square feet across the sixth and seventh floors. It was purchased for £19 million in 2016 but is now being offered for just under £12 million.
Knight Frank and Sotheby’s International Realty are jointly marketing the apartment. The listing describes it as “an exceptional duplex penthouse with staff accommodation and commanding unrivalled views across Kensington Gardens from one of London’s most prestigious addresses.”
The brochure does not identify its politically sensitive connections but notes: “Due to the property being in receivership, we do not have all of the material information for the property; therefore you should ensure you make all relevant inquiries,” the report said.
The second penthouse occupies the seventh and eighth floors of the same building. It was bought for £16.75 million in 2014 and has also entered receivership.
Land Registry documents show that financial advisory firm Teneo was appointed as its receiver, the report said, adding that the apartment does not appear to have been publicly listed, leaving its asking price unknown.
Several prospective buyers are believed to have viewed the properties amid significant interest, according to The Sunday Times.
The registered owner of both apartments is Iranian banker Ali Ansari, whom the US Treasury sanctioned in July as a “key financier” for Khamenei. Washington said Ansari “oversees a sprawling global network of assets benefiting Iran’s leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, and other regime elites.”
Ansari was previously sanctioned by Britain over allegations that he financed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. His British assets were frozen, and he was barred from entering the country. He is understood to deny wrongdoing.
The British government is believed to have authorized the sale of the two apartments after Ansari defaulted on their mortgages, according to The Sunday Times. The private lenders that financed the purchases appointed receivers to recover their money, although the amount originally borrowed is not known.
Any proceeds remaining after the lenders are repaid are expected to be frozen while Ansari remains under sanctions.
Neither Khamenei nor Ansari has been seen by employees at the Palace Green development since the apartments were purchased, the newspaper reported.
Since his father was killed in US-Israeli airstrikes in February, Mojtaba Khamenei has not been seen or heard publicly, leaving his condition and circumstances unclear.
