Iran International
Iran-UAE ties have unraveled over the past two months, beginning with Iranian airstrikes on Emirati targets during the US-led war and escalating into a crisis that now threatens one of Tehran’s most vital trade and financial channels.
During the conflict, Iran struck civilian buildings, oil facilities, and sensitive infrastructure, including a data center linked to Oracle. In response, the UAE recalled its ambassador from Tehran, signaling a swift escalation in diplomatic tensions.
The diplomatic fallout deepened further this week when UAE state security authorities said they had arrested members of what they described as a “terrorist group linked to Iran’s ruling system” in Sharjah. The suspects were accused of planning attacks, undermining national security, and facilitating illicit financial transfers.
At the same time, Tehran has formally demanded compensation from several regional states, including the UAE, for allowing their airspace and bases to be used by the United States and Israel in strikes against Iran.
These developments have intensified a crisis that threatens to disrupt one of Iran’s most vital economic lifelines.
A deeply rooted economic partnership
Despite long-standing disputes, including disagreements over the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, Iran and the UAE have built extensive and resilient economic ties over the past several decades.
Geographical proximity, advanced port infrastructure, and liberal trade regulations have transformed the UAE into a hub for Iranian commerce since the end of the Iran-Iraq War. Thousands of Iranian companies have established operations there, and a large share of Iran’s imports has flowed through re-export channels based in Dubai. Over time, the UAE became not just a trading partner but a critical gateway to global markets for heavily-sanctioned Iran.
For much of the past two decades, the UAE has ranked either first or second among Iran’s trading partners, often competing closely with China. Today, it remains one of the largest suppliers of goods to Iran, accounting for a significant share of its imports.
Roughly one-third of goods entering Iran—from mobile phones and electronics to auto parts, cosmetics, and clothing—have passed through the UAE, representing trade worth billions of dollars annually. The disruption of this flow is already being felt. In some sectors, such as mobile phones, prices have reportedly surged by 40 to 50 percent following the halt in imports.
With limited alternatives offering the same combination of proximity, infrastructure, and financial connectivity, any prolonged rupture could deepen Iran’s economic isolation and accelerate a costly realignment of its trade networks.
Trade imbalance and export structure
Iran’s exports to the UAE have largely consisted of oil products, petrochemicals such as fertilizers and industrial feedstocks, metals and minerals, agricultural goods including fresh produce and nuts, and construction materials like stone. However, much of this trade has been indirect, with the UAE serving as a re-export hub for Iranian goods destined for third markets.
At the same time, exports from the UAE to Iran have consistently exceeded Iran’s exports in the opposite direction, creating a significant trade imbalance. The UAE’s role as an intermediary—rather than a final destination—has been central to this asymmetry.
Sanctions and the UAE’s pivotal role
The importance of the UAE grew dramatically after the tightening of US and European sanctions on Iran, particularly following Washington’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) in 2018. As direct trade routes narrowed, the UAE became the primary conduit for goods, capital, and financial flows into Iran.
Emirati exports to Iran rose from around $5.2 billion in 2018 to more than $20 billion in recent years. Dubai also became a financial hub for Iranian exchange houses, many of which played a key role in facilitating currency transfers and circumventing sanctions. Exchange rates set in Dubai’s markets often influenced the value of the Iranian rial domestically.
However, this system is now under pressure. UAE authorities have reportedly targeted Iranian exchange houses and so-called “trust companies,” freezing accounts, shutting offices, and detaining some operators. These actions could severely constrain Iran’s access to international financial channels.
Impact on the Iranian diaspora
The measures taken extend beyond trade to the large Iranian community in the UAE. More than 500,000 Iranians have lived and worked there, supported by frequent travel links that once included around 300 weekly flights between the two countries.
Since the outbreak of hostilities, Emirati authorities have taken a series of restrictive measures. A long-standing Iranian government hospital was closed, along with Iranian schools and a branch of Islamic Azad University. Some students were reportedly detained before later being released.
In addition, assets linked to Iranian state institutions, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), have been targeted. While ordinary Iranian residents have not broadly faced asset seizures, many report visa cancellations, especially for those outside the UAE at the time. Others have been given only days to leave.
Business owners say bank accounts have been frozen in some cases, and many who built livelihoods over decades now face abrupt displacement. As a result, numerous Iranian traders are seeking to relocate operations to alternative hubs such as China, Hong Kong, Oman, or Turkey, highlighting a potential long-term shift in regional trade patterns.
Trading has been suspended for two months. Ticker symbols remain closed, and millions of retail investors have been unable to move their assets.
The head of the Securities and Exchange Organization said the market would reopen within ten to twelve days in phases. In the first stage, only companies not directly damaged by the war will resume trading, while steel and petrochemical firms that suffered losses will remain closed.
Reopening a damaged petrochemical company whose production has halted and whose recovery costs and timeline are unclear would likely trigger a sharp price drop and create a volatile market signal. Yet the current approach of prolonged closure presents deeper structural concerns.
There are three conceivable scenarios for reopening the Tehran Stock Market.
Scenario one: Comprehensive deal with US
The first scenario envisions a comprehensive agreement and broad sanctions relief. In an optimistic case, Iran reconnects to the global financial system, oil and petrochemical exports face fewer restrictions, and foreign investment gradually returns. Market reopening could then mark the beginning of long-delayed reforms: transition from price controls to market pricing, reduced financial repression in banking, and transparent government balance sheets.
Export-oriented sectors such as steel, petrochemicals, and copper would benefit from renewed access to global markets. Banks could reassess their balance sheets and shift toward genuine credit evaluation. Foreign investors, absent for nearly two decades, might gradually return.
However, without internal coordination and structural reform, even sanctions relief would not rescue the TEDPIX.
Scenario two: Limited military and regional agreement
A more likely scenario involves a limited agreement focused on military and regional tensions. Hostilities ease, but sanctions remain largely intact and foreign investment prospects stay uncertain.
Under these conditions, reopening may trigger a new crisis. Major export-driven firms would initially remain untradeable. Downstream industries would face raw material shortages and price spikes. The automotive sector, already loss-making before the war, would struggle with supply chain disruptions and accumulated losses.
Meanwhile, limited foreign currency inflows could push the government toward inflationary financing to fund reconstruction and subsidies, either through money creation or borrowing from banks already dependent on regulatory forbearance. With high inflation ahead, questions arise about how listed firms can generate sufficient value to remain profitable, especially amid infrastructure damage and seasonal energy shortages.
Investors, having endured months of uncertainty without clear disclosure of portfolio losses, may view reopening as an exit opportunity. Investment funds facing redemption waves would be forced into selling queues, amplifying downward pressure. The market could reopen with a heavy backlog of sell orders, and each negative headline could trigger further declines.
Scenario three: Continued conflict and further escalation
If negotiations fail and conflict intensifies, prolonged closure would likely continue. In such a scenario, Tehran Stock Exchange, under its current management and policy framework, could effectively cease to function as a credible capital market.
Policymakers may believe closure prevents price collapse, but in practice, investor confidence collapses instead. Alternative investment channels gain prominence: foreign currency, gold, real estate, consumer goods, or capital flight to neighboring countries.
Iran’s economy before and after the war
Even before the recent conflict, Iran’s economy faced a structural crisis. Industrial capacity was constrained by aging machinery, energy imbalances, and sanctions. Institutional trust was at its lowest level in four decades. Key industries — steel, petrochemicals, automotive, and banking — were either loss-making or dependent on hidden subsidies. War in such an environment acts as a crisis accelerator, pushing uncertainty beyond policymakers’ management capacity.
Tools available for reopening — tighter price limits, sales restrictions, targeted liquidity injections, and market-maker intervention — can at best distribute the shock and manage short-term risk. They cannot substitute for honest disclosure of losses, independent audit assessments, and credible reconstruction plans.
Reopening the Tehran Stock Exchange alone will not resolve broader economic challenges. In the best-case scenario, it could form part of a larger reform package aligned with political agreement and foreign capital inflows. In the other two scenarios, reopening may merely accelerate the crisis cycle.
The core question facing policymakers is political rather than technical: are they willing to accept the real market value of shareholders’ assets, or will they postpone the cost through opacity and suspension, only to face a larger reckoning later.
“Prices here have increased tenfold and rice and cooking oil are hard to find,” one resident wrote from Zahedan in southeastern Iran, pointing to worsening access to staple goods.
Other citizens described the rapid erosion of purchasing power. “We go to sleep and wake up to everything being twice as expensive,” one message said, reflecting widespread concern over accelerating inflation.
Food costs climb, access narrows
Messages from multiple cities highlighted steep increases in the cost of everyday items. Citizens said even the most basic foods were becoming unaffordable, with eggs, rice and cooking oil among the hardest hit.
“Eggs have become so expensive they are being removed from our tables,” one citizen wrote, describing the shrinking range of affordable protein options.
Restaurant prices were also cited as an indicator of inflation. Citizens said a single serving of kebab now costs between 5,000,000 and 6,000,000 rials (about $3.10 to $3.75), while a plate of chicken with rice ranges from 3,000,000 to 4,000,000 rials (about $1.90 to $2.50). Soft drinks were reported to exceed 1,000,000 rials (about $0.60).
Based on an exchange rate of around 1,600,000 rials per dollar, the new minimum monthly wage of 162,550,000 rials is equivalent to roughly $104. This comes as annual inflation had already exceeded 70 percent before the start war on February 28, reaching its highest level since World War II.
As of late 2025/early 2026, average Iranian incomes have contracted to roughly $200 per month.
Shortages compounded the problem. Messages described difficulty finding chicken in distribution centers and limits on purchasing cooking oil in shops. Others pointed to disruptions in supply chains linked to industrial slowdowns and rising production costs.
Economic journalist Arash Azarmi said the surge in food prices was hitting lower-income households hardest. “Eggs priced at 200,000 rials ($0.12) each are shocking. This is a basic food item, especially for lower-income households, and it is effectively being pushed out of their consumption basket,” Azarmi said.
Official data, he added, already showed food inflation exceeding 112 percent, with some categories such as cooking oil rising by more than 200 percent.
Iran’s monthly minimum wage for workers is set at one of the lowest levels compared to many countries in the region. Among Oman, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iraq, Qatar, Pakistan and Lebanon, the lowest minimum wage belongs to Pakistan, where workers earn at least the equivalent of $133. This figure is about $201 in Lebanon, around $275 in Qatar, about $345 in Iraq, and $625 and $585 in Turkey and Oman, respectively.
Pressure spreads beyond food
Beyond rising prices, citizens said financial obligations continued to tighten during and after the conflict period, adding to the strain on households and businesses.
“During the war there was no tax relief, insurance was taken in full from the private sector, and all loans faced late penalties despite earlier promises,” one message said, describing continued pressure on businesses.
Another citizen pointed to mounting banking enforcement and legal follow-up tied to unpaid debts. “All checks were bounced, accounts were closed and legal action started. Loan installments were either collected with interest or deducted from guarantors,” the message read.
Business owners described a cycle of rising costs and falling demand. A clothing seller said prices for goods were increasing by around 35 percent each week, while customers’ ability to pay continued to decline.
Jobs scarce, costs rising
Citizens also pointed to a lack of job opportunities and growing difficulty in covering basic living expenses, including rent and utilities.
“There is no work and our savings are gone,” one citizen said, describing limited options for supplementing income.
Others reported rising bills even as businesses slowed or shut down. “We cannot pay rent, we cannot work,” another citizen wrote, pointing to disruptions affecting daily commerce.
Small business owners said they were increasingly operating at a loss. One restaurant operator said higher meat prices and reduced customer demand were pushing the business toward closure. “If this continues, we will shut down and pay rent from our own pockets,” the message read.
Experts warn of accelerating inflation
Economist Mohammad Machinechian said the pace of price increases had reached a point where monthly inflation was more relevant than annual figures.
“I’m no longer talking about annual inflation, but monthly inflation, and that is the reality we’re dealing with,” Machinechian said. “Even in the best-case scenario, inflation could average at least 5 percent a month, meaning prices rise around 80 percent over a year.”
Machinechian added that in a prolonged stalemate scenario, prices could triple over the year, while renewed conflict could push monthly inflation above 20 percent, leading to annual increases approaching 500 percent.
Azarmi described the situation as a “modern famine,” where goods remain available but are increasingly unaffordable for many households.
The accounts from citizens across the country depict an economy where rapid price increases, supply constraints and falling incomes are converging, leaving many struggling to secure even the most basic necessities.
