Hardliners pile on 'traitor' Zarif, urge his arrest over call for end of war

One of the clearest examples came on March 10, when Police Commander Ahmad-Reza Radan addressed the possibility of protests during the conflict.

Speaking on state television, he warned that anyone who took to the streets “at the will of the enemy” would no longer be treated as a protester but as an “enemy combatant.”

The wording marked a significant escalation. By invoking the language of combat, the state effectively framed domestic dissent as participation in the war itself.

Such framing has appeared repeatedly in recent broadcasts. Commentators and officials frequently describe protests not as political grievances but as extensions of foreign military pressure.

The same rhetorical shift is evident in the way foreign adversaries are described. Television hosts increasingly employ dehumanizing metaphors to portray Western and Israeli leaders.

Israeli officials have been repeatedly referred to as “rabid dogs” on talk shows, imagery that casts them as biological threats rather than political opponents.

Foreign-based Persian-language media outlets are portrayed in similarly extreme terms. Iran International TV, for example, has been described on state television as a “satanic network,” while presenters have warned that its regional offices could be considered legitimate targets.

The tone is often even more unrestrained online, where state television presenters engage in public taunts and insults with Israeli officials and journalists on social media.

The language echoes wartime propaganda seen in many conflicts, where demonization of the enemy is used to mobilize domestic support. But the Iranian broadcasts go further by combining this rhetoric with arguments that dismiss international norms governing warfare.

On several television panel discussions in March, state-aligned analysts suggested that international humanitarian law and institutions such as the United Nations serve merely as tools of Western power.

Some commentators declared bluntly that “the age of diplomacy is dead” and that the West understands only “the language of missiles.”

In this atmosphere, messaging increasingly serves not only to condemn foreign adversaries but also to warn domestic audiences about the consequences of dissent.

When protests are described as actions carried out “at the will of the enemy,” the implication is that political opposition itself becomes a form of collaboration with hostile powers.

Wars have always reshaped political language. Governments under military pressure tend to simplify narratives, divide the world into allies and enemies, and suppress ambiguity. Iran’s state television now appears to be moving decisively in that direction.

When state television begins speaking about its own citizens in the language of the battlefield, it signals that the war is no longer being presented as something happening only beyond the country’s borders.

In a phone call on Tuesday with European Council President Antonio Costa, Pezeshkian said Iran has the “necessary will” to bring the conflict to an end - provided that “essential conditions, especially guarantees to prevent renewed aggression, are met.”

Following Pezeshkian’s remarks, US President Donald Trump wrote on Truth Social that the “president of the new Iranian regime” had requested a ceasefire. Oil prices dipped slightly after the comments.

Iranian officials swiftly rejected Trump’s characterization. Mehdi Tabatabaei, the deputy for communications and information at the president’s office, responded on X:

“The position of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the defense of the nation against the aggression of evildoers and the conditions for ending the imposed war has not changed, and there is no regard for the delusions and lies of criminals.”

In a letter addressed to the American public published on Wednesday, Pezeshkian reiterated that Iran’s military actions were “purely a response and defense, not the initiation of war and aggression.” He described continued confrontation as “costly and fruitless,” signaling a more pragmatic tone from parts of the political establishment.

• 

  Rift deepens between Iran’s president and Guards chief over war, economy

• 

  IRGC pressured Pezeshkian to appoint Zolghadr as security chief

Hardliners and figures aligned with the security establishment have set stricter conditions for ending the war. Mohsen Rezaei, now a military adviser to Mojtaba Khamenei, has said the conflict should only end with reparations and guarantees, including the removal of US bases from the region.

Hardliner backlash intensifies

Pezeshkian’s comments triggered strong criticism from conservative and hardline figures. Lawmaker Hamid Rasaei described the remarks as evidence of a “wavering personality” and “passivity in the face of the enemy,” arguing that such positions could embolden further attacks.

Rasaei has previously compared Pezeshkian to Iran’s first president, Abolhassan Banisadr, who was removed from office by parliament for “political incompetence”. Similar comparisons have circulated widely on social media in recent days.

Some critics framed the conflict as a struggle between “truth and falsehood” and opposed any negotiated settlement short of total victory.

Calls for deterrence over diplomacy

In an open letter published on X, hardline activist Mohammad Shirakvand criticized Pezeshkian’s appeal for European guarantees, writing: “When you yourself state that the United States does not believe in diplomacy, what does speaking of guarantees for ending the war mean other than repeating a costly mistake?”

“This war is a battle of truth against falsehood and an arena of clashing wills. The government must play on this field, not on promises that have repeatedly proven unreliable,” he added.

Shirakvand argued that “real guarantees are not built through diplomacy, but through power and deterrence on the battlefield.”

• 

  IRGC takes de facto control of Iran government amid deepening power struggle

• 

  Pezeshkian grilled after apologizing for ‘fire at will’ strikes on neighbors

Another widely shared post by a conservative account, Rah-e Dialameh, described Pezeshkian’s remarks as “sending a signal of weakness to the enemy,” linking them to the drop in oil prices and warning that such a strategy “must be stopped before it causes further damage.”

Some hardline users accused Pezeshkian of “sending ceasefire signals” and weakening Iran’s military posture, demanding that security authorities “control” him.

One user appeared to issue an implicit threat, suggesting authorities should restrict his public appearances “to protect his life,” claiming the country “is better managed on autopilot.”

Son defends the president’s stance

Amid escalating criticism, Pezeshkian’s son and adviser, Yousef Pezeshkian, publicly defended his father. He challenged critics’ logic, asking: “I do not understand the meaning of these criticisms; are we not seeking to meet conditions and obtain guarantees? Or are we seeking war until the complete destruction of America and Israel?”

He framed the president’s position as a realistic attempt at conditional de-escalation, contrasting it with what he implied were unrealistic or maximalist goals.

He also defended his father’s earlier apology to neighboring countries affected by Iranian strikes, calling it an “ethical duty” and highlighting efforts to maintain regional relations despite the conflict.

As the regional conflict involving Iran, Israel, and the United States escalates, Iran’s state broadcaster, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), has undergone a marked transformation in tone and language.

In a segment of a program on Iran’s state broadcaster, presenter Mohammad Jafar Khosravi acknowledged that officials are hiding in safe houses among ordinary citizens and urged the public not to reveal their locations, warning that otherwise they would be “finished” and targeted.

Alongside this shift, dehumanizing language toward foreign adversaries has become increasingly common. Following intensified strikes in late February, IRIB hosts and commentators repeatedly described Israeli officials as “rabid dogs,” portraying them as threats that must be eliminated.

The escalation in tone extends beyond broadcast television. On social media platform X, IRIB presenters have engaged in increasingly personal exchanges with Israeli officials.

Figures such as Ameneh Saadat Zabihpour and Ali Rezvani, both sanctioned by the United States in 2022 as "Interrogator Journalists", have traded insults with Israeli spokespersons, with some interactions descending into personal attacks, religious provocation, and inflammatory rhetoric.

"After blunt death threats by the Revolutionary Guard, aired on State TV and the televised intimidation of the women's football team, State TV presenters are openly calling for the murder of the people of Iran," the Iranian Independent Filmmakers Association (IIFMA) said in a post on its Instagram.

"The recent calls for 'shoot-to-kill' verdicts make the broadcaster an instrument of direct attack on a population already reeling from the violent suppression of January uprising," the Association said last month.

The IRGC has blocked presidential appointments and decisions while erecting a security perimeter around the core of power, effectively sidelining the government from executive control.

Efforts by Masoud to appoint a new intelligence minister last Thursday collapsed under direct pressure from IRGC chief-commander Ahmad Vahidi, sources with knowledge of the situation told Iran International.

All proposed candidates, including Hossein Dehghan, were rejected. Vahidi is said to have insisted that, given wartime conditions, all critical and sensitive leadership positions must be selected and managed directly by the IRGC until further notice.

Under Iran’s political system, presidents have traditionally nominated intelligence ministers only after securing the approval of the Supreme Leader, who holds ultimate authority over key security portfolios.

However, with the condition and whereabouts of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei unclear in recent weeks, the IRGC is now effectively blocking the president from advancing its preferred candidate, further consolidating its grip over the state’s security apparatus.

Security cordon around Khamenei Jr.

Pezeshkian has repeatedly sought an urgent meeting with Mojtaba Khamenei in recent days, but all requests have gone unanswered, with no contact established.

Informed sources say a “military council” composed of senior IRGC officers now exercises full control over the core decision-making structure, enforcing a security cordon around Mojtaba Khamenei and preventing government reports on the country’s situation from reaching him.

Speculation has also emerged regarding whether Mojtaba Khamenei’s health condition may be contributing to the current power dynamics.

Efforts to remove Hejazi

At the same time, an unprecedented internal crisis is reportedly unfolding within Mojtaba Khamenei’s inner circle. Some close associates are said to be pushing to remove Ali Asghar Hejazi, a powerful security figure in the Supreme Leader’s office.

The tensions are rooted in Hejazi’s explicit opposition to Mojtaba Khamenei’s potential succession. He had previously warned members of the Assembly of Experts that Mojtaba lacks the necessary qualifications for leadership and argued that hereditary succession is incompatible with the principles outlined by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, according to informed sources.

Hejazi reportedly cautioned that elevating Mojtaba would effectively hand full control of the country to the IRGC and permanently sideline civilian institutions.

In the first week of the ongoing war, Israeli media reported that Hejazi had been targeted in an airstrike in Tehran. However, later reports indicated that he survived the attack.

What appears, at first glance, as a dynastic shift is in fact the continuation of an ideological and institutional project: the consolidation and reproduction of Khameneism.

The central argument is straightforward: Mojtaba Khamenei does not represent a new phase in the Islamic Republic. He represents the success of a long-term process of “rail-laying”—a deliberate restructuring of power that ensures continuity regardless of who formally occupies the position of Supreme Leader. In this sense, the system no longer depends on individual authority; it reproduces a predefined ideological and political logic.

This transformation was made possible by the way Ali Khamenei maximized the latent capacities of the Islamic Republic’s constitutional framework. The constitution already concentrates extraordinary power in the office of the Supreme Leader. However, Khamenei did not merely operate within these limits—he expanded and operationalized them. Over 37 years, he systematically turned flexible or ambiguous mechanisms into rigid and enforceable structures, embedding his ideological preferences into the institutional fabric of the state.

One of the clearest examples of this process is the evolution of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution. This body, notably absent from the constitution, was gradually transformed under Khamenei into a central pillar of ideological control. What began as a mechanism for purging universities in the early years of the revolution became a highly structured institution with dozens of sub-councils, extending its reach across education, culture, media, and social policy. It evolved into a powerful instrument for shaping and policing societal norms—without ever requiring formal constitutional legitimacy. This is Khameneism in practice: the ability to formalize control without formal law.

A similar trajectory can be observed in the transformation of the Guardian Council. Originally conceived as a supervisory body overseeing legislation and elections, it was reengineered into a decisive mechanism for controlling political outcomes. Through expanded vetting powers and systematic disqualification of candidates, the council moved from oversight to orchestration. Over time, it became capable not only of influencing elections but effectively determining their results in advance. This shift—from supervision to engineering—was not incidental; it was a key step in institutionalizing Khameneism.

These developments were not isolated. They formed part of a broader strategy to eliminate unpredictability from the system. Independent political actors were sidelined, reformist currents neutralized, and institutional autonomy steadily eroded. What emerged was a tightly controlled ecosystem in which all meaningful levers of power—political, judicial, cultural, and economic—were aligned with a single ideological framework.

Within this context, the emergence of Mojtaba Khamenei as a central figure becomes comprehensible. His lack of traditional religious credentials or broad political legitimacy is not a contradiction—it is a consequence of the system’s evolution. Years of institutional engineering, including the careful management of the Assembly of Experts and the systematic removal of potential obstacles, made such a transition possible. The “selection” process itself reflects the culmination of Khamenei’s long-term restructuring: a system in which outcomes are preconfigured rather than contested.

More importantly, Mojtaba’s rise demonstrates that Khameneism has achieved a critical threshold—it can now sustain itself without its original architect. The ideology has been embedded so deeply within the system that any successor, regardless of personal inclination, is compelled to operate within its parameters. The structure dictates the outcome.

This is why the question of leadership succession is, in many ways, secondary. Whether it is Mojtaba Khamenei or another figure, the current institutional configuration leaves little room for deviation. The mechanisms of control, the networks of power, and the ideological priorities—particularly the emphasis on regime preservation, anti-Western positioning, and hostility toward Israel even at significant national cost—are all structurally entrenched.

Khameneism, therefore, is no longer simply an ideology associated with one leader. It is a system of governance—self-reinforcing, expansive, and resistant to change. The Islamic Republic has, through decades of deliberate restructuring, lost its capacity to generate alternative political paths from within.

In this sense, Mojtaba Khamenei is not the beginning of a new chapter. He is the continuation of a trajectory that has been decades in the making.

And perhaps more significantly, this continuity underscores a deeper reality: the Islamic Republic has reached a point where change from within has become structurally improbable. The very mechanisms designed to preserve the system have also eliminated its flexibility.

Khameneism, as both ideology and structure, may ultimately define not only how the system survives—but how it ends. It sustains the Islamic Republic by centralizing power, eliminating dissent, and enforcing ideological conformity across all institutions. Yet those same mechanisms steadily erode the foundations of long-term stability: public trust, institutional adaptability, and economic resilience. A system built to prevent deviation becomes incapable of reform; a state designed to suppress a crisis becomes dependent on perpetual coercion to manage it.

In this sense, Khameneism transforms survival into a self-consuming process. Each cycle of repression narrows the regime’s options further, raises the cost of governance, and deepens the gap between state and society. The tools that once ensured control—security dominance, ideological rigidity, and exclusion of alternative voices—gradually become liabilities, locking the system into a path where it can neither evolve nor retreat.

As a result, Khameneism may determine not only the durability of the Islamic Republic, but also the form of its eventual breakdown: not a sudden collapse, but an accumulated exhaustion. A system that endures by sacrificing its capacity to renew itself ultimately reaches a point where continuation itself becomes unsustainable.