Iran International
A leaked internal directive from the IRGC’s missile command appears to show that the use of civilian locations to conceal, support and in some cases facilitate missile launch operations is not ad hoc, but structured, documented and built into operational planning.
The 33-page document, marked “very confidential,” is titled Instruction for Identification, Maintenance and Use of Positions and is attributed to the Specialized Documents Center of the Intelligence and Operations Deputy of the missile command.
A framework for missile operations
What emerges from the directive is a bureaucratic framework for missile deployment that goes well beyond hardened silos or underground “missile cities.”
The text lays out categories of launch positions, inspection procedures, coding systems, site records, chains of responsibility and rules for maintaining access to a wide network of locations that can be used before, during and after missile fire.
Its significance lies not only in the variety of launch positions it defines, but in the explicit inclusion of non-military environments in that system.
In its introduction, the document says missile positions are an inseparable part of missile warfare tactics and argues that the enemy’s growing ability to detect, track and destroy missile systems requires special rules for identifying, selecting, using and maintaining such positions.
It adds that the use of “deception,” “cover” and “normalization” alongside other methods would make the force more successful in using those positions.
That language is important. It suggests the document is not merely about protecting fixed military assets. It is about making missile units harder to distinguish from their surroundings and harder to detect in the first place.
Civilian locations as missile cover
The implication of the directive is that it describes a system for embedding missile activity within ordinary civilian geography.
Rather than relying only on conventional military facilities, the document sets out a model in which missile units can move across a wider landscape of pre-identified sites selected for concealment, access and operational utility.
The result is a structure that appears designed to preserve launch capability while reducing visibility and complicating detection.
The clearest indication comes in the section on what the document describes as artificial dispersion or cover positions. These include service, industrial and sports centers, as well as sheds and warehouses – places that are civilian in function or appearance, but can be repurposed to hide missile units.
The conditions listed for such sites include being enclosed, not overlooked by surrounding buildings, and either lacking CCTV cameras or allowing them to be switched off.
Taken together, those requirements point to a deliberate screening process for civilian sites that can be used as missile cover. The concern is not only protection from attack, but invisibility within the civilian landscape.
The broader structure of the document reinforces that conclusion. It contains sections on site identities, naming and coding, inspections of routes and positions, record maintenance and responsibilities across intelligence, operations, engineering, communications, safety, health and counterintelligence.
This is the language of a standing system, not an improvised wartime workaround.
A system for concealment
Farzin Nadimi, a senior defense and security analyst at the Washington Institute who reviewed the document for Iran International’s The Lead with Niusha Saremi, said the text points to a database-driven effort to identify areas around missile bases that can be used for different kinds of positions.
He said the IRGC missile force appears to have mapped not only launch positions, but also dispersal, deception and technical positions – the latter being places suitable for storing launchers and support vehicles and, when needed, preparing missiles for firing.
“These technical positions,” Nadimi said, “can include large, covered spaces such as industrial sheds or sports halls, where missile launchers and support vehicles can be brought inside, and where missiles can be mounted onto launchers, warheads attached and, in the case of liquid-fueled systems, fueling operations carried out.”
That point is critical. If civilian-looking or civilian-owned structures are being used not only to shelter launchers, but also to prepare them for launch, then the document describes more than concealment. It describes the embedding of missile operations inside civilian infrastructure.
A network built for dispersal
Nadimi also said the directive places repeated emphasis on speed – getting launch vehicles into these buildings quickly before launch and returning them to cover quickly afterward.
In his reading, the database tied to these positions includes technical features of each site, access routes and nearby facilities, including the nearest medical center, police station and military post.
It also, he added, records whether use of the property can be coordinated in advance with the owner, including contact details, or whether occupation could occur without prior coordination in urgent cases.
If so, that would suggest the system extends down to the level of property access and local civilian surroundings, turning seemingly ordinary sites into preplanned nodes in a missile network.
The document’s own emphasis on route inspection, site profiles, records and coded classification supports the picture of a missile force operating through a dispersed support architecture rather than through fixed bases alone.
Why this puts civilians at risk
Nadimi warned that the use of civilian environments is especially troubling because many IRGC launchers are themselves designed to blend into civilian traffic.
“Many of these launchers essentially resemble civilian vehicles or trailers,” he said.
He added that larger launchers for Khorramshahr missiles can be covered with a white casing that makes them look like an ordinary white civilian trailer, while the towing vehicle is also typically white.
Smaller launchers, he said, are often painted not in conventional camouflage but in ways that make them less conspicuous in civilian surroundings.
That observation fits closely with the document’s emphasis on cover, concealment and post-launch disappearance. The combination of disguised launch vehicles and preidentified civilian sites suggests an operational doctrine built around blending missile units into non-military space.
According to Nadimi, this has direct consequences under the laws of war.
“The use of civilian environments, structures and buildings for this purpose is unlawful under the laws of war,” he said. “It removes the protection those buildings would otherwise have and turns them into legitimate military targets.”
The danger, he added, is that civilians living or working in such places may have no idea a missile launcher is being hidden in their vicinity until they themselves are exposed to attack.
An organized doctrine, not an exception
The leaked directive therefore appears to document something broader than the existence of underground missile facilities or dispersed launch sites.
It points to an organized method for extending missile operations into the civilian sphere – using industrial buildings, service facilities, sports complexes, warehouses and other non-military spaces as part of a launch architecture designed to survive surveillance, evade detection and preserve firing capability under wartime pressure.
In that sense, the document is not just about positions where missiles are launched from. It is about how a military force can fold launch operations into everyday civilian geography – and in doing so, transfer the risks of missile warfare onto places and people that outwardly have nothing to do with it.
The sites span 17 provinces, 28 cities and two villages. Nearly half of them – 34 in total – were primary or secondary schools. Other locations identified in eyewitness accounts and documents reviewed by Iran International included hospitals, stadiums, universities, mosques, parks and government offices.
The accounts were gathered over a 10-day period from March 2 to March 14, 2026, during a near-total internet shutdown that sharply restricted the flow of messages, photos and video from inside Iran.
While Iran International could not independently verify every account, it geolocated visual evidence from seven reported sites, all of them schools.
Civilian sites and battlefield risk
The deployment of military forces at civilian sites “shifts battlefield risks onto civilians,” a regional security source who requested anonymity said, adding that using such locations for military purposes is prohibited under international law.
“When security or paramilitary forces move into schools, hospitals or mosques, they endanger civilians physically, degrade protected civilian services and may turn those sites into military objectives,” the source said.
Under international humanitarian law, civilian sites can lose protected status if used for military purposes, though attacking forces must still comply with rules on distinction, proportionality and precaution.
The source said the legal implications vary depending on the type of site but warned that such practices can strip civilian locations of their protected status.
“Schools are civilian objects; using them as barracks, firing positions, detention sites, or weapons depots can make them lawful military targets, while still leaving the attacker bound by distinction, proportionality, and feasible precautions,” the source said, adding that this “amounts to human shielding.”
At least four hospitals were identified in eyewitness accounts as having nearby or associated military deployments, including Golestan Hospital in Ahvaz and medical sites in Kermanshah and other western regions.
“Hospitals get even stronger protection than schools. Under International Humanitarian Law, they must be respected and protected, but if they are used outside their humanitarian role, such as for a base, observation post, military center, shelter for military-security personnel, or weapons depot, they lose that special protection, although a clear warning is required before any attack,” the source said.
At least three mosques were identified in eyewitness accounts as having been used for military deployments. In the capital, Tehran, this included Rezvan Mosque on March 8 and Chahardeh Masoum Mosque in University Town on March 7, where special police units were stationed.
Malek Ashtar Mosque in Khosrowshah in East Azarbaijan province was also used on March 9, where IRGC forces were relocated.
Mosques are protected as civilian objects and may also qualify as cultural property under the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, the source said.
“Using mosques for military purposes is prohibited, but if turned into a military objective, they lose protection, while attacking forces must still take precautions and avoid indiscriminate or disproportionate action,” the source added.
How the reporting was assembled
As authorities imposed a near-total internet shutdown across the country after the outbreak of the war, only a limited number of messages were able to get through filtering systems, while photo and video footage remained scarce.
Iran International collected eyewitness accounts from March 2 to March 14 but could not independently verify every claim.
It was nevertheless able to geolocate visual evidence accompanying some of the reports, identifying seven locations, all of them schools.
A pattern across multiple provinces
The accounts reviewed by Iran International illustrate the breadth of the reported deployments across multiple provinces.
In Tehran and surrounding areas in north-central Iran, eyewitness reports said police, intelligence and administrative offices in Malard were relocated on March 8 to Fatemiyeh Girls’ High School, which is located alongside two other schools near a gas station.
One of the main hubs for Iran’s plainclothes security forces in Tehran is the Basij’s Meghdad Resistance District, known as the “Meghdad base.” It is located on Azadi Street, next to Sharif University of Technology.
During the June 15, 2009 protests – part of the mass demonstrations that followed Iran’s disputed presidential election and became known as the Green Movement – gunfire using live ammunition was directed at demonstrators from the base’s rooftop.
The Meghdad base sits next to the central headquarters of the West Tehran Combatants Council, a complex with significant influence across paramilitary and security structures. The surrounding area was targeted in strikes on March 6.
After the strikes, eyewitness accounts on March 8 said remaining personnel and equipment had been moved to a fire department building directly opposite the former Meghdad base.
Another eyewitness account on March 9 said forces and equipment were relocated again, this time to a Bank Mellat complex on Azadi Street near the start of Jeyhoon Street. The site is one of the bank’s key national facilities and houses its data center.
Beyond the capital, similar deployments were reported across multiple regions of the country.
In Khuzestan province in southwestern Iran, eyewitness accounts said military forces were stationed at Takhti stadiums in Izeh and Ahvaz, as well as at Chamran University and near Golestan Hospital in Ahvaz, and at a girls’ primary school in Dezful.
In Fars province in southern Iran, military forces were reported at Sardaran Stadium and near the Negin commercial complex in Shiraz, as well as at schools in rural areas.
In Kermanshah in western Iran, missile launchers and military forces were deployed near major hospitals and at an industrial factory. In East Azarbaijan in northwestern Iran, forces were reported at multiple schools in Tabriz and in Hadishahr.
In Isfahan province in central Iran, forces were stationed at women’s parks, sports facilities and schools in several cities, including Isfahan, Dastgerd and Naein. In Alborz province west of Tehran, deployments were reported across Karaj, Hashtgerd and Mehrshahr.
In Razavi Khorasan in northeastern Iran, forces were reported to have used schools in Mashhad as bases, while in Bushehr in southern Iran they were stationed at universities.
In West Azarbaijan in northwestern Iran, forces were reported at a school in Khoy, while 22 Bahman Stadium in Qazvin in north-central Iran served as a main base.
In Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad province in southwestern Iran, military forces used Naft Stadium in Gachsaran. In Markazi province in central Iran, deployments were reported at a school and a government office in Arak. In Mazandaran in northern Iran, schools in Tonekabon were used as bases.
In Golestan in northern Iran, military forces were reported at a school and a government building in Gorgan, while in Lorestan in western Iran, deployments were reported at several high schools in Borujerd.
US warning and Israeli response
Iranian officials have repeatedly denied accusations that the country uses civilians as shields and have accused Israel of targeting civilian infrastructure during the conflict.
The Israeli military, when contacted for comment, confirmed that Iranian forces were deploying personnel and weapons at civilian sites such as schools, mosques and stadiums.
“Iran’s regime, like all of its proxy and terrorist groups across the Middle East that are activated and employed by this regime, has effectively turned defenseless people into its human shields and hides behind these innocent, unfortunate civilian populations,” Israel Defense Forces Persian-speaking spokesman Kamal Penhasi told Iran International.
“It tries to conceal its military assets and weapons behind people and among the population, including in hospitals, schools, and mosques,” he added.
Asked how civilian harm is minimized in populated areas, Penhasi said evacuation warnings are issued ahead of operations and precision-guided weapons are used to limit collateral damage.
“We do everything within our power to the extent possible to prevent harm to civilians and the citizens of the dear Iranian nation.”
Penhasi urged people to distance themselves from such locations and follow evacuation warnings.
“I ask the people of Iran to pay attention to our messages to protect their lives and safety. As soon as they receive a warning message, they should move away and also pass it on to their neighbors, friends, and relatives,” he said.
Iran International also reached out to the US Central Command, the White House and the Pentagon for comment, but they did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
US Central Command on March 8 issued a safety warning to civilians in Iran, saying civilian locations used for military purposes could become legitimate military targets under international law.
“The Iranian regime is using heavily populated civilian areas to conduct military operations, including launching one-way attack drones and ballistic missiles,” CENTCOM said in a statement.
“This dangerous decision risks the lives of all civilians in Iran since locations used for military purposes lose protected status and could become legitimate military targets under international law,” the statement added.
The strongest reaction has come from people in cities where the forces have reportedly been seen, especially in the southwest.
Viewers who contacted Iran International said the arrival of Hashd al-Shaabi fighters in Abadan had made the city feel “unsafe and frightening,” and said residents were worried about their children.
One viewer described the forces as “terrorists” and said their entry into Iran, particularly in Ahvaz, Khorramshahr and Abadan, was aimed at “another massacre of the people.”
Another message asked: “Hashd al-Shaabi convoys entered Iran with armored vehicles. Why are Israel and America not targeting them?”
A message from Abadan said: “I’m sending this message from Abadan. The presence of these forces with flags and military uniforms has made the city frightening.”
Another viewer said: “These forces have come to kill people. We have not forgotten the January killings, when the government used them to help kill people.”
Anger was also directed at the cost of hosting such forces at a time of economic hardship.
One viewer wrote: “In these terrible economic and inflationary conditions that people are facing, why should the Islamic Republic pay for Hashd al-Shaabi terrorists and even house and feed their families for free?”
Other messages sent to Iran International suggested a wider pattern of deployment.
One said Hashd al-Shaabi forces had gathered in warehouses belonging to the Arvandan company in Dehloran county in Ilam province.
Another said the forces had been stationed since the previous day at the Persian Gulf Hotel in Genaveh, Bushehr province.
A more detailed message from Abadan said: “Around 1:30 a.m. on March 30, Hashd al-Shaabi forces arrived with several Hilux vehicles at the Basij base opposite the City Center to be stationed there, and along the route there were several checkpoints with a large number of IRGC forces inspecting people so they could not film.”
The reports followed footage circulated this week showing a convoy of Iran-backed militias in Iraq moving toward Iran.
Iran International audiences also reported on Sunday that Iraqi militias had been housed in residential units belonging to Revolutionary Guards personnel on Otobusrani Street in Bandar Abbas.
Dadban, a legal advisory and training center for activists, warned this week that the purpose of deploying Hashd al-Shaabi forces inside Iran was “participation in repression.”
According to its report, Iraqi militias crossed into Iran and entered Abadan and Khorramshahr in Khuzestan province, where they were received by officials of the Islamic Republic.
Dadban said the organized and armed presence of foreign forces inside the country, without going through a legal process, had no legal basis and pointed to Article 146 of Iran’s constitution, which bars the establishment of foreign military forces in Iran.
It also warned that using foreign forces to suppress domestic protests would amount to an escalation in violations of citizens’ fundamental rights, including the right to assembly and personal security.
Reaction on social media echoed many of the concerns raised in messages sent to Iran International.
Users described the presence of Hashd al-Shaabi as a violation of national sovereignty and a sign that the authorities were preparing for a harsher phase of internal repression.
One user, referring to reports of their presence in Khorramshahr, wrote: “God freed Khorramshahr, and with the help of the disgraceful Islamic Republic it has been occupied again.”
Another wrote: “Hashd al-Shaabi terrorists have officially entered Iran. This is the invasion of Iranian soil by a foreign ground force. We must stand against it completely.”
Another user mocked pro-government rhetoric by writing: “What happened to the people who said domestic problems must be solved inside the family? Is Hashd al-Shaabi family too? Here, a foreign force is acceptable? But if we ask for help, we are traitors?”
Another post said the government knew “the final battle will be decided on the streets of the big cities, especially Tehran,” and argued that Hashd al-Shaabi had been brought in to help defend the state at that front.
Together, the messages and online reactions suggest that for many Iranians, the issue is not only the arrival of an allied militia, but what its presence may signal about the Islamic Republic’s readiness to use outside forces to intimidate and suppress people at home.
Iraqi criticism of support for Iran
The backlash has not been limited to Iran.
In an exclusive interview with Iran International, Sheikh Abdullah al-Jughayfi, a member of the Security and Defense Committee and adviser to the Anbar governorate, confirmed that “Hashd al-Shaabi forces in recent days have transferred financial and non-financial aid to Iran.”
He said the aid had been sent over the past three days “with Hashd al-Shaabi flags raised.”
Al-Jughayfi criticized the move and warned that “this action could further complicate Iraq’s relations with the United States and increase the likelihood of new sanctions.”
At the same time, Jalil al-Lami, deputy head of the Iraq Center for Strategic Affairs, told Iran International from Baghdad that the move amounted politically to “a clear alignment by Iraq” and warned that it effectively ended Baghdad’s balancing policy between Washington and Tehran.
He added that “the presence of Hashd al-Shaabi forces inside Iran could expand the range of targets inside Iraq, whether through direct attacks or indirect escalation, pushing the country toward an open atmosphere of confrontation.”
