Iran International
New details from eyewitnesses and medical staff in Iran’s southeastern city of Kerman indicate that security forces opened fire and killed dozens of protesters attempting to reach a statue of slain IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani in early January.
Witnesses said the violence unfolded on the evening of January 8 around Azadi Square, where one of the country’s most prominent monuments to Soleimani stood.
Protests in Kerman had begun days earlier with small, scattered gatherings around the city’s bazaar and residential neighborhoods, residents said. But by late afternoon on January 8, significantly larger crowds, including families, were moving toward the square.
One resident said Azadi Square had gradually become a focal point for protesters in the preceding days, despite the absence of formal calls to gather. Videos reviewed by Iran International show the Soleimani statue set on fire during the unrest.
According to a member of the medical staff at a Kerman treatment center, at least 70 protester deaths were registered in the city’s hospitals. He said the figure included only those formally recorded in medical facilities and did not capture all fatalities.
Iran’s government has not provided city-level breakdowns of protest deaths but leaked documents obtained and reviewed by. Iran International shows up to 36,500 people were killed across the country on those two days.
Witnesses said security forces had deployed in force around Azadi Square before peak gathering hours, blocking roads with vehicles and personnel to prevent crowds from reaching the monument. Protesters instead gathered along surrounding streets, including Jomhouri Boulevard, Khajoo intersection, and Bahmanyar and Esteghlal streets.
One protester said security forces initially used tear gas, pellet fire and warning shots. Drones were visible overhead between roughly 7:00 and 8:00 p.m. By around 8:00 p.m., he said, live ammunition was being fired directly at crowds.
He said some of the heaviest clashes occurred near Khajoo intersection and along Jomhouri Boulevard, where large crowds had formed. Witnesses also reported gunfire from elevated positions on nearby buildings, though this could not be independently verified.
Because of the concentration of hospitals, clinics and medical complexes near Azadi Square, many wounded protesters were able to reach treatment facilities quickly. Medical staff described treating gunshot wounds, severe bleeding and respiratory injuries caused by tear gas exposure.
In the days that followed, security forces detained medical personnel who had assisted protesters, according to a healthcare worker familiar with the arrests. He said at least 10 doctors in Kerman had been detained, though only two—Amir Shafiei and Saman Salari—have been publicly identified.
Witnesses said the scale of the January 8 turnout had been significantly larger than previous protests in the city. Some participants said the presence of families and older residents created a false sense of safety, leading many to underestimate the likelihood of lethal force.
A woman who took part in the protests said clashes continued across multiple neighborhoods late into the night and into the following day. Tear gas and gunfire affected large areas of the city, forcing residents indoors.
She also described the sudden appearance of motorcyclists who vandalized banks and government buildings while security forces present at the scene did not intervene. After the motorcyclists left, she said, security forces moved against protesters. The identities and affiliations of the motorcyclists could not be independently confirmed.
The crackdown was followed by widespread arrests and legal action, according to a lawyer in Kerman familiar with the cases. He said detainees were frequently moved between facilities, making it difficult for families to determine their whereabouts.
The lawyer said at least 30 detainees have been charged with “moharebeh,” or waging war against God, a capital offense under Iranian law. He also reported that approximately 500 detainees had received prison sentences, including medical staff and young protesters, while many others remained in legal limbo.
These figures could not be independently verified.
Families have often been reluctant to publicize arrests or disappearances, he said, citing fear of retaliation and reports of abuse in detention.
Among those whose deaths have been publicly confirmed were Mehdi Khosravi, 24, who was shot on January 8, and Ehsan Jafari, a university student who died weeks later after being wounded during the protests. Other victims included students, teachers and residents from across Kerman province.
The protests in Kerman focused in part on the Soleimani statue, which has become a symbol of state authority in the city where the general is buried.
Residents said many protesters viewed the monument as a representation of the political system itself. Their attempt to topple it was met by a brutal force that turned the surrounding streets into one of the deadliest flashpoints of unrest in the city.
The full death toll in Kerman remains unknown.
Within hours of the badges disappearing, accounts styled as satirical versions of Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and senior official Ali Larijani began drawing thousands of views and followers.
One parody account using Larijani’s name published a post arguing that anyone who believes a meaningful agreement can be reached with the Islamic Republic is naïve.
Another account in Araghchi’s name, which was suspended later, published the monarchist slogan “Long live the King.”
X also removed blue ticks from accounts attributed to Judiciary chief Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei and parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, according to a review of the platform.
An account using the name of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei posted a message suggesting he seek refuge with the Taliban. “If our friendly neighboring brothers, the Taliban, kindly issue six-month tourist visas, the situation is dire,” the post read.
Separately, parody accounts posing as parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and late Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani posted mocking replies in comment threads.
One fake Ghalibaf account warned the United States that if it repeated a hostile act “once more, it will become twice,” mimicking official rhetoric in an exaggerated, satirical tone.
A parody account impersonating former president Ebrahim Raisi posted a Valentine’s Day message lamenting that “no one sent us a teddy bear,” while another billed itself as “the first president in Iran’s history to be eaten by a bear” – a darkly comic nod to the online satire that has persisted around his death.
Most of the new profiles visibly carry the label “Parody account,” a designation that appears when a user identifies their profile as satirical.
Under X rules, accounts that present themselves as real individuals without clearly disclosing their unofficial nature can face suspension, prompting many users to add the parody label to reduce the risk of removal.
A parody account created in Khamenei’s name drew nearly 9,000 followers within hours. Similar accounts impersonating Araghchi and Larijani quickly grew to more than 20,000 and about 12,000 followers, respectively.
Official silence, media warning
Islamic Republic officials have not formally addressed the wave of impersonations. The Guards-linked Tasnim website wrote that following the removal of blue verification badges, several fake accounts misusing Larijani’s name and image had become active.
The episode follows earlier disputes between Iranian authorities and the platform. In November, X introduced a location feature showing the approximate origin of posts.
The update exposed numerous pro-government figures and individuals tied to the Islamic Republic posting from inside Iran, enjoying a tiered, privileged internet, where most users must bypass state restrictions on social media through tools such as VPNs.
The platform also replaced the Islamic Republic flag emoji with the pre-1979 Lion and Sun emblem for accounts set to Iran, prompting criticism from pro-government users and praise from some opposition voices.
To understand what could follow the Islamic Republic, it helps to start with where Iran stands now. As of February 2026, with the Islamic Republic still in power, tens of thousands of Iranians have been killed.
Inflation has surged: year-on-year inflation hit 60% in January, with annual inflation hovering at 45%. By comparison, Iraq’s inflation rate in 2002 – before Saddam Hussein was toppled – was around 19%, although Iraq had already lived through a severe five-year crisis from 1991 to 1995.
Years of politically mandated lending and the rapid expansion of private banks have pushed Iran into an acute banking crisis. Bank Ayandeh has collapsed, and by the Central Bank’s own criteria only nine banks in the country are not considered insolvent. The strain has now reached Bank Sepah, which pays the salaries of Iran’s military – an institution that itself was once created through mergers of military-linked banks to avert systemic failure.
Civilian deaths in the US-led invasion of Iraq to remove Saddam are widely estimated at roughly 7,000. In Iran, by contrast, at least 36,500 citizens were killed over two days and a matter of hours in what was described as a massacre – without any foreign military intervention – exceeding the toll of some of the largest wars and crackdowns in modern history over a comparable timeframe.
The economic disruption is already visible in daily life. In 2024, the state’s inability to supply gas in winter and electricity in summer meant at least one province was effectively shut for 72 of 291 working days. A survey by Iran’s Chamber of Commerce of more than 3,000 businesses found firms were operating at just 39% of capacity in autumn 2025.
Taken together, the figures suggest that even before the national uprising began in January 2026, Iran was already exhibiting the hallmarks of a country battered by war.
Pessimistic scenarios
Since the mid-2010s – especially after the civil wars in Syria and Lebanon – much of the media conversation about a post-Islamic Republic Iran has centered on worst-case outcomes. Those arguments have resurfaced again in recent months. The main scenarios typically cited are:
War and foreign intervention: In a central power vacuum, neighboring states could intervene directly or back separatist groups. Yet after the fall of Iraq’s Baathist regime and the Taliban in Afghanistan, regime collapse did not automatically trigger large-scale foreign invasions.
The challenge of post-collapse security, the argument goes, is likely to be as much political as military.
The Iran Prosperity Project, launched in 2025 as a transition-era economic and governance blueprint supported by exiled Prince Reza Pahlavi, sets out an “emergency phase” handbook that urges early outreach to neighbors – particularly Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey – as a way to contain spillover risks and reduce the chances of destabilization after a collapse.
Fragmentation and civil war: Another fear is a spiral into armed conflict – either from forces loyal to the Islamic Republic resisting change, or from ideological and ethnic fighting on the model of Syria, Libya or Yemen – creating space for extremist groups such as ISIS and driving insecurity along Iran’s borders. Supporters of this view point to the danger of militia-style violence and state breakdown.
At the same time, the reported entry of at least 5,000 Iraqi mercenaries during the January crackdown could be read as a sign of uncertainty about the reliability of domestic forces.
And during the January uprising, the same pro-monarchy slogans were heard from Kurdish-majority Kermanshah to Turkish-dominant Tabriz and Baluch-majority Zahedan – alongside Tehran and Fars – without clear evidence of widespread ethnic or sectarian fracture, even as the risk is still seen as latent.
A rebranded Revolutionary Guard dictatorship: In this scenario, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) fills the vacuum, consolidating power with a less overtly religious posture.
But the IRGC’s reach is already a central driver of international pressure on the current system, making it unlikely – under this reading – that foreign powers would accept its continued dominance after a collapse.
A drawn-out transition: A slower-motion breakdown is another widely cited possibility: deepening economic isolation, accelerating brain drain, sharp declines in production, rolling protests and a society worn down by exhaustion and uncertainty.
Disillusionment with transitional justice and a revival of the Islamic Republic: A further risk is political backlash if accountability is perceived as weak. Public anger over mass killings and systemic corruption could turn against a transitional administration if leading perpetrators are not quickly brought to justice and if assets transferred abroad – an outflow US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent pointed to in January – cannot be traced and seized. In that climate, loyalist networks could regroup, backed by money moved offshore.
Planning for transition
By most economic and statistical measures, Iran under the Islamic Republic already bears the hallmarks of a war-damaged state. The January killings were unprecedented in scale over such a short period.
In recent years, the Iran Prosperity Project – backed by Prince Reza Pahlavi and affiliated with advocacy organization the National Union for Democracy in Iran – has developed an extensive policy framework for a post-Islamic Republic transition.
A series of white papers published on the project’s website address governance, energy, foreign policy, healthcare, industry and macroeconomic stabilization.
From these documents, the authors compiled an “Emergency Period Handbook” outlining how to manage the interval between regime collapse and the installation of a new government.
The latest version, released in summer 2025, spans 15 chapters and focuses on the first 100 to 180 days after the fall of the Islamic Republic.
Supporters describe it as the only fully structured opposition blueprint for the immediate post-collapse period, drafted by a 26-member team of specialists with input from additional unnamed advisers inside and outside Iran, whose identities are withheld for security reasons.
The plan assumes the absence of civil war and broad public backing for Prince Pahlavi during the transition.
Preventing famine and securing essential goods
One of the first challenges in any transition would be stabilizing supply chains.
Mohammadreza Jahanparvar, an economist involved in the project, told Iran International that financing essential imports would not be the primary obstacle.
“Funding essential goods is not particularly difficult,” he said. “The greater challenge is restoring communication and negotiation with suppliers. Iran has never been sanctioned on food.”
According to Jahanparvar, supplier countries have been identified and preliminary discussions held to allow imports to resume immediately after regime collapse.
Security, however, poses a parallel challenge. Control over ports, customs terminals and transportation corridors would be critical to prevent disruption. The handbook’s section on “Maintaining Core Functions” prioritizes the rapid restoration and protection of vital systems, including food production and healthcare, from day one through the first three months.
Maintaining uninterrupted flows of energy and water is another pillar. In its “Seize and Stabilize” section, the plan calls for securing key infrastructure – energy facilities, oil and gas installations, water systems and power plants – using vetted army units to deter sabotage. The criteria for vetting are not publicly detailed, likely for security reasons.
A related initiative, known as “National Cooperation,” was launched in July 2025. It invited civil servants, security personnel and members of the armed forces to signal their willingness to cooperate in a future transition by scanning a QR code broadcast during a live Iran International program. In August, Prince Pahlavi said 50,000 individuals had responded. Iran’s armed forces are estimated to number roughly 640,000.
Financing the transition
Tehran’s draft budget for the next Iranian year (starting on March 21) projects total expenditures of 401,740 billion tomans (or 4,017.4 trillion rials) approximately $25 billion at an exchange rate of 1,620,000 rials to the dollar – equivalent to about $2 billion per month simply to sustain current operations.
Sanctions have frozen substantial Iranian assets abroad while also limiting the country’s external borrowing.
Jahanparvar estimates that between $100 billion and $200 billion in Iranian assets could potentially be recovered.
By comparison, oil export revenue in 2025 was estimated at between $30 billion and $60 billion, meaning recoverable assets could equal two to seven years of oil income.
Sanctions nonetheless pose a practical hurdle. Even if assets exist overseas, access would not be automatic during a transition. Jahanparvar argues that the US president could grant temporary three-month waivers, with comparable measures potentially adopted by European governments.
“Based on precedents in other sanctioned countries,” he said, “short-term exemptions pending formal legal review are both feasible and common.”
Other stopgap measures could include securing a modest loan from the United States – not primarily for its size, but for the signal it would send to global financial markets. Even if frozen assets remain temporarily inaccessible, they could serve as collateral to unlock short-term international financing.
“Iran has not drawn on its IMF quota since the 1960s,” Jahanparvar noted. “With the political constraints associated with the Islamic Republic removed, those channels could reopen.”
Pessimism or optimism?
All of these measures relate to the emergency phase immediately following a collapse.
If the more dire scenarios fail to materialize, the subsequent stabilization phase could see the return of thousands of Iranian entrepreneurs and professionals. With at least nine million Iranians living abroad, the diaspora represents a significant pool of capital, expertise and investment potential. During the national uprising, many demonstrated continued ties to their homeland.
The future remains uncertain and dependent on both internal dynamics and external actors. Yet one variable, proponents argue, lies largely in the hands of Iranians themselves: national cohesion.
Until 24 hours before the January 8-9 uprising, some questioned whether Prince Pahlavi commanded broad public backing. Then the largest street protests in the Islamic Republic’s history erupted.
For years, the Islamic Republic has invoked worst-case scenarios – “Syrianization,” lack of alternatives, war and insecurity – to discourage defections and blunt support for change.
Yet Iran’s economic indicators already resemble those of a country at war, and the two-day massacre exceeded even the Islamic Republic’s own official tally of 276 civilian deaths from Israel’s 12-day full-scale attack.
Iranian society and political actors may need to prepare for pessimistic outcomes. But at pivotal moments, the country’s recent history suggests, the public has shown an ability to defy the expectations of analysts.
