Internet traffic in Iran began to rise at around 18:00 UTC on January 21 as two weeks of a nationwide digital blackout approached, with increases seen across several
Cloudflare added that traffic growth was seen across major operators MCCI, IranCell, TCI and RighTel, with RighTel showing a more significant and sustained increase.
Russia likely views Iran’s mass anti-regime protests with deep unease, but may ultimately adapt just as it did in Syria to preserve influence whether the Islamic Republic survives or a new political order emerges.
After the loss of longtime Russian allies Bashar al-Assad in Syria and Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela, the Kremlin can hardly wish to suffer further loss of an ally in Tehran.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei may yet remain in power—thanks partly to ongoing Russian-Iranian cooperation. But even if he does not, Vladimir Putin may still be able to salvage the situation.
Moscow, according to an analysis by the Carnegie Endowment, does not seem likely to intervene militarily in Iran to defend the Islamic Republic against its opponents. Russian forces, after all, are preoccupied with the war in Ukraine.
Yet, as detailed in an article in Foreign Policy, Moscow has long provided Tehran with electronic and other tools of repression. Since the Iranian demonstrators are not an armed opposition, Russian military intervention may not be needed to contain or suppress the unrest.
The situation might change, of course, if US president Donald Trump follows through on his threats to intervene in Iran. Both Tehran and Moscow want to avoid this. But how?
While Putin himself has been remarkably quiet about events in Iran, the one initiative Russia has engaged in so far is mediation between Iran and Israel. Both governments have reportedly conveyed to Moscow that neither will preemptively attack the other.
This Russian mediation effort may be highly important for protecting the Islamic Republic. Unlike just before and during the June 2025 twelve-day war—when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was urging the United States to join attacks on Iran—Netanyahu is now reportedly counseling restraint in Washington regarding military intervention.
While Israel has long opposed Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, Netanyahu may prefer that a weakened Islamic Republic remain in power rather than be overthrown and replaced by either a more hostile regime, or one more closely aligned with the West in ways Israel cannot shape.
Netanyahu has already found himself at cross-purposes with Trump over Syria, where the United States has sought to cooperate with the new leadership under Ahmed al-Sharaa, while Israel views the government in Damascus as a threat.
Moscow’s coordination with Israel may therefore increase Putin’s ability to dissuade Trump from intervening in Iran.
For Moscow, the best outcome in the current crisis is that the Islamic Republic defeats its internal opponents and survives. But Russia may still retain significant influence and cooperation with Iran after a change in leadership—or even regime.
In Syria, Moscow has kept its naval and air bases despite the fall of Assad. In Venezuela, Russia has moved quickly to re-engage with the post-Maduro authorities, seeking to preserve economic and strategic ties despite a major political rupture.
If Khamenei falls but the Islamic Republic remains intact, Tehran is likely to continue cooperating with Russia despite any newfound willingness to work with the United States.
Even if the Islamic Republic collapses, its replacement will almost certainly continue to envision Iran as a regional great power.
A new Iranian government may pursue more cooperative relations with Washington while still seeking ties with Russia, China, and others—much as new leaderships elsewhere have attempted to diversify their external partnerships.
Moscow, for its part, will actively seek cooperation with any new authorities in Tehran to prevent Iran from becoming overly dependent on the West.
With regard to Ukraine, Putin has shown little flexibility, pressing ahead despite extraordinary human and financial costs. But when it comes to supporting anti-Western allies in the Global South, Moscow has been more pragmatic.
The demands of the war in Ukraine limit Russia’s ability to defend embattled partners elsewhere, while Putin’s long-standing efforts to cultivate relations with traditionally pro-Western governments have reduced the strategic necessity of rigid ideological allies.
It is undoubtedly embarrassing for Moscow to see longtime partners fall from power, but this is hardly unique to Russia—as the collapse of the Western-backed government in Afghanistan demonstrated.
Putin appears to understand that the downfall of any government in the Global South is typically followed by competition among outside powers for influence. This is not a moment to lament losses, but to adapt—to engage new leaders eager to keep their options open rather than rely on a single great-power patron.
Moscow’s preferred outcome in Iran remains the survival of the Islamic Republic and the continuation of close cooperation. But if leadership—or even regime—change occurs, Russia will move quickly to adjust.
If Putin’s success in retaining Russian bases in Syria despite backing the losing side is any guide, he may well succeed in doing so in Iran as well.
Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan held a phone call on Thursday with his Iranian counterpart Masoud Pezeshkian in which he expressed opposition to any foreign intervention in Iran and Ankara's desire for peace and stability in the country.
The conversation is among the only known senior-level contacts between Tehran and a neighbor since authorities crushed nationwide protests this month, killing thousands.
Erdogan added to Pezeshkian that the resolution of problems in Iran without further escalation would benefit Turkey as well, the statement added.
"As for Iran, everyone is waiting to see what America will do. And the world offers nothing, Europe offers nothing, and does not want to enter this issue as a supporter of the Iranian people and the democracy they need," Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said at the World Economic Forum on Thursday.
“There was so much talk about the protests in Iran, but they drowned in blood," he added.
"By the time politicians started forming positions, the Ayatollah had already killed thousands … What will Iran become after this bloodshed? If the regime survives, it sends a clear signal to every bully: kill enough people and you stay in power,”
Austrian lawmaker Helmut Brandstätter said Iran’s leadership was losing control as public fear ebbed, calling on Europe to step up support for the country’s opposition.
“The regime is losing the fear of the people – now we must strengthen the opposition,” Brandstätter, a member of the European Parliament, wrote on X.
He said Iran mattered to Europe not only on human rights grounds but also for security and social reasons.
“Why should Iran concern us?” he wrote. “Because cyberattacks threaten us all. Because Iranian citizens are part of our societies. Because human rights are universal.”
The number of civilians killed in Iran’s crackdown on protests may be more than 20,000, the UN special rapporteur on human rights in Iran said, citing reports from doctors inside the country, Bloomberg reported.
Mai Sato said earlier this week that civilian deaths were estimated at 5,000 or more, adding that medical reports suggested the toll could be far higher, at about 20,000 or more.