Iran’s factions gear up for local elections despite public apathy

“The United States is in no position to determine what countries should or should not possess nuclear capabilities,” Khamenei said, adding that Iran’s missiles “remain ready to be used again if necessary.”

That tone has quickly been amplified across Iran’s hardline media.

Key hardline outlets—including state television (IRIB), Kayhan closely aligned with Khamenei’s office, Javan linked to the Revolutionary Guards and the ultraconservative Vatan-e Emrooz—have echoed the message that rapprochement with Washington is no longer on the table.

IRIB continues to attack any suggestion that dialogue with the United States could help resolve Iran’s foreign policy or economic challenges.

Its flagship Channel 2 news bulletin, known for ties to the intelligence community, has intensified messaging around “the weakening of US global hegemony” and the rise of powers such as China, Russia, India, and Iran.

'America is gone!'

Javan on Thursday sharply rebuked foreign minister Abbas Araghchi for what it called “ambivalent attitudes” toward the US, accusing him of creating false expectations about a possible thaw in relations.

“Iranian markets react to even the slightest hint of rapprochement,” the daily wrote in an editorial, torching Tehran’s top diplomat for showing readiness to engage if Washington abandoned its “excessive demands” and hinting at indirect contact through US negotiator Steve Witkoff.

“This keeps Iran suspended, waiting for America to reach out,” Javan wrote. “We must forget about friendship with the United States… America is gone!”

Kayhan echoed the sentiment in an editorial titled “Indulge in Your Imagination,” quoting Khamenei’s retort to former US President Donald Trump’s claims about ending Iran’s nuclear program.

“Bombing a center or assassinating a scientist is like cutting one branch of a tree whose roots run throughout Iran,” the paper wrote, asserting that Iran’s nuclear capabilities are scattered wide and deep—across more than 20 universities, 70 research centers, and 1,500 senior experts.

Gearing up?

Vatan-e Emrooz ran a similar headline in English, as if addressing Trump.

“OK. In Your Dreams!” the daily declared, adding that Tehran’s nemesis “has reached the end of its strategy to contain Iran.”

Both papers emphasized that Khamenei’s remarks were not rhetorical flourishes but strategic declarations.

The consistency across IRIB, Javan, Kayhan, and Vatan-e Emrooz suggests a coordinated media campaign to amplify Khamenei’s message: that the Islamic Republic is not entertaining the idea of renewed diplomacy and is readying for more confrontation.

“We're all in the same boat shaped by the sacrifices of the martyrs of the Islamic Revolution, and it would be a shame if our differences created weaknesses", he said in an interview with state media

It sounded, at first, like an appeal for unity. But in the opaque language of the Islamic Republic, moral parables are rarely innocent.

Beneath the call for calm was a political warning: a message to rival factions inside the regime to stop leaking, stop exposing, stop fighting, before their infighting sinks the whole ship.

When Shamkhani urged everyone not to “puncture the boat,” he invited an obvious question: whose boat? Was he speaking of the Iranian nation or of the VIP mariners like himself who have captained it for nearly five decades?

In one reading, the “boat” is the state itself, a vessel battered by sanctions, protests and crises. From that vantage point, Shamkhani’s warning was a familiar one: security men urging unity to preserve the ship of state.

But there’s another interpretation, and it’s the one most Iranians heard. This wasn’t a plea for national survival.

It was a coded SOS from the elite, a reminder to fellow insiders that the leaks threatening to sink them were coming from within their own cabin. Their “boat” isn’t the Islamic Republic; it's the luxury vessel of privilege, patronage and power that keeps them afloat while the rest of the country treads water.

History has shown that when Iran’s political ship hits rough waters, it’s not the captains who drown, it’s the crew.

Economic collapse, inflation, repression, all of it falls hardest on those already half-submerged: workers, teachers, pensioners and the youth. Meanwhile, those steering the ship have lifeboats waiting: foreign bank accounts, Dominica passports, villas on Private Islands or even in London.

So when Shamkhani warns that “we’ll all sink together,” he isn’t speaking to the street vendors or nurses who can’t afford rent. He’s speaking to his peers, the sanctioned oligarchs and security bosses who know that too much sunlight might burn their privilege.

The crumbling myth of piety

The scandal’s power lies not in the wedding itself, but in what it reveals: the erosion of the ruling system's last claim to legitimacy and moral authority.

For decades, the Islamic Republic justified its rule through an ethic of sacrifice and piety. The message was simple: we may be strict, but we are righteous. Now, its ruling class lives like exiled royalty and curses its critics.

Every leaked image of over-indulgence, every glimpse behind the velvet curtain, peels away another layer of the revolution’s moral armor.

Corruption is not a crack in the hull; it is the hull. And the public knows it. Outrage has given way to a colder recognition: the ship has been taking on water for years.

The Iranian people no longer expect reform from within. They have learned that the system cannot self-correct because it was never built to share accountability, only to protect those who built it.

And so, Shamkhani’s metaphor holds, but not in the way he intended.

Iran is a boat, yes. But it’s one where a few dine under chandeliers while others take on water in the dark. The waves are rising. And this time, the passengers in steerage are no longer willing to go down quietly.

“The law banning satellite receivers has become obsolete and is no longer enforced,” Ezzatollah Zarghami wrote in the government’s official daily Iran. “Similarly, the morality patrol is now obsolete.”

“All those who care for the revolution admit the wrongfulness and ineffectiveness (of the satellite ban),” added Zarghami, who served as culture minister under conservative President Ebrahim Raisi.

Other establishment figures have voiced similar views.

Mohammadreza Bahonar, a senior Expediency Council member, said during a televised debate that “the era of governing the country through mandatory hijab laws is over,” though he later softened his tone, calling the hijab a “social necessity.”

Such comments from prominent conservatives suggest the theocracy’s flagship ban may be on its way to a long list of restrictions that have quietly fallen into disuse.

Satellite dishes: banned but ever-present

The possession and use of satellite equipment has been banned under a 1994 law but millions of Iranians continue to use dishes, and with the ban only remaining on paper, enforcement largely lapsed.

During the 2000s and 2010s, police and Basij forces famously rappelled down buildings to seize dishes in a crackdown against “Western cultural invasion.” The raids targeted households secretly using satellite dishes.

Morality patrols in retreat

Feared morality patrols that enforced Islamic veiling largely vanished from the streets of Tehran and other cities after the nationwide protests following the death of a young woman, Mahsa Amini, in their custody in September 2022. Many women now go out without even carrying a headscarf.

Iran's Supreme National Security Council this year shelved a very strict new hijab law drawn by the Parliament’s ultra-hardliners, likely in a bid to avert a public backlash.

The new law aimed to dramatically increase fines and prison terms for women appearing unveiled in public and extended penalties to businesses and online platforms that fail to enforce or promote the dress code.

President Masoud Pezeshkian’s government says no resources will be allocated for enforcement, but hardliners continue to push back.

Judiciary spokesman Asghar Jahangir affirmed earlier hijab laws remain enforceable, with police warning businesses to comply and Tehran’s morality enforcers say they are planning to mobilize 80,000 “promoters of virtue” to monitor women’s dress across the capital and a “Chastity and Hijab Situation Room” involving cultural and executive bodies.

Bans fail or fall away

From satellite dishes to hijab, chess and billiards, Iran’s history shows that laws may be decreed, but culture often wins in the end.

Chess was banned for several years following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, as some clerics considered it a form of gambling and a distraction from religious duties.

Ayatollah Khomeini, who initially opposed the game, issued a 1988 fatwa allowing chess if no gambling was involved and religious obligations were not neglected.

Its reinstatement led to a resurgence of interest. Today, chess tables and players are a common sight in urban parks.

In the early 1980s, billiard halls were shut down as symbols of Western decadence and immoral leisure, with authoritities associating them with gambling, smoking and social corruption. Even selling billiard tables was prohibited.

By the mid-1990s billiards was officially reclassified as a “sport” rather than a “vice,” allowing clubs to operate legally. Today, Iranian players compete internationally.

Speaking during a visit to West Azarbaijan province, Pezeshkian acknowledged that raising fuel prices is unavoidable to address Iran’s worsening energy shortages but cautioned that any decision would require “careful planning” to avoid deepening economic hardship.

“There is no question that gasoline must become more expensive,” he said, according to state media. “But it is not a simple decision. We cannot act overnight or create more difficulties for people.”

His comments came amid intensifying debate over Tehran’s plans to introduce a new pricing system aimed at curbing soaring fuel consumption and smuggling.

Over the past two weeks, Iranian media have reported that the government is reviewing several reform scenarios, including multiple pricing tiers and possible changes to fuel quotas.

Last week, Khaneh Eghtesad published what it said was a leaked cabinet decree outlining a roadmap for “gradual correction” of gasoline prices. The government initially denied the report but later confirmed that the issue was under study by cabinet working groups.

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  Iran MP warns of four-fold gasoline price rise amid fuel reform debate

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  Government denies new fuel price plan after leak of decree on gasoline reform

Cabinet secretary Kamal Taghavi-Nejad said this week that fuel reform had been discussed but “no final decision” had been taken. A lawmaker, Amirhossein Sabeti, said the debate over introducing three fuel price tiers had become serious in parliament.

Energy officials say domestic gasoline consumption has surged well beyond refining capacity, forcing costly imports and draining subsidies that analysts estimate at more than $30 billion annually.

Pezeshkian has pledged to overhaul Iran’s energy subsidy system, arguing that maintaining the current artificially low prices is unsustainable. “Even water costs more than gasoline in Iran,” he said earlier this week.

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  Iran faces rising risk of unrest as UN sanctions deepen economic strain - Reuters

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  Iran gearing up for gasoline price hike despite risk of domestic backlash

The last major fuel price hike in November 2019 sparked nationwide protests that were met with a violent crackdown. Rights groups and Reuters reported that at least 1,500 people were killed.

Officials have since stressed that any future reform would be gradual and paired with compensation measures for low-income households. The administration insists it will not repeat the sudden price shock of 2019.

Economists warn that aligning prices with real production costs could sharply raise inflation but may also help reduce smuggling and waste. The government is expected to unveil its energy reform framework before submitting next year’s budget in December.

In a rare declaration Wednesday, the unions—representing cinematographers, actors, production designers, sound recordists, editors, photographers and makeup artists—backed a statement issued a day earlier by the Iranian Film Directors Association condemning state censors.

“There is no justification for the existence of the Film Production Permit Council in today’s Iranian society,” the directors said in their statement. “Filmmakers will no longer seek approval from a body that judges their way of thinking.”

According to the state-run ISNA news agency, they called on Deputy Culture Minister for Cinema Raed Faridzadeh to disband the council and said their representatives would no longer participate in its meetings.

They also proposed that all film industry unions be represented in the separate body that grants screening permits after a film’s completion.

The call was backed on Wednesday by representatives of all trades, who said reform was essential in a “system of censorship that begins before a film is even made.”

Underscoring the challenges, It Was Just an Accident by auteur director Jafar Panahi went from being filmed Iran in secret to avoid censorship to a 2025 Oscar contender nominated by France, whose cinema industry participated in production.

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and affiliated institutions such as the Farabi Cinema Foundation have exercised tight control over filmmaking—from script development and casting to posters and promotion—dictating even which actors’ images may appear in advertising.

Writers join in

On Wednesday, the Screenwriters Association joined the protest with a statement even more direct than the directors’ declaration.

Calling screenwriters “the first victims of censorship in Iranian cinema,” the group called for replacing the current system with a registration process that would not scrutinize content, allowing films to reflect life in contemporary Iran.

The screenwriters also urged the creation of a joint committee between the state and trade unions to rewrite filmmaking regulations and replace restrictive mechanisms with supportive frameworks.

Despite international acclaim for Iranian cinema, many filmmakers have been forced to work abroad to escape ideological controls, and some have faced prison upon returning home.

In March 2026, four Iranian films are expected to compete for the Academy Award for Best International Feature. Only one—Cause of Death: Unknown by Ali Zarnegar—represents the Islamic Republic.

The other three—It Was Just an Accident, The Things You Kill by Alireza Khatami, and Black Rabbit, White Rabbit by Shahram Mokri—have been nominated by France, Canada, and Tajikistan.