A currency dealer poses for a photo with a U.S one dollar bill and Iranian rials in an exchange shop in Tehran, Iran December 25, 2022.
Foreign exchange rates, which have a critical impact on economic life, fluctuate frequently depending on where they are traded, adding to the anxiety of businesses and ordinary Iranians enduring inflation and sanctions.
The Iranian rial hit an all-time low in March, trading at one million per US dollar in March as tensions with the United States flared.
Now ahead of a third round of Iran-US nuclear talks in Oman on Saturday, the open market rate for the dollar was around 810,000 rials, while two government-controlled rates, the EST and the official rate for importing basic goods stood at 692,000 and 280,000 respectively.
Ordinary people, who often convert their savings into hard currency or gold during periods of political and international uncertainty, generally only have access to the open market.
Many businesses — and even some semi-official entities — also turn to the open market when they cannot access foreign currency through official channels or when they require immediate liquidity.
In recent years, successive governments have attempted to reform Iran’s tangled foreign exchange system to curb corruption fueled by cronyism, where favored individuals, groups and state entities secure access to cheaper rates to import goods that are later sold at much higher open market prices.
The reforms have mostly failed because entrenched political networks benefiting from the system oppose them.
The open market
Iran’s open or free foreign exchange market operates largely outside government control. It consists of authorized currency exchange shops or sarrafi as well as informal street-level transactions.
The open market -- where currencies like the US dollar, Euro, and UAE dirham are the most actively traded -- reflects real-time supply and demand. Prices in the open market are heavily influenced by inflation expectations, political risks, sanctions developments and broader economic conditions.
Open market rates typically run significantly higher than the officially controlled rates, particularly during times of instability and often provide the clearest snapshot of Iran’s underlying economic and political realities.
They serve as a crucial, unofficial benchmark that influences pricing, import costs, and inflation across the country.
The government occasionally intervenes, injecting foreign currency through selected sarrafi or cracking down on street traders they deem illegal when volatility escalates amid ramped up political tension or rapid devaluation.
Official rates for staples, medical goods
This rate, currently 285,000 rials to the dollar, is provided through designated banks to importers of basic goods such as wheat, rice, and animal feed as well as medicine and medical supplies.
The decision on allocation of this type of currency lies with related ministries and the Central Bank of Iran (CBI).
An earlier preferential rate for these imports fixed at 48,000 rials has now been almost completely scraped.
Electronic Trading System (ETS) rates
The ETS rate, closer to the free-market rate, is set by supply and demand within the Electronic Trading System (ETS) of the Iran Center for Currency and Gold Exchange.
Established in late February 2022, the center was intended to provide a formal platform for cash currency exchanges to undercut the open market.
While exchange rates on ETS are determined by market forces, the CBI actively supervises the platform, intervening by injecting or limiting foreign currency supplies to influence rates.
This managed market — accessible to licensed banks and exchange offices — handles both cash transactions and informal transfers called hawala. Transactions that previously took place through a system dubbed NIMA are now also routed through ETS.
The defunct NIMA system
The NIMA system, an acronym for integrated system of foreign exchange, was created to regulate foreign currency earned through exports and allocate it for imports of non-essential goods and services. It was officially scrapped in January.
Within NIMA, transactions occurred between exporters and importers under CBI supervision, with the central bank setting a floor and ceiling for permissible exchange rates.
For years, NIMA served as the government’s primary tool for managing the trade balance and controlling the flow of foreign currency.
Its elimination marked a significant shift toward market-based pricing mechanisms — albeit still heavily managed — through the ETS platform.
Corruption amid multiple rates
Several major corruption scandals have rocked Iran in recent years, many of which stem from its multi-tiered exchange rate system.
The Debsh Tea Company scandal is one of the most recent and possibly largest embezzlement cases in the history of the Islamic Republic.
High-ranking officials from various ministries, the Customs Administration and the Central Bank were implicated in the scandal that first came to public attention in 2023.
The family-owned company received $3.37 billion in subsidized foreign currency (at the NIMA rate) to import tea and machinery but sold $1.4 billion of the currency it had received in the open market at higher rates, did not import the promised equipment and allegedly imported low-quality tea it labelled as premium-grade.
Talks with Tehran aim to deprive Washington's Middle East nemesis of a nuclear weapon, but time will tell whether US President Donald Trump will carry through on his threat to bomb the country.
After a stunning political comeback landed Trump back in the White House for a second term, the outcome of a typically Trumpian, bumpy dash for a deal is not yet known after 100 days.
Trump’s new term began with a reinstatement of his so-called “maximum pressure” campaign, this time aggressively targeting Iran’s energy and oil sectors, including Chinese importers and independent refineries processing Iranian crude.
Since Trump took office, the Iranian currency initially plummeted by 80,000 rials to the dollar. However, it has recently clawed back some value due to growing optimism around nuclear negotiations between Washington and Tehran.
This diplomatic track is being pursued alongside potential military contingency plans, with Trump repeatedly warning that if a deal is not reached, "there will be bombing."
"It will be bombing the likes of which they have never seen before," the president said during an NBC news interview in March.
Signs of military posturing are evident: strategic bombers positioned near Iran in Diego Garcia, a surge of US aircraft in Doha, and intensified strikes against the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen—all serving as a backdrop to the ongoing negotiations.
'Rushed, inconsistent'
Trump’s Iran policy so far appears muscular but inconsistent, said retired Major General Andrew Fox in an interview with Iran International.
“Trump is showing military flex but he’s not using all the leverage America has,” Fox argued. “In terms of timing, the Iranian economy was already struggling. That could have been leveraged further. We saw the rial jump 20% as soon as the talks were announced—so potentially a negotiating lever was given away too easily."
Fox described Trump's approach so far as "mixed, rushed, and inconsistent."
“We know Trump values a deal above all else. He’s super anti-war. He doesn't like using the military lever of governance,” said Fox, now a research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.
One reason for the haste may be Trump’s self-imposed 60-day deadline for reaching a nuclear agreement with Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Trump issued this timeline in a letter delivered shortly after taking office, news outlet Axios reported.
Speed versus Substance
Holly Dagres, creator of the newsletter The Iranist and a senior fellow at The Washington Institute, warned that Trump's fast-track approach risks overlooking critical issues like human rights.
“This hurry might meet the 60-day deadline Trump wants,” Dagres said. “But it risks rushing past key issues that deserve deeper negotiation.”
Dagres suggested human rights benchmarks could be tied to sanctions relief—crediting Nobel laureate Narges Mohammadi and other activists inside Iran for pushing to include human rights in the nuclear discussions.
Mixed Messaging from Trump's Team
Adding to the confusion, US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff recently issued conflicting public statements on the goal of the negotiations.
On April 14, Witkoff told Fox News the US might accept Iran maintaining uranium enrichment at those permitted by a 2015 nuclear deal (3.67%) under stringent verification.
Yet a day later he insisted on social media that a "Trump deal" must require Iran to "stop and eliminate" its enrichment program entirely.
The apparent contradiction could be strategic, according to Behnam Ben Taleblu, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD).
“The president actually likes to cultivate uncertainty,” Taleblu said, arguing it is too early to fully grade Trump’s Iran policy—or even predict where it is headed.
Ironically, Taleblu added, Trump’s biggest success so far has gone largely unrecognized.
“The most successful element of the Iran policy has not been celebrated even by die-hard politicos who believe in the president, and that is getting the Islamic Republic of Iran under Ali Khamenei to engage, be it directly or indirectly, with the Trump administration."
Early Days, Uncertain Outcomes
For Iranian-American policy director Cameron Khansarinia of the National Union for Democracy in Iran (NUFDI), it’s simply too soon to judge.
Trump’s unpredictable style, Khansarinia said, makes it difficult to forecast his next move. But he praised Trump’s first-term Iran policy as the most effective against Iran's theocratic rulers —and sees similar themes emerging now.
“I think he does have a strategy. It just hasn't had time yet to bear fruit," Khansarinia said. "For a successful Iran strategy, all he has to do is go back to his first term and implement those policies.”
President Trump’s unpredictable style arguably may have forced Tehran into negotiations—an achievement or a mishap depending on where one sits on the political spectrum.
His current Iran policy reflects a strategic shift from his first term, combining diplomatic overtures with overt threats of attack, the wisdom of which remains unclear.
Iran is stepping up diplomatic outreach to the E3 group of countries—France, Britain and Germany—in an effort to delay or prevent their activation of the so-called snapback mechanism built into a 2015 deal if nuclear talks with the United States fail.
The so-called snapback of UN sanctions on Iran can technically be restored automatically if any party to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) deems Iran to be non-compliant.
But after US President Donald Trump pulled the United States out of the deal in 2018, Washington cannot itself trigger the snapback but those European countries can, giving them key leverage as the high-stakes diplomacy rumbles on.
Appearing to recognize their clout, Tehran has proposed a meeting with the E3 in either Rome or in Tehran on the Friday before the US talks are due to enter their fourth round, Reuters reported citing diplomatic sources.
An Iranian official cited by the news agency said the E3 had yet to respond.
The initiative follows Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s public offer last week to travel to Britain, France, and Germany for nuclear discussions with his counterparts. None have formally responded to his proposal yet.
French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot on Monday warned that the E3 would not hesitate to trigger the snapback clause if Iran’s nuclear escalation was deemed a threat to European security.
“Iran is on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons,” Barrot told reporters. “There is no military solution to the Iranian nuclear problem. There is a diplomatic path to achieve it, but it is a narrow road.”
Barrot added that the E3 remains in close contact with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on the issue, who said before the US-Iran talks began this year that Trump sought the snapback of sanctions.
Tehran faces tight deadline before JCPOA sunset
The three powers are currently negotiating with Iran about future steps to salvage the agreement, and they last met in January in Geneva.
In March, the E3 issued a joint statement expressing concerns over Iran's nuclear activities, including unprecedented enrichment levels, advanced centrifuge deployment, lack of transparency and threats to non-proliferation.
With UN Security Council Resolution 2231—which enshrined the JCPOA—set to expire in October 2025, Iran has a narrow window to persuade the countries not to trigger the sanctions.
Tehran has warned that it may withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in retaliation if the sanctions are triggered.
As with North Korea in 2003, leaving the NPT would lift Iran’s legal obligation to remain a non-nuclear weapons state and allow it to end IAEA inspections and monitoring entirely.
Such a move would escalate tensions dramatically, raising the risk of preemptive military action by Israel or the United States and potentially sparking a regional arms race if countries like Saudi Arabia seek to develop their own nuclear programs.
How the snapback mechanism works
Under UN Security Council Resolution 2231, any JCPOA participant—the E3, Russia, China or the United States —could file a non-compliance complaint with the UN Security Council.
The other participants in the JCPOA have argued that the United States can no longer enforce the snapback mechanism because it withdrew from it in 2018.
If no resolution is adopted to continue sanctions relief within 30 days, all previous UN sanctions are automatically reimposed, including cargo inspections on Iranian shipments, Reinstated arms embargoes and restrictions on missile-related technologies.
This automatic snapback process cannot be vetoed—even by permanent members like Russia or China, which have boosted ties with Iran in recent years and whose relationship with the West is increasingly adversarial.
Although both countries may oppose the move politically, they lack the power to stop it once initiated.
To avert snapback, the Council must pass a resolution during the 30-day review period to continue sanctions relief. But any permanent member can veto it—meaning if the US or E3 object, the resolution will fail, and sanctions will snap back by default.
More than half of Iran's port activity remains offline following a major explosion at the Shahid Rajaee port in Bandar Abbas, according to Iranian port authority data.
The explosion on Saturday which has devastated Rajaei Port, the country's largest container port near Bandar Abbas, has halted 57% of the country's nominal loading and unloading capacity.
Although Iranian customs officials announced that some customs and transit activities have resumed, full port operations are still suspended pending the complete extinguishment of the fire.
Cleanup efforts are underway, with Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni saying that about 80% of firefighting operations had been completed by Sunday afternoon.
At least 28 people have been killed and more than 1,000 injured.
The Ministry of Health has declared a state of emergency in Bandar Abbas, citing serious air pollution and the risk of chemical contamination. Authorities have also shut down all schools, universities, and government offices in the city as a precaution.
Rajaei Port processes about 85% of Iran’s container cargo and 52% of its oil product trade, according to the Iranian Ports and Maritime Organization.
Over the past Iranian year (March 2024 - March 2025), the port handled over 81 million tons of goods — over half of Iran’s total maritime cargo traffic — and $29 billion of Iran’s $130 billion foreign trade.
Smoke rises following an explosion at the Shahid Rajaee port in Bandar Abbas, Iran, April 26, 2025.
In the container sector, Shahid Rajaee handles a dominant 77% of the country's nominal container capacity, equivalent to 6.65 million TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units), out of 11 active container ports. The next largest, Bushehr, has a capacity of just 550,000 TEUs.
A rough estimation suggests that each day of disruption at the port potentially halts the movement of an estimated 221,000 tons of various goods, including 61,000 tons of containerized cargo and 75,000 tons of oil products.
The cause of the explosion remains under investigation. A source with ties to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps told the New York Times that the blast was triggered by sodium perchlorate, a chemical used in solid rocket fuel.
Less than a month before the explosion, reports indicated the arrival of the Jairan, an Iranian cargo ship linked to the transport of missile components from China to Bandar Abbas.
The Jairan, owned by the US-sanctioned Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), delivered a cargo of sodium perchlorate to the port in late March, following a similar delivery by the MV Golbon in February, according to The Maritime Executive.
The substance is processed in Iranian facilities such as Parchin and Khojir to produce ammonium perchlorate, which constitutes 70% of the fuel for Iran’s solid-fueled ballistic missiles, including the Kheybar-Shekan, Fattah, Fateh-110, and Zolfaghar missiles.
On Sunday, an Iranian defense ministry spokesperson said that there were no military-use shipments among the import or export cargo at the port, adding that foreign media had been spreading rumors regarding the incident.
Iran’s moderate Ham-Mihan newspaper suggested sabotage was a likely cause, noting the coincidence of the blast with the resumption of expert-level talks between Iran and the United States.
Comparisons have been drawn between the Rajaei Port explosion and the 2020 Beirut port disaster. Lebanese authorities said the explosion was triggered by a fire in a warehouse with a huge stockpile of ammonium nitrate fertiliser - commonly used for ammunition and explosives - which had been negligently stored for years.
Rajaei Port, ranked 59th among the world's major ports, is considered vital for Iran’s economy, with no immediate alternative to its vast cargo-handling capacity.
Iranian officials said a full assessment of the damage and a timeline for complete restoration would be announced after the fire is fully extinguished.
Iran has finalized four agreements worth a total investment of $4 billion with Russian companies to develop seven oil fields, Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad said.
During his visit to Moscow for the 18th session of the Iran-Russia Joint Economic Commission, Paknejad said on Thursday that the deals form part of broader efforts to expand strategic cooperation across sectors, including energy, finance, and agriculture.
“The potential for trade between Iran and Russia is far greater than the current $5 billion level,” he said, adding that additional memoranda of understanding are under negotiation in the oil and gas sectors. “Expert groups are actively working to finalize these talks and turn them into binding contracts.”
The oil minister also announced plans for a new nuclear power plant to be constructed in the country, financed by a credit line from Moscow.
Paknejad also said that discussions are underway on importing natural gas from Russia in an initial phase, followed by gas swaps and transit to other countries. “This is one of the key areas of interest for both sides,” he said. “We have had detailed negotiations, and only a few items remain before finalizing the first-phase import volumes.”
The minister added that the latest agreements follow the ratification of a long-term strategic cooperation treaty between Tehran and Moscow. “This is the first joint commission meeting since the treaty’s approval last week, and it opens new pathways for economic collaboration,” he said.
Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad meets with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak in Moscow on April 25, 2025
Separately, Saeed Tavakkoli, managing director of Iran’s National Gas Company, said progress has been made on an earlier agreement with Russia to transfer gas to northern Iran, where domestic production is limited. “This plan will help meet energy needs in northern provinces and contribute to Iran’s goal of becoming a regional gas hub,” he said.
Tavakkoli added that while further technical assessments are needed, current negotiations have been effective, and the project aligns with the targets of Iran’s seventh development plan.
The agreements come as Western sanction -- isolating Russia over Ukraine and Iran for its nuclear program, regional role, and human rights -- have spurred a rapid deepening of their ties.
Their shared predicament, alongside a common interest in countering US influence, underpins their growing partnership. Both nations are also exploring ways to bypass these restrictions, including using national currencies and alternative financial channels for trade.
A growing divide in Iran over how to approach negotiations between Tehran and Washington over Iran's nuclear program appears to have reached the office of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Khamenei has largely silenced Tehran's hardliners ahead of the third round of talks with Washington but some opposition persists within his own office.
Two newspapers funded and maintained by Khamenei’s office —Kayhan and Ettela'at —have been presenting starkly different perspectives on the talks over the past week. Both are among Iran’s oldest newspapers, and their top management is personally appointed by the Supreme Leader.
Kayhan, known for its consistently anti-US stance, has maintained a hardline, pessimistic view on the negotiations, even after Khamenei’s rhetoric softened in his recent speeches.
The newspaper insists that "the talks will lead to nowhere." Previously, the daily had writted "negotiating with the United States would be foolish." In a controversial satirical commentary, Kayhan even called for the assassination of President Donald Trump.
The newspaper’s editor, Hossein Shariatmadari, wrote on April 18 that "Iran is engaged in a hybrid war with the United States, and the Iranian government should adopt a combat posture against Washington."
Later, on April 22, the daily quoted IRGC-linked Defa Press website as saying, "Iran is sufficiently armed with top-secret weapons to attack Diego Garcia and confront US and British forces there. Iran’s Shahed-136 drones can reach Diego Garcia, located approximately 4,000 kilometers from its borders."
The report added, "Iran can set fire to Diego Garcia with its improved Khorramshahr ballistic missiles, while its cruise missiles can target massive U.S. vessels in the Indian Ocean."
Although the articles may be a mix of falsehoods, disinformation and wishful thinking, they appear to reflect abiding suspicions of the diplomatic outreach among hardliners.
'Embarrassing themselves'
Earlier, Ettela'at had welcomed the negotiations. In an analysis published on April 22, the newspaper sought to expose "those who are undermining the talks."
"Three groups in Iran are attempting to obstruct the negotiations. Although they are too weak to derail the process entirely, they might succeed in discouraging some people and embarrassing themselves."
In an apparent reference to previous Iranian governments and their leaders, Ettela'at identified the first group as "those who question why negotiations were not allowed when they were in power and could have claimed them as their own achievement."
The second group, according to the newspaper, consists of "those who equate negotiations and compromise with treason. They chant radical slogans, create tensions, and sometimes their rhetoric proves costly for the government. On occasion, they even incite small protests in the streets." T
This appeared to be a clear reference to ultraconservatives, such as members of the ultra-conservative Paydari Party and the editors of Kayhan.
The third group attempting to obstruct the negotiations, Ettela'at wrote, is "the foreign-based Iranian opposition," which the newspaper characterized as "bankrupt opportunists."
"Let us support détente and the ongoing negotiations," the daily insisted.
This development could be seen as an extension of Khamenei's "good cop-bad cop" strategy. However, the timing –just as negotiations continue—and the stark contrast between the two perspectives strongly suggest a deeper divide within Khamenei's office.
While pockets of resistance against a potential deal with Washington persist, some Iranians—such as sociologist Ebrahim Fayyaz—are already considering the aftermath of an agreement.
Characterizing the negotiations as inevitable, Fayyaz said in an interview with Khabar Online, "This is the first time Iranians are engaging in negotiations with a world power on equal footing."
At the same time, he warned that radical rhetoric from hardliners, particularly those affiliated with Iran’s state television, could point to serious internal instability.