Iran's state media boast about sanctioned maritime carrier’s success

Foreign policy analyst Amir Ali Abolfath told the conservative Nameh News website in Tehran that Trump is almost certain to adopt a maximum pressure policy toward Iran. He noted that Trump would likely leverage the strength of the US economy and international bodies, such as the IAEA Board of Governors, to advance his hardline approach.

According to Nameh News, nearly all of the pessimistic assessments made by Iranian pundits are based on the combination of hardline political figures who have been named as the likely members of Trump's cabinet.

Abolfath stated that Trump believes his maximum pressure policy against Iran was not sustained under President Joe Biden and seeks to reinstate it. However, he questioned its potential effectiveness, remarking, "What Trump says is not important; we need to see what he can do."

Meanwhile, foreign policy analyst Qasem Mohebali told another Tehran website that the period of neither war nor peace for Iran’s Islamic government is over. Now it is time for either peace or war. Mohebali added, "Trump will most certainly offer to negotiate with Iran and will wait for Tehran's response. The situation is more complicated than eight years ago, and Iran needs to be careful not to turn the opportunity for negotiation into a threat."

Mohebali said, "Eight years ago, Trump's policy hinged on harnessing Iran's nuclear activity and its influence in the region. With his maximum pressure policy, he tried to prevent Iran's access to financial resources needed to facilitate the country's development. However, that policy led to an escalation of tensions in the region and in Iran-US relations. Nonetheless, he is likely to resume his previous policy." Mohebali did not mention that Iran also needed the financial resources to maintain its proxy groups in the region that target Israel and US interests.

He noted that for the first time in 30 years, Republicans now control all key pillars of decision-making in the United States, a dynamic that could influence Tehran's relations with Washington. Mohebali suggested that this alignment might benefit Iran if Trump secures an agreement favorable to Tehran, as no one within the US political structure would be positioned to oppose or block his decision. Over the past three decades, Congress often had the power to obstruct deals made by presidents and their administration.

Over the next two months, Iran must consider all possibilities and prepare to negotiate if President Trump presents terms for a deal. Referring to Khamenei's "neither war nor negotiations" policy following Trump's 2018 withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, Mohebali suggested, without directly naming Khamenei, that this era has ended. He argued that Iran now faces a critical choice between war and peace, with Trump having the freedom to pursue either path.

Mehdi Motaharnia, another Iranian foreign policy analyst, said he believes the Trump administration will enter negotiations with Iran with all of its power. But this is going to be a negotiation much more difficult than holding talks with the Obama or Biden administrations.

Motaharnia remarked that in his second term, "Trump aims to leave a lasting legacy both domestically and internationally. His team is made up of like-minded conservatives, and negotiating with Iran is a key objective of his foreign policy. However, he negotiates on his own terms, presenting both opportunities and threats during the process. These talks are unlikely to focus solely on the 2015 nuclear deal; instead, he seeks to broaden the scope to include other issues, aiming to extract as many concessions as possible."

However, Motaharnia cautioned that if Iran refuses to negotiate, the situation could become significantly more challenging. In such a scenario, the Trump administration may strengthen its ties with Tel Aviv, ensuring increased pressure on Tehran. This could leave Iran vulnerable to a range of difficulties.

The Iranian government appears to have its own conditions for potential negotiations. In an interview with the Mossallass website, Iranian government spokesperson Elias Hazrati stated, "Iran can negotiate with Trump if the United States refrains from interfering in Iran's internal affairs and does not target our interests. Since 1979, the United States has consistently sought to harm Iran with the intention of regime change."

This stance contrasts with Trump’s assertion that he does not pursue a policy of regime change in Iran.

The planned censure is likely going through despite Tehran offering to cap its highly enriched uranium stock.

France, Britain, Germany, and the United States will introduce the resolution at Wednesday's meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, Iran International has learned.

Iran and nuclear experts agree on one thing: Trump’s return to the White House will have an impact on the Islamic Republic, but whether and how the incoming administration and the Islamic Republic may engage on the nuclear issue is up for debate.

The Iranian establishment has concern over the censure because of the approaching October 20, 2025 deadline for UN restrictions to be fully lifted. That’s when most restrictions against Tehran's nuclear program will be removed under the UN Security Council Resolution 2231, and the West will no longer be able to apply “snapback” sanctions.

A prior censure was made in June of this year, but it didn't seem to make any difference, however, experts point out the political climate was different a few months ago.

The Europeans could activate or trigger the mechanism, bringing back all of the previously lifted UN sanctions. 

Sina Azodi, a professor and researcher at George Washington University, told Iran International that the Islamic Republic would try to avoid internationally mandated sanctions from a political standpoint because it doesn’t serve their interests.

“Iran is under sanctions, but they are US unilateral sanctions. They are not internationally mandated sanctions of the United Nations. From a political standpoint, Iran would try to avoid a snapback of UN sanctions, especially since they're less than a year away from those sanctions to be completely lifted,” said Azodi who specializes in Iran's nuclear and foreign policies. 

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi made comments on Iranian State TV Saturday suggesting that a diplomatic route on Iran’s nuclear ambitions still exists.

"We believe the window for diplomacy is still open, albeit for a short time, provided the other parties demonstrate genuine willingness. Without such commitment, we will pursue an alternative course, "said Araghchi.

Araghchi also said that Iran’s intentions were conveyed to the IAEA chief Rafael Mariano Grossi during his latest trip to the Islamic Republic last week. Iran offered not to expand its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% during his visit.

Gregory Brew, an Iran analyst with the Eurasia Group, noted that while Iran appears to signal a willingness to make concessions, it insists on doing so strictly on its own terms.

“Iran will deal, but only if they get what they want—sanctions relief—without having to make sweeping concessions on either their program or other elements of their foreign policy,” said Brew.

Despite the rhetoric, Iran’s actions are proving otherwise.

Tehran has increased its stockpile of enriched uranium to near weapons-grade levels, according to the Associated Press, which viewed a confidential report by the United Nations' nuclear watchdog Tuesday.

Uranium enriched at 60% purity is just a short step away from weapons-grade levels of 90%.

With Trump’s second term around the corner – and Iran’s deterrence proxies Hamas and Hezbollah taking a severe blow by Israel – that leaves Tehran in a predicament.

Does it double down towards nukes or try to deal with the future president, which US intelligence reports say Iran tried to assassinate?

Brew said Trumps’ return was always an element of thinking for Iran, but they are still playing it the same as with the Biden-Harris administration, wanting sanctions relief and will - as he described it - play it nice - until 2231 resolution expires. Then Iran can likely negotiate without JCPOA commitments.

Andrea Stricker, the Deputy Director and Research Fellow at FDD’s Nonproliferation & Biodefense Program, told Iran International that if Tehran makes concessions, it’s because of the incoming US president's use of peace through strength and maximum pressure.

“Tehran sees the writing on the wall that with Trump coming back into office and the E3 also prepared to increase pressure against the regime, that snapback is likely inevitable. It will seek to evade restored sanctions with the help of its patrons Russia and China, and its partner North Korea,” said Stricker.

Stricker said Trump’s maximum pressure will force Iran to tone down its nuclear ambitions and aggression in the region and that if a deal is possible, it would only be due to maximum pressure and fear of Trump.

She said Iran is fearful of Trump who ordered the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani in a targeted strike in Iraq in 2020, withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal, and re-imposed sanctions aimed at cutting Iran's oil sales to zero.

The reported enrichment of uranium stockpiles, Stricker views, as a form of blackmail to the West to prevent the censure and the snapback on UN sanctions.

“It's too little, too late,” she added.

Azodi told Iran International that Tehran has historically reacted with anger to IAEA resolutions. Based on Iran’s behavior, Azodi sees a strong possibility that Tehran would expand their nuclear program to increase the number of centrifuges and inaugurate a new centrifuge center, but he refers to it as a diplomatic play – and not a serious ploy for a bomb.

He’s doesn’t believe Iran would go for a bomb, citing that Israel and the US would do everything in their power to prevent it.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Trump have repeatedly said that they would not allow Iran to become a nuclear power.

With that knowledge, Azodi said a dash for the bomb would put Iran in a position of an attack - a risk he believes the Islamic Republic would not take for its own survival. Rather, some sort of a deal is more likely.

The Financial Times recently reported that Trump intends on bankrupting Iran to force Tehran to drop its nuclear program and stop funding regional proxies.

Prior to winning the US presidential election, Trump appeared on an American podcast show with host Patrick Bet-David saying he would like Iran to be successful.

“I would like to see Iran be very successful. The only thing is, they can't have a nuclear weapon,” said Trump.

Stricker believes Tehran's rulers are intimidated by Trump, seeing the potential for a deal through his strategy of maximum pressure. Azodi, on the other hand, argues that Trump's interest in striking a deal with Iran is not driven by diplomatic or ideological motives but by a desire to secure his place in history.

Iran's Foreign Ministry on Tuesday night summoned the British chargé d’affaires to protest the latest UK sanctions on Iran’s shipping and aviation industries over Tehran’s alleged missile transfers to Russia.

The British envoy was told that Iran's defense cooperation with Russia is legitimate and legal and is not against any third party, according to Iran’s state TV.

The UK envoy was summoned hours after the ambassador of Hungary, the rotating president of the EU, was summoned to receive Iran’s strong protest over similar sanctions imposed by the EU against the Islamic Republic.

The Iranian Foreign Ministry slammed the British and EU sanctions as illegal interference in Iran’s domestic affairs, saying it is not acceptable in any way.

The sanctions, introduced on Monday, targeted several Iranian entities and individuals including the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) as well as Iran’s flagship carrier Iran Air.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on Tuesday the EU and the UK have accused Iran of supplying ballistic missiles to Russia and imposed sanctions on Iran’s airlines and shipping without presenting any evidence.

“At the same time, based on documents submitted to court, British media today reveals that the UK, fully aware that its arms and F-35 components are used by Israel in grave violations of international humanitarian law, continues to export these weapons. The UK's justification? Maintaining ties with the US and NATO. This contradictory behavior exposes their double standards and abdication of responsibility toward human rights,” Araghchi tweeted.

Earlier in the day, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman had called the EU and British sanctions “unjustified”, saying they were imposed based on false claims of missile transfers to Russia.

"Iran considers the imposition of new sanctions by the European Union and the United Kingdom against a number of Iranian individuals and legal entities on the false claim of sending ballistic missiles to Russia as an unjustified act that contradicts the norms of international law," Esmail Baghaei said.

Baghaei accused the European parties of violating international law, including the freedom of navigation and maritime trade, via sanctions.

In September, the United States, citing intelligence shared with its allies, reported that Russia had received ballistic missiles from Iran for use in its ongoing conflict in Ukraine. In response, Washington imposed sanctions on the vessels and companies involved in facilitating the weapons transfers.

The new sanctions, imposed on the 1,000th day of the Ukraine war, are part of a wider strategy to economically and diplomatically isolate Iran.

When did it start?

The first reports of Iran supplying drones to Russia emerged in July 2022. On July 11, US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan revealed intelligence saying Iran was preparing to send several hundred drones to Russia, including those with combat capabilities.

“Our information indicates that the Iranian government is preparing to provide Russia with up to several hundred UAVs, including weapons-capable UAVs on an expedited timeline,” he told reporters.

By mid-October 2022, Ukrainian forces began identifying Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones in Russian attacks, confirming their deployment in the conflict.

Sullivan’s statement marked a pivotal moment, as it was among the earliest public indications of this emerging military collaboration. The level of specificity in the intelligence, including remarks that Iran planned to send hundreds of drones, surprised many.

How many drones were supplied?

According to the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Iran has supplied Russia with up to 3,000 drones - primarily the Shahed-136 model - though the exact number remains uncertain.

“Estimates vary on how many Iranian drones Russia has acquired, ranging from 600 to more than 3,000. While this number might seem large, these munitions are often used in waves, so a supply of a few thousand can be depleted in a matter of days or weeks,” the CFR wrote in October 2022.

Russia’s drone manufacturing facility

In June 2023, US intelligence alleged Iran was aiding Russia in building a drone manufacturing facility in Yelabuga, within the Alabuga Special Economic Zone on the steppes of the Tatarstan region.

The plant focuses on producing Shahed-136 drones domestically, which Russia rebranded as the Geran-2. The collaboration aims to manufacture approximately 6,000 drones by mid-2025, ensuring a consistent supply for Russia's military needs.

Iran has provided the technical expertise, blueprints, and potentially key components for the Yelabuga plant.

This facility reflected a strategic shift, allowing Russia to bypass sanctions and reduce its dependency on direct imports from Iran.

The project, however, has faced challenges, including labor shortages and logistical hurdles, prompting Moscow to scramble for workers including from among African students in the country according to the Associated Press.

How does Russia use Iranian drones?

Russian forces utilize drones like the Shahed-136 for kamikaze strikes. It means that the drones crash into fixed targets, delivering explosive payloads to damage energy grids, command centers, and supply depots.

The drone swarms are also deployed to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses, forcing them to expend costly missiles on relatively inexpensive UAVs.

Their frequent use, particularly in nighttime attacks, creates fear among civilians and military personnel.

Iranian drones rely on GPS-guided navigation rather than first-person view (FPV) systems. This makes them cost-effective weapons but limits their adaptability to dynamic combat scenarios. Their payload capacity of approximately 40-50 kilograms and range of up to 2,500 kilometers enable strikes deep into Ukrainian territory.

Russia strategically uses drones to deplete resources, meaning drone swarms force Ukraine to expend high-value air defense missiles. Once defenses are exhausted, more advanced missile systems can reach their targets with fewer losses.

The drones also help map Ukrainian air defenses, revealing gaps for exploitation.

These tactics underscore the drones' dual role as both offensive weapons and tools for battlefield intelligence.

Efficiency and cost

Iranian drones like the Shahed-136 are considered cost-effective. Production costs range from $20,000 to $50,000 per unit, significantly cheaper than most precision-guided missiles. However, foreign buyers such as Russia pay far more—up to $290,000 per drone in smaller shipments. This pricing discrepancy reflects the added value of technology transfer and production rights.

The Shahed-136 relies on GPS for navigation, making it vulnerable to jamming. Pre-programmed flight paths limit their adaptability to dynamic combat scenarios and Ukrainian forces have increasingly intercepted these drones using advanced air defense systems, electronic jamming, and counter-drone measures.

While the exact terms of compensation remain unclear, reports suggest that Russia has made payments in cash, gold, and possibly other forms of material exchange.

In November 2022, Sky News reported that Moscow transferred €140 million in cash and captured Western weapons to Iran.

International repercussions

Iran's drone exports to Russia have drawn widespread condemnation and punitive measures, mostly from the United States and its European allies.

The US Treasury Department has sanctioned several entities involved in the production and export of Iranian drones, including Shahed Aviation Industries. Additional restrictions target logistics networks facilitating the transport of drones to Russia.

The EU has also imposed similar sanctions, focusing on Iran's drone manufacturers and individuals linked to their deployment in Ukraine. Travel bans and asset freezes have been applied to Iranian officials and companies overseeing these operations.

The controversy has led Ukraine to downgrade its diplomatic ties with Iran. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has accused Tehran of complicity in Russian war crimes, while Western nations have sought to hold Iran accountable for violating arms embargoes under United Nations resolutions.

By supplying advanced UAVs and aiding domestic production, Tehran has bolstered Moscow’s capabilities in its war in Ukraine. However, the partnership has also drawn intense scrutiny, resulting in stepped-up international sanctions and heightened tensions between Iran and Western nations.

During the two high-profile visits last week amid Israeli air strikes, Larijani delivered personal messages from Ali Khamenei to allied militant groups, the Lebanese authorities and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Both visits received extensive coverage from domestic, regional, and international media, although very few details were revealed about the messages he carried and the talks he held.

The veteran politician who had kept a very low profile since 2020, when his tenure ended in the parliament, reportedly relayed Khamenei’s blessing for a US-mediated ceasefire with Israel to Hezbollah.

According to Iranian media, during his visit, he delivered a message of support and reassurance to the Syrian president in light of Israel's threats to target him. The visit, they suggest, may also serve to counter allegations that ties between Tehran and Damascus have weakened following Israel's strikes on Iran in late October.

“It must be born in mind that after Israel’s strikes on Iran, some [groups or people] tried to change the course of Iran's relations with Syria, saying Syria had been passive or even claiming that the country had allowed Israeli fighter jets to use its airspace,” Rouydad24 news website said in a commentary titled “What is Larijani’s Mission in Damascus” Thursday.

“But now with Larijani’s visit it has been revealed that the relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Assad are as strong as before,” the article added.

Pundits and Iranian media suggest that Khamenei’s decision to entrust the moderate-conservative Larijani with delivering his messages signals a move to assign Larijani a prominent role in Iran's foreign affairs apparatus.

Larijani, who served as secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council from 2005 to 2008 and, prior to that, headed the state broadcaster IRIB from 1994 to 2004 by Khamenei's appointment, chose not to seek re-election to parliament in 2020 after twelve years of leadership. Instead, he set his sights on the presidency.

The ultra-hardliner Guardian Council, however, barred him from running for the presidency then and again this year after Ebrahim Raisi’s death in a helicopter crash by announcing that it had been able to “ascertain” his qualifications for running for the post without any further explanations despite Larijani’s insistence.

To most in Iran, the rejection of Larijani’s candidacy in two consecutive terms signaled the end of his political career and his “political death”.

However, Khamenei had appointed Larijani as a member of the Expediency Council and as an adviser to the Supreme Leader in 2020, which was largely seen as ceremonial and of little political importance.

“Choosing Ali Larijani to relay the messages of the Leader of the Revolution also suggests that approval of the Guardian Council [as in Jalili’s case] does not necessarily mean approval by the great Leader of the Revolution and disqualification by the Council also does not mean lack of qualification [for participation] in the country’s political structure,” Rouydad wrote.

In a commentary on Sunday titled “Radicals Dream of Eliminating Larijani Did Not Come True” Khabar Online, a news website believed to represent Larijani’s interests, claimed his “special appointment” by Khamenei has raised concerns among ultra-hardliners who fear President Masoud Pezeshkian may appoint him as the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.

By law, the secretary of the Council does not have a vote in its decisions. However, they can gain voting rights if appointed as the Supreme Leader's representative to the Council, as has been the case in most prior instances.

Both positions are currently held by ultra-hardliner Saeed Jalili who after losing the elections to Masoud Pezeshkian appears to have somehow also fallen from Khamenei’s favor, too.