Drug prices jump up to 400% as shortages strain Iranian pharmacies

The street has become a kind of world within a world, a haven where people briefly lose sight of what is happening outside.

At times it almost feels normal—with one tiny but crucial difference: fewer phones are out. There is no internet to warrant the persistent scrolling.

The music is low. The coffees are overpriced. Couples flirt. Groups of teenagers debate politics and migration plans over cheesecake and iced americanos as if the country around them were not still carrying the shock of war.

But the conversations are different now.

“We thought it would be over in a few days,” says Mani, 17, referring to the January protests that were brutally crushed. “It wasn’t.”

He says he was on the streets with many of his school friends but would think twice if there were another call to action.

“If the US and Israel couldn’t get rid of them, no one can,” Mani says. “I don’t think I’d go out again. I’ll leave Iran as soon as I can.”

That appeared to be the dominant mood among the Gen Zs I met in one cafe this week. One was my best friend’s daughter. The others were her friends.

Their worldview is hard to grasp and harder to explain. The best phrase I can find for it is “suspended expectation”: a belief that the Islamic Republic may eventually fall, paired with almost no confidence that they themselves can bring it down.

The January massacre and the war that followed appear to have fundamentally altered how many young opponents of the system think about change.

“I still like the Prince,” says Saba, another 17-year-old, referring to Iran’s most prominent opposition figure, Reza Pahlavi. “I think he’s a decent man. But I don’t think he can beat this seven-headed dragon.”

The contempt for Iran’s ruling elite is unmistakable. It may be the closest thing to a shared political feeling in the cafe.

Saba and her friends describe moments of fear during the bombings, but also flashes of exhilaration after reports that senior officials had been killed.

“We partied hard when Khamenei was killed,” says Tannaz, 19. “We danced through the night wearing headphones so no music could be heard from outside the apartment.”

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Tannaz says she protested too and saw a friend badly injured with pellets. The crackdown, she says, “shattered” her emotionally.

“After January 10, I couldn’t get out of bed for days,” she says. “Then there was a ray of hope when Khamenei was killed. But not anymore. I really don’t know what’s going to happen to Iran. I’m trying to take it day by day until I can leave.”

That last sentiment may be the most common political position among parts of Tehran’s urban youth today: not revolution, not reform, but exit.

The war does not appear to have softened hostility toward the ruling system among these circles. If anything, it deepened it. But it also reinforced a conclusion many seem to have reached after January: that the state is far harsher and more durable than they once believed.

So they “chill,” as Mani puts it with a laugh. “What else can one do?”

They are still hanging out when I leave—no doubt drifting from politics to names and trends non-Gen Zs would struggle to decipher.

Tehran has regained its noise after the war. But beneath it sits a generation that no longer seems to believe history belongs to them.

The network’s winning projects included its Telegram bot, the interactive map of Israeli targets in the 12-Day War, and the Woman, Life, Freedom campaign. The Telegram bot also advanced to the global stage of the WAN-IFRA awards.

The Telegram bot, entered by Volant Media in the United Kingdom, won Best in Audience Engagement and Most Innovative Digital Product. WAN-IFRA described it as a secure, AI-assisted channel that allowed users to submit footage and reports from inside Iran, with all material verified by Iran International journalists.

Launched during mass protests, the bot became a major news-gathering tool, receiving thousands of messages a day from inside Iran.

After a nationwide internet shutdown, it also became a communication bridge, allowing Iranians abroad to send messages to relatives cut off from the internet. The messages were broadcast on satellite TV, with one message displayed every 20 seconds during live programming.

The WAN-IFRA jury said the project showed “exceptionally innovative” editorial use of a familiar technology, adding that its transformation during internet shutdowns into a bridge between diaspora families and people inside Iran showed “significant real-world user impact beyond news gathering.”

The jury said the bot’s verification workflows, security protections and cross-platform integration made it “a strong reference model for participatory journalism in restricted environments.”

Iran International’s interactive map of Israeli targets in the 12-Day War, a project by Amirhadi Anvari, won Best Data Visualization in the Middle East.

The project mapped strike locations across Iran during the 12-day war, combining citizen-reported information with verified data from multiple sources, including international reporting.

WAN-IFRA said the map provided a comprehensive and accessible view of the conflict at a time when location-specific information was scarce and fragmented.

The project’s main editorial challenge was verifying, locating and explaining events across competing information environments. It drew on citizen videos, domestic reporting and open-source geospatial data, with each location cross-checked and mapped with coordinates, classification and explanatory context.

Designed for clarity and usability, the map uses custom markers, layered views and filters to help audiences navigate complex information. Most locations link to visual evidence or related reporting, while additional layers provide context, including the proximity of military and sensitive sites to civilian infrastructure.

The jury called it a “thorough geolocation of categorized information” and praised its link to Google Maps, adding: “The simple and brief narrative allows the user to freely explore the content.”

Iran International also won Best Marketing Campaign for a News Brand for its Woman, Life, Freedom campaign, marking the third anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death in police custody in 2022.

The campaign centered on an installation of 1,000 hand-folded origami birds, each carrying the name of a victim and arranged to form “Woman, Life, Freedom” in Persian. The installation was filmed and amplified across broadcast and digital platforms, inviting audiences to fold and share their own origami birds using the hashtag #MahsaBird.

WAN-IFRA said the campaign turned remembrance into collective action in a context where open dissent carries major risks. It offered audiences inside Iran and across the diaspora a simple and safe act of remembrance, using paper, light and human hands to turn individual grief into visible solidarity.

The jury called it “a powerful uplift,” saying it translated Iran International’s mission into “a safe, participatory act of remembrance under repression.”

“Deeply inspiring,” the jury said.

The Iran International Telegram bot has also advanced to the global stage of the WAN-IFRA awards. The global winners are due to be announced in June during the WAN-IFRA World News Media Congress in Marseille, France.

WAN-IFRA, the World Association of News Publishers, is one of the largest international organizations in media and journalism, representing thousands of publishers and news organizations worldwide. Its Digital Media Awards honor leading work in digital journalism, data visualization, media products, marketing and audience engagement.

In the latest episode of the Eye for Iran podcast, host Mohamad Machine-Chian sat down with two experts to dissect the fallout: Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, Head of Digital News Services at Iran International and former Reuters Energy Correspondent, and Dr. Iman Nasseri, Managing Director for the Middle East Research at FGE Nexant consultancy, in Dubai.

Together, they painted a picture of a region at a point where a "broken" waterway might be forcing the world to permanently look elsewhere.

Tehran’s unexpected leverage

For decades, the Islamic Republic used the threat of closing the Strait as a rhetorical deterrent. However, according to Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, the actual closure in early 2026 was as much a surprise to Tehran as it was to the world. Having seen their primary deterrents – missile programs and regional proxies like Hezbollah – fail to prevent direct conflict with the US and Israel, the establishment stumbled upon a different kind of power.

"Iranians are also surprised," Sharafedin noted. "The deterrence they didn’t count on that much – the closure of the Strait of Hormuz – became their most valuable card. Now, they are tying the future security of Iran to the management of Hormuz. We had the deputy speaker of the parliament saying that the Strait of Hormuz is our nuclear weapon."

This shift in doctrine has led to a dangerous sense of triumphalism in Tehran. State-controlled media has floated the idea of imposing "transit fees" or "security taxes" on ships, much like the Suez Canal.

But Sharafedin warns that this strategy is fatally short-sighted. Unlike the Suez, which is governed by an international treaty and relative predictability, the Islamic Republic’s logic defies stability. "They will try to impose their political views and preferences on this transit route," he explained. "Many shipping lines simply won't risk it."

The 'broken vase' of global energy

The economic consequences of this closure are already being felt, even if they aren't always visible in the "Brent Crude" price tag seen on news tickers. Dr. Iman Nasseri pointed out that while the public looks at futures prices, the physical market has been in agony.

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"The price of jet fuel was over $200 for a prolonged period," Nasseri revealed. "The market is furious and frustrated. We have 12 to 14 million barrels per day of unsupplied demand. In India, many people do not have gas for cooking. The demand destruction has already happened."

This disruption has permanently changed how global powers view the Persian Gulf. Sharafedin cited comments by International Energy Agency (IEA) chief Fatih Birol, saying: "The Strait of Hormuz is like a broken vase. It's broken. The damage is done. It's almost impossible to put it back together." The world is no longer waiting for the Strait to reopen; it is actively building a future without it.

The exodus to alternative routes

The most immediate reaction to the blockade has been a massive surge in investment toward alternative infrastructure. Pipelines that were once considered "economically unfeasible" are now receiving emergency funding. Sharafedin noted that since the start of the conflict in February, the volume of oil transferred via alternative routes has nearly doubled, jumping from 4.2 million to 7 million barrels per day.

"Iraq recently allocated $1.5 billion for a pipeline connecting Basra to Jordan, Syria, and Turkey," Sharafedin said. This diversification isn't limited to the Middle East. Buyers like Pakistan, which relied on Kuwaiti oil for 50 years, are now sourcing crude from Nigeria, Libya, and the United States. Even China, the region's biggest customer, is accelerating its trillion-dollar pivot toward nuclear and solar energy to escape its reliance on the Hormuz bottleneck.

Regional prosperity held hostage

While the global economy may eventually adjust by finding new suppliers, the outlook for the Middle East itself is much grimmer. For the last decade, countries like the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia have tied their future prosperity to a logic of stability and foreign investment. That dream is now under direct attack.

"The Islamic Republic is single-handedly holding the region down," Sharafedin argued. He pointed out that every time the region moves toward a better future – whether through the Arab Uprisings or attracting tech giants like Amazon AWS – Tehran intervenes to sabotage the stability required for such progress. By attacking infrastructure in Fujairah and targeting tankers in the Red Sea, the regime has signaled that no alternative route is safe.

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"I don't think many of those countries can now justify the investment of huge data centers," Sharafedin lamented. "Both short-term and long-term, the regional countries will pay a heavy price."

Scenarios for 2027: A prolonged limbo

As the US shifts from "Operation Epic Fury" to "Project Freedom," a new diplomatic phase is emerging, but Dr. Nasseri remains skeptical of a quick fix. He outlined a base-case scenario where the market sees only a "gradual recovery" to about 60% of pre-war levels by late 2026, with the situation remaining largely flat well into 2027.

The fundamental issue, Nasseri argues, is the massive gap between Washington and Tehran’s expectations. "The same regime that has not agreed to terms over the last couple of years will not suddenly do so now," he said. While a potential Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) might provide temporary "happy headlines" to calm traders, the structural reality remains one of severe disruption.

Hundreds of thousands of Iranians who built lives and businesses in the UAE now face visa cancellations, frozen finances and mounting uncertainty as relations between Tehran and Abu Dhabi deteriorate.

According to several affected residents, Iranian nationals who left the UAE during the recent conflict—whether for Iran or third countries—are no longer being allowed to return, even to collect their belongings. In some cases, families still inside the Emirates have reportedly been given only weeks to leave.

Many Iranian residents say they have also been instructed to transfer funds abroad and are increasingly unable to use UAE bank accounts.

While properties and businesses have not formally been confiscated, some owners can no longer manage them directly and must rely on proxies or powers of attorney to sell assets.

Foreign companies operating in the UAE are also becoming increasingly reluctant to deal with Iranian individuals or firms, particularly those connected to trade with Iran. Many export orders involving Iran have reportedly been canceled.

“No one knows what tomorrow will bring”

Reza, a 40-year-old Iranian who has lived in Dubai with his wife for more than eight years, said Iranians still inside the UAE have not yet been deported but remain under constant pressure.

“For now, our residency status in Dubai has not changed,” he said. “But my friends say Sharjah, Abu Dhabi and other emirates are cancelling visas even for Iranians who are still inside the country.”

Reza said he and his wife, a physician, have effectively lost their livelihoods despite retaining residency permits. His wife’s hospital declined to renew her contract, while his own import-export business has ground to a halt.

“My situation is very unclear,” he said. “No one knows what tomorrow will bring.”

He added that although his company’s licence has not officially been revoked, it can no longer function because trade involving Iran has effectively stopped.

“With work permits cancelled, people can no longer use their own assets,” he said. “A food wholesaler’s store has been shut down and, because he no longer has a business licence, he cannot even sell the goods sitting in his warehouse.”

According to Reza, the pressure is even greater on intermediaries accused of helping Iran circumvent sanctions by selling oil or moving funds abroad. He said many have already been expelled from the UAE and had their bank accounts frozen.

A critical trade relationship disrupted

For years, Dubai, particularly Jebel Ali port, served as one of Iran’s most important commercial gateways, handling a large share of Iranian imports and transit trade. The UAE was often Iran’s largest or second-largest trading partner after China.

That trade route now appears severely disrupted amid rising regional tensions and what Iranian media describe as a tightening maritime blockade.

The UAE said Friday it had intercepted new missile and drone attacks allegedly launched from Iran, adding that three residents were injured.

Earlier this week, Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters denied carrying out attacks on the UAE but warned that any operation launched from Emirati territory against Iranian islands, ports or coastlines would receive a “crushing and regret-inducing response.”

Iranian media have meanwhile intensified criticism of Abu Dhabi. Jam-e Jam newspaper described the alleged seizure of Iranian assets as “modern-day robbery and open hostility,” while Abolfazl Khaki of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce accused the UAE of showing “maximum hostility” toward Iranian traders during the recent conflict.

“The recent experience showed that the UAE is no longer a safe place for Iranian investors,” Khaki said.

Iranian officials are now openly discussing alternative trade hubs. Nadir Pourparcham of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce said trade ties with the UAE “will never return to the way they were” and pointed to Qatar’s Hamad Port as a possible replacement. Iranian media have also promoted Pakistan’s ports as alternative corridors for Iranian trade.

The conservative outlet Mashregh News argued that Iran no longer needed “unreliable intermediaries” such as the UAE and said closer ties with China and Pakistan could help Tehran withstand economic pressure.

“It is time for Dubai to understand that Iran’s geography is not for sale,” the outlet wrote.

In a system where political and ideological objectives consistently outweigh environmental sustainability and public welfare, even severe and widely recognized crises fail to trigger meaningful correction.

In this sense, Iran’s water crisis is not a failure of resources, it is a consequence of deliberate choices. The impact of decades of misguided water engineering and policy decisions is already visible across Iran’s water systems.

Major lakes and wetlands such as Urmia Lake have shrunk. Groundwater has been depleted across more than half of the country’s plains, land subsidence is accelerating, and per capita water availability has fallen to near or below 1,000 cubic meters.

At the same time, access to reliable drinking water has become increasingly uncertain. Water quality is declining because of inadequate wastewater treatment and aging infrastructure, while policy still emphasizes large-scale agricultural self-sufficiency despite mounting environmental constraints.

It would be easy to assume that these failures could stem partially from financial limitations. But this is not a story of absolute constraint. Even under sanctions, Iran has continued to generate substantial revenues, particularly from oil exports, over the past decade.

The water crisis is not necessarily due to a lack of resources, but how those resources are allocated. Based on Iran’s FY1404 (2025-2026) public budget, significant funding is still directed toward religious and ideological institutions, amounting to roughly $750 to $860 million annually, depending on exchange rates.

At the same time, Iran’s regional activities, including support for groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Houthis, and allied militias, are widely estimated, based on publicly reported figures, to cost an additional $1.1 to $1.5 billion each year.

These estimates reflect direct financial transfers and likely understate total support, which also includes substantial non-cash assistance such as weapons, equipment, and logistical backing.

In total, nearly $1.8 to $2.4 billion per year is allocated to priorities that do little to address Iran’s most urgent domestic challenges. Even redirecting a portion of these resources toward water management and infrastructure could support large-scale, practical solutions. Over a five-year period, such a shift would mobilize roughly $10 billion, enough to move beyond short-term fixes and begin addressing some of the structural drivers of Iran’s water crisis.

Based on order-of-magnitude cost benchmarks for standard water infrastructure projects, a reallocation of roughly $10 billion over five years could finance a coherent national water program. This would include a full-scale effort to reduce water losses in Tehran’s aging distribution network, where non-revenue water (NRW), water lost before it reaches consumers due to leaks, aging infrastructure, and inefficiencies is estimated at roughly 25 to 30 percent.

It could also support the deployment of potable reuse facilities across major urban centers such as Tehran, Mashhad, Isfahan, Shiraz, Yazd, and Ahvaz, helping relieve pressure on overstretched freshwater supplies.

In parallel, a targeted desalination and conveyance package could be implemented for Sistan and Baluchestan province, designed specifically to secure drinking water in a region facing chronic shortages, rather than to support inland agriculture.

Such an investment could also enable the construction of dozens of wastewater treatment plants nationwide, depending on facility size and treatment level, addressing both water quality degradation and reuse potential in regions struggling with untreated discharge.

Beyond urban infrastructure, even limited investments in agriculture could deliver measurable benefits. For example, modernizing irrigation in a single province such as Isfahan, where more efficient systems can reduce water use by roughly 30 to 60 percent, could significantly lower demand in one of Iran’s most water-stressed regions.

Even at the current economic development and growth, over a five-year period, roughly $10 billion directed toward ideological priorities could instead finance a nationwide water recovery program: upgrading Tehran’s water distribution system to reduce losses, building 10 potable reuse facilities for major cities, developing seven coastal desalination plants for southern Iran, and constructing a strategic water transfer system to Zahedan in Sistan and Baluchestan.

It could also fund eight large wastewater treatment plants, dozens of mid-size facilities across the country, and modernize irrigation in Isfahan. Instead, those resources are being directed elsewhere. Now imagine how the country’s water infrastructure can be overhauled if the regime is gone and Iran is back on the path to growth and prosperity, with access to the latest technologies the world has to offer, to tackle this issue.

These figures are illustrative, not precise. They highlight both Iran’s potential capacity to invest in water infrastructure and the scale of resources currently misallocated, without even accounting for additional spending on missile programs, and nuclear development, which further underscores the magnitude of available resources.

Ultimately, the constraint is neither technical nor financial: it is political. As long as the current regime remains in power, resources that could stabilize and modernize Iran’s water systems will continue to be diverted toward non-productive ideological ends.