War-hit homeowners feel abandoned as Iran’s reconstruction aid fades

The protests were the result of several crises converging at once. Economic collapse, political exclusion and a growing sense of humiliation pushed society beyond its tolerance threshold and created a shared feeling across social groups that life in Iran had become increasingly unlivable.

When demonstrations erupted across the country, many slogans targeted the Islamic Republic itself.

The roots of the unrest run deep in provinces that host major oil and industrial projects but have long seen little improvement in living standards.

From Abadan to Bushehr and from Kangan to Gilan-e Gharb, many of the cities that first erupted in protest are places where people have spent years asking the same question: where did the country’s oil wealth go?

President Masoud Pezeshkian’s government attempted to calm tensions by announcing direct cash payments to households after eliminating subsidized exchange rates. The payment amounted to about one million tomans—roughly seven dollars.

The gesture came at a time when food prices were soaring. Cooking oil prices had risen more than 200 percent, eggs were more than twice as expensive as a year earlier, and some shopkeepers had begun selling basic dairy products on installment plans.

For many Iranians the payment symbolized not relief but humiliation.

The middle class and the bazaar

One of the defining features of the January protests was the erosion of the social distance between Iran’s middle class and its poorer citizens.

Historically, Iran’s middle class has been a carrier of civil and political demands. But by early 2026 many middle-class families were struggling simply to avoid falling into poverty.

Political sociologists have long argued that revolutions are rarely led by the poorest members of society. They tend instead to emerge among groups that once enjoyed relative stability but now feel they are falling.

In Iran, the middle class had not only lost income but also social status. That loss helped create an unwritten alliance between middle-class citizens and poorer groups, both of whom felt they were suffering under the same policies.

Another signal that the unrest had entered new territory came when parts of Tehran’s Grand Bazaar closed on January 7.

The bazaar has historically been one of the most cautious institutions in Iran’s political life. Even during severe economic crises it has often preferred negotiation and indirect pressure to open confrontation. During the 2009 protests many merchants stayed silent, and in 2022 they largely remained on the sidelines. This time was different.

Currency volatility made supply chains chaotic and pricing unpredictable. A product purchased in the morning could be worth something entirely different by the afternoon. Many traders said they could no longer price goods reliably, and keeping shops open risked losses rather than gains.

When sections of the bazaar shut their doors, it signaled that dissatisfaction had spread beyond traditional protest groups. A conservative economic institution had concluded that the existing order itself had become a source of instability.

The collapse of reformist hopes

For some voters, President Pezeshkian had represented a final opportunity for reform and for avoiding war.

As protests intensified, however, he adopted increasingly hardline rhetoric. On January 11 he described protesters as “terrorists” and called on security forces to respond decisively.

Even some reformist figures who had supported him began to express frustration.

The shift reinforced a broader perception among many Iranians that the political system was incapable of meaningful change.

Combined with the economic crisis and the aftermath of the 12-day war, this sense of political closure deepened public despair.

From scattered anger to mass protest

The January protests also unfolded against a tense geopolitical backdrop.

Statements from foreign political figures—including remarks by Donald Trump warning Tehran against violent repression—were widely circulated among Iranian audiences. At the same time, Iran’s exiled prince Reza Pahlavi called for coordinated demonstrations and nightly slogans across the country.

Such messages helped focus attention on specific moments of protest. But they did not create the anger that drove people into the streets. That anger had been building for years.

The protests occurred as the Islamic Republic appeared to be shifting toward what might be described as a more defensive style of governance.

In this approach, economic grievances and social demands are increasingly treated as potential security threats. Limited cultural concessions—such as relaxing enforcement of the hijab law or allowing controlled concerts—serve mainly as tools for managing pressure rather than as signs of genuine reform.

The January protests tested this model. The state ultimately suppressed the demonstrations. Yet repression alone cannot address the deeper structural tensions that produced the uprising in the first place.

The streets may have emptied. But many Iranians now believe that the country cannot return to the conditions that existed before January.

The backlash, which has intensified in recent days across hardline media and social platforms, prompted Ghalibaf to sit for a lengthy interview on state television aimed largely at persuading critics who reject any form of diplomacy and advocate continued confrontation.

In the interview, Ghalibaf framed negotiations not as a retreat but as a continuation of the conflict by other means. Diplomacy, he said, is neither a withdrawal from Iran’s demands nor separate from the battlefield, but a way to consolidate military gains and translate them into political outcomes and lasting peace.

Most notably, perhaps, he cautioned against exaggerating Iran’s leverage, stressing that US military superiority and capabilities should not be underestimated.

Hardline critics have intensified attacks on Ghalibaf, particularly on domestic social media platforms such as Eitaa, accusing him of ignoring red lines set by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and signaling weakness toward the United States.

One critic wrote in a post that “there is no good in negotiation except harm,” adding that Ghalibaf’s remarks suggested an optimism about progress in the talks that was “worrying.”

Another post went further, calling on the Revolutionary Guard to intervene and stop what it described as Ghalibaf’s “betrayal.”

Similar rhetoric has surfaced in nighttime gatherings by pro-government supporters, where speakers denounce negotiations and potential concessions—such as handing over enriched nuclear material, a core US demand—and chant slogans including “Death to compromisers.”

Ghalibaf did emphasize his personal commitment, declaring that for him there is no distinction between the battlefield and the negotiating table and that he is ready to sacrifice “both my life and my reputation” for “the people to attain their rights.”

The controversy widened after a social media account linked to ultrahardliner Saeed Jalili, a longtime political rival of Ghalibaf and a member of Iran’s national security council, published a post with the hashtag “coup plotter.”

The post called on Mojtaba Khamenei to publicly clarify his position if he indeed supports the negotiations, warning that without such confirmation officials could be accused of acting without the leader’s authorization.

The account was deactivated shortly afterward without explanation.

Jalili, who previously served as Khamenei’s representative on the Supreme National Security Council, has not commented publicly on the controversy, and there has been no official announcement about whether he retains that role under the current leadership.

Despite the backlash, several reformist figures have publicly backed Ghalibaf’s approach.

“A rare historical moment has placed Ghalibaf in a position where anyone who even slightly cares about Iran should support this rational soldier-politician and his decisions on war and peace,” Mohammad Ali Abtahi, a former vice president under Mohammad Khatami wrote on X.

Journalist and commentator Ahmad Zeidabadi also defended him, arguing that volunteering to negotiate in such a tense environment required significant political and reputational risk.

Iranian media outlets have also offered differing interpretations of the interview. The conservative website Tabnak said Ghalibaf was outlining a strategic framework in which military strength, public support and diplomacy operate simultaneously.

The centrist outlet Asr-e Iran described the remarks as a broader roadmap for confronting the United States and Israel, arguing that diplomacy should be seen as a continuation of Iran’s battlefield resistance rather than a departure from it.

The protests that started in the Grand Bazaar of Tehran in late December and quickly spread across the country were followed by what has been described as the deadliest crackdown on protesters in Iran’s contemporary history in January.

Shortly thereafter, a war involving the United States and Israel began, compounding the country’s economic distress.

The service sector was hit hard during the protests. Advertising agencies, technical consulting firms, digital service providers, and hospitality and tourism businesses have since suffered further, and in many cases irreparable, damage because of the war.

Three weeks of internet disruptions during the protests, and over 1,100 hours since the beginning of the war on February 28, have effectively paralyzed large parts of the digital economy.

"According to official estimates released by Iranian authorities, more than 10 million people in Iran earn their income directly through the internet. As a result, any disruption or shutdown of internet services poses a serious threat to their livelihoods," Dadban, a legal advisory and training center for activists, said in a report.

"With the continuation of this situation, millions have faced a sharp drop in income or unemployment," Dadban added.

More significantly, the conflict has inflicted severe damage on critical economic infrastructure, including key petrochemical industries and steel production across multiple cities. These sectors, considered the backbone of Iran’s industrial economy, have suffered extensive losses.

The destruction of major industries has disrupted the supply of raw materials, triggering cascading effects across manufacturing and related sectors.

Widespread layoffs have followed, affecting not only workers in these industries but also those employed in dependent businesses.

At the same time, exports have declined sharply, further constraining an already limited flow of foreign revenue.

The scale of the economic shock is underscored by official estimates. A government spokesperson has put total war damages at around $270 billion—roughly 57 percent of Iran’s gross domestic product and several times larger than the country’s annual oil revenues.

The figure is estimated to be nearly three times the government’s general budget, highlighting the unprecedented fiscal strain facing the state.

Stagflation and rising risk of renewed unrest

Iran’s economy has now entered a period of stagflation, combining high inflation with economic stagnation and rising unemployment.

Even if the conflict were to end in the near term, economists warn that recovery will be protracted and uneven.

These worsening conditions have heightened the risk of renewed social unrest.

Without a political resolution—particularly an agreement with the United States—analysts suggest that further protests, potentially larger than those seen in December, are increasingly likely.

Public anger boils over online

Public sentiment, particularly on social media, reflects growing frustration and despair.

One user highlighted the desperation faced by unemployed citizens: “I live in Tehran, I’m married and renting. Since January I was working reduced hours, and I was officially laid off on March 25.”

Another user described the collapse of freelance work: “In this situation, most jobs have shut down, especially for people like us who worked freelance. Our income has dropped to zero, and we don’t know what we can do if the war and internet outages continue.”

A third user wrote: “Given the brutality of the clerical regime and its supporters, the skyrocketing prices of basic necessities, and the bizarre inflation that keeps getting worse… I think people are just waiting for a spark to come back to the streets. Death is no longer the issue—this situation is worse than death and must end.”

Inflation surges to historic highs

Inflation has risen dramatically over the past 100 days. Official data show point-to-point inflation, already above 50 percent at the end of December, climbed to over 70 percent by late February—before the war—reaching its highest level in decades.

In essential goods such as meat, dairy, oil, rice, fruits, and vegetables, inflation has exceeded 110 percent. Prices of critical medications, including some types of insulin, have multiplied several times—when they are available at all.

Although updated overall inflation figures have not been released, some experts believe the rate may already have entered triple digits, with further increases expected.

Survival economy takes hold

Some Iranians say the absence of severe shortages during the war reflects collapsing demand rather than stable or sufficient supply. With incomes sharply reduced, many households can no longer afford basic goods.

To cope, families are increasingly relying on savings, rental deposits, or loans from banks and relatives—placing them at risk of losing their homes. In some cases, household are selling personal belongings just to afford food.

Business owners are also under pressure. Many have begun selling equipment, with online marketplaces now flooded with listings for café and restaurant supplies and electronic devices—often with little or no buyer interest.

Meanwhile, the government faces mounting fiscal constraints. Even before the war, it struggled to meet budgetary obligations. Now, with millions feared to be unemployed, the government lacks the capacity to provide adequate unemployment benefits, and some workers report being unable to access them at all.

"In line with the ceasefire in Lebanon, the passage for all commercial vessels through Strait of Hormuz is declared completely open for the remaining period of ceasefire, on the coordinated route as already announced by Ports and Maritime Organisation of the Islamic Rep. of Iran," Araghchi announced in a post on X on Friday.

Minutes later, US President Donald Trump said "Iran has just announced that the Strait of Iran [sic] is fully open and ready for full passage."

Araghchi's post was widely criticized by hardliners and their outlets, including the state-run Mehr News which said Araghchi's tweet "provided the best opportunity for Trump to go beyond reality, declare himself the winner of the war and celebrate victory."

"It is clear that ceasefire-related negotiations are not being handled solely by the Foreign Ministry. Therefore, it is natural that under these circumstances the entire team should collectively explain the decisions that have been made," Mehr News said.

Tasnim News Agency described the post as a “bad and incomplete tweet that created misleading ambiguity about the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz."

The IRGC outlet said the announcement lacked “necessary and sufficient explanations” about the conditions, mechanisms and restrictions governing vessel transit, prompting widespread questions.

Fellow IRGC outlet Fars News Agency earlier quoted an informed source close to the Supreme National Security Council as saying that the Strait's reopening was subject to three conditions:

"Ships must be commercial. The passage of military vessels is prohibited, and neither the ships nor their cargo may be linked to hostile countries. Vessels must pass through routes designated by Iran, and transit must be coordinated with Iranian forces responsible for managing passage."

The source said Iran considers the continuation of a US naval blockade as a violation of the ceasefire and would close the Strait of Hormuz again if the blockade is not lifted.

Tasnim said Araghchi's post on X lacked "any verbal explanation or at least sufficient written clarification” which it said amounted to “complete poor judgment in communication."

The outlet urged either the Foreign Ministry to revise its approach or the Supreme National Security Council to step in and impose a more coherent messaging framework.

The criticism was echoed by Fars News Agency, which addressed authorities directly and questioned their silence.

“Officials, at least explain the reason for your ‘lack of explanation,’” Fars wrote, warning that the absence of clear communication had left the public in a “state of confusion.”

It added that "while citizens trust officials to uphold national red lines, they still expect transparency about why details are being withheld."

Fars also cautioned that without clear messaging, “the narrative of the enemy and hostile media” could fill the gap, adding that “this ‘lack of explanation’ itself needs explanation.”

The video featured Julia Boutros, a Christian artist widely known across the Arab world for songs supporting Lebanese and Palestinian “resistance” movements.

In the footage shown on a large screen before a mixed-gender audience, she appeared without a headscarf.

For nearly half a century, broadcasting a female singer’s solo voice to male audiences has been prohibited in Iran. Women who have challenged this restriction, even in private concerts or online, have often faced harsh repercussions.

The public screening of Boutros’s performance at an officially sanctioned gathering therefore represents a striking departure from established norms, even if it may have occurred unintentionally.

Events like the rally typically require official permits, suggesting at least tacit approval by local authorities. Yet judicial bodies, which have historically acted quickly against perceived breaches of cultural or religious codes, have so far issued no public criticism of the incident.

Rallies evolving after ceasefire

The episode comes as the character of pro-government gatherings has been changing since the ceasefire that ended weeks of fighting nearly two weeks ago.

Social media posts increasingly depict the rallies as taking on a festival-like atmosphere. Families attend together, and for some participants the events appear to function as social gatherings as much as political demonstrations.

Large banners, video screens and coordinated staging are now common, while mosques and local Basij militia bases often serve as assembly points before crowds move toward central gathering locations.

These developments have also generated complaints from residents about late-night noise and traffic congestion, concerns widely discussed on social media.

Incentives and organization

There are also claims—difficult to independently verify—that participants are being mobilized through local institutions and offered incentives such as food, snacks or other benefits.

Photographs circulating online show numerous tents distributing free food and drinks, a practice consistent with the Shia tradition of nazri, in which charitable offerings are made during religious gatherings.

Images from recent days also showed senior military figure General Habibollah Sayyari helping prepare and distribute food at one such tent, highlighting the visible presence of state institutions at the events.

Pro-government celebrities from the film and sports worlds have also attended, with state media giving extensive coverage to their participation.

Political messaging intensifies

Hardline political groups have used the rallies as platforms for speeches and mobilization, with invited speakers addressing contentious issues such as whether Iran should accept ceasefire terms or pursue negotiations with the United States.

Some speeches have targeted prominent political figures, including former President Hassan Rouhani, former foreign minister Mohammad-Javad Zarif and Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, encouraging crowds to chant slogans against them.

In one instance, a live broadcast of a speech by a religious performer was abruptly cut by state television and replaced with pre-recorded programming, suggesting heightened sensitivity to the messages being aired.

The rallies themselves were initially encouraged by senior officials as a demonstration of wartime solidarity. Earlier in the conflict, Ghalibaf called on citizens to take to the streets in support of Iran’s armed forces.

Yet the appearance of Boutros’s unveiled image on a giant screen at a pro-government gathering has underscored the contradictions between Tehran’s cultural restrictions and the messaging it seeks to project.