Sweden suspends visas for Iranian diplomats, warns of more action

The longtime hardliner is the new chief of the Supreme National Security Council to replace his slain predecessor Ali Larijani, state television said Tuesday.

Zolghadr is not a new figure emerging in a moment of crisis, but a product of the Islamic Republic’s original revolutionary security networks. A man whose career spans armed militancy, senior command within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and influential roles across Iran’s political and judicial institutions.

“He is one of the last remnants of the radical revolutionaries that armed themselves against the Pahlavi monarchy,” historian Shahram Kholdi told Iran International.

A former deputy commander of the IRGC, Zolghadr belongs to the generation that helped transform the Guards into the backbone of the Islamic Republic not only as a military force, but as a political and economic power center. Over decades, the IRGC expanded its reach across the state, embedding itself in key institutions from the interior ministry to the judiciary.

Kholdi traces Zolghadr back to the early networks that evolved into the Quds Force — the IRGC’s elite unit responsible for managing Iran’s proxy militias and projecting power across the Middle East placing him alongside the system later commanded by Qassem Soleimani, the architect of Iran’s regional strategy.

His appointment following the killing of Larijani underscores what many analysts see as an accelerating trend: the consolidation of power by hardline military figures. What has been a gradual shift over decades appears to have intensified amid the current conflict, with the Guards tightening their grip over both national security and political decision-making.

The Quds Force, the IRGC’s external arm, has been at the center of Iran’s regional power projection, training and directing militias from Iraq to Syria, where it helped sustain Bashar al-Assad’s war in a conflict marked by widespread civilian suffering.

“He is part of the three to four thousand families that have been forming the power core of the Islamic Republic,” Kholdi said.

Zolghadr’s rise does not mark a departure from that system, but a continuation of it, reflecting the enduring dominance of a tightly knit network of insiders drawn from the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary and security institutions.

His role in internal repression also stretches back decades. During the 1999 student protests — a pivotal moment in the regime’s violent suppression of dissent— Zolghadr was among a group of senior IRGC commanders who signed a sharply worded letter to then-reformist President Mohammad Khatami. The message warned that if the government failed to decisively crush the unrest, the Guards would act on their own. The episode is widely seen as a turning point, marking a more overt willingness by the IRGC to intervene directly in politics and, for many Iranians, cementing the reform movement’s ultimate failure.

His political trajectory has long aligned with Iran’s most hardline currents. He played a role in the rise of former hardline president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and later acknowledged that conservative factions had carried out coordinated efforts to secure that victory. In office, he adopted a confrontational posture toward the United States, warning that Iran would respond to any attack with overwhelming missile strikes.

During the Iran-Iraq War, he led units he fought in cross-border operations, which is experience that would help shape the regime’s enduring emphasis on asymmetrical warfare.

According to Kholdi, Zolghadr was among those who helped design that doctrine alongside figures like Qassem Soleimani — building a decentralized system capable of operating even under sustained attack.

“They created this asymmetrical hierarchy where units can act independently… and continue operating even if leadership is cut off,” Kholdi said.

That system is now visible in Iran’s military posture, with dispersed missile and drone capabilities across the region.

Kholdi also points to Zolghadr’s deep institutional knowledge as a key factor in his significance today.

“The fact that he hasn’t been eliminated is bad news — he is one of the main people who knows a lot about how this system works,” he said, adding that Zolghadr likely has insight into sensitive areas including the country’s nuclear program.

For ordinary Iranians, his rise is much the same as his predecessor Ali Larijani, who was eliminated in an Israeli airstrike overnight on March 16 in Tehran.

“No, he is much the same,” Kholdi said when asked whether Zolghadr differs from figures like Larijani.

His appointment underscores a consistent reality: power in the Islamic Republic remains concentrated within a small circle of entrenched insiders — many of whom have been at the center of the system since its earliest days.

The projectile was not intercepted in Lebanese airspace and instead landed on the coast, according to Iran International sources, disputing earlier reporting by Reuters.

The strike came shortly after Lebanon declared Iran’s ambassador to Beirut, Mohammad Reza Raouf Sheibani, persona non grata and ordered his expulsion.

Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Raggi said on X that the decision had been formally communicated and that the envoy must leave the country by March 29.

Lebanon also recalled its ambassador from Tehran for consultations, accusing Iran of violating diplomatic norms and established protocols between the two countries.

Israel’s military said that, based on its assessments, a ballistic missile launched from Iran fell in Beirut around the same time as missile attacks targeting Israel. In a statement, the army said the projectile was fired by the “Iranian regime” and landed inside Lebanon.

Diplomats from several Persian Gulf states told Iran International on Tuesday that Tehran was acting like a “runaway horse,” warning that attacking another Arab country crossed a new red line and would not be tolerated.

According to Iran International sources, since the start of the current conflict following US and Israeli strikes in early March, Iran has targeted at least 12 countries in the region. Lebanon is now the 13th.

Reactions to Lebanon’s move were swift. Israel’s President Isaac Herzog called the expulsion a “very courageous decision,” according to Israeli media. Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar welcomed the move, describing it as “justified and necessary” in response to Iran’s actions in Lebanon, including its backing of Hezbollah.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said Israel would continue its attacks against Iranian positions “with full force.”

Hezbollah condemned the decision, warning it could undermine national unity and deepen internal divisions.

Meanwhile, Bloomberg reported on Tuesday that Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates are growing increasingly impatient after attacks on energy infrastructure and airports, and could join US- and Israeli-led strikes if Iran targets critical facilities.

The Rebrand Begins

The pattern is familiar. When Ali Larijani was killed in an Israeli strike last week, some Western coverage quickly reached for the usual labels: practical, moderate, easier to work with than the other men around him. Ghalibaf may now be next. He is now the most senior surviving figure in the Islamic Republic with deep IRGC roots. That puts him in a dangerous and important position. He could become the next major assassination target. He could also be sold as a channel to the West in a system that increasingly looks like an IRGC republic.

At the very moment that reports are emerging of further U.S. military steps around Iran, there are also reports that JD Vance may soon meet senior regime figures. Ghalibaf may be one of them. We do not know whether those reports are true, whether any such contact will take place, or who exactly would be involved. No name has been officially confirmed. But if such a meeting does happen, it may prove clarifying. Vance belongs to the isolationist wing of the Trump administration. A meeting with Ghalibaf or another senior regime figure would give Vance a direct look at who actually holds power in Iran and the kind of men the administration would be dealing with. That could matter if the war deepens and the isolationist wing has to judge the regime more directly.

As I argued in an earlier piece, ambiguity about potential contacts is already doing political work, unsettling senior officials in Iran as they wonder who may be talking to Washington. This piece makes a different point. The same ambiguity can also create openings for the wrong kind of figure to be misread as a moderate or a usable channel.

But Ghalibaf is not a moderate. He is not a hidden reformer. He is not a practical man trapped inside an ideological state. He is a hardliner, corrupt to the bone, who has spent years trying to look like something else.

Ghalibaf has always been ambitious. He once cast himself as the Islamic Republic’s version of a modernising strongman, even using the language of an “Islamic Reza Khan.” He wanted the presidency and, for years, carried himself like Iran’s next president. He ran in four presidential elections after 2005. Around him, that ambition produced a political project: to present Ghalibaf not as just another insider, but as the man who could impose order after Khamenei.

That image was built not only for domestic politics. It was built for foreign eyes too.

How the image was built

Inside the system, Ghalibaf is a hardliner and a loyal product of the regime. Outside that circle, especially in private meetings and foreign-facing conversations, he has long tried to present himself as more modern, more practical, more disciplined, and less ideological than the Islamic Republic’s usual faces. He has tried to market himself as the man who could keep the system in place while making it easier for the outside world to deal with.

By mid-2024, that effort was already visible. On June 10, IranWire reported that people presenting themselves as Ghalibaf’s advisers had spent the previous two weeks approaching European and American diplomats with a clear message: Iran would need a strongman after Khamenei, and that strongman should be Ghalibaf. A European diplomat quoted in the report said they were presenting him as the only figure with the authority and connections to contain factional conflict, restore order, improve Iran’s foreign relations, and “cleanse” the regime of radical elements. The diplomat added that academics and think tank figures in Europe and the United States were also involved, suggesting a broader effort to persuade Western officials that Ghalibaf was not merely a candidate, but a future leader they should start accepting now.

My own sources point in the same direction. One source who was in the room told me that, in a meeting with European politicians in a European capital a few years before the IranWire report, Ghalibaf was plainly marketing himself as the kind of Islamic Republic figure the West could do business with after Khamenei. He was not presenting himself as an opponent of the regime. He was presenting himself as a more polished custodian of it: strong enough to control the system at home, but measured enough to speak to foreign capitals abroad.

There was another reason this belief took root. People familiar with the matter say Ghalibaf saw his absence from U.S. sanctions lists as a form of distinction, as if Washington treated him differently from other senior figures in the Islamic Republic. According to those familiar with the issue, the explanation was technical and legal rather than political, particularly because of his role as speaker of parliament. Even so, the coincidence seems to have had a real political effect. It fed his belief that he was seen abroad as a more acceptable and more usable figure than others in the system.

According to sources inside Iran, this also made parts of the regime suspicious of him. Some in the intelligence apparatus viewed his unsanctioned status with distrust and asked why a man of his seniority had escaped measures imposed on others. His ability to travel to the West only added to that unease. Ghalibaf is a pilot and, according to these sources, has at times flown aircraft himself, including on trips to London to keep his pilot credentials current. That too strengthened the sense among some insiders that he occupied an unusual place in the regime’s external profile.

The Record Behind the Image

But the image collapses the moment one looks at the record.

Ghalibaf is not a reformer held back by the system. He is one of its purest products. He rose through the Revolutionary Guards, the police, the municipality, and the institutions that sustain power in the Islamic Republic. His name is tied not only to hardline politics but also to repression, corruption, and elite hypocrisy.

For many Iranians, his role in repression has made him one of the most hated faces of the Islamic Republic. He is linked not only to the student crackdowns but also to the coercive institutions that kept the system alive through fear and force.

His corruption record is just as important. His years as mayor of Tehran are tied to some of the best-known scandals of that period, including the “astronomical properties” affair and the wider Yas Holding and Isa Sharifi case. These were not minor accusations at the edge of his career. They became part of the political meaning of his name.

The family scandals tell the same story. “Sismoni-gate” was politically damaging not because it was the gravest case against him, but because it exposed the hypocrisy of the ruling class. While the regime preached sacrifice and resistance, members of Ghalibaf’s family were seen shopping in Turkey for baby goods. Later came the embarrassment over his son’s attempt to secure permanent residence in Canada. These episodes confirmed a familiar pattern: the men who speak in the language of endurance often arrange private exits for their own families.

Why the West Should Resist the Script

That is why the current moment matters.

As war and decapitation strikes have thinned the Islamic Republic’s upper ranks, Ghalibaf has moved closer to the centre of power. Reports have suggested that he may have been involved in contacts with Washington. He has publicly denied that. He called the reports fake news and rejected any suggestion that negotiations had taken place.

But the deeper point is not whether he is lying or whether the reports are true in full. The deeper point is that his name surfaced so quickly at all. Whether Ghalibaf is really involved is almost secondary. He is exactly the kind of figure around whom such speculation gathers: a hardliner who has spent years trying to present himself as more practical, more modern, and more internationally legible than the rest of the ruling class. That makes him a natural target for rumour, whether or not he is the actual channel.

And that is the danger.

In moments of crisis, some in the West begin looking again for a hard man they can call practical. Faced with chaos in Tehran, they search for someone tough enough to control the machine but polished enough to sound like a statesman. Ghalibaf has spent years preparing for that role. He has tried to look like the man who could preserve the system while making it more manageable for outsiders.

But he is not a post-Khamenei solution. He is a distilled product of the Khamenei system.

Before anyone in the West starts calling him a pragmatist, it is worth remembering what he really is.

He is one of the clearest expressions of the Islamic Republic, and one of its most hated figures in the eyes of the Iranian public. That public is not a bystander here. Less than three months ago, Iranians gave more than 30,000 lives in resistance to the same oppressive system that Ghalibaf stands at the heart of. Anyone thinking of dealing with him should remember that.

And that is the point to make now, before the rebranding begins.

Trump did not provide details about the offer he said Iran had made but described it as related to oil, gas and the Strait of Hormuz.

Speaking to reporters in the Oval Office, Trump said Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio were among the officials leading the talks and were "dealing with the right people" in Iran.

Tehran has not publicly acknowledged any such proposal. Iranian officials, however, have been quoted by various outlets as saying that they have received proposals conveyed through intermediaries and are reviewing them.

Trump suggested that Tehran was eager to reach an agreement after weeks of fighting with the United States and Israel.

“And the other side, I can tell you they’d like to make a deal, and who wouldn’t?” Trump said. “If you were there, look, their navy’s gone, their air force is gone, their communications are done — that’s the biggest problem.”

The president’s remarks marked a shift in tone from comments he made at the White House last week, when he said he did not want a cease-fire.

Pressed on the apparent reversal, Trump said the change reflected the progress of talks.

“The fact that they are talking to us and they are talking sense,” he said.

Trump reiterated that the central condition of any agreement would be Iran’s commitment not to develop nuclear weapons.

“And remember, it all starts with they cannot have a nuclear weapon, just as I said yesterday,” he said. “I said, ‘Well, number one, two and three is they can’t have a nuclear weapon,’ and they’re not going to have a nuclear weapon, and we’re talking about that.”

Officials in Washington have indicated that potential talks could involve senior US negotiators and intermediaries in countries such as Pakistan or Turkey, as diplomatic efforts intensify alongside the continuing conflict.

Iranian officials have acknowledged indirect contacts with Washington but have said any agreement would require recognition of Iran’s rights under international law and relief from sanctions.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif said Tuesday that Islamabad was “ready and honoured to be the host” for direct or indirect negotiations if both sides agree.

The proposal comes amid reports that Pakistan has been relaying messages between the two sides and could potentially host discussions if they progress to that stage.

Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, spoke with President Donald Trump on March 23, while Sharif held a phone call with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian the following day as part of a push for de-escalation.

Trump announced a five-day pause in planned strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure on Monday, saying there had been “productive conversations” about potential diplomacy. Iranian officials, however, insist no direct negotiations with Washington have taken place.

Pakistan is one of several countries—alongside Turkey and Egypt—that appear to be passing messages between Washington and Tehran while encouraging diplomatic contacts.

What role is Pakistan playing?

Pakistan is positioning itself as both messenger and potential host.

Its prime minister and army chief have spoken with leaders in Washington and Tehran while publicly offering Islamabad as a venue should talks take place.

Pakistani officials describe the effort as part of broader back-channel diplomacy aimed at reducing tensions.

Why Pakistan?

Pakistan maintains working relationships with both Iran and the United States, giving it unusual access to the two governments.

Since 1992, Iran’s interests section in Washington—which handles limited diplomatic matters after the two countries severed relations in 1980—has operated under the protection of the Pakistani embassy.

Pakistan also has political and military ties with the United States. That combination allows Islamabad to communicate with both sides while avoiding the perception that it is fully aligned with either.

Has Pakistan tried this before?

Yes, though usually behind the scenes.

In 2019, then-Prime Minister Imran Khan publicly offered to mediate during a period of heightened US-Iran tensions after speaking with leaders in both countries.

Pakistan has periodically offered to help ease regional tensions, though mediation efforts have rarely moved beyond preliminary diplomacy.

Will it actually lead to negotiations?

That remains uncertain.

Iranian officials have publicly insisted that no negotiations with Washington are taking place. The White House has also avoided confirming any talks, saying it will not negotiate through the media.

Israel has meanwhile signaled that its military operations against Iran will continue regardless of diplomatic developments.

Pakistan’s proposal therefore represents a potential diplomatic channel rather than a confirmed breakthrough. Whether talks materialize will depend on whether Washington and Tehran conclude that diplomacy offers a way to limit the conflict.