'Death to America' devotees in Iran slam dovish Pezeshkian interview

Tepid support from the hardline establishment and deepening economic woes defined his first year, in which the Iranian currency lost a full half of its value.

Now after an Israeli-American military drubbing dealt the Islamic Republic its greatest ever challenge, his problems may only deepen.

His election was celebrated by Iran’s moderates, but rejected by some hardliners and many dissidents who had boycotted the election.

Pezeshkian narrowly secured victory in an election that saw the lowest voter turnout in the Islamic Republic’s 46-year history. Yet, the series of crises that unfolded over the following year may have rendered him the unluckiest president Iran has seen.

The night after his inauguration, senior Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran in a strike attributed to Israel.

The attack, which took place at an Revolutionary Guards-provided residence, deeply unnerved Tehran. A year on, the details remain murky.

The year that followed was dominated by an escalating cycle of threats, counter-threats, and the direct attacks traded between Iran and Israel.

Simultaneously, Pezeshkian faced relentless efforts by ultraconservatives to unseat him. Discussions about impeaching his cabinet ministers and ousting his vice presidents persisted throughout the year.

Enemies within and without

So far, his rivals have successfully removed Vice President Mohammad Javad Zarif—the former foreign minister whose experience and charisma were key assets in forming Pezeshkian’s cabinet.

Pezeshkian's Economy Minister, Abdolnasser Hemmati, was impeached and removed, leaving his post vacant for nearly four months.

Eventually, one of Pezeshkian’s candidates, Ali Madanizadeh, was approved by the parliament—perhaps thanks to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei who spoke against intra-regime infighting during the war with Israel.

Throughout the year, voices from across the political divide—including many ordinary citizens—insisted that Pezeshkian honor the promises he made during his campaign.

Chief among them was a pledge to improve Iran’s worsening economic conditions, marked by rampant inflation, high unemployment, and widespread financial hardship.

These crises were deeply entrenched well before the war with Israel, and following the conflict, the administration seems poised to use the war as justification for its failures.

Campaign rhetoric meets wartime reality

Another key promise—especially significant to women—was to dismantle the compulsory hijab patrols. This was not achieved, though a draconian new enforcement law lapsed amid broad public objections.

The patrols returned to the streets weeks before the war, once again harassing women. Their more recent absence owes more to women’s defiance and the outbreak of war than to any government action. Pezeshkian can claim little—if any—credit here.

A third major demand was the removal of censorship on social media platforms essential to the livelihoods of some 400,000 online businesses, according to government and Chamber of Commerce figures.

Despite an extensive publicity campaign, only WhatsApp saw its ban lifted. Yet as the war erupted, the state once again clamped down on digital freedoms, including renewed restrictions on WhatsApp.

The government blamed social media for enabling Israel’s apparent access to sensitive information about Iranian officials, sparking widespread ridicule from the public.

Roughly a week after the Tehran–Tel Aviv ceasefire, a slight easing of media restrictions allowed pro-reform outlets such as Etemad to resurface. They warned that ignoring campaign promises would only deepen public discontent.

“Dissent may return to the streets with renewed momentum,” an Etemad editorial cautioned, “especially as economic pressures mount.”

“For now, both the streets and skies are quiet. But neither calm is likely to hold—and Pezeshkian may be in for a rougher ride than the year he just survived.”

The pause shows a swift post-war drive to crack down on alleged Israeli spying is hitting some obstacles even in the hardliner-dominated establishment.

Iran's Guardian Council sent back the controversial bill to parliament for revisions, citing ambiguities in definitions and potential conflicts with Islamic law and constitutional principles.

The draft legislation seeks to impose harsher punishments—including the death penalty—for a broad range of alleged activities defined as espionage or collaboration with Israel, the United States, and other “hostile” states or groups.

The bill, titled the “Intensification of Punishment for Espionage and Cooperation with the Zionist Regime and Hostile States Against National Security and Interests,” was approved by Iran’s parliament late June but faced scrutiny from the Guardian Council, which is tasked with ensuring that legislation complies with Islamic law and the constitution.

"The necessity of precision in legal definitions is critical," said Hadi Tahan Nazif, spokesperson for the Guardian Council. "There is ambiguity in identifying who determines 'hostile states and groups.' It must be clarified which official institution makes that designation."

Tahan Nazif further warned that vaguely defined terms like “creating division” or “undermining national security,” as used in Article 4 of the bill, could infringe on constitutionally protected rights. “Such qualitative language may, in practice, restrict legitimate freedom of expression. These ambiguities must be resolved,” he said.

Among the most contentious points is the bill’s expansion of the crime of “spreading corruption on earth” (efsadfel-arz)—a charge that can carry the death penalty.

The Guardian Council objected to Article 2, which equates“any direct or indirect assistance”to Israel with corruption on earth. The Council said this could lead to capital punishment for acts that do not meet the strict criteria for that charge under Islamic law.

“In Islamic jurisprudence, the conditions for establishing the crime of corruption on earth are specific and strict. Broadening its scope without meeting these conditions is contrary to Sharia,” Tahan Nazif explained.

At the same time, the Council criticized the bill for limiting some cases—such as widespread distribution of unlicensed communications equipment used in organized opposition—to prison terms, when it argued they could meet the threshold for corruption on earth.

Another key concern centers on retroactive enforcement. Article 9 of the bill says that the law applies to offenses committed before its ratification, contradicting Article 169 of Iran’s Constitution, which prohibits retroactive criminal laws.

“No act or omission may be considered a crime under a law enacted after the fact,” Tahan Nazif emphasized, echoing the constitutional safeguard.

Despite its critique, the Guardian Council affirmed the importance of robust legal tools to defend national security, particularly in the wake of the 12-day Iran-Israel war, the spur of the latest emergency legislation.

“Our intent is not to obstruct legislation but to ensure laws are both enforceable and aligned with the constitution and Sharia, while also safeguarding citizens’ rights,” Tahan Nazif said.

Mohsen Dehnavi, the spokesperson for Iran’s Expediency Council, said on Wednesday that its supervisory board supports the general framework of the bill but some provisions in the draft were ambiguous.

A legal path to expanded crackdowns?

The bill follows heightened internal security measures and increased arrests, particularly since last month's war which saw devastation wrought on both sides of the conflict.

On Wednesday, Tehran’s prosecutor Ali Salehi confirmed that several cases involving alleged espionage, intelligence leaks, and smuggling of explosives are under urgent investigation.

“These cases involve individuals accused of sending maps and GPS coordinates to the Zionist regime, as well as transferring explosive materials,” Salehi said at an event in Tehran. “With full support from the judiciary and security forces, investigations are proceeding swiftly.”

Salehi also addressed allegations of espionage tied to the recent conflict: “Once investigations are complete, the public will be informed. The judiciary will not tolerate any actions that compromise national security.”

Escalating rhetoric

The bill and judicial statements come amid intensified rhetoric in Iranian state media. This week, Fars News Agency, which is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), published an editorial calling for the mass execution of detainees accused of collaborating with Israel and Western intelligence services.

“In the current conditions, those who enabled the killing of hundreds of Iranian citizens through espionage and weapons smuggling deserve to be executed in the style of 1988,” the editorial said, referencing mass executions of political prisoners. Amnesty International estimates that at least 5,000 people were executed during that period, often following secret trials without due process.

The article described the 1988 executions as “a brilliant chapter” in Iran’s history and saying that the public supports similar action today against what it termed “domestic terrorist networks.”

Definitions and penalties

The legislation, in its current form, criminalizes a broad range of activities under national security offenses.

It introduces the death penalty for espionage or intelligence cooperation with Israel, the United States, or their affiliated entities. The same punishment would apply to the manufacture, transfer, or import of drones for military or surveillance purposes, if deemed to involve "malicious intent."

The bill also imposes prison terms of 10 to 15 years for disseminating content—such as news, videos, or images—considered to harm national security or sow division.

Penalties ranging from six months to 10 years would apply to the use or distribution of unauthorized communication equipment, including satellite internet services like Starlink, depending on scale and intent.

Additionally, the bill allows for retroactive prosecution of offenses committed before its passage, a provision that legal experts say violates constitutional safeguards.

The draft is expected to return to parliament for clarification and possible amendment before undergoing a final review by the Guardian Council.

Last month, in the wake of the war with Israel, Iran arrested over 700 people in a mass roundup, accused of working for the Jewish state.

The request—made to Mahmoud Karimi, a hardline maddah closely aligned with Khamenei—capped not only ten days of mourning but two weeks of state-sponsored flag-waving to rally a war-worn people.

In processions that traditionally focus on the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, mourners this year chanted not just elegies, but songs about Iran and its ancient glory.

The one Khamenei called for begins with the line: “You remain in my soul and spirit, O homeland.”

Patriotism over piety

Muharram marks the death of the Shiites’ third Imam, killed in 680 CE at the Battle of Karbala.Iranians typically observe the month with processions, recitations, and rituals such as chest-beating or striking the back with chains. Events may be state-funded or grassroots.

This year, however, the ceremonies unfolded just weeks after the 12-day war with Israel and a fragile ceasefire.

State media and cultural institutions quickly moved to frame the mood, promoting a unified nationalist-religious narrative. A new slogan was emblazoned on banners, billboards, and public screens across cities: Iran, loyal to Hussein, will always prevail.

For the first time, patriotic anthems like O Iran—composed in 1944 and long associated with opposition movements—were performed during ceremonies. In previous years, such songs might have drawn censure or bans.

In many neighborhoods, the Iranian tricolor flew alongside the black and green standards of Karbala. Officials and local municipalities provided logistical and financial support to mourning groups that embraced the new tone.

State control, grassroots defiance

Khamenei’s Ashura appearance followed three nights of absence from the annual ceremonies held at his residence—an unusual break that had fueled speculation about his health.

His brief presence, and the seemingly spontaneous request for My Iran, was widely viewed as carefully orchestrated: a symbolic moment signaling that patriotic devotion now held equal standing with religious mourning in the Islamic Republic’s ideological framework.

The regime has long drawn on the defiance of Imam Hussein to frame its political posture, casting enemies such as Israel, the United States, and domestic critics as modern-day Yazids.

But Muharram has never been solely the regime’s domain. Despite increasing state choreography, it remains a space where protest and dissent can still break through.

During the widespread protests of 2022, some mourning groups adopted openly critical tones, invoking the deaths of young protesters at the hands of security forces. Echoes of that defiance surfaced again this year.

In an article published this week, the semi-official Fars News Agency described current detainees accused of collaborating with Israel and Western intelligence agencies as “deserving of execution in the style of 1988.”

“In the current conditions, when some mercenary elements—Iranians and foreign nationals—have enabled the killing of hundreds of Iranian citizens, including women, children and civilians, by transferring intelligence to the Zionist enemy and smuggling weapons into the country, they deserve to be executed in the manner of 1988," the article said.

The publication argued that the 1988 executions were a “brilliant chapter” in the Islamic Republic’s fight against terrorism and said that “society today recognizes the need for such proper measures against domestic terrorist networks.”

Between July and September 1988, thousands of political prisoners were summarily executed across Iran after a fatwa by Ayatollah Khomeini.

Amnesty International estimates the death toll at a minimum of 5,000. Victims, many of whom had already been serving sentences for political dissent, were subjected to secret trials and then executed. Their bodies were buried in unmarked graves, and families were never officially notified.

“The anguish caused to families by this ongoing crime constitutes torture,” Amnesty said in a 2023 report, adding that “the extrajudicial executions and the ongoing enforced disappearances amount to crimes against humanity.”

The Iranian authorities have never acknowledged the full scope of the killings. Families of the victims have been subjected to intimidation, denial of burial rights, and the destruction of mass grave sites. Amnesty International and other human rights groups continue to call for accountability.

In 2016, an audio recording surfaced in which Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, once heir apparent to Khomeini, condemned the executions in a meeting with judiciary officials involved in the process. “I believe the greatest crime in the history of the Islamic Republic, for which history will condemn us, has been committed by you,” he said. “Your names will go down in history as criminals.”

Montazeri was subsequently dismissed from power and placed under house arrest until his death in 2009.

Calls for renewed repression

In its editorial, Fars revisited the history of the 1980s and described dissident organizations such as the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) as armed insurgents who “attempted to hijack the revolution from within.”

The article said the MEK collaborated with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war and “committed atrocities against civilians,” framing the 1988 executions as both justifiable and necessary for national security.

“Unlike the false portrayal by opposition media that the 1988 executions were against human rights, today the public sees the necessity of repeating such decisive actions,” Fars wrote, also defending the role of late President Ebrahim Raisi, who was one of the judiciary officials implicated in the process.

Iran is intensifying a nationwide crackdown in the wake of its 12-day war with Israel, targeting ethnic and religious minority groups as well as foreign nationals.

Late in June, Fars reported that Iranian intelligence forces arrested more than 700 Iranians accused of acting as agents for Israel.

No Iranian official has yet responded to or repudiated Fars’ latest statements. Iranian authorities typically avoid direct acknowledgment of the 1988 killings in public discourse, though some judiciary and government figures have repeatedly defended them as lawful.

Iran’s parliament passed an emergency bill late last month to increase penalties for espionage and collaboration with “hostile states,” allowing suspects to be tried under wartime conditions.

Judiciary chief Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei said those arrested in the context of Israel’s recent attacks would be prosecuted under “wartime legal provisions.”

Judiciary spokesperson Asghar Jahangir said on state TV that current espionage laws are “too general” and inadequate for addressing recent cases, adding that legal reforms are needed to handle detainees linked to the conflict with Israel.

The ten state-appointed clerics issued an open letter on Monday referring to US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister as "infidel combatants", an Islamic legal term for a non-believer at war with Muslims who deserves death.

In a speech delivered in Azeri, another state-appointed cleric in Iran's West Azarbaijan Province announced a reward of 100 billion tomans (approximately $1.14 million) for anyone who kills Trump.

“We will give 100 billion tomans to anyone who brings the head of Trump,” said Mansour Emami, the provincial director of the official Islamic Propagation Organization in West Azerbaijan.

An Iranian website, thaar.ir, alleged that it was running a public campaign to solicit money for the assassination of Trump. The site most recently displayed more than $20 million raised.

There was no immediate confirmation of the authenticity of the figure.

During an interview with US media personality Tucker Carlson aired on Monday, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian distanced the Iranian government from the religious decrees, saying that they are not directed at any specific person.

“To the best of my knowledge, they have not issued decrees or fatwas against any individual or against Donald Trump. It has nothing to do with the Iranian government or the Supreme Leader of Iran,” Pezeshkian said.

Last month, Alireza Panahian, a hardline Iranian cleric close to the Supreme Leader, called on Muslims to kill Trump and Netanyahu in retaliation for their threats on the life of Khamenei during a 12-day war.

Panahian cited fatwas labeling those who made such a threat a “mohareb,” or enemy of God.

Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi and Ayatollah Hossein Nouri Hamedani had previously issued separate fatwas against Trump and Netanyahu. In his statement, Shirazi declared:

“Any regime or individual threatening the leaders of the Islamic Ummah (nation) and acting on those threats qualifies as a mohareb.”

Ahmad Alamolhoda, Khamenei’s representative in Iran's Razavi Khorasan Province, on Monday expressed support for the two clerics' fatwa.

“Labeling those who insult or violate the sanctity of the Supreme Leader as apostates and enemies of God will strengthen the foundations of the Islamic Republic and the Revolution," Alamolhoda said.

In 1989, Iran’s former leader Ruhollah Khomeini issued a fatwa against British author Salman Rushdie for allegedly blaspheming Islam in his novel The Satanic Verses.

Despite living under heavy security for decades, Rushdie was stabbed and blinded in one eye by an assailant in New York in 2022—an attack widely linked to Khomeini’s fatwa.