Khamenei moves to calm domestic rifts as outside pressure mounts

“People see the children of officials—those who just a few years ago couldn’t even afford a motorcycle—now owning ships, planes and industry monopolies. It raises serious questions,” national security committee member Mohammad Mehdi Shahriari was quoted as saying by Iran’s labour news outlet, ILNA.

“This behavior has created widespread distrust in society,” the relative moderate and Iran's former envoy to Germany added.

The remarks come amid a growing backlash over the arrest of the son and daughter-in-law of Tehran’s interim Friday prayer leader, Kazem Sedighi, in a high-profile corruption case.

The couple were detained by the Revolutionary Guard’s intelligence unit for alleged misconduct related to property transfers.

“One of the public’s main grievances with the system is the perception of discrimination,” Shahriari said.

“When there are economic hardships, people expect everyone to bear the burden equally. But when they see that’s not the case—when they see privilege and monopoly—they react.”

Sedighi is an appointee and close associate of supreme leader Ali Khamenei. Apart from leading the capital’s Friday prayers, he heads the state body promoting behavior deemed Islamic—the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice—which includes Iran’s police chief and the ministers of intelligence and interior.

The cleric first came under fire in March 2024, when a whistleblower accused him and his sons of unlawfully acquiring a $20 million plot of land in Tehran. He apologized publicly—to the supreme leader and the Iranian people—once his claim of innocence was proved to be false.

Sedighi was neither prosecuted nor formally investigated.

“What added insult to injury was that he remained Tehran’s interim Friday prayer leader,” Shahriari said, linking what he described as growing mistrust and a broader sense of discrimination and unequal treatment.

“If legal action is taken fairly and equally, people will have confidence in the judiciary,” he concluded. “But when people see that there is discrimination and the hardships are not shared equally, frustration builds.”

“If a leader is to be chosen after Mr. Khamenei, which will be the case because that’s the law now, I would personally prefer it to be Mojtaba,” she said in a YouTube interview with Abdi Media.

Though she acknowledged his lack of public legitimacy, Hashemi argued that Mojtaba is young, potentially flexible, and better placed than others to push reforms—drawing comparisons to Saudi Arabia’s crown prince Mohammed bin Salman and his top-down modernization drive.

The idea of Mojtaba succeeding his father has long circulated in conservative circles, often raised by hardliners or figures close to the security apparatus. But hearing it from Hashemi—who is outspokenly secular, reformist, and opposed to clerical rule—has taken many by surprise, triggering fierce debate across the political spectrum.

When asked to choose between Mojtaba Khamenei and exiled prince Reza Pahlavi as a future leader, she declined, saying that decision belongs to the Iranian people and that she advocates a secular government and social democracy.

Her refusal to endorse Pahlavi sparked backlash from some of his supporters on social media, who accused Hashemi of drawing false equivalence between the clerical establishment and the monarchy.

The obscure ‘heir’

Mojtaba Khamenei remains an elusive figure to most Iranians. He has never occupied a formal political role, and little is publicly known about his views.

In September 2024, he unexpectedly suspended his online khārij (advanced jurisprudence) classes, ending a 13-year teaching stint attended by a few hundred students. He claimed the decision had no political motive and said he had not informed his father in advance, but the move nonetheless fueled speculation about his future ambitions.

On the streets, opposition to hereditary succession has been vocal and sustained. Protesters have repeatedly chanted slogans such as “Mojtaba, may you die before becoming Leader,” turning his name into a symbol of unease over dynastic power in a system that claims to reject monarchy.

Still, the idea of him succeeding his 86-year-old father is floated by Tehran’s commentariat from time to time, with frequent references to Mohammed bin Salman.

One vocal advocate of the idea is Abdolreza Davari, a former adviser to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has repeatedly called for an “authoritarian development model” centered on Khamenei’s son.

In interviews and social media posts, Davari has argued that such a model could bridge Iran’s generational divide, revive the economy, and offer limited social liberalization without upending the political order.

But the vision he outlines is deeply polarizing—and widely seen as implausible by critics.

“Is it really possible for someone who has never given a speech, never held public office, and is largely unknown to suddenly become the leader of a nation?” one user, @Mhd1889, posted in response to Davari.

The IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency reported Sunday that the Revolutionary Guard’s Intelligence Organization had detained two sons of Tehran’s Friday imam, Kazem Sedighi, two weeks earlier.

The report said they were arrested on charges of misconduct and collusion, without further details. On Monday, the outlet issued a correction, saying the detainees were Sedighi’s son and daughter-in-law.

Sedighi responded soon after, saying he would submit to the law if wrongdoing were proven.

Appointed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in 2009, Sedighi previously chaired the Supreme Disciplinary Court for Judges.

He now heads a state body promoting behavior deemed Islamic—the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice—which includes Iran’s police chief and the ministers of intelligence and interior.

Serious or symbolic?

While some conservatives argue the arrests show corruption is being addressed, many others see them as symbolic.

"Some actions have been taken against corruption, but don’t talk about 'decisive measures'—because the people have not seen any truly decisive action in the fight against economic corruption so far," a popular comment on the conservative Alef website read.

“Even in systemic corruption, some cases are (occasionally) dealt with on a case-by-case, symbolic basis,” reformist journalist and politician Mohammad Sahafi posted on X.

The post echoed a widely held belief that crackdowns lack seriousness.

“(This was) a kind of belated, superficial surgical removal of the countless tumors of corruption within the circle of power,” psychoanalyst Mohammad Reza Ebrahimi wrote on X.

Chief judge wins praise

Since his 2021 appointment, judiciary head Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei has made anti-corruption central to his image.

Conservatives framed the move as a sign of resolve and an attempt to restore public trust.

Hardliner lawmaker Mojtaba Zarei thanked Mohseni-Ejei on X for “revitalizing the judicial system to combat corruption.”

“The fight against corruption is not a stage for theatrical exposés; the judicial system of the Islamic Republic of Iran is itself at the forefront of the battle against corruption,” he wrote.

Former reformist vice president Mohammad-Ali Abtahi echoed the praise:“Mr. Ejei’s transparency, integrity, persistence, and courage can promote a model of worthy governance.”

“The head of the judiciary, by the nature of his job, is generally not expected to be respected and trusted—but Ejei is. He deserves praise for his impartial fight against the corruption of officials and their relatives,” he added.

Calls for Sedighi to step down

Unlike Ejei, Sedighi faces mounting pressure over the revelations, with many conservatives and some ultra-hardliners urging him to resign.

“Resign from all responsibilities and seek forgiveness for the rest of your life; perhaps you can save your hereafter,” conservative journalist Ahmadreza Danesh posted on X.

In March 2024, a whistleblower accused Sedighi and his sons of unlawfully acquiring a $20 million plot in Tehran.

Sedighi claimed his signature had been forged. After this proved false, he apologized to Khamenei and the Iranian people in a Friday sermon, calling it negligence.

He was neither prosecuted nor formally investigated.

“Resign unconditionally now if you believe in even a fraction of what you have preached,” conservative politician Seyed Ali Hashemi wrote on X.

“Not because of proven guilt, but out of respect for the people, to preserve the clergy’s reputation, and to prevent the collapse of social trust,” he added.

Hosseinnejad, a nail technician from Eslamshahr, south of Tehran, vanished on May 25 after leaving work to care for her younger brother.

Her disappearance quickly drew attention after her family raised the alarm on social media, prompting thousands to share her photo in hopes of locating her.

Instagram posts by Hosseinnejad show a determined young woman supporting her family, expressing sympathy for executed protesters and backing the Woman, Life, Freedom movement.

On June 5, police arrested a man in his early 30s in connection with her death. Authorities said he operated an unlicensed taxi and had a criminal record.

Public reaction

The response was immediate. Messages of sorrow poured in from citizens, artists, and public figures.

“One murder victim and 90 million wounded,” many posted on social media.

Zahra Behrouz-Azar, vice president for women and family affairs, wrote on Telegram that the reaction sent a clear message: preventing violence against women is a national demand.

She cited “cultural and economic crises, weaknesses in preventive infrastructure, and gaps in legal and support systems” as causes.

State and police criticized

After her disappearance, many accused the authorities of systemic failure to protect citizens—especially women.

“How is it that thousands of agents and surveillance cameras are present across cities to harass Iranian women for improper veiling, but no measures (are taken) to ensure the safety of citizens, especially women?” activist and former political prisoner Hossein Ronaghi asked on X before Hosseinnejad’s body was found.

Hours after the arrest, police released two videos of the suspect’s interrogation and confession.

In the footage, he admits to trying to steal Hosseinnejad’s phone, stabbing her when she resisted and abandoning her body near Tehran’s airport. One video shows him on the floor during interrogation, recoiling after being slapped.

“The videos of the arrest and interrogation of Elaheh Hosseinnejad’s murderer are enough on their own to make me lose all hope in the improvement of security in this country,” digital rights activist and entrepreneur Nima Namdari posted on X.

“Justice will never be established in a country where the rights of the accused and the principles of fair trial are not respected. As long as there is no justice, there will be no security,” he added.

Legal inequality under scrutiny

The case has revived debate over Iran’s gender-based legal discrimination.

Murder is punishable by death, but if a man kills a woman, the victim’s family must first pay half the value of full blood money (diyeh)—set annually by judicial authorities—to the killer’s family before the execution can proceed.

This does not apply when both victim and perpetrator are male, reinforcing what activists call a system that devalues women’s lives.

“Why should the victim and their family bear the cost of the inequality in the law?” user @mynamefarshad posted on X.

Supporters of Sharia-based laws say the system allows flexibility. In high-profile cases, the state can pay the blood money itself to proceed with execution under Islamic jurisprudence.

Police released Hosseinnejad’s body to her family on Friday. Citizen reports say she was buried immediately, under strict security, without a public announcement in Eslamshahr.

People in Iran are often accused of contributing to the country’s economic woes through wasteful habits—not just by officials, but by one another. But how much truth is there to these claims?

One common claim is that Iranians use far more electricity than other nations. But data from Iran’s Energy Ministry shows that per capita household electricity consumption is about 1,100 kilowatt-hours per year—40% lower than the EU average, and well below usage in the US, Canada, Japan, or even many neighboring countries.

It’s the same story with food.

Iran’s agriculture minister recently criticized Iranians for “excessive consumption” of sugar and cooking oil, asserting that government subsidies are being squandered.

But that assertion appears to contradict data from the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), which shows that Iran’s per capita consumption of both items is below the global average and significantly lower than in nearby countries like Turkey.

Last year, Iranians consumed 2.3 million tons of cooking oil, compared to 3.5 million tons in Turkey, which has a similar population. On a per capita basis, Iranian consumption is 30% lower than the global average.

The minister also claimed that 90% of Iran’s cooking oil is imported at subsidized rates, yet FAO data puts the figure closer to 56%, with imports steadily declining over the past three years.

Sugar tells a similar story. Iranians consume about 10% less than the global average, and nearly half as much as Turks. Far from being excessive, these levels reflect increasing constraints on household consumption.

Chasing the basics

These accusations also overlook a crucial fact: food inflation in Iran is out of control. The price of cooking oil surged 20% in just three months, according to a report by economic outlet Tejarat News on Monday. 

Iran’s Statistical Center reports annual inflation of 31% for cooking oil and 41% for sugar.

Such price spikes make basic goods increasingly unaffordable for most households. And the toll is visible in declining food security.

FAO data shows that per capita meat consumption in Iran has fallen by 40% over the past decade, while dairy consumption has dropped by 30%.

A senior food industry official said last week that the average Iranian now consumes 7–10 kilograms of meat per year—consistent with FAO’s estimate of just over 8 kilograms, down from 12 kg just a few years ago.

“Meat consumption in Iran is deeply unequal—some eat nothing, while others manage 20 kilograms a year,” said Masoud Rasouli, secretary of the Meat Production and Packaging Association, adding that the global average is 32 kilograms.

The figures don’t lie: Iranians are not consuming too much—they’re getting by with less.

Contrary to the official line—and even public opinion—excess is not a national trait. It’s an alien concept to the majority chasing the basics.