Iranian woman removes cleric's turban in airport confrontation
A screengrab from a video of a confrontation between a woman and a cleric at Tehran's Imam Khomeini airport (January 2024)
A video has gone viral on social media showing a woman without a mandatory headscarf confronting a cleric at Tehran's Mehrabad Airport, removing his turban and placing it on her own head like a scarf during the altercation.
The video, shared widely on social media on Sunday and Monday, shows the woman angrily removing the turban and saying to the cleric, "So you have honor now?”
She then searches for her husband, calling his name and asking, "What did you do to my husband?"
The exact date and cause of the initial confrontation remain unclear.
A media outlet affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Mashregh News, reported that the incident was unrelated to hijab and claimed the woman had "psychological problems."
The outlet also stated that the woman was briefly detained but later released "with the consent of the complainants."
The incident occurred within the context of increasing civil disobedience by women in Iran, particularly following the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody in September 2022. Crackdowns on women defying mandatory hijab in public places, including airports, have also intensified.
The government's tendency to pathologize dissent is a recurring theme. In November, a female student at the Azad University in Tehran’s Science and Research branch became a symbol of the movement for freedom of dress by removing her clothing in protest.
While many Iranians recognized the as an act of defiance, official narratives attempted to portray her as mentally unstable. Four Iranian psychology and psychiatry associations criticized the government last year for misusing psychiatry and psychology to suppress opposition to mandatory hijab.
Countering Mashregh News's claims, some social media users have interpreted the airport incident as a powerful act of protest, with some describing it as a " remarkable protest performance."
For instance, one user praised the woman's "transformation of the turban into a mandatory scarf" as an innovative form of resistance.
The Israeli television network Kan 11 also shared the video, framing it as a protest against the enforcement of mandatory hijab.
The incident highlights the ongoing struggle over women's rights in Iran. In the past two years, thousands of women have faced arrest, summons, fines, prosecution, or denial of public services for not adhering to the state-mandated dress code.
In December 2023, Mohsen Aghili, the head of airport police, stated that women would be denied airport services if they did not wear a hijab.
Prior to that, officials at airports in Fars province and Mashhad had announced the deployment of hijab enforcers to prevent what they called improperly veiled people from entering airports and terminals.
In July, the Tehran office of Turkish Airlines was temporarily closed due to its employees' non-compliance with hijab regulations.
The Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRANA) reported in December that over 30,000 women faced legal action last year for defying mandatory hijab.
The Iranian authorities' efforts to enforce hijab continue through various means, including the recently passed the so-called Chastity and Hijab Law.
The final text of the "Family Protection through Promoting the Culture of Chastity and Hijab" law was published in Iranian media in November, prompting widespread expressions of concern from several rights groups and activists, including UN experts.
Earlier in January, Rouhollah Momen-Nasab, the secretary of the Tehran Headquarters for Promoting Virtue and Preventing Vice, called for the law's implementation before the summer. However, the government is hesitant to enforce the law, likely due to concerns about public backlash.
Iran has denied any connection between the detention of Italian journalist Cecilia Sala and the arrest of Iranian national Mohammad Abedini Najafabadi in Milan, describing reports of a reciprocal exchange as false.
“These two matters are entirely unrelated,” foreign ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said during a press briefing on Monday. “The Italian journalist was detained for violating Iranian laws, while the Iranian individual was arrested for circumventing US sanctions.”
Baghaei also criticized what he described as the US targeting Iranian citizens abroad.
“Several Iranian nationals are pursued and extradited in certain countries at the request of the US, which we consider a form of hostage-taking,” he said.
However, a source familiar with discussions between Sala's family and the Italian government told Iran International that Tehran made clear to Rome that Sala's freedom depends on Italy's release of Mohammad Abedini Najafabadi, an Iranian arrested at Washington's behest.
While Iran's Supreme Leader continues calls for Syrian youth to reject the new leadership, Iran’s foreign ministry has reaffirmed its commitment to Syria’s sovereignty.
“Syria must not become a safe haven for terrorists, and its people should decide their future without foreign, regional, or extra-regional interventions,” Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei said during a press briefing on Monday.
In contrast, Khamenei accused the United States and Israel of orchestrating the removal of former President Bashar al Assad, urging resistance against what he described as a foreign-imposed government.
The fall of Assad in December and the rise of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has upended Iran’s influence in Syria, challenging its long-standing strategic foothold in the country.
“We respect the choice and decisions of the Syrian people,” Baghaei said. The foreign ministry is advocating for diplomacy and cooperation with Syria while Khamenei’s rhetoric signals Tehran’s unwillingness to relinquish its influence in the country, which turned from being a key ally to a potential adversary as the Sunni HTS aligns with Iran's rivals in the region and garners international support.
Iran's Foreign Ministry Spokesman Esmail Baghaei during a weekly briefing on January 6, 2024.
US pressures and nuclear negotiations
Simultaneously, Iran faces mounting pressure from the United States over its nuclear program.
National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan recently presented President Joe Biden with potential military options against Iranian nuclear facilities as reported by Axios. Baghaei condemned these threats as violations of the United Nations Charter, calling on the Security Council to address what he described as provocations undermining international peace and security.
“The threat of force against a country’s peaceful nuclear facilities constitutes a double violation of international obligations,” Baghaei said. He accused Washington of attempting to dictate policies in preparation for the next US administration.
Iran’s strained relations with Western powers extend to stalled nuclear negotiations. Baghaei said talks with European countries are set to resume in Geneva on January 12 and insisted that Iran remains committed to dialogue, saying, “We have never avoided the negotiation table and have always believed in honorable negotiations.”
The talks come at a critical time, as the IAEA reports Iran’s progress in enriching uranium to near-weapons-grade levels. Tehran insists its nuclear program remains peaceful, but international concerns persist over its potential for weaponization.
The "chain murders" of the 1990s—a series of assassinations targeting Iranian dissidents and intellectuals—claimed at least 80 lives and stand as a dark chapter in the Islamic Republic's history of extrajudicial killings.
Carried out by the Ministry of Intelligence under President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, these killings sought to silence critics deemed threats to the state, continuing into the presidency of Mohammad Khatami.
In 1999, the Ministry of Intelligence officially—but only partially—admitted responsibility for four of the murders.
Q: Who were the dissidents killed by intelligence ministry agents?
Five individuals whose murders in November and December 1998 drew national and international attention were:
Majid Sharif: A translator and journalist.
Dariush Forouhar: Leader of the Pan-Iranist Nation Party of Iran.
Parvaneh Forouhar (Eskandari): Activist and wife of Dariush Forouhar.
Mohammad-Jafar Pouyandeh: Member of the banned Iranian Writers Association.
Mohammad Mokhtari: Member of the banned Iranian Writers Association.
The Ministry officially acknowledged responsibility for the killings of Dariush and Parvaneh Forouhar, Mohammad Mokhtari, and Mohammad-Ja’far Pouyandeh, but denied involvement in other cases, including Pirouz Davani’s death.
Q. How were the victims killed and where were their bodies found?
Majid Sharif’s body was found on the side of a road in Tehran on November 19, 1998, six days after he disappeared. Authorities claimed heart failure as the official cause of his death.
Dariush and Parvaneh Forouhar were stabbed to death in their Tehran home on November 22. Both sustained multiple stab wounds, suggesting the attack was both deliberate and exceptionally violent.
Mokhtari’s body was discovered on December 3 near a cement factory on a road south of Tehran, several days after he went missing.
Pouyandeh’s body was found in a field in Shahriyar, also south of Tehran, on December 8, a day after he left his office in the capital to return home.
Both bodies showed signs of strangulation, though the authorities never officially confirmed the cause of death.
Q: Were the killings limited to those in November and December 1998?
No. At the time, political groups and media outlets suspected the intelligence ministry of involvement in numerous other assassinations, often disguised as overdoses, car accidents, or unexplained stabbings.
The suspected victims of these systematic assassinations were primarily opponents of the Islamic Republic, including dissident politicians, literary figures, and translators. Others reportedly targeted included an Armenian, three Protestant priests, followers of the banned Bahá'í faith, a prominent university professor with no known political affiliations, and civilians allegedly linked to the intelligence ministry’s covert operations.
Q: When did government-linked murders begin and end?
Many believe the "Chain Murders" began with the killing of Dr. Kazem Sami, who served as minister of health in the first post-revolution cabinet in 1979.
Dr. Kazem Sami was stabbed to death in his medical practice in 1988. The individual accused of his murder reportedly died by suicide in prison. Years later, former President Akbar Rafsanjani, in his memoirs, referenced the alleged killer’s death, fueling further questions about the case.
Some activists and advocates argue that the "Chain Murders" never truly ceased, with allegations of systematic killings resurfacing in recent years.
Prominent filmmaker Kioumars Pourahmad, whose body was found without a suicide note in April 2023, andDariush Mehrjui and his wife, who were fatally stabbed in their Karaj home in October 2023, have been cited as possible victims of a renewed wave of targeted killings.
Q: Who did the authorities blame for the murders?
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his supporters initially blamed “foreign enemies,” including Israel, for the murders of the Forouhars and the two writers.
Public outcry over these particular killings, however, put pressure on the so-called reformist government of President Mohammad Khatami.
At Khatami's insistence, a three-member independent team was established to investigate the killings. The committee ultimately confirmed suspicions of the intelligence ministry’s direct involvement.
On January 4, 1999, the ministry issued an unprecedented statement partially acknowledging responsibility by blaming “rogue” agents for four of the murders and describing the killings as “despicable and abhorrent.”
This limited admission prompted further scrutiny, as the intelligence ministry operates under the authority of Khamenei, raising questions about how such "rogue" actions could occur without his knowledge.
Q: What happened to the “rogue agents”?
Three top officials of the ministry—Saeed Emami, Mostafa Kazemi, and Mehrdad Alikhani—along with several agents, were charged with ordering and carrying out the assassinations.
Emami, widely regarded as the mastermind behind the killings, allegedly died by suicide in prison before his trial.
The remaining defendants were tried in Tehran's military court. Sentences ranged from qisas (death penalty) to life imprisonment, with some receiving as little as two and a half years.
Q: Were the death sentences carried out?
No. Judiciary authorities stated that the victims’ families had waived their Sharia-based right to qisas for the killers. This act of pardon spared the defendants from execution.
Q: Did the revelation of the ministry’s role in the killings affect the minister?
Ghorban-Ali Dorri-Najafabadi, a minister favored by Khamenei, who at the time had not yet fully consolidated his power as Supreme Leader, was forced to resign. He was replaced by the relatively moderate Ali Younesi.
Najafabadi has consistently denied any knowledge of the assassinations. However, some defendants in the case rejected this claim, stating that the "physical elimination" of targets identified by higher authorities was part of their job description.
In his 1999 trial, prominent reformist cleric and politician Abdollah Nouri accused Najafabadi of being aware of the killings.
At least 31 women were executed in Iran in 2024, according to the Oslo-based rights group Iran Human Rights (IHR), marking the highest annual figure in 17 years since the organization began documenting executions.
The report, titled “Women and the Death Penalty in Iran: A Gendered Perspective,” sheds light on systemic gender disparities and judicial bias affecting women on death row.
It highlights that many women executed for murder acted out of desperation in response to violence, rape, or coercive control, with about 70% of cases involving male partners.
The report noted that Islamic Republic's legal system rarely considers mitigating circumstances, as women’s testimonies are worth half of men’s, and laws fail to address domestic violence or marital rape.
“The execution of women in Iran reveals not just the brutality of the death penalty, but the depth of systemic gender inequality in the judicial system,” said Mahmood Amiry-Moghaddam, director of IHR. He called on the international community to act urgently to address “systemic injustices and gender apartheid” in Iran.
The report also revealed that transparency around executions has worsened, with only 26% of women’s executions officially announced, a figure dropping to 12% in recent years.
Marginalized ethnic minorities, including women from Sistan and Baluchistan, are disproportionately represented among those executed, reflecting the intersection of poverty, discrimination, and judicial bias.
Since 1979, the Islamic Republic has used executions to maintain power and instill fear, IHR said, underscoring the need for international attention to systemic injustices and the plight of women on death row.
IHR emphasized that the report does not account for the significant number of female political prisoners executed during the 1980s, nor does it include women subjected to stoning or hanging for adultery during the first three decades of the Islamic Republic.
Iran witnessed a stark rise in executions in 2024, with at least 930 death sentences carried out, according to the Washington-based Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran.
The figure for years 2023 and 2022 were 811 and 579 respectively, which shows a consistent upward trend.
Iranian authorities are facing criticism over a recent incendiary speech by a eulogist that has further strained the Islamic Republic’s relations with the Republic of Azerbaijan.
Last week Baku summoned Tehran's interim chargé d'affaires to demand an end to what it called "provocative actions" by Tehran. It followed a fervent anti-Baku speech by a lay Shia eulogist or religious singer, Gholamreza Gholizadeh, at an event in Ardabil, the capital of the northwestern province of the same name.
Tehran-Baku relations are very complex due to religious, ethnic, economic, and political factors including Tehran’s good relations with Armenia, its other northwestern neighbor, and Baku's strong ties with Iran's archenemy, Israel.
The maddah and his controversial speech
Gholizadeh, who leads a Shia mourning society in Ardabil that organizes ceremonies to honor Shia saints—delivered most of his speech in Turki, a language spoken in Iran's northwestern provinces that Azerbaijanis in the Republic of Azerbaijan easily understand.
During his speech, he referred to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as “bastards” and “consumers of illegitimately acquired food.”
The event, broadcast live by Iran’s state-run News Network, was attended by Seyyed Hassan Ameli, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative in the province.
Gholizadeh also declared that Iran would reclaim its former territories in the Caucasus—lost during the Russo-Persian Wars (1651-1828)—and raise the Shia flag there. He further insulted early Islamic figures revered by Sunnis.
Over half the population of the Republic of Azerbaijan follows Shia Islam, but political power largely rests with Sunnis. Baku media often allege that radical Shia groups, such as Hüseynçilər (The Islamic Resistance Movement of Azerbaijan), receive backing from Iran.
The Ardabil event—the first of its kind in the Islamic Republic’s history—commemorated the “martyrs of the Battle of Chaldiran” in 1514. The battle between Iran’s Safavid Shia Empire and the Sunni Ottoman Empire ended in an Ottoman victory.
Ayatollah Seyyed Hasan Ameli, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative, at the event
Criticism of authorities for giving free reign to maddahs
In an editorial on Monday titled “Are Maddahs Free to Say Whatever They Want and Insult Whoever They Wish?” the conservative newspaper Jomhouri Eslami criticized the insults directed at Azerbaijan’s president as both politically and religiously inappropriate.
According to Shia law, calling a person "a bastard" is an offense punishable by eighty lashes.
The newspaper also questioned the relevance of holding an event to commemorate the victims of the Battle of Chaldiran and criticized the failure of provincial authorities, including Ameli, to oversee and regulate such events. All government-approved gatherings in Iran are strictly monitored to ensure compliance with existing policies, though occasional lapses may occur during religious ceremonies.
Ameli who is also a member of the Assembly of Experts and the Friday prayer leader of Ardabil, appointed by Khamenei, took to X on Friday, two days after Baku’s strong reaction to the incident, to argue that the “inappropriate language” used by the maddah should not be construed as representing the Islamic Republic’s official stance.
Ameli’s post received nearly 350 comments, with opinions divided. While some supported the maddah’s highly controversial remarks, others criticized Ameli for failing to intervene during the speech, which he had praised as “epic.”
Critics alleged close ties between Ameli and the maddah’s religious group, with one commenter among the hundreds asking, “Were you not there? Why did you let him swear and insult? Stop this bragging and focus on the country’s progress. We will get nowhere with war and enmity.”
Another user, Gholamreza Tabrizi, claimed to have heard the full audio recording of the speech and warned that, if published, it could spark a diplomatic crisis with Sunni Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, because of its anti-Sunni content.
Under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s three-decade leadership, eulogists have gained prominence in both religious and political spheres. Many “celebrity eulogists” are closely affiliated with ultra-hardline political factions and use state-sponsored events, including Friday prayers, to promote their views.
“The most inappropriate language, the most irrelevant stances, and the most unconventional topics are often raised during Friday sermons,” wrote Hossein Selahvarzi, a former head of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce, in an X post addressing the Ardabil incident. “These actions frequently have repercussions for the country’s diplomatic apparatus and economy.”
Also criticizing the authorities for the recent incident in Ardabil, Mohsen Gharavian, a conservative politician and cleric, warned the authorities about the political and religious implications of maddahs’ increasing involvement in politics.
“The country’s key political authorities, such as the Supreme National Security Council … should warn these maddahs and thwart such divisiveness to prevent damages and political and social problems in the current sensitive situation in the region,” he said in an interview with the Iranian Labour News Agency (ILNA) published Sunday.