Iranian detained in Italy at US request denied conditional release

A convoy carrying construction materials and logistical reinforcements was seen heading to Kobani on Thursday, according to the SDF-affiliated North Press Agency.

The convoy included prefabricated structures, trench-digging machinery, surveillance equipment, and fuel tanks as reported by the New Region.

It comes amidst renewed violence in areas controlled by the SDF, following Turkey-backed forces' campaigns that began in late November which have resulted in significant casualties and displaced thousands of civilians.

The recent ousting of the Assad government, led by the Turkey-backed rebel coalition Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, has reshaped the region.

The collapse of Assad on December 8 marked the end of his family's five-decade rule, presenting a strategic setback for Iran.

Syria has historically served as a key conduit for Iran to supply Hezbollah in Lebanon and bolster its military allies in the region. The loss of this corridor undermines Tehran's regional influence and disrupts its long-standing strategy in the Levant.

Iran’s deep military and financial commitments in Syria now face diminishing returns. Rival actors such as Turkey and Persian Gulf Arab states are poised to fill the void, further isolating Hezbollah and compelling Tehran to reconsider its regional posture amidst intensifying domestic economic pressures.

Turkey has intensified its efforts to capture strategic locations from the SDF, including Kobani and the Tishrin Dam on the Euphrates River. Backed by Turkish warplanes, these operations underscore Ankara's intent to neutralize what it views as a security threat posed by the Kurdish-led forces. Despite these efforts, the SDF has so far resisted the advances.

As the US's primary ally in the fight against ISIS, the SDF controls nearly a quarter of Syrian territory, primarily in the northeast and east. However, Turkey continues to press for the disarmament of the group, insisting that it poses a direct risk to its national security.

“There are moments like now when the old era is dead, the old illusions are dead, and various things are killing it. And I suspect that the regime in Tehran will be gone in the next few years as well. So I think there’s a real opportunity for freedom to spread and for opportunity to spread,” he said, speaking on the Conflicted podcast on Wednesday.

He attributed the Islamic Republic’s weakening to the fallout from the 2020 US drone strike that killed Qassem Soleimani, a key Iranian military commander, calling it a pivotal moment that disrupted Iran’s influence across the Middle East.

“I’m always struck by how some people can be much more seminal, much more key, pivotal to an organization than you realize at the time. The reality is when Qassem Suleimani was killed in January 2020, he held in his head all the relationships, all the deals for everybody around the region,” he said.

“He was replaced, but he wasn’t really, because nobody could replace the personal 20-year relationships that he held. That’s really the unpicking. So I have to say, I know it’s not popular, but President Trump, effectively, was the trigger that began the fall of the Assad regime.”

Tugendhat highlighted growing dissent within Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), where younger members reportedly view the older leadership as corrupt and ineffective. This generational divide, he said, reflects broader frustrations with the Islamic Republic’s inability to maintain its standing both at home and abroad.

“Young members of the IRGC are saying two things. One, the old guard are corrupt and incompetent. That’s why Hezbollah has been hung out to dry and defeated. That’s why old allies like Assad have fallen ... The second thing they’re saying is that they’re hearing rumors, I don’t know how true they are, but they’re hearing rumors that the ayatollah and the government in Tehran wants to talk to the Americans to try and find a way out of this and perhaps hang on.”

He suggested that rumors of potential talks between Tehran and Washington about a new nuclear deal are further fueling tensions within the IRGC, with hardliners fiercely opposing any engagement with the US, particularly after Soleimani’s killing.

Since Soleimani’s death, Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have repeatedly vowed revenge against the US and those involved in the operation. However, the threats have largely failed to materialize into substantive action, underscoring what Tugendhat described as a diminishing capacity to project power regionally.

In Syria, where Soleimani played a crucial role in sustaining Assad’s government, the situation has shifted dramatically. Tugendhat argued that the West has a unique opportunity to help rebuild the country into a stabilizing force in the region.

“Frankly, if we get Syria right in 10 years, Syria could be absolutely not just a pole of stability but a fantastic economic powerhouse in the region, exporting stability and civilization, as it has done for quite literally tens of thousands of years, to the rest of the world again,” he said.

Tugendhat also criticized the West’s inconsistent policies in the Middle East, which he believes allowed adversaries like Russia to gain influence. He pointed to key moments, such as the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and inaction following Assad’s use of chemical weapons in 2013, as examples of missed opportunities to assert strategic leadership.

Three days after Najafabadi’s detention, on December 19, Italian journalist Cecilia Sala was arrested in Iran on unspecified charges of "violating Iranian law." Her arrest is widely regarded as a direct retaliation for Najafabadi’s detention.

This decision by the Attorney General coincides with complex negotiations between the Italian government and intelligence agencies and their Iranian counterparts to secure Sala’s release.

While Nanni's opinion is formally separate from these discussions, it will determine whether house arrest for Najafabadi would be sufficient to prevent his disappearance while awaiting extradition proceedings to the US. A favorable opinion on Najafabadi’s lawyer’s request could be positively received in Tehran.

Iran has officially confirmed Sala’s arrest, with its state news agency IRNA reporting on Monday that the 29-year-old journalist, who works for Il Foglio and the podcast company Chora Media, was detained for "violating the laws of the Islamic Republic."

US authorities allege that Najafabadi supplied materials for a deadly Iran-linked drone attack on American troops in Jordan.

“One of the reasons that has led us to consider changing the capital is the imbalance between resources and expenditures in Tehran,” he said in a meeting with representatives from the central region of Semnan.

Tehran, home to over 9 million residents, has long struggled with overpopulation, traffic congestion, air pollution, and resource mismanagement. Pezeshkian argued that moving the capital closer to the Persian Gulf would streamline economic operations.

“Transporting raw materials from the south to the center, processing them, and then returning them south for export drains our competitive capacity. We must shift the country’s economic and political center to the south and closer to the sea,” he said.

Previous Iranian administrations have explored various iterations of the idea. However, financial constraints and political inertia have consistently stalled progress.

It gained traction during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, mainly over concerns about Tehran’s vulnerability to earthquakes. President Hassan Rouhani revisited it in the mid-2010s, citing the city’s unsustainable growth and environmental challenges.

Relocating the capital would require massive investment and pose logistical challenges, while potentially harming Tehran’s economy. It seems unlikely, therefore, that Pezeshkian follows his remarks with actions that his predecessors avoided in less challenging times.

The funds are crucial to boost gas production to meet targets set by Iran's long-term development plan, which on paper inform budgets and industrial policies.

"According to the Seventh Development Plan, gas production must reach 1 billion and 380 million cubic meters per day by the end of the plan," Paknejad said. "To achieve this goal, $45 billion of investment is required."

The majority of this funding, he explained, must be directed towards developing gas fields and upgrading related infrastructure.

Successive Irani governments have struggled to meet soaring consumption, especially during colder months when power plants are forced to burn polluting fuels that compound the problem of air quality in urban areas.

Iran possesses vast reserves of natural gas, but rising domestic demand and lack of investment to maintain and expand the infrastructure means the country is often a net-importer of energy.

Paknejad outlined a two-pronged approach to tackle the crisis, emphasizing the urgent need for substantial investment as well as consumption management.

"More important than increasing production is managing demand and optimizing consumption," he said, emphasizing the need for greater efficiency in domestic gas usage.

Over 860 million cubic meters of processed natural gas (sweet gas) are delivered to Iran's national grid daily, the oil minister said, more than three-quarters of which is taken up by households, businesses, and small industries.

The government has called on Iranians to limit their use, but seem reluctant to press harder on the issue, mindful of the widespread discontent in the country.

Iran's oil minister alluded to this reality, while suggesting that resource management and optimization lagged behind production growth.

"Any reform in the energy consumption system should be accompanied by considering the living conditions of the people," Paknejad said.