• العربية
  • فارسی
Brand
  • Iran Insight
  • Politics
  • Economy
  • Analysis
  • Special Report
  • Opinion
  • Podcast
  • Iran Insight
  • Politics
  • Economy
  • Analysis
  • Special Report
  • Opinion
  • Podcast
  • Theme
  • Language
    • العربية
    • فارسی
  • Iran Insight
  • Politics
  • Economy
  • Analysis
  • Special Report
  • Opinion
  • Podcast
All rights reserved for Volant Media UK Limited
volant media logo
OPINION

MoU's forgotten casualty is the Iranian people

Eric Mandel
Eric Mandel

Director of Middle East Political Information Network

Jun 22, 2026, 01:16 GMT+1
Iranian demonstrators gather in a street during a protest over the collapse of the currency's value, in Tehran, Iran, January 8, 2026.
Iranian demonstrators gather in a street during a protest over the collapse of the currency's value, in Tehran, Iran, January 8, 2026.

The Memorandum of Understanding between Iran and the United States may strengthen the Revolutionary Guards, weaken Persian Gulf security and deepen China's access to Iranian energy. Above all, however, it leaves Iranians to face the Islamic Republic on their own.

Paragraph 2 of the MOU effectively enshrines the abandonment of the Iranian people by committing both sides to "refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs."

This clause stands in direct contrast to many of President Trump's previous statements regarding the Iranian people and his repeated condemnations of the regime's brutality.

In 2017, Trump described Iranians as "a proud people" forced to submit to extremist rule. In 2018, he tweeted: "Such respect for the people of Iran as they try to take back their corrupt government. You will see great support from the United States at the appropriate time!"

Following the June 2025 strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, he posted: "If the current Iranian Regime is unable to MAKE IRAN GREAT AGAIN, why wouldn't there be a Regime change? MIGA."

In January 2026, he urged Iranians to continue protesting and "take over your institutions," adding that "help is on its way." The following month, during major opposition demonstrations, he again appealed directly to Iranians: "When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take."

Today, however, the MOU represents a dramatic reversal of those positions. The agreement abandons a population Trump repeatedly encouraged to reclaim its country and signals that the United States is no longer willing to support internal pressure against the regime.

The contrast is particularly striking because it comes after a period in which Iran was arguably more vulnerable than at any point in decades.

Following military setbacks, economic pressure and growing domestic dissatisfaction, the regime faced mounting challenges both externally and internally. Yet rather than using that leverage to pursue broader political change, Washington appears to have chosen accommodation.

Trump now speaks of Iran's leaders as "very smart" and "strong," describing them as pragmatic negotiating partners. According to PBS NewsHour, a US official said Iran would be rewarded for "acting like a normal country."

That raises a fundamental question: after 47 years of repression, terrorism, hostage-taking, regional destabilization and the deaths of many Americans linked to Iran and its proxy network, is Tehran now being offered normalization without accountability?

The agreement appears poised to provide sanctions relief, access to frozen assets and expanded oil sales. Much of that oil is likely to flow to China. Additional revenue could strengthen the IRGC, reinforce domestic repression and increase support for armed allies such as Hezbollah and Hamas.

Supporters of the agreement argue that diplomacy is preferable to conflict and that negotiated limits are better than perpetual confrontation. Yet history suggests that agreements with the Islamic Republic are only as effective as the enforcement mechanisms behind them and the willingness to use them.

If substantial benefits are delivered before key obligations are fully verified, leverage disappears while risks increase.

This concern is not new. When President Obama declined to support Iran's Green Movement following the disputed 2009 election, many critics viewed the decision as both a betrayal of democratic values and a missed strategic opportunity to weaken the regime from within.

The current debate echoes many of the same arguments. But what Trump has done may prove even more consequential.

After authorizing actions that significantly degraded Iran's nuclear infrastructure, ballistic missile capabilities and military assets, he achieved what many previous administrations were unwilling or unable to attempt.

Yet by rapidly transitioning from maximum pressure to accommodation, he risks transforming a major tactical victory into a strategic mistake.

At the moment Iran appeared most vulnerable and many Iranians seemed most willing to challenge the regime, the United States chose not to prioritize support for opposition movements or increase pressure on the IRGC from within.

Whether such efforts would have succeeded is unknowable, but abandoning them entirely removed a source of leverage that would have, at the very least, strengthened America's negotiating position.

A different strategy would have required a sustained effort to explain to the American people why supporting the aspirations of ordinary Iranians serves both value-based American principles and long-term US security interests.

Genuine stability in the Middle East is unlikely to emerge solely from agreements with authoritarian rulers. Lasting stability comes when governments enjoy legitimacy among their own populations, especially populations that are likely to be among the most pro-American in the Muslim world.

Instead, the administration chose strategic impatience. In doing so, it not only disheartened many Iranians who hoped for greater international support, but also created uncertainty among Gulf allies and Israel.

Several regional and foreign-policy experts argue that Persian Gulf states may now reassess the reliability of American security guarantees and adapt accordingly.

The art of diplomacy is not surrendering hard-won leverage before a final agreement is fully negotiated and enforceable.

A 60-day ceasefire could easily become months of inconclusive negotiations while Iran replenishes its finances, strengthens the IRGC, suppresses domestic dissent and supports regional proxies.

But one thing is already clear: the agreement's most overlooked consequence is not what it says about centrifuges, missiles or sanctions. It is what it says about the people of Iran and American assurances.

For years, American leaders, including President Trump, spoke of supporting Iranians seeking freedom from Islamist authoritarian rule. The MOU signals a different set of priorities.

By pledging noninterference in Iran's internal affairs while offering the regime a pathway toward normalization and economic relief, Washington appears to have chosen engagement with Tehran over support for political change.

Whether that choice ultimately produces peace or merely postpones a larger confrontation remains to be seen. But for millions of Iranians who believed the United States stood with them against their oppressors, the message of this agreement is unmistakable: they are now largely on their own.

Most Viewed

Hardliners accuse negotiating team of ignoring Supreme Leader's objections
1

Hardliners accuse negotiating team of ignoring Supreme Leader's objections

2

Hardliner reveals ‘top-secret’ Khamenei objections to US talks on state TV

3
ANALYSIS

Iran may get a lifeline, but major obstacles remain

4

Iran’s legal drug market is being hollowed out as shortages feed illicit channels

5
INSIGHT

Can Iran rebuild ties with Arab neighbours without a US deal?

Banner
Banner
Banner

Spotlight

  • MoU's forgotten casualty is the Iranian people
    OPINION

    MoU's forgotten casualty is the Iranian people

  • Iran may get a lifeline, but major obstacles remain
    ANALYSIS

    Iran may get a lifeline, but major obstacles remain

  • Can Iran rebuild ties with Arab neighbours without a US deal?
    INSIGHT

    Can Iran rebuild ties with Arab neighbours without a US deal?

  • Tehran divided over what Khamenei MoU message really meant
    INSIGHT

    Tehran divided over what Khamenei MoU message really meant

  • Trump says Iran is 'finished', experts say Tehran won big
    PODCAST

    Trump says Iran is 'finished', experts say Tehran won big

  • A US-Iran deal alone won't rescue Iran's oil economy
    ANALYSIS

    A US-Iran deal alone won't rescue Iran's oil economy

•
•
•

More Stories

Hardliner reveals ‘top-secret’ Khamenei objections to US talks on state TV

Jun 20, 2026, 19:45 GMT+1
Hardliner reveals ‘top-secret’ Khamenei objections to US talks on state TV
100%
File photo shows hardline lawmaker Mahmoud Nabavian

A hardline lawmaker sparked a major backlash after reading excerpts from what were described as top-secret letters by Iran’s Supreme Leader on state TV, claiming he opposed US talks, before he was interrupted and the program was abruptly cut off.

Mahmoud Nabavian, a member of parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had repeatedly objected to the course of negotiations with the United States and set conditions that were not reflected in the Iran-US memorandum of understanding.

His remarks came as Iran’s negotiating team travelled to Switzerland for a new round of technical talks with the United States, days after Tehran and Washington signed the MoU aimed at ending the war and opening the way for further negotiations.

“The Supreme Leader explicitly expresses his dissatisfaction,” Nabavian said on the program. “He says, ‘Why did you not observe the conditions?’”

He said Khamenei had written that Iran was “neither in a hurry nor under any compulsion to negotiate or reach an agreement,” adding that the talks should be aimed at “ending the war and securing compensation,” not the nuclear issue.

According to Nabavian, Khamenei had also told negotiators not to discuss what he called “the main issue," apparently referring to Tehran's nuclear program.

“I will read one sentence. There is no other choice,” Nabavian said, before quoting from what he described as Khamenei’s correspondence: “What has taken shape in the Pakistan negotiations is fundamentally different from what was supposed to happen and from what constituted the condition for the legitimacy of the negotiations.”

Nabavian said Khamenei then called for the negotiations to be stopped.

He also said Khamenei repeated his position on the nuclear file on April 4, April 18 and April 24, insisting that Iran should either achieve “victory” by forcing the other side to fully recognize its right to enrichment, or remove the nuclear issue from the agenda of negotiations “forever.”

On the Strait of Hormuz, Nabavian said Khamenei viewed the waterway as a key point of leverage against Washington.

“The Strait of Hormuz is a very important key,” Nabavian quoted him as saying. “If the Americans want pressure taken off their throat, they must first implement preconditions, foremost among them the payment of compensation and debts.”

Nabavian added that “none of these things” had appeared in the MoU.

He said Khamenei had insisted that management of the Strait of Hormuz must remain exclusively in Iran’s hands, “not even with Oman, let alone other countries.”

According to Nabavian, Khamenei had also divided ships into different categories, saying some vessels should be stopped altogether, some could pass after paying tolls, and others, including ships belonging to Iran’s allies, could pass without payment.

He said the instructions were included in a message dated March 12.

As Nabavian continued speaking, he was interrupted by the state TV's presenter and the program abruptly ended.

State TV vows legal action

Iran’s state broadcaster later called his remarks a legal violation warranting judicial action, saying his references to classified documents and correspondence by senior officials were punishable.

It also said one director at the organization had resigned over the incident and that disciplinary action would be taken.

The disclosure also drew criticism from conservative media circles. The editor-in-chief of Mashregh accused Nabavian of selectively reading from a wider set of correspondence.

“Why don’t you say these selective excerpts of yours were from about 20-something correspondences, and in fact from the earliest ones?” Hossein Soleimani wrote on X, addressing Nabavian. “Since you disclosed and published the system’s secret and top-secret documents, you should at least have disclosed them correctly and accurately.”

Nabavian and other figures close to the hardline Paydari Front have sharply criticized the Iran-US MoU in recent days, accusing President Masoud Pezeshkian, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi of making dangerous concessions to Washington.

The criticisms come as a message attributed to Khamenei said he authorized the signing of the memorandum of understanding despite having “another view in principle,” after receiving assurances from Pezeshkian that Iran’s rights and those of the “Resistance Front” would be protected.

Iranian media have reported that the negotiating team, led by Ghalibaf and including Araghchi, Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati and other senior officials, has left for Switzerland for technical talks with the United States.

The talks are being held as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy has once again closed the Strait of Hormuz over what Tehran describes as violations of the MoU in Lebanon.

On Saturday, Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, in a directive seen by Iran International, instructed media outlets not to portray the renewed closure of the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s simultaneous participation in talks as a split between the “field” and diplomacy.

The directive said Iran was pursuing a single strategy combining military pressure and diplomacy, and urged media outlets to frame action in Hormuz not as an alternative to negotiations but as support for them.

Iranian human rights lawyer Javad Alikordi sentenced to 18 years in jail

Jun 20, 2026, 19:22 GMT+1
Iranian human rights lawyer Javad Alikordi sentenced to 18 years in jail
100%
Javad Alikordi

Iranian rights lawyer Javad Alikordi has been sentenced to 18 years in prison, HRANA reported, more than six months after his arrest in connection with a memorial for his brother, rights attorney Khosrow Alikordi, who died under suspicious circumstances.

The rights group said Branch 1 of the Mashhad Revolutionary Court sentenced Alikordi to five years in prison on charges of “assembly and collusion to act against national security” and 13 years for “propaganda against national security” under Iran’s newly hardened espionage-related legislation.

Under Iran’s sentencing rules for multiple convictions, if the ruling is upheld, Alikordi would serve the longest prison term handed down in the case, which is 13 years.

Alikordi, who is being held in Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad, was also sentenced to two years of exile in Saravan, in the underprivileged Sistan and Baluchestan province, and a two-year ban on leaving the country.

HRANA said he was arrested by security forces at his workplace in Mashhad in December 2025, days after the death of his brother Khosrow who was a prominent lawyer who represented jailed protesters, political prisoners and bereaved families seeking justice for relatives killed during Iran’s 2022 protests.

Khosrow Alikordi was found dead in his office in Mashhad under unclear circumstances in December. Iranian authorities cited cardiac arrest, but fellow lawyers, activists and some relatives of victims he represented questioned the official account and called for an independent investigation.

Javad Alikordi, a lawyer, university lecturer and former member of the Sabzevar City Council, had also represented political prisoners and families of slain protesters.

He was arrested after protesting the detention of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Narges Mohammadi and other activists during Khosrow's memorial.

Rights groups say he has faced repeated judicial pressure over his legal and human rights work.

Illegal adoptions expose Iran’s hidden baby-selling market, child advocate warns

Jun 20, 2026, 11:49 GMT+1
Illegal adoptions expose Iran’s hidden baby-selling market, child advocate warns
100%

Nearly one-third of registered adoptions in Iran over the past decade were illegal, according to state welfare data, exposing a hidden child-transfer market that advocates say can leave babies vulnerable to sale, abandonment, domestic servitude and other forms of abuse.

Parisa Valentina Pouyan, director of the Pouya Helpers of Child Workers Institute, told Iran’s labor-focused ILNA news agency that baby-selling is a hidden and complex phenomenon driven not only by poverty but also by addiction, cultural pressures, weak oversight, lack of parenting education and failures in state protection systems.

“Buying and selling children is one of the most horrifying forms of social harm and one of the most damaging acts committed against children,” Pouyan said.

Her remarks followed renewed attention in Iranian media to the case of a mother accused of selling several of her newborns over different years for small sums, reviving concerns about underground markets for infants and the future awaiting children transferred outside legal adoption channels.

A recent analytical report by Iran’s State Welfare Organization, known as Behzisti, found that illegal adoption remains a serious challenge for the country’s child-protection and judicial systems.

According to the report, 18,240 adoption cases were registered from 2013 to 2024, of which 13,020, or 71 percent, were legal, while 5,224, or 29 percent, were recorded as illegal.

  • Iranian influencer’s ‘40 days of motherhood’ sparks debate on foster care

    Iranian influencer’s ‘40 days of motherhood’ sparks debate on foster care

Behzisti is the main state body responsible for welfare and child-protection cases in Iran, including formal adoption procedures. Illegal adoptions take place outside that system, often through private arrangements, brokers or concealed transfers of newborns.

Pouyan said official and precise statistics on baby-selling do not exist because the practice is hidden. But she said poverty creates fertile ground for such cases, especially during wider social and economic crises.

Still, she warned against reducing the issue to poverty alone.

“Would every poor family sell its child?” she said. “If parents have sold a child once and their living conditions improve a little, does that mean they will never do it again?”

Pouyan said global experience shows baby-selling has become a lucrative trade in some places, and that poverty is only one driver. She cited addiction, sex work, cultural pressures and the possibility that a mother herself may have been a victim of child-selling as factors that can feed the trade.

She said the hidden nature of illegal transfers means the child’s future is often irrelevant to the transaction.

“In this kind of trade, parents who sell their baby or child do not care whether the buyers have the conditions and qualifications needed to become parents,” she said, adding that in illegal transfers “money comes first.”

Pouyan said she had personally been approached several years ago by someone seeking a child for a couple living abroad, both doctors, who wanted to adopt by finding a parent willing to sell a child. She said she rejected the request and warned she would report any such case.

  • Child trafficking ring exposed in Iranian holy city

    Child trafficking ring exposed in Iranian holy city

According to Pouyan, the darker danger is that not all buyers are seeking parenthood.

In some cases, she said, children are bought or taken through illegal adoption channels for domestic labor or other forms of exploitation.

“I have seen a case in which a child was illegally adopted and, a few years later, became the family’s servant,” she said.

Pouyan said Iran’s response to baby-selling and illegal adoption is weakened by poor oversight, ineffective intervention by responsible agencies and possible misconduct inside institutions meant to protect children.

Iran may get a lifeline, but major obstacles remain

Jun 20, 2026, 09:37 GMT+1
•
Dalga Khatinoglu
Iran may get a lifeline, but major obstacles remain
100%
Children and families enjoy the return of water to the Zayandeh Roud in Isfahan, where the river's revival drew crowds to its banks after years of recurring drought and shortages, June 16, 2026

The agreement between Tehran and Washington holds out the prospect of sanctions relief and potentially unprecedented foreign investment, but many of its economic promises remain uncertain and some may prove difficult to deliver even if negotiations succeed.

The relative strengthening of the Iranian rial suggests the agreement has already had a positive psychological impact.

The US dollar, which traded above 1.8 million rials during the recent conflict, has fallen to around 1.57 million. Even so, it remains roughly 18 percent higher than six months ago.

According to estimates by Kpler, Iran was exporting about 1.5 million barrels per day of crude oil and condensates before the recent conflict. Without sanctions, exports could eventually return to around 2.5 million barrels per day.

Iran would also no longer be forced to sell much of its crude to Chinese buyers at steep discounts.

Revenue boost

According to OPEC estimates, Iran earned $46.7 billion from exports of crude oil and petroleum products last year. If sanctions are lifted and oil prices remain relatively elevated, that figure could rise substantially.

A rapid recovery, however, should not be expected.

Iran's petrochemical and steel industries, which together generate roughly $17 billion in annual export revenue, have suffered extensive damage during the conflict.

As a result, Iran could temporarily become a net importer of some products it has traditionally exported.

Persian Gulf Holding, which accounts for 38 percent of Iran's petrochemical production, recently reported that output at six heavily damaged complexes fell to just 13 percent of levels recorded during the same period last year. Overall production across the holding's petrochemical subsidiaries declined by 75 percent.

According to Iran's Central Bank, oil, gas, steel and petrochemicals account for 73 percent of the country's total exports, underscoring the importance of rebuilding damaged industrial capacity.

Release of frozen assets

Iran is estimated to hold approximately $24 billion in frozen assets abroad, about half of which could be released within two months.

The Wall Street Journal reported on June 19 that, contingent upon what it described as appropriate Iranian behavior and the transfer of enriched uranium, Tehran could gain access to $6 billion in frozen funds currently held in Qatari banks for the purchase of humanitarian and agricultural goods from the United States.

The arrangement could benefit both countries. Iran imports approximately $17 billion worth of grain annually, while the United States remains the world's largest grain exporter.

Trade between the two countries has collapsed since the 1979 revolution. According to official US statistics, bilateral trade totaled $6.6 billion in 1978 but amounted to only $60 million last year, almost entirely consisting of US exports to Iran.

The reconstruction fund

One of the most ambitious — and least defined — elements of the agreement is a proposed $300 billion reconstruction fund involving foreign companies, including firms from Arab states, to support Iran's reconstruction.

Unlike historical reconstruction programs financed by governments, the proposed fund is expected to rely largely on private investment. That raises significant questions about how such a large sum could be mobilized and whether foreign companies would be willing to commit substantial capital to Iran after years of sanctions, regional tensions and political uncertainty.

Beyond political considerations, investors would also have to weigh sanctions risks, regulatory uncertainty and the long-term stability of the investment environment before committing significant capital.

Given Tehran's strained relations with many Arab states in recent years, enthusiasm among regional investors may remain limited, although countries such as Qatar and Oman could encourage some level of participation.

For now, the creation of a fund on the scale envisioned by the agreement appears unlikely in the medium term. More modest investment flows may be possible if Tehran complies with future commitments and continues improving ties with its neighbors.

The need for investment is undeniable. Iran's oil and gas sector alone is estimated to require at least $300 billion in capital to modernize infrastructure and expand production after decades of underinvestment.

Ultimately, the economic benefits outlined in the agreement depend not only on sanctions relief but also on Tehran's ability to reassure investors, rebuild damaged industries and maintain stable relations with regional and international partners.

For now, the agreement has boosted expectations. Whether it can deliver a lasting economic recovery remains an open question.

Iran's top university expels seven students for dissent

Jun 20, 2026, 02:44 GMT+1
Iran's top university expels seven students for dissent
100%
Students protesting at Tehran's Sharif University of Technology, in this undated file photo

Sharif University of Technology has issued preliminary expulsion orders for seven students, according to the student group United Students, in a move that rights advocates say reflects a broader postwar tightening of political and social control inside Iran.

The disciplinary committee at Sharif, widely regarded as Iran's leading technical university, handed down expulsion orders and, in several cases, multi-year bans from higher education, the group said.

The students named in the report include Reza Dalman, a master's student in computer engineering; Fatemeh Khakpour, an undergraduate chemistry student; Hossein Shadman, a master's student in industrial engineering; Sepanta Saeedi, an undergraduate computer engineering student; Masiha Bagheri, an undergraduate computer engineering student; Fariborz Kohanzad, an electrical engineering student; and Parnian Khodabakhshi, an undergraduate materials science and engineering student.

The expulsions come amid a crackdown that has continued since nationwide unrest in January and intensified during the recent war with the United States.

Rights groups say Iranian authorities have used the security climate to tighten control at home, with arrests, student disciplinary cases and executions rising sharply.

Iran has also carried out executions at record levels in recent months, fueling concerns that the political calm following the US-Iran memorandum of understanding could give authorities greater room to suppress dissent away from the battlefield.

United Students said disciplinary cases against three of the students — Saeedi, Shadman and Bagheri — centered on activity on social media. The other four cases were linked to protests in March, the group said.

The group also said detained student Ariana Koochak had been expelled.

Earlier this week, the Islamic Association of Sharif University students said families of several students had received calls from an unidentified number and reported that a number of students had been banned from entering the campus.

Sharif University has long held a special place in Iran's political and intellectual life. Often described as Iran's MIT, it is the country's most prestigious technical institution, with many graduates going on to pursue advanced degrees and careers at leading universities and technology companies abroad.

The university has also been a hotbed of student protest in recent years.

During the war, the campus was bombed in what officials said was an attack on research centers alleged to have dual-use applications.

The strike was condemned by Tehran and by rights organizations, which warned against attacks on civilian educational institutions.

The new expulsions suggest that even as Iran enters a formal diplomatic process with Washington, pressure on students and universities is continuing at home.