Is Ghalibaf becoming Iran’s Khrushchev?

Dominated by the Revolutionary Guards, the leadership in Tehran may be less constrained by theology and more driven by revenge.

This is an assessment by analysts tracking the post-war power shift in Tehran, as a string of attacks on Jewish and Israeli targets have taken place since the Feb. 28 US-Israeli strikes. 

Across Europe, an Iran-linked group calling itself Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia has claimed several attacks, including the targeting of Jewish volunteer ambulances in London, a synagogue in Belgium and a synagogue and Jewish school in the Netherlands. 

In Azerbaijan, an alleged Iranian plot targeting the Israeli embassy in Baku and Jewish community sites was foiled by authorities. 

Danny Citrinowicz, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, says the post-Ali Khamenei Islamic Republic is likely to become more operationally aggressive, with sleeper cells and lone-wolf attacks posing a growing threat to Tehran’s adversaries.

"Lone wolves are a bigger threat," Citrinowicz told Iran International, referring to the act of an individual committing a violent act alone without a direct order.

"You just need to create the atmosphere," Citrinowicz said. "It will lead to someone saying, I'm going to do something." 

Citrinowicz describes the Islamic Republic in 2026 as "Iranian Revolution 3.0" — its third iteration since 1979 — in which a military junta has taken control of the founding doctrine of clerical rule, Velayat-e Faqih, with the IRGC dominating all meaningful decisions.

It is a regime that has demonstrated, through the foreign fighters it brought in to suppress its own population during the January 2026 uprising, that it harbors sizable loyal support outside its borders. 

"The regime will try to present itself as a continuation of Ali Khamenei's regime," Citrinowicz said.

Yet the IRGC-dominated leadership still faces a limitation in its power, inheriting a government whose revolutionary appeal has long outlasted its domestic popularity. 

Iran International reported that around 800 members of Iraqi militia groups — including Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba — entered Iran days before the January 2026 crackdown that killed tens of thousands of protesters.

Proxy Shia forces from Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan have also been reported inside Iran. 

The Pakistani contingent — the Zainabiyoun Brigade — is an armed wing rooted in Tehran's ideological network, drawn from South Asia's Shia communities. But one militia is only part of the picture.

Simon Wolfgang Fuchs, an associate professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, describes Lahore-based cleric Jawad Naqvi as running a sprawling and sophisticated Shia seminary operation in Lahore, Pakistan. 

The seminary produces Qom-trained scholars, high-quality social media content, and an explicit political model.

"He's really someone who says we have to implement the Iranian model in Pakistan," Fuchs told Iran International. Naqvi's political model draws inspiration from Hezbollah, Fuchs argues — a Shia minority that embraced Velayat-e Faqih and came to dominate Lebanon's political field.

"The vision and the boldness to simply claim that you could also dominate the state is definitely there," Fuchs said, though he cautioned the comparison has limits — Pakistan's Shia community has no history of armed resistance. 

"Iran's efforts to gain a following as the legitimate leader of the Shia (community) has paid off somewhat in South Asia," said Cliff Smith, a fellow at the Middle East Forum who visited Indian-administered Kashmir and documented Iranian influence on the ground.

"The idea of Iran is stronger outside its borders than it is inside." 

India, home to between 20 and 40 million Shia — the second-largest such population after Iran — has received less scrutiny than its neighbour. 

Smith observed during time spent in Kashmir that New Delhi had effectively tolerated Iranian influence among the Shia community, calculating it served as a useful counterweight to Sunni radicalism from Pakistan.

The wave of protests and unrest that was seen in India following Khamenei's killing has prompted a reassessment, according to Smith. 

"I had one of those people tell me, when they had seen the riots and demonstrations after Khamenei’s death, that I was right. We should have paid attention to this sooner," he said, recalling a contact at an Indian think tank. 

Abhinav Pandya of India's Usanas Foundation argues the blind spot runs deeper than Kashmir, as Iran's influence among Indian Muslims is not confined to Shia communities.

India is home to around 200 million Muslims — the world's third-largest — and Pandya argues the Indian security establishment has been too focused on the Sunni threat to register how deeply the Islamic Republic's influence has taken root among the country's Shia groups. 

"The biggest misunderstanding is that most of the jihadist problem comes from the Sunni Muslims, and the Shias — they don't need to bother about them, Shias are completely loyal," Pandya said.

"So far Shia Muslims have not majorly participated in any terrorist activity... But partly this understanding is problematic." 

For Citrinowicz, the killing of Khamenei —a figure seen as much as a religious leader as a political one — risks transforming Iran's conflict with the US and Israel into something far harder to contain. 

“The killing of him is potentially opening some sort of religious war that I think that we have to make sure it won't expand between the Shias and the state of Israel," he said.

Citrinowicz also warned of an increase in Iranian terror activity abroad. "While they have this kind of capabilities and shared communities all over the world, especially in places like India, definitely we'll see an uptick."

Chinese leader Xi Jinping this week publicly called for the Strait of Hormuz to reopen and urged an immediate ceasefire, his clearest intervention yet in the conflict and a sign Beijing is watching events closely.

Zineb Zineb Riboua, a research fellow at the Hudson Institute who specializes in Chinese influence in the Middle East and North Africa, told Eye for Iran that the broader significance of Operation Epic Fury—the US campaign against Ira—may lie in weakening China’s strategic position through its deep ties to the Islamic Republic.

“I am in the group of those who think it is about weakening China,” Riboua said. “I don't think the administration says it this way… but I think it's a very important one.”

Beijing forced into the open

For weeks, China had largely avoided direct public comment on the Hormuz crisis despite its dependence on Persian Gulf energy flows.

Riboua said Xi’s sudden remarks reflected Beijing’s anxiety and may also have exposed China’s limited leverage over Tehran.

“For a long time there was this assumption that the United States was in decline,” she said, adding that Xi’s intervention suggests Washington may be “breaking the status quo that benefited China.”

She added that Beijing remains dependent on US positions in the strait and may lack sufficient influence to pressure Tehran directly.

Why Iran matters to China

China remains a major buyer of Iranian crude and has long benefited from Tehran’s isolation.

“China benefited on three fronts,” Riboua said. “The first one is really the oil… It's 90% of Iran’s oil that goes to China and it goes with a discount.”

China is the world’s largest crude importer, bringing in roughly 11 million barrels per day, and is exposed to any disruption in Hormuz, through which about one-fifth of global consumption passes.

Chinese buyers reportedly took more than 80% of Iran’s exported crude in 2025, often at discounts of $8 to $10 below Brent, giving Beijing a valuable cheap supply.

Any prolonged US-Iran standoff or naval blockade in Hormuz could force China to replace cheaper Iranian oil with more expensive alternatives, while higher freight and insurance costs would add further pressure.

Riboua said Iran also serves as a testing ground for sanctions evasion and alternative financial channels.

“What the Islamic Republic was useful for China is really also the sanctions evasion laboratory.”

Chinese-linked networks have used front companies, ship-to-ship transfers, relabeled cargoes and alternative payment channels to keep Iranian oil flowing despite Western restrictions.

‘US trapped in Mideast’

Iran’s efforts to weaponize the Strait of Hormuz may also have hurt one of its own most important partners.

“The Islamic Republic thought that by weaponizing the Strait of Hormuz it could coerce the US president,” Riboua said. “But in the process, they've been hurting China.”

With China heavily reliant on regional energy flows, any prolonged disruption raises the stakes for Beijing.

Riboua argued the wider contest remains centered on Asia.

“You want the Americans to be trapped in the Middle East,” she said. “That’s a perfect scenario when you're thinking about invading Taiwan.”

If Riboua is right, Operation Epic Fury may prove to be more than a campaign to curb Iran. It may mark an early move in a broader contest over China’s reach in the Middle East—and beyond.

Assertions by US President Donald Trump that Iran’s leadership is divided, and Tehran’s increasingly coordinated effort to deny it, have thrust the issue of unity to the center of the standoff between the two countries.

Trump has repeatedly cast Iran’s leadership as fractured and disorganized. In one post, he wrote: “Iran is having a very hard time figuring out who their leader is! They just don’t know!”

As speculation spread, President Masoud Masoud Pezeshkian sought to set the tone in a social media post declaring: “In Iran there are no ‘hardliners’ or ‘moderates.’ We are all Iranians and revolutionaries.”

The message was reposted verbatim by senior officials across the political and military establishment, including judiciary chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, underscoring the coordinated nature of the response.

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Trump has repeatedly cast Iran’s leadership as fractured and disorganized. In one post, he wrote: “Iran is having a very hard time figuring out who their leader is! They just don’t know!” describing “infighting” between “‘Hardliners,’ who have been losing BADLY on the battlefield, and the ‘Moderates,’ who are not very moderate at all.”

In a separate interview, he said: “They’re all messed up. They have no idea who their leader is… we took out, really, three levels of leaders.”

As speculation spread, President Masoud Masoud Pezeshkian sought to set the tone in a social media post declaring: “In Iran there are no ‘hardliners’ or ‘moderates.’ We are all Iranians and revolutionaries.”

The message was reposted verbatim by senior officials across the political and military establishment, including judiciary chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, Vice President Mohammad-Reza Aref, senior advisers, and the Supreme National Security Council, underscoring the coordinated nature of the response.

Mohseni-Ejei went further in a separate post, directly attacking Trump and calling the labels “hardliner” and “moderate” “fabricated and hollow terms” borrowed from Western political literature.

The messaging blitz from Tehran followed the collapse of negotiations in Islamabad and reports that parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—who led Tehran’s delegation there—may have stepped down from the negotiating team, fueling speculation over internal disagreements about talks with Washington.

Reports first circulated by Israel’s Channel 12 claimed Ghalibaf resigned following interference by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Other reports suggested he was reprimanded for trying to include Iran’s nuclear program in discussions with the United States.

Hardline lawmaker Mahmoud Nabavian appeared to confirm tensions in a leaked audio recording, saying the team had discussed the nuclear issue “against the Supreme Leader’s position” and calling it a “strategic error.”

Saeed Saeed Jalili, widely rumored to be a possible replacement for Ghalibaf, struck a similar note while avoiding the exact phrasing, emphasizing “the unity of all segments of the nation” under the Supreme Leader.

The Supreme Leader’s official account also weighed in, warning that enemy “media operations” were aimed at undermining national unity and security.

Some analysts see Trump’s comments as deliberate pressure. Reformist journalist Ahmad Zeidabadi argued Trump was trying to “create division and conflict within the structure of the government” to present any eventual deal as “his complete victory.”

Ali Afshari, a US-based political analyst, described the remarks as “psychological warfare aimed at disrupting the cohesion of the opposing side.”

Yet even as officials insist on unity, conflicting signals from Tehran have deepened public uncertainty over negotiations and the future of the war.

Hardline lawmaker Ali Khezrian said the resumption of war was “inevitable” and claimed Iran had halted all communication with Washington.

Despite publicly dismissing reports of Ghalibaf’s resignation, parliament communications chief Iman Shamsaei said no new round of negotiations had been scheduled.

Journalist Saeed Agenji, meanwhile, insisted Ghalibaf still held “the helm of negotiations and domestic management of the country.”

Zeidabadi warned that mixed messaging over negotiations, ceasefire, agreement and even the ultimate goals of the war had left ordinary Iranians confused, risking reinforcing exactly the perception of disarray Tehran is trying to deny.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi was in Islamabad on Saturday, where he met Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and army chief Asim Munir as Pakistan continued efforts to mediate between Tehran and Washington.

A Pakistani source involved in the talks told Reuters that Araghchi conveyed Tehran’s demands and concerns about US positions during the visit. Iranian state media also said he delivered Iran’s response to proposals in a meeting with Munir before leaving Islamabad for Oman and Russia.

Iranian officials had earlier said Araghchi had no plan to meet US officials in Pakistan.

Lake, a journalist at The Free Press and host of the Breaking History podcast, told Eye for Iran that the Islamic Republic is seeking negotiations as a lifeline after major military, economic and political setbacks.

“Their backs are against the wall and these negotiations they hope are going to be a lifeline,” Lake said.

But he argued that any renewed diplomatic track should begin with pressure on Tehran over the Iranian people.

“If I was Vice President Vance, I would say… the first thing I’d say is, you need to turn back on the internet if you’re going to get these financial lifelines. You need to release political prisoners,” Lake said.

He added that Washington should also demand an end to executions.

The remarks come as Iran’s internet blackout has entered its 57th day, according to NetBlocks, with international connectivity still largely severed amid worsening conditions inside the country.

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Lake said the US should recognize that “our best allies are the Iranian people on the ground,” and warned against strikes on civilian infrastructure such as power plants, saying they would hurt ordinary Iranians more than the Islamic Republic.

The diplomatic maneuvering has also unfolded amid signs of deepening disagreement inside Tehran. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the parliament speaker, has stepped down as head of Iran’s negotiating team amid internal disputes, with Saeed Jalili floated as a possible replacement and Araghchi seeking greater control of the talks.

Lake said he believes the fractures inside the Islamic Republic are genuine.

“At the end of the day, with enough pressure, they’re probably going to start turning on each other,” he said.

He argued that the Islamic Republic has lost legitimacy and that Iran’s future will ultimately be decided by Iranians themselves.

“You cannot keep these people down,” Lake said..