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INSIGHT

Hardliners push Hormuz ‘red line’ as US blockade tests Iran’s leverage

Maryam Sinaiee
Maryam Sinaiee

Iran International

Apr 15, 2026, 18:34 GMT+1
People walk across a street in Tehran with an anti-US billboard in the background, April 5, 2026
People walk across a street in Tehran with an anti-US billboard in the background, April 5, 2026

Hardline voices in Tehran are escalating rhetoric around the Strait of Hormuz, calling for transit fees on ships even as a US blockade challenges Iran’s control over the strategic waterway.

They portray control over Hormuz—much like uranium enrichment—as a “red line” that Iranian negotiators must not compromise in any future talks.

Amir-Hossein Sabeti, a member of parliament, recently declared that Iran could soon gain “a third source of income called the Strait of Hormuz.”

Mehdi Mohammadi, a strategic analyst and adviser to the parliament speaker, went further, claiming Iran could earn as much as $800 billion annually from the waterway.

“We have only just discovered this treasure,” he wrote.

Energy analyst Ehsan Hosseini said Iran increasingly sees the strait as its main deterrent—likening it to an “atomic bomb”—and is unwilling to trade this existing leverage for uncertain promises of sanctions relief.

Yet experts and critics say the idea of a “Hormuz toll” is economically unrealistic, legally problematic and potentially damaging to Iran’s long-term interests.

“Some want to take us back, to turn the Strait of Hormuz into a bargaining chip and give it away just to have sanctions lifted,” international affairs expert and university professor Naser Torabi said. “This is a disaster. This means defeat,” he added.

Economic commentator Abdollah Babakhani also warned against inflated expectations.

“Experts have a responsibility to stand against exaggerated narratives—such as claims of $50 to $60 billion in revenue from the Strait of Hormuz—so that unrealistic expectations do not form or persist in society,” he wrote on X.

The United States is enforcing a maritime blockade on vessels entering or leaving Iranian ports, part of a broader effort to pressure Tehran after talks failed to produce a breakthrough.

Shipping data from the firm Kpler shows a sharp drop in traffic through the strait, with only six vessels transiting on April 13 compared with 14 the previous day.

Within Iran, some hardliners initially dismissed the blockade as a bluff. Iran’s top joint military command warned that its armed forces could move to prevent the continuation of trade flows across regional waters if the blockade persists.

Yet more than two days into the blockade, Tehran has yet to take direct military action, as both sides explore diplomatic routes to ending the war.

President Donald Trump said on Wednesday that the Strait of Hormuz would soon be open again to maritime traffic, even as US forces continue enforcing the blockade around Iranian ports.

Some moderates and experts in Tehran have warned that aggressively leveraging the strait could ultimately weaken Iran’s position, especially given that regional producers have invested in pipelines and export routes designed to bypass Hormuz.

Ebrahim Gholamzadeh-Zanganeh, head of the Iran-Kuwait Chamber of Commerce, argued that even if a toll were possible, any financial benefit would pale against the opportunity cost of Iran’s isolation.

“The reality is that our losses from sanctions have been—and continue to be—many times these figures each year,” he said.

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Spotlight

  • Hardliners push Hormuz ‘red line’ as US blockade tests Iran’s leverage
    INSIGHT

    Hardliners push Hormuz ‘red line’ as US blockade tests Iran’s leverage

  • Ideology may be fading in Iran, but not in Kashmir's ‘Mini Iran'
    INSIGHT

    Ideology may be fading in Iran, but not in Kashmir's ‘Mini Iran'

  • War damage amounts to $3,000 per Iranian, with blockade set to add to losses
    INSIGHT

    War damage amounts to $3,000 per Iranian, with blockade set to add to losses

  • Why the $100 billion Hormuz toll revenue is a myth
    ANALYSIS

    Why the $100 billion Hormuz toll revenue is a myth

  • US blockade targets Iran oil boom amid regional disruption
    ANALYSIS

    US blockade targets Iran oil boom amid regional disruption

  • Iran's digital economy battered by prolonged blackout
    INSIGHT

    Iran's digital economy battered by prolonged blackout

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Ideology may be fading in Iran, but not in Kashmir's ‘Mini Iran'

Apr 15, 2026, 15:25 GMT+1
•
Shervin Shahrestani

Fundraising drives across Indian-administered Kashmir have collected nearly $2 million for Iran following the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, highlighting the depth of religious and ideological ties between the region’s Shia community and the Islamic Republic.

The connection runs deep enough that the region has long been nicknamed Irani Sagir (or Mini Iran.)

Across towns and villages, portraits of Khamenei appeared at donation events where residents contributed whatever they could spare: banknotes, gold jewellery and even copper utensils.

A Kashmiri Muslim girl donates a gold ring at an Imambara fund collection centre in Budgam
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A Kashmiri Muslim girl donates a gold ring at an Imambara fund collection centre in Budgam

The collection drives, held in late March in cities including Budgam and Srinagar, allowed proceeds to be wired directly to the Iranian embassy in New Delhi. Iran’s embassy in India has also posted a QR code for donations on X since March 23.

In just one week, nearly ₹18 crore (about $2 million) was collected across Kashmir, excluding amounts deposited directly into the embassy’s account, according to local media reports.

One contribution seen by Iran International was ₹26 lakh (around $28,000).

A cheque written out to Iran's embassy
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A cheque written out to Iran's embassy

The fundraising came weeks after widespread protests erupted across Kashmir following the US-Israeli airstrike that killed Khamenei on Feb. 28.

Demonstrations in Srinagar turned violent in places, leaving at least 12 people injured, including five police officers. Authorities responded with tear gas and batons, shut schools, throttled mobile internet for five days and arrested at least 50 people.

Among the outpouring of grief were calls for revenge from some protesters.“Those who oppress Muslims—we will kill them,” one unnamed demonstrator in Srinagar told Reuters on March 1.

The unrest prompted authorities to investigate several political figures accused of spreading inflammatory content online. Among them was Srinagar MP Aga Syed Ruhullah Mehdi, an influential Shia cleric with a cross-sectarian following.

“Some fools in J&K Police and administration think that by withdrawing/downgrading my security detail and suspending my Facebook account will stop me from calling out their atrocities. It is laughable,” Mehdi wrote on Facebook.

Former Srinagar mayor Junaid Azim Mattu also had his security withdrawn after condemning Khamenei’s killing on X.

A Facebook page affiliated with Mattu has Ali Khamenei as the profile picture
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A Facebook page affiliated with Mattu has Ali Khamenei as the profile picture

Citrinowicz, Danny Citrinowicz, a fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv and former head of the Iran branch in Israeli military intelligence, warned that the donations were a possible indication that a post-Ali Khamenei Islamic Republic, likely dominated by the IRGC, would prove more operationally aggressive, not less.

"Those who think it will stay only at the level of donations are totally mistaken," he said.

For scholars of South Asian Islam, the reactions in Kashmir reflect a longstanding—though often misunderstood—connection between the region and Iran.

Oxford University's Associate Professor Justin Jones
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Oxford University's Associate Professor Justin Jones

Justin Jones, a specialist in modern Islam in South Asia at Oxford University, said that for most Indian Shias the Islamic Republic functions primarily as a political symbol rather than a direct religious authority.

“The actual political thought of Velayat-e Faqih doesn’t cut very deep in much of India,” he said, referencing the Islamic Republic’s central doctrine of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, founded by Ruhollah Khomeini after Iran’s 1979 revolution.

“It’s simply a kind of imaginary of Shia power, which has some psychological effect, but maybe not a political one.”

Kashmir, however, is different.

“Kashmir is one of the places that has been most receptive to Iranian influence,” Jones said, citing both themes of political justice that resonate with local Shia communities and ideological currents linked to Iran’s doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih.

 Javed Beigh, a human rights activist based in Budgam
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Javed Beigh, a human rights activist based in Budgam

“Iran is perceived as the representative of the Muslim world,” human rights activist Javed Beigh told Iran International.

“There was no other Muslim leader perceived as strongly against the United States and its allies as Seyyed Ali Khamenei,” said Beigh, who is a Shia Muslim based in Budgam.

That perception, he added, has also resonated with some Sunni Muslims across the subcontinent, particularly amid Israel’s war in Gaza.

A Kashmiri law student who asked not to be identified described two different responses among younger Shias.

One group, he said, views the Islamic Republic as a political system that must survive — and would find its collapse “almost existentially shattering”. The other sees Iran’s 1979 revolution as a historical process that may endure even if the current regime falls.

“They think of it as something in evolution,” he said. “It might fail temporarily, but they have a strong belief in the possible resurgence and resurrection of the system in the future.”

Simon Wolfgang Fuchs, an associate professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem who studies Shia Islam in South Asia and the Middle East, said the Islamic Republic’s influence in the region extends beyond politics.

Simon Wolfgang Fuchs, Associate Professor at Hebrew University
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Simon Wolfgang Fuchs, Associate Professor at Hebrew University

“For them, Iran is very much a religious landscape—an enchanted place where you have a Shia-run state,” he said.

“The symbolic capital of Iran has not weakened… for South Asian Shia, Iran has been perceived as someone who stands by them and protects them.”

That connection has deepened as Iranian-trained clerics return to South Asia and pilgrims travel through Iran to reach holy sites in Iraq, experiencing the country as part of a broader sacred geography.

The Kashmiri student said many Shias in the region view that geography, stretching from Iran to Iraq, as central to the future of Shia political movements.

“Iran and Iraq are seen to inhabit the symbols of the sacred geography of the Shiite tradition,” he said. “If such a movement is going to be reborn, it must be around that geography—not outside it.”

He estimated that roughly 60 to 70 percent of Kashmiri Shias hold that view: that any future resurgence of the ideology would belong in the Middle East rather than South Asia.

Those ties are reinforced by institutions that operate independently of Tehran.

The Imam Khomeini Memorial Trust, an Iranian-linked organisation active in Kashmir, trains local clerics and funds religious education, according to research by the Middle East Forum.

Al-Mustafa International University, headquartered in Qom and funded directly by Iran’s Supreme Leader, operates affiliated seminaries across India and Pakistan whose graduates return to run religious institutions, according to research by United Against Nuclear Iran.

“Many people, even from my village, are still in Iran — living there, doing business, studying,” Beigh said. “That’s how you actually develop a strong bond between two communities.”

For some security analysts, however, those connections raise concerns about political radicalisation.

Sajid Yousuf Shaha, a lawyer and political analyst in Jammu and Kashmir
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Sajid Yousuf Shaha, a lawyer and political analyst in Jammu and Kashmir

Sajid Yousuf Shah, a political analyst in Jammu and Kashmir with India's ruling Hindu nationalist BJP party, said ideological loyalty to the Islamic Republic runs deep within the region’s Shia community.

“They don’t want modernisation. They don’t want westernisation. They don’t want any regime change in Iran,” he said, arguing that many supporters hope for the Islamic Republic’s survival rather than its replication elsewhere.

Abhinav Pandya, CEO of the Usanas Foundation, a geopolitical think tank in India, said Tehran’s ideological outreach has fostered what he described as “extraterritorial loyalties”.

Abhinav Pandya of the Usanas Foundation
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Abhinav Pandya of the Usanas Foundation

“Increasingly, the Shia Muslims in India have come under the influence of the Iranian regime,” he said. “That is very problematic.”

Pandya also pointed to contacts between Iran-aligned militant groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah and anti-India militant networks in the region, citing Indian media reports linking such groups to militant activity in Kashmir.

It was a similar concern voiced by Citrinowicz, who said Iran’s student and religious networks in India could potentially serve as recruitment channels.

Danny Citrinowicz, a fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv
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Danny Citrinowicz, a fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv

“The platform they are able to build—through control of religious centres, through academia, through social media—has transformed these places into fertile ground for recruitment,” he said.

Citrinowicz points to the Islamic Republic’s history of retaliating globally following the killing of its senior figures, with plots disrupted across Africa, Europe and Asia after the assassinations of Qasem Soleimani and Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in 2020.

"Nobody should be surprised if you'll see in the next couple of weeks or months (Iran) again tries to do something against India.”

Indian officials familiar with the issue, however, say such fears may be overstated.

A former official at India’s National Security Council Secretariat said the solidarity expressed after Khamenei’s killing reflected religious sentiment more than political mobilisation.

“The reverence is more on the religious side than on a struggle side,” he said, describing the protests as a form of collective mourning typical of Shia communities.

While authorities were monitoring the donation drives, he said they did not consider them significant enough to warrant intervention. The donations themselves also reveal a more complex picture.

Local media reported that some Hindu donors sympathetic to Iran’s historical ties with the subcontinent also contributed to the fundraising drive.

Fabrizio Speziale, Professor at CEIAS
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Fabrizio Speziale, Professor at CEIAS

Fabrizio Speziale, a Professor of Indo-Persian history at the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences in Paris, said the cultural connections between Iran and South Asia have long crossed religious boundaries.

Persian culture historically served as a shared intellectual language across the region, linking Sunni, Shia, Hindu and even European scholars.

That legacy, he said, differs significantly from the modern political ideology of Velayat-e Faqih.

For Beigh, however, the bond between Kashmir’s Shia community and Iran transcends politics. “We have more than 90 percent of things we do in our daily lives similar to what you do in Iran,” he said.

Even if the Islamic Republic were to collapse, he believes the connection would endure. “They will have to embrace any change in Iran,” he said. “But the bond will remain.”

War damage amounts to $3,000 per Iranian, with blockade set to add to losses

Apr 14, 2026, 20:51 GMT+1
•
Hooman Abedi

War damage to Iran’s economy has reached $270 billion in 40 days, equivalent to roughly $3,000 per person, according to official figures, with losses expected to grow as trade disruptions deepen under a US blockade of Iranian ports.

Fatemeh Mohajerani, the spokesperson for the Iranian government, said on Tuesday losses from the US-Israeli military campaign are estimated at around $270 billion.

The New York Times, citing three Iranian officials and two economists, reported that early estimates broadly align with that figure, placing the damage at roughly $300 billion or higher.

Preliminary estimates by the US-based think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies also suggest Iran absorbed roughly $150–$300 billion in economic damage.

Using a population of about 92 million, the lower estimate of $150 billion translates to roughly $1,600 per person, rising to nearly $3,250 per person under the higher estimate.

These figures reflect national wealth lost through destruction, halted production and disrupted trade.

Iran’s central bank has warned President Masoud Pezeshkian that rebuilding the country’s war-damaged economy could take more than a decade, sources familiar with internal deliberations told Iran International.

In a stark assessment delivered to the president in recent days, senior economic officials said the damage inflicted during the 40-day war with the United States and Israel—combined with Iran’s already fragile economic situation—could take up to 12 years to repair.

Industrial sectors bear largest losses

Petrochemicals account for the largest share of damage. Iran’s petrochemical sector, with annual sales of $29.1 billion, has seen about 85% of export capacity disrupted following strikes on major hubs including Mahshahr and South Pars. Estimated losses range from $30 billion to $50 billion.

Energy infrastructure has also been heavily affected. Refineries, storage depots and gas facilities have been struck, weakening a sector that generated about $78 billion in exports in 2024. Losses are estimated at $15 billion to $25 billion.

Explosion at Iran's Mahshahr petrochemical complex during US-Israeli strikes
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Explosion at Iran's Mahshahr petrochemical complex during US-Israeli strikes

Steel production, which underpins both industrial output and reconstruction, has been severely reduced, with about 70% of capacity disrupted. Losses are estimated at $5 billion to $10 billion.

Beyond physical losses, the war has triggered a sharp contraction in output.

Experts estimated a decline of more than 10% in GDP, equivalent to $34 billion to $44 billion in lost economic activity, affecting an economy that was already under strain before the conflict.

Beyond physical damage, policy-driven disruptions have compounded the losses.

Internet shutdown

A nationwide internet blackout beginning Feb. 28 has imposed additional costs.

Direct losses are estimated at $37 million to $42 million per day, totaling $1.5 billion to $2.5 billion over more than five weeks.

  • Iran's digital economy battered by prolonged blackout

    Iran's digital economy battered by prolonged blackout

Afshin Kolahi, a member of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce, said Monday indirect losses could raise the daily figure to $70 million to $80 million due to disruption to online businesses.

Online sales fell by about 80% during the shutdown, while the Tehran Stock Exchange lost 450,000 points within four days.

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The shutdown is affecting multiple layers of the economy simultaneously, according to economic analyst Masoumeh Taherkhani.

“The Iranian economy is damaged at three levels by internet disruption, starting with the digital core, which employs between four and five million people,” Taherkhani told Iran International. “Then the platform layer collapses, and finally the broader economy is affected in a way that spreads across production and services.”

Taherkhani said the combined effect leads to widespread job losses. “When the economy is fully stagnant, the outcome is unemployment for workers, and that is not something that can easily be reversed,” she said.

Trade disruption and self-inflicted losses

Disruptions linked to the Strait of Hormuz have added further pressure, with estimated losses of $5 billion to $15 billion.

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The restrictions have affected imports of essential goods and weakened non-oil exports, contributing to supply chain disruptions across the economy.

A US naval blockade targeting Iran’s maritime trade routes is expected to deepen losses.

Sanctions strategist and former US Treasury official Miad Maleki estimated that cutting off seaborne trade could eliminate about $435 million in daily economic activity, equivalent to roughly $13 billion per month.

  • What the US naval blockade would mean for Iran’s economy

    What the US naval blockade would mean for Iran’s economy

Iran relies on the Persian Gulf for more than 90% of its trade, leaving it highly exposed to sustained disruption.

Oil exports of about 1.5 million barrels per day – generating roughly $139 million daily – could be halted almost entirely, removing the country’s main source of foreign currency.

What the losses could have funded

The scale of damage corresponds to investment levels that could have reshaped core sectors of the economy.

A large combined-cycle power plant with capacity of around 1,000 to 1,500 megawatts typically costs between $600 million and $1 billion to build, depending on technology and fuel infrastructure.

At the lower estimate of $150 billion in losses, Iran could have financed roughly 150 to 250 such plants. At the upper estimate of $300 billion, that rises to between 300 and 500 plants, enough to eliminate electricity shortages and significantly expand export capacity.

In housing, average construction costs for a modest apartment unit range between $30,000 and $50,000. With $150 billion, between 3 million and 5 million housing units could have been built. At $300 billion, that increases to roughly 6 million to 10 million units, enough to address shortages across major urban areas.

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High-speed rail construction typically costs between $20 million and $40 million per kilometer. The lower estimate of losses could have funded approximately 3,750 to 7,500 kilometers of rail, while the higher estimate could support up to 15,000 kilometers, connecting major cities nationwide.

A modern hospital costs between $200 million and $500 million to construct and equip. The lower-end losses could have built 300 to 750 hospitals, while the higher estimate could fund up to 1,500 facilities, expanding healthcare access across the country.

What it means for individual Iranians

The per capita loss of up to $3,250 represents a substantial share of annual income for many households.

With average monthly earnings between $150 and $200, an individual earns roughly $1,800 to $2,400 per year, meaning a $3,250 equivalent exceeds a full year of income for many citizens.

If such an amount were available, it could cover between 12 and 20 months of living expenses for an average worker. Families could use it toward housing costs, including down payments or completing home purchases in smaller cities.

Small businesses could be launched with startup capital of $2,000 to $5,000, enabling self-employment in sectors such as retail, services or online commerce. Households could also afford private healthcare, education or relocation costs that are otherwise beyond reach.

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Even the lower estimate per person represents several months of income, providing a buffer against inflation, job loss or unexpected expenses.

The overall range reflects damage already incurred, with additional losses building as trade, production and financial flows remain disrupted.

At up to $3,250 per person and rising, the economic toll underscores the scale of damage to Iran’s productive capacity, with long-term implications for recovery and growth.

Iran negotiators ordered to return after internal rift over Islamabad talks

Apr 14, 2026, 18:57 GMT+1

Sharp disagreements among members of Iran’s negotiating team led them to abandon US talks in Islamabad and return to Tehran on April 11 following an order from Iran's top security official, sources familiar with the deliberations told Iran International.

The sources said that during Friday’s negotiations with the United States, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi showed signs of flexibility in some of his positions, particularly regarding reducing or halting financial and military support for the so-called Axis of Resistance, including Lebanon’s Hezbollah.

According to the sources, this approach drew a strong reaction from Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, in Tehran.

The sources said Zolghadr, who was briefed on the talks, submitted a report to the leadership and senior IRGC commanders, which fueled anger at the highest levels. The report reportedly cited “deviation from the delegation’s mandate” and engagement in discussions beyond the leadership’s directives.

Following consultations at the leadership level, and with the involvement of Hossein Taeb, an advisor to the supreme leader, an order was issued on Saturday afternoon for the delegation’s immediate return to Tehran, the sources said.

Reports of similar internal rifts had surfaced earlier. On March 28, accounts emerged of serious disagreements between President Masoud Pezeshkian and IRGC Chief-Commander Ahmad Vahidi.

Informed sources told Iran International that the rifts stemmed from disagreements over the conduct of the war and its impact on livelihoods and the wider economy.

Three days later, reports indicated Pezeshkian was dissatisfied with being in a “complete political deadlock” and had even lost authority over appointing officials killed during the war.

According to those reports, Vahidi had said that due to wartime conditions, all key managerial positions should be directly controlled by the IRGC until further notice.

Despite the diverse composition of Iran’s negotiating delegation in Islamabad, reports suggest representatives aligned with the IRGC held significant influence.

Iran’s insistence on continuing its nuclear program and maintaining control over the Strait of Hormuz ultimately contributed to the failure of the Islamabad talks, according to reports.

Following the breakdown, the United States announced a naval blockade targeting Iran’s southern ports, with US Central Command saying from Monday morning it would prevent ships from entering or leaving Iranian ports. The blockade was implemented as scheduled.

Despite the failure of the first round of talks, Pakistan said on Monday that consultations with both sides were ongoing and another round of talks remained possible.

US President Donald Trump also told the New York Post on Tuesday that talks with Iran “could resume within two days” in Pakistan.

Sources had earlier told Reuters that despite the apparent deadlock, diplomatic channels remain open, with an Iranian embassy official in Pakistan saying the next round of talks could take place later this week or early next week.

Why the $100 billion Hormuz toll revenue is a myth

Apr 14, 2026, 18:24 GMT+1
•
Umud Shokri

The idea that Iran could generate tens of billions of dollars annually by charging ships to pass through the Strait of Hormuz has gained traction in media commentary, but the claim does not withstand scrutiny.

Estimates circulating in public debate frequently suggest Iran could earn $40–100 billion annually by imposing transit fees on vessels using the strait, effectively turning the country into a “$100 billion gatekeeper” of global energy flows.

Yet a closer look at shipping volumes, pricing norms and international law suggests the potential revenues would likely be closer to $1–2 billion a year, even under optimistic assumptions.

According to the US Energy Information Administration, nearly 21 million barrels of oil per day passed through the strait in early 2025—around 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption and roughly a quarter of seaborne oil trade. About 20% of global LNG trade, largely from Qatar, also transits the waterway.

With petroleum cargo alone worth more than $500 billion annually, it is easy to see why the toll narrative is appealing.

Simple arithmetic of multiplying a hypothetical transit fee by daily vessel traffic quickly produces headline-grabbing estimates of tens of billions of dollars. But those calculations overlook how maritime transit actually works.

Legal and practical limits

Unlike the Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz is a natural waterway, not an engineered passage requiring dredging, infrastructure and navigation services.

The canal charges substantial transit fees partly because it is an artificial route requiring constant maintenance. Those fees typically range from about $200,000 to $700,000 per vessel.

Natural straits such as Hormuz operate under the transit passage regime established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which prohibits charging vessels simply for passage and requires non-discriminatory treatment.

Although Iran has not formally ratified the convention, these principles are widely recognized as customary international law. Oman, which shares jurisdiction over the strait and has ratified the treaty, has shown little willingness to support aggressive tolling policies.

Any unilateral attempt to impose large transit fees would likely trigger legal challenges and opposition from maritime powers and major energy importers.

The math behind the myth

Even ignoring legal constraints, realistic pricing benchmarks produce far smaller revenue estimates.

Applying Suez-style fee levels to Hormuz traffic dramatically reduces the numbers. Pre-conflict flows included roughly 10 very large crude carriers per day, alongside LNG and product tankers.

Using comparable Suez pricing (roughly $535,000 per tanker), and accounting for Oman’s jurisdictional share, Iran’s portion would likely amount to around $1.5 billion annually under ideal conditions.

And even that estimate assumes stable traffic, full compliance and minimal enforcement costs—conditions unlikely to hold if Tehran attempted to impose tariffs unilaterally.

In practice, traffic would likely fall as ships sought alternative routes or bypass pipelines such as Saudi Arabia’s East–West pipeline.

Geopolitical reality

The geopolitical constraints are equally significant.

The Strait of Hormuz is a critical energy lifeline for major economies including China, India, Japan and European states. Countries heavily dependent on Middle East energy supplies would be unlikely to accept large additional costs imposed unilaterally.

History offers a clear precedent. During the 1980s Tanker War, attacks on Persian Gulf shipping triggered international military intervention to secure maritime flows. Similar dynamics would likely emerge if transit fees were imposed on a large scale.

For Iran itself, the economic logic is also questionable. The country already struggles to monetize its oil exports because of sanctions and financial restrictions. Attempting to impose transit tariffs would likely intensify geopolitical pressure and reduce shipping volumes, offsetting much of the potential revenue.

The danger of the narrative

The biggest risk lies not in the policy itself but in the narrative surrounding it.

Inflated revenue estimates exaggerate Iran’s potential leverage over global energy markets. For Tehran, they may encourage overconfidence in the economic value of coercive maritime policies.

For external actors, they risk inflating the perceived threat and encouraging responses based on exaggerated assumptions.

The strategic value of the Strait of Hormuz lies not in its potential as a revenue-generating toll system, but in its role as a stable transit corridor for global energy flows.

The widely cited estimates are not supported by legal precedent, market behavior or geopolitical realities.

The “$100 billion gatekeeper” is not a viable strategy. It is a catchy headline for an economic illusion.

US blockade targets Iran oil boom amid regional disruption

Apr 14, 2026, 15:55 GMT+1
•
Dalga Khatinoglu

The United States moved to impose a naval blockade on Iran just as the country’s oil exports were surging to their highest levels in years, underscoring Washington’s effort to halt a wartime boom in Tehran’s energy revenues.

The move followed the collapse of negotiations in Pakistan and comes amid a war that has disrupted much of the Persian Gulf’s energy trade.

Since the launch of joint military operations by Israel and the United States, Iran has effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz. Even after the April 8 ceasefire, maritime traffic through the strategic waterway has yet to recover.

Data from the International Energy Agency show exports from Persian Gulf states have fallen sharply during the conflict, with more than 170 million barrels of their oil stranded in tankers anchored across the region, according to Kepler data.

Iran exports rise as others fall

At the same time, shipping data point to a striking countertrend: rising Iranian oil exports.

Despite the conflict, Iran has increased its daily oil loadings and exports to around 2 million barrels over the past three months.

China has raised its purchases of Iranian crude by more than 300,000 barrels per day, bringing total imports close to 1.6 million barrels daily. India, which halted Iranian oil imports in 2019, has also resumed purchases, receiving at least 2 million barrels this month.

Tehran has also opened discussions with Singapore, Taiwan, Japan and other Asian importers to expand its market share.

Reuters has reported that Iranian crude has recently been sold to some Chinese buyers at prices even higher than the Brent benchmark—an unusual development for a country that typically sells at a discount due to sanctions.

Windfall revenues

The World Bank estimates the economies of Kuwait, Qatar and Iraq, whose oil and LNG exports have been severely disrupted, could contract by between 5 and 9 percent this year.

Iran, by contrast, appears to be benefiting from both increased exports and a roughly 40 percent rise in global oil prices during the war.

Tehran has also begun collecting ad hoc transit fees from vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Ships are required to register with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and transit near Iranian islands.

Reports suggest Iran is charging up to $2 million per vessel. Under normal conditions, roughly 150 ships pass through the strait each day.

Blockade seeks to cut revenue

US President Donald Trump announced the naval blockade in an effort to halt Iranian oil exports while warning that vessels paying transit fees to Iran could face seizure.

Yet Iran appears to have prepared for disruption. Kpler estimates Tehran had already stockpiled roughly 200 million barrels of crude in Asian waters before the conflict began in late February, with an additional 23 million barrels stored in the Sea of Oman.

Those reserves could allow Iran to continue supplying customers for months even without new shipments.

Although Washington has threatened sanctions against buyers of Iranian oil, it remains unclear whether China—effectively Tehran’s main customer since 2019—will comply.

The conflict is also raising wider maritime risks across the region.

Iran has attacked around 20 vessels in its southern waters over the past 50 days, while incidents are spreading beyond the Gulf.

The UK Maritime Trade Operations agency reported on April 12 that armed individuals in a small boat attempted to approach a vessel in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, another vital energy chokepoint handling roughly 9.3 million barrels of oil and petroleum products each day.

Whether the US blockade will succeed in curbing Iran’s export surge—or further deepen disruption across global energy markets—remains uncertain.