Iran analyst
A 12-day war with Israel has ushered Iran into a new phase where crisis is no longer episodic but structural—an unstable order held together by instability itself.
Though short-lived, the war inflicted deep symbolic and political damage on Tehran.
Strikes on strategic infrastructure, the killing of top commanders and damage to air defense systems raised serious doubts about the Islamic Republic’s capacity to provide security.
Far from healing old wounds, the war exposed and deepened the theocracy’s core weaknesses.
From water and power shortages to currency volatility, from political gridlock to widening social divides, nearly every facet of life in Iran bears the mark of dysfunction.
Instability is now normalized. It’s not the exception but the constant.
The new normal
Even before the war, Iran faced a web of interlocking crises: economic collapse, institutional decay, mass emigration, widespread social discontent, and deep political distrust.
Some political actors believed tactical flexibility or resource redistribution might restore order. Others foresaw collapse as inevitable. Both camps, in different ways, assumed that transformation—whether internal or external—was still possible.
The war has shifted that assumption.
Iran’s ruling establishment no longer appears capable of restoring legitimacy or reorganizing itself, but viable alternatives also seem more fractured than ever.
The opposition is scattered, the political class adrift, and grassroots movements are fragmented and organizationally thin.
Much of society is caught in a suspended state: disillusioned but not mobilized, angry but exhausted.
The Islamic Republic has tightened control—erecting checkpoints, increasing Revolutionary Guards and Basij presence and policing public spaces.
The message is blunt: We are still here. But this is not stability born of legitimacy. It is the visibility of power imposed on restless cities.
Today’s urban order rests not on consent, but on continuous police presence.
A collapsing narrative
The 12-day war exposed the hollowness of official narratives: deterrence, security and regional authority no longer carry weight.
Iran’s vulnerability wasn’t just military. It was discursive. The state’s security narrative took a direct hit.
Worse, the war ended without a lasting peace or credible guarantee against future conflict. Peace itself has become unstable. It’s more of an anxious interlude, not a resolution.
With explosions and air defense activity continuing in multiple regions, many expect a new, possibly more intense, confrontation.
Living With Crisis
The long-held notion that the Islamic Republic feeds on crisis is no longer sufficient.
In the past, crises were instrumental—tactics to manage society and consolidate power. Today, crisis is not just a means of rule but the system’s very foundation.
Crises are no longer resolved; they are extended, normalized, and embedded into daily life. The system doesn’t merely survive crisis—it is sustained by it.
This condition has been made possible by a combination of factors: the absence of a unifying alternative, the suppression of public discourse, the fragmentation of dissent, and the systematic blocking of political imagination.
The state has succeeded in minimizing mobilization through control—but it offers no vision for legitimacy in return.
Power has become form without content—a hollow repetition of authority sustained by imposed hopelessness.
Yet this persistence is not stability.
Chronic instability may appear contained—thanks to force and habituation—but the cracks are widening. The theocracy is more detached than ever from the economic, social and institutional foundations that once upheld it.
The drift into slow, grinding dysfunction leaves the country vulnerable to sudden shocks: social uprisings in neglected regions, systemic failures in water, health, or energy, or collective protests triggered by seemingly small sparks.
The Islamic Republic may still be standing—but the ground beneath it has never been shakier.
“The nuclear issue, uranium enrichment, and human rights are just excuses,” Khamenei said during a ceremony marking the 40th day after the deaths of Iranian military commanders and scientists killed during a recent 12-day conflict with Israel.
“Their real problem is Iran’s religion, knowledge, and national unity under the banner of Islam and the Quran.”
US President Donald Trump on Sunday expressed surprise at Tehran’s continued insistence on uranium enrichment despite last month’s American airstrikes on its nuclear facilities, vowing renewed strikes if Iran restarts nuclear work.
Speaking at the Imam Khomeini Hosseiniyeh at his residence in Tehran on Tuesday, Khamenei addressed families of the deceased and government officials.
“The world has now seen the full capability of the Islamic Republic up close,” he said. “These events are not new for us. For 46 years, we have resisted coups, wars, political unrest, and all types of plots.”
Khamenei added that Iran would not abandon its twin foundations of “religion and knowledge” despite mounting international pressure.
“With God’s help, we will continue to take great strides in strengthening our faith and deepening our scientific achievements,” he said. “To the dismay of our enemies, we will elevate Iran to the height of progress and pride.”
Iran’s nuclear program has long been a flashpoint in its relations with the West, with the US and European powers accusing Tehran of seeking to develop nuclear weapons. Iran denies the accusation, saying its nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes.
In a wide-ranging interview with the reformist outlet Didar News, Gholam Ali Jafarzadeh Imanabadi said Iran’s security establishment had failed in its most basic duty—protecting lives—despite massive budgets and broad powers.
“Where were our intelligence agencies with all their hefty budgets? How did they fail to detect the spies?” he asked. “Commanders and nuclear scientists were murdered in their own bedrooms. The intelligence community must be held accountable.”
A war veteran and former MP for Rasht, Imanabadi has long used a wheelchair since being wounded in the Iran–Iraq war. Though no longer in office, he remains known for his blunt political style and ties to moderate factions.
Imanabadi, who was barred for seeking re-election by hardliner-dominated establishment, mused that security forces were totally penetrated by Israel's spy agency.
"A group of Mossad spies are looking for Mossad spies among Mossad spies."
Intel collapse, state silence
Imanabadi singled out the Intelligence Ministry and the intelligence apparatus of the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), criticizing both for failing to anticipate the Israeli attack despite weeks of tension.
“I felt insulted when the head of IRGC Intelligence and four of his deputies were killed,” he said. “I expected resignations or dismissals after these disasters.”
He went on to mock the government’s surveillance priorities.
“We are lost. We have no idea where we’re headed,” he said. “The intelligence forces were busy arresting dog walkers and those without hijab. If they’re incompetent, they should step down.”
Despite mounting internal and external threats, Iran continues to dedicate substantial resources to controlling the private behavior and public expression of its citizens.
Weak president, muted parliament
While the interview marked his harshest critique of Iran’s intelligence failures, Imanabadi also attacked the broader ruling system.
“Up to the night before the war, top officials—including Pezeshkian and military commanders—insisted there would be no war. They owe the public an explanation but refuse to speak,” he said.
“(Pezeshkian) has had absolutely no achievements in his first year in office. He lacks both the will and a plan to implement any change.”
Turning to the legislature, he asked: “Why hasn’t the Majles impeached the minister of intelligence? We no longer have a functioning parliament in Iran.”
‘Change course’
Israel’s unrelenting strikes on Iran not only exposed deep cracks in the state’s command and control structures but also disrupted the official narrative. More voices can now be heard challenging an embattled establishment.
A fundamental shift in tone is required to make up for past mistakes, Imanabadi suggested.
“Enemies are bad. Critics are good. During the 12-day war, it was the people—including critics and opposition figures—who passed the test. Only the officials failed.”
He cited the renewed prison sentence of veteran activist Mostafa Tajzadeh as a sign that the government was “slapping charges” on its critics instead of thanking them.
“They proved that people cannot rely on them,” he said.