Iran analyst
The threat of war looming over Iran by President Trump’s ultimatum to make a nuclear deal or face attack may be a blessing in disguise for rulers in Tehran as they seek to manage growing popular discontent.
Iranian officials have repeatedly rejected negotiations with the United States under terms set by Donald Trump, doubling down on Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's hardline stance.
Questioning the point of talks with a "deal-breaking" US president, Khamenei on Monday nonchalantly dismissed the consequences of shunning Washington.
"The United States is threatening militarization,” Khamenei said on the day his foreign ministry finally confirmed receiving a personal letter from Trump to Khamenei. “War is not a one-sided blow. Iran is capable of retaliating and will certainly do so,” he added.
War, once a distant threat, now looks a distinct possibility. It should concern those in power Tehran—and it perhaps does. But it may serve them as an instrument to deter adversaries and to enforce control at home.
War as a mechanism for control
Looking at Iran’s official outlets, the refrain of war is omnipresent. Military figures dominate state media and security-focused language overshadows other narratives.
This change of tone and substance—transmitted mainly inside Iran—appears to be not just a response to foreign threats, but a calculated strategy to unify and subdue the populace, forcing societal alignment by amplifying fears of conflict.
And this approach is driven by insecurity as much as intent.
Behzad Nabavi, a former minister and veteran lawmaker of the Reform camp, said recently that a wartime atmosphere could foster national solidarity, suggesting that even moderates long-shunned from power circles see fear as a unifying force.
Meanwhile, those in power have intensified the crackdown on the internet, branding the free flow of information a “cognitive war.” The sentiment was best summed up recently by Iran’s national police chief Ahmadreza Radan.
“Back then, we were encircled in the Komeil trench,” he said, invoking memories of the eight-year war with Iraq in the 1980s. “Today, we are surrounded in virtual trenches. If we’re not fighters now, we’ll surely retreat and surrender the homeland."
War as a gambit for survival
The Islamic Republic faces multiple challenges of significant severity: an ailing economy, environmental collapse, budget shortfalls, and entrenched corruption. Public trust has eroded, with sporadic protests signaling discontent.
Fearing another “sedition”—a term used to label past protests and justify their brutal suppression—officials now see war’s shadow as a lifeline.
The theocracy has a proven record of internet blackouts, arbitrary arrests and harsher suppression of dissent in general. It can be expected to do more in a state of inflated external threats, dishing out labels of “subversion” and “enemy collaboration.”
This isn’t mere opportunism—it’s a high-stakes gamble.
Iranians did rally during the war with Iraq, especially the early years. But that was forty-odd years ago. And Khamenei is no Khomeini, the first supreme leader who had all but universal following when he called for Iran’s monarchy to be replaced by an Islamic Republic.
Today, the system, as Khamenei likes to call it, is all but universally loathed. While he clings to power by keeping loyal forces primed and its critics silenced, millions of ordinary Iranians face an unrelenting battle of survival.
Stoking war fears and siege mentality to stifle unrest may work for the supreme leader. Or it could backfire spectacularly and save Trump a war he clearly does not want.
War as a lever for defense and deterrence
The Islamic Republic frames conflict as both a defensive necessity and a means to intimidate foes. Israel and Arab states astride the Persian Gulf have often borne the brunt of this rhetoric.
A senior commander of the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) warned recently that an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would spark “a fire in the region that cannot be contained.” Another senior IRGC figure made it clearer: "True Promise 3 will take place at the right moment, destroying Israel and leveling Tel Aviv and Haifa.”
These threats are backed by action. Iran has nearly doubled its military exercises since October 2024, according to the Financial Times, with drills concentrated near the Natanz nuclear facility and the Strait of Hormuz.
This posturing may not be as effective in deterring the US or Israel but does help shape domestic perceptions amid worsening economic and social crises.
The decision of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) not to enforce the controversial law could not have been made without the approval of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who has avoided discussing the issue in his speeches for months.
Enforcing the morality legislation—which imposes severe penalties, including heavy fines and prison sentences on women who violate strict hijab rules, as well as businesses that fail to comply—could be highly provocative under current conditions, potentially sparking widespread anti-government protests.
Internal clash over the enforcement of the hijab law
Mahmoud Nabavian, a senior member of the hardline Paydari (Steadfastness) Party and the Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, is facing backlash from his allies after condemning recent protests led by radical elements. His remarks have surprised many within his faction, where he was long regarded as a key figure and a strict enforcer of their agenda.
Despite playing a key role in drafting the hijab legislation, Nabavian now argues that preserving the Islamic Republic must take precedence over enforcing the law—implicitly acknowledging the risk of unrest. “If implementing the hijab law creates tensions and weakens the system, it should automatically be set aside,” he said last week.
According to the Islamic Republic’s founder, Ruhollah Khomeini, preserving the system must take “utmost priority,” even if it requires temporarily setting aside religious obligations like prayer and fasting. By that logic, hijab would be no exception—a stance authorities now seem compelled to accept, much to the frustration of the hardline political and religious establishment.
Concerns over national stability
Nabavian justified the security council’s suspension of the hijab law by pointing to major geopolitical developments—the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and Israel’s assassination of Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah. He argued that enforcing the law at this time could provide foreign adversaries with an opportunity to destabilize Iran.
“Given the country’s and the region’s current conditions, especially the situation in Yemen, and the need for national unity, we must all support the implementation of the law but polarizing the society, calling for illegal gatherings, and staging street protests—no matter the faction—are against the country’s interests,” Nabavian warned in an X post on Sunday. His remarks came after the US military launched massive airstrikes against Iran-aligned Houthi rebels in Yemen on Saturday.
Hasan Soleimani, editor-in-chief of the hardline Mashregh News, a publication believed to be linked to the Revolutionary Guards Intelligence Organization (SAS), defended Nabavian’s position. In an X post, he accused radical hardliners of using the hijab issue as a pretext to disrupt the country’s stability. He went further, comparing them to the Forqan group—an Islamist faction that carried out assassinations against officials of the newly established Islamic Republic, including a failed attempt on Khamenei’s life in 1981.
Highlighting defiance of Khamenei’s decisions
Nabavian also accused ultra-hardliners—whom he refers to as “super-revolutionaries” or “radicals”—of openly defying Khamenei, citing their opposition to Covid vaccination. “I won’t even mention the disgraceful remarks they made [about Khamenei’s own vaccination],” he said last week. He also linked their defiance to more recent criticism over Iran’s two-month delay in 2024 before retaliating against Israel’s attack on Iranian military facilities—a decision ultimately made by Khamenei.
Similarly, if Khamenei decides to permit direct talks with the Trump administration in the coming weeks or months, ultra-hardliners’ reaction could pose a significant challenge. He ruled out the possibility of such talks in a recent speech and has so far not acknowledged the US President’s letter to him. Former President Hassan Rouhani suggested a few days ago that Khamenei’s stance could change depending on circumstances, as it did in 2013 when he allowed secret talks with the US.
Warnings of a fragile political climate
Citing the hardliners' protests in Mashhad against moderate conservative Hassan Rouhani’s government on December 28, 2017, some media outlets and analysts have warned that demonstrations organized by “super-revolutionaries” could similarly spiral out of control.
The Mashhad protests quickly spread nationwide, with demonstrators in several cities chanting against Khamenei. The weeklong unrest resulted in at least 25 deaths and thousands of arrests.
However, the current situation is fundamentally different from 2017, an article in the reformist Etemad daily warned on Sunday. It pointed to Trump's presence in the White House and heightened regional tensions, citing a statement from the Supreme National Security Council Secretariat that cautioned any provocation or political polarization could cause irreparable damage to the country.
Government Spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani said on Sunday that Zarif's resignation, announced amid controversy over his children's US citizenship, has not been officially accepted, emphasizing that his appointment has not been revoked, nor has a replacement been named.
"From the government's perspective, Zarif remains the Strategic Affairs Vice-President," Mohajerani said. "Dr. Zarif's vice presidency remains valid, though he is absent from government meetings."
Zarif announced his resignation earlier this month, citing pressure from the Judiciary and a desire to "prevent further pressure on the government" after criticism from hardliners who cited a 2022 law banning officials with dual citizenship or close relatives with dual citizenship from holding sensitive positions.
Mohajerani also addressed concerns about other officials with dual citizenship. "If the law is to be enforced, it must apply uniformly across all branches of government," she added.
Mohajerani revealed that Zarif had met with President Masoud Pezeshkian after submitting his resignation, where she said they discussed "Zarif's capabilities, impact, and unique experiences".
Though she said "the text he released indicated a kind of resignation", she went on to say: “The Vice-President for Strategic Affairs resigned from his position to prevent harm to the President, the government, and the country."
Zarif's resignation sparked sharp political reactions in Iran, with hardliners celebrating his exit and reformists warning of its broader implications.
His departure came less than four weeks after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reaffirmed his opposition to negotiations with the United States, a stance that undermined Zarif’s role in the government.
It was widely perceived that Zarif joined the Pezeshkian administration to help negotiate another nuclear deal with world powers similar to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was scrapped by Donald Trump during his first term in office.
However, Khamenei, the country's ultimate decision-maker, rejected the idea of talks with Trump last month.
Reformist commentators have warned that Zarif’s resignation, coming shortly after the impeachment of Economy Minister Abdolnaser Hemmati, signals growing instability within Pezeshkian’s administration.
