Iran International
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected US President Donald Trump’s overture for a deal with Tehran even before opening Trump’s letter. Still, like commentators and diplomats in Iran and abroad, he was likely aware of its contents.
Around the same time Khamenei was speaking in Tehran on March 12, Iranian and Russian sources revealed that Trump’s proposal was not limited to the nuclear issue, as Iran had expected, but also included discussions on Iran’s regional proxy groups.
While Iranians traditionally view negotiations as a lengthy process of bargaining, much like haggling over a carpet in the bazaar, Trump’s approach appears more like a spring storm—starting with thunder and lightning, followed by a brief but intense downpour, before quickly subsiding into calm.
Former Iranian diplomat Kourosh Ahmadi, in an article in Shargh newspaper, wrote that Khamenei’s earlier refusal to engage with the United States—widely interpreted as a rejection of negotiations—was not fundamentally different from remarks by Iran’s envoy in New York, Saeed Iravani. Iravani stated that "if negotiations are meant to address concerns about the militarization of Iran’s nuclear program, such talks are possible."
Ahmadi added that Iravani’s remarks show a change and indicate a new development in Iran’s position. This comes while Khamenei had stressed that negotiation over “Iran’s defense capabilities, its international power and the range of its missiles and so on will certainly not be accepted."
Nonetheless, the former diplomat noted that “the nuclear issue is by far Trump’s most important, and possibly his only, priority” when it comes to Iran. Ahmadi argued that the United States recognizes Iran’s regional proxies have been significantly weakened and that restoring their previous strength is no longer feasible. Additionally, he pointed out that both Iran’s neighbors and Washington understand that Iran’s missiles have a limited range and that its regional presence is largely justified by the absence of a conventional air force.
In another development, centrist politician Ezzatollah Yousefian Molla told the conservative Nameh News website that "Trump will gradually retreat from his current positions." He added that Iran has no issue with logical negotiations and realistic demands but emphasized, "If the other side intends to impose its views, that can no longer be called negotiation."
Several other politicians and commentators also stated last week that most of Trump’s threats are mere "bluffs." Yousefian Molla argued that Trump will walk back his more extreme proposals, recognizing that preventing war serves everyone's interests. He also claimed that "Trump understands that engaging in an all-out war is not in the United States’ interest, as Iran would respond forcefully to any military conflict."
However, Iranian academic Kiumars Yazdanpanah warned that "both Iranian and US officials have adopted increasingly confrontational stances, making the possibility of an actual conflict quite real. At this moment, conflict appears to be the most likely outcome."
Yazdanpanah outlined three possible scenarios for the near future. First, he suggested there could be limited military exchanges between Iran and the United States, with one or two swift retaliatory actions. The second scenario, he said, is a temporary state of war, in which the US launches extensive military strikes against Iran while simultaneously working to isolate the country, incite unrest, and exploit geopolitical tensions. The third possibility, according to Yazdanpanah, is that the current standoff—whether through continued escalation or negotiation—leads to a compromise aligned with both sides’ national interests, potentially facilitated by international mediation.
He added that Saudi Arabia is best positioned to act as a mediator and help prevent a war between Iran and the United States. However, he emphasized that regardless of whether a conflict occurs, Iran must rethink its current regional strategy.
Outlining the challenges facing policymakers considering such action, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy argued that such an action would be the opening round of a long campaign built upon decades of covert efforts and will escalate in pace and intensity.
"A preventive attack is unlikely to be a solitary event, but rather the opening round of a long campaign employing military strikes, covert action, as well as economic, informational, and other elements of national power," the report said.
The research, written by Michael Eisenstadt, said that a successful preventive strike against Iran's nuclear program requires: eliminating materials and facilities, enabling covert rebuilding disruption, securing political support, and crafting a post-strike strategy to deter Iran from rebuilding.
However, the threat of military action could prompt Iran to hide materials, complicating future strikes. It also risks pushing Iran to abandon its current nuclear hedging strategy and accelerate weaponization.
Eisenstadt suggested that the preparatory phase has already begun, citing Israel's airstrikes targeting Iranian radar systems in April and October 2024, which weakened air defenses around key nuclear and missile sites.
"A lengthy campaign would be required because key installations associated with Iran’s nuclear program are located at over a half-dozen sites," the report said, noting that some are hardened and buried, making complete destruction unlikely.
According to the research, Israeli leaders view Iran's current vulnerability as an opportunity to degrade its nuclear capabilities. "Many Israelis believe that Iran’s current weakness provides a unique opportunity to destroy, or at least set back, its nuclear program through a military strike".
US President Donald Trump has reaffirmed his position that "Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon," expressing readiness for diplomatic engagement but suggesting military action as a last resort. He said there are "two ways of stopping [Iran], with bombs or with a written piece of paper."
The report also warned of Iran’s likely response to a possible attack, saying that it could range from measured retaliations to severe escalation, including potential withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) or further restrictions on the UN nuclear watchdog's operations in the country.
"Tehran might feel a need to respond massively to a preventive strike, although recent setbacks inflicted by Israel on its proxy forces and missile production capability may limit its ability to do so. It could also respond by withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and expelling International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors," it added.
In 2023, Iran already banned at least one third of inspectors with the UN's nuclear chief voicing frustration at Iran's intransigence.
Eisenstadt also highlighted Iran's resilience, warning that following a strike, Iran would likely attempt to rebuild its nuclear capabilities, potentially hiding clandestine facilities in civilian areas or deeply buried sites believed to be beyond the reach of Israel or the United States.
"Thus, in the aftermath of a strike, Iran will likely try to rebuild, perhaps hiding small clandestine centrifuge-enrichment and weaponization facilities in plain sight (e.g., in residential areas or civilian industrial parks), or more likely, in hardened, deeply buried facilities which it believes are beyond the reach of Israel or the United States."
It is not the first time experts warn of Iran's resilience. Last month, Sina Azodi, an expert on US-Iran relations, told the Eye for Iran podcast that Iran can easily rebuild nuclear facilities hit by air attacks.
"Once you know how to make a car, it doesn't matter how many times you get into a car accident. You can still rebuild it," he said.
The potential for clandestine rebuilding necessitates "follow-on covert action and military strikes to disrupt and delay efforts to rebuild" in the years following an initial attack, according to the Washington Institute report.
The analysis concluded that if diplomacy fails to dismantle Iran's nuclear program, policymakers must weigh the risks of a nuclear-threshold Iran against military intervention. While a strike risks triggering nuclear proliferation, it may also enable the long-term containment of a weakened Iran, Eisenstadt argued.
He said that fearing a change in its leadership, which US assurances may not alleviate, Iran might retaliate more aggressively and accelerate its nuclear program after a preventive strike.
