Iran International
The costs of Iran’s nuclear program are negligible compared to the achievement of gaining nuclear technology despite sanctions, the country’s atomic energy chief said on Sunday.
"We shouldn’t focus on weighing costs against benefits. While we are paying a heavy price due to sanctions, the emphasis is not on the costs," said Mohammad Eslami, an Iranian vice president and head of the Atomic Energy Organization.
When asked by a state TV interviewer to explain how the expenses are justified, he underscored the importance of acquiring advanced technology that so-called arrogant global powers seek to deny other nations, particularly Iran.
Eslami argued that evaluating the program’s costs and benefits should occur only after what he described as the required technological capabilities were achieved.
“We are now on this path. We’ve reached a stage where we can apply nuclear technology in various fields,” he added.
He maintained that Iran’s nuclear program is transparent and peaceful, accusing critics of using it to fuel what he called Iranophobia internationally.
Eslami's remarks came after Ali Larijani, an advisor to the Supreme Leader, signaled a softer stance on Iran’s nuclear program, calling it vital but stressing that it should not overshadow broader progress as “people must live their lives.”
The nuclear program is a pillar of our development, but not its entirety, he said on Saturday, stressing that despite his direct role in past negotiations, its scope must remain within defined limits.
"The nuclear issue is part of our national strength, but it is not all of it. People must live their lives, and progress must be achieved in various fields. The nuclear agreement [JCPOA] preserved nuclear knowledge, ensuring its continuation, but reduced the number of centrifuges from 9,000 to 5,000," Larijani, who is considered a moderate conservative in the Islamic Republic's political spectrum, argued.
Iran has faced ongoing electricity and gas shortages due to underinvestment and the impact of US-led sanctions which have hindered modernization efforts in its power, oil and gas sectors.
Iran’s leadership has been wrestling with the idea of re-engaging with Washington over the nuclear program in order to reduce US economic sanctions.
Iran's nuclear program: costs vs benefits
On January 23, Eslami highlighted the economic benefits of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, saying it cost $1.8 billion but has supplied 70 billion kilowatt hours of electricity to the grid in more than a decade. He estimated that producing the same amount of energy from fossil fuels would have cost $8 billion. However, government data shows that the reactor produces just 2% of Iran's annual electricity needs.
Critics argue the program’s costs outweigh its benefits.
Outspoken reformist commentator Sadegh Zibakalam criticized the nuclear program in a post on X on January 23, questioning its value.
“Mr. Zarif says we had no intention of producing nuclear weapons and could have built them if we wanted. So why incur such enormous costs for over 20 years?” he wrote. Zibakalam also cited unfulfilled promises to build five nuclear plants comparable to Bushehr.
In a letter to hardline lawmaker Hamid Rasaei in February 2023, Zibakalam argued that Iran could procure fuel for its Bushehr power plant through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
“Not only does our insistence on producing nuclear fuel domestically have no economic justification due to its high cost, but also other things like speaking of 'our proud nuclear achievements' are one-sided and exaggerated.”
Since US President Donald Trump imposed what he called maximum pressure sanctions in his first term starting in 2018, Iran’s national currency has depreciated nearly 20-fold, and inflation has surged to 40%.
The sanctions severely disrupted the economy, particularly in the banking, trade, transportation and insurance sectors.
Sanctions have severely disrupted multiple sectors of Iran’s economy, particularly international trade, which has been hit hard by rising costs in banking, transportation, shipping, and insurance.
In a recent state-run television program, Saeed-Reza Ameli, former secretary of Iran's Supreme Cultural Revolution Council, said sanctions have cost the Iranian economy $1.2 trillion over the past 12 years.
Economist Vahid Shaghaghi-Shahri echoed similar concerns in an interview with the Etemad newspaper last week, saying Iran’s gross domestic product has shrunk from $640 billion to $400 billion over the same period.
Without sanctions, he estimated, the economy could have grown to $1 trillion.
"The current situation of high prices and livelihood problems that are putting pressure on the people is unacceptable," he said. "Some of it is in our hands, and some of it is not," he added without elaborating.
Pezeshkian made the remarks during a joint meeting with Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, Chief Justice Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, and other senior legislative and judicial officials.
Iran's current economic crisis stems from both US and European sanctions, as well as systemic mismanagement linked to the government's bureaucracy and its dominant role in the economy.
Official media often attributes economic responsibility to the presidential administration, but since foreign policy decisions rest with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, lifting sanctions is beyond the president's control.
Last month, the Statistical Center of Iran reported significant price increases on essential goods, with some food items seeing prices multiply up to five times compared to last year.
Ordinary workers currently earn less than $150 a month, while official estimates indicate that a family of three needs at least $450 a month to cover basic necessities.
Pezeshkian said it is time to engage the population, at least one third of whom have been pushed below the poverty line, warning that more protests lie ahead.
"When we are unable to fulfill our commitments to the people... if they come to the streets and protest, we must engage in dialogue with them ... but instead, we treat them badly.
"Solving the people's problems is our duty; if we cannot, we should at least explain it to them in a kind manner... not treat them violently."
He accused the country's adversaries of taking advantage of the dire economic conditions, warning: "Of course, the people should also be careful that the enemy does not exploit their protests to disrupt society.”
Acknowledging declining public support for the government, he asked, "In the recent elections, 50 percent of the people did not participate. Are they not one of us, and are we not their servants? Shouldn't we ask ourselves why they are dissatisfied with us?"
Only 24 million of 61 million eligible Iranians voted on June 28 in snap presidential elections called after the untimely death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash.
The 39.9 percent turnout was the worst in the history of the Islamic Republic. Pezeshkian did not secure the 50 percent required to avoid a run-off. The turnout improved in the second round to 49.68%.
Known as Dahe-ye Fajr (“Ten Days of Dawn”), this period is officially commemorated annually with various ceremonies. Due to differences between the Iranian and Western calendars, this period can begin on January 31 or February 1 and end on February 10 or 11.
For supporters of the Islamic Republic, Fajr (“Dawn”) symbolizes the "new era" in Iran’s history marked by the fall of the monarchy and the establishment of an Islamic governance.
Q: What are the key ceremonies during Dahe-ye Fajr?
On the first day of the ten-day "Dawn" period, a ceremony takes place at Khomeini’s mausoleum in southern Tehran, commemorating his return to Iran after 14 years in exile, the majority of which he spent in Iraq.
On the final day, state-sponsored rallies take place nationwide to mark the Islamic Revolution's victory. The president addresses participants at Azadi Square (“Freedom Square”) in Tehran, and the day is observed as a public holiday.
Q: How does the state’s media cover the events?
State-run television channels extensively cover all the ceremonies of Dahe-ye Fajr, particularly the Revolution Day rallies. These broadcasts often feature large crowds, which Iranian state officials claim reflect widespread support for the Islamic Republic and its Supreme Leader.
Q: What criticisms have been raised about the media coverage of these events?
Individual critics and opposition groups argue that participation in these rallies has significantly declined in recent years.
They also say that state authorities use incentives like gifts, paid leave, or implicit threats to compel attendance – particularly among civil servants, soldiers, students, and workers.
Q: How did the monarchy fall in 1979?
Months of massive protests forced King Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, to leave the country with his family on January 16, 1979.
He entrusted a Regency Council and opposition Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar to manage the country in his absence.
Khomeini had vowed to return to Iran. Bakhtiar initially attempted to block his return by closing Iran's airports.
However, widespread protests, led by both Islamists and leftist groups, compelled him to reopen them.
Q: What happened when Khomeini returned to Iran?
On February 1, Khomeini arrived in Tehran on a chartered Air France plane, accompanied by opposition figures who had supported him during his exile.
Upon arrival, millions of Iranians flooded the streets to welcome the 76-year-old cleric.
Khomeini traveled directly to Behesht-e Zahra, Tehran’s largest cemetery, to honor the “martyrs of the Revolution.”
In a fiery speech, he declared the Shah-appointed Bakhtiar government "illegal" and announced his intention to establish a new administration.
“I will appoint a government. I will slap this government on the mouth. I will establish a government with the support of the nation because the nation has accepted me,” Khomeini proclaimed.
Q: What did Khomeini do after his return to Iran?
A few days after that speech, Khomeini appointed Mehdi Bazargan, a moderate Islamist scholar and politician, as prime minister.
By February 11, revolutionary forces had seized control of all government institutions. The state broadcaster officially announced the monarchy's collapse the same day.
Q: What happened to Khomeini’s closest aides after his return?
Ironically, many of Khomeini’s close aides from his time in exile were later accused of treason or marginalized – and ultimately faced tragic fates.
Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, who served as foreign minister between November 1979 and August 1980, was accused of plotting to assassinate Khomeini and of attempting a coup to topple the newly established Islamic Republic in April 1982. He was executed by firing squad in September of the same year.
Another aide, Hassan Banisadr, who was elected as the Islamic Republic’s first president (from February 1980 to June 1981), was impeached and deposed by Parliament, allegedly for opposing the clerics in power. He went into hiding and later escaped to France, where he lived until his death in Paris in 2021.
In the now-infamous photos of Khomeini descending the stairs from the Air France plane upon his return to Tehran, state-run news outlets have edited out several of his aides who were by his side.
Today, the only individual still visible next to Khomeini in the official photos is the airliner’s pilot, holding his hand.
In a Sunday editorial, Ham-Mihan, a newspaper aligned with Iran’s Reformist faction, argued that the Foreign Ministry’s performance over the past six months has led to a diminished and weakened position in at least three key areas.
The newspaper pointed to Iran’s handling of overtures for negotiations with the United States as a key concern.
Iran’s policy toward Washington has long been a sensitive and contentious issue, especially after the US withdrawal from the JCPOA nuclear deal in 2018 and the imposition of sanctions. With President Donald Trump’s return, many Iranian politicians and commentators are voicing concerns over the possibility of harsher sanctions as the country struggles with a deep economic crisis.
Ham-Mihan said that efforts at engagement—whether overt or behind closed doors—have consistently encountered resistance from hardliners in both Tehran and Washington.
Beyond internal challenges, Ham-Mihan warned that Trump’s different view of foreign policy makes Iran’s diplomatic messaging particularly sensitive.
“One of Trump’s main arguments for withdrawing from the JCPOA was the lack of economic benefits for American companies,” the paper added, suggesting that any new diplomatic overtures must be framed in a way that aligns with Trump’s priorities.
Araghchi, however, has been criticized for failing to take such dynamics into account. The newspaper pointed to his recent interview with Al Jazeera, in which he asked for the release of frozen Iranian assets as a confidence-building measure.
Ham-Mihan argued that this approach misjudged Trump’s negotiating style and contrasted it with other Iranian officials who have suggested offering American companies investment opportunities in Iran instead.
The newspaper also expressed alarm over the apparent disarray within Iran’s foreign policy structure. Unlike the administration of President Hassan Rouhani where the foreign ministry led negotiations, figures like former Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani and Strategic Council on Foreign Relations President Kamal Kharrazi now seem to be pursuing independent agendas, leading to confusion.
Additionally, Ham-Mihan criticized some of Araghchi’s recent regional visits, suggesting they have become more about symbolic appearances than meaningful diplomatic efforts.
The paper particularly highlighted his trips to Beirut and Damascus right before Bashar al-Assad's fall, arguing that they failed to achieve meaningful results to bolster Iran's influence and instead reinforced the country's image as a passive observer rather than an influential actor.
The newspaper urged Araghchi to reassess his approach, warning that without a more unified and strategic direction, the Foreign Ministry risks becoming increasingly sidelined in shaping Iran’s diplomatic agenda.
The shortage has deepened in recent months, driving prices ever higher. More than 100 essential medications, including treatments for cancer and rare diseases, are either scarce or entirely unavailable.
While Iran has long had an underground market for imported medicine, prices have soared since late summer, and reports of counterfeit drugs are rising.
Investigations by Iran International reveal that counterfeit medications are being sold at exorbitant prices—often reaching hundreds of dollars—right in the heart of Tehran. Cancer patients, in particular, face an increasingly dire situation.
“Not only have cancer and rare disease medications become shockingly expensive, but some have completely disappeared from pharmacies and even the underground market,” a pharmacist in Tehran said on condition of anonymity. “As original medicines grow scarce, counterfeit sales have increased.”
He noted that cancer drug prices range from 150 million rials ($180) to as much as four billion ($4800).
“A breast cancer patient had to pay 900 million rials ($1,100) for just 56 pills,” the pharmacist added. “She could have had a lower-quality Indian version a bit cheaper, but she was desperate to get the best on offer. We’ve had patients selling their property to get cancer treatment for themselves or loved ones.”
Buying drugs on the black market isn’t just costly—it’s dangerous. The pharmacist recalled a case where a patient needed Zavicefta, an antibiotic unavailable in pharmacies. Desperate, they turned to the underground market, paying 3 billion rials ($3600).
“The patient brought the drug to me and I could tell immediately it was fake. The real version comes in sealed packaging but theirs had been tampered with,” he said. “Imagine paying that much money and getting a counterfeit.”
A lawmaker on Iran’s parliamentary health committee had warned of the crisis a month earlier, reporting 116 scarce medications and predicting the number could increase tenfold within months without government intervention.
Iran International contacted several pharmacies in Tehran to inquire about various medications, and all confirmed the scarcity of imported drugs. Even major state-run pharmacies, such as 13-Aban and the Red Crescent, had limited or no stock.
Some Iran-made drugs are also becoming scarce due to shortages of raw materials and hoarding by suppliers who benefit from rising prices.
A young art student who lost her sister to leukemia shared her experience.
“My sister’s doctor prescribed German-made drugs, saying local alternatives wouldn’t be as effective and would make chemotherapy even harder. My father, two brothers, and I spent everything we had on her medication, but in the end, we lost her.”
She described the excruciating process of hunting for medication.
“For months, we visited 13 Aban and Red Crescent pharmacies every other day, only to be told they didn’t have it. We often had to buy from the black market. Some drugs, like Endoxan, we never found.”
For patients with rare conditions like hemophilia, MPS, and SMA, the situation is even worse. Patients and their families have staged several protests outside the Health Ministry and Iran’s Food and Drug Organization.
Such medication is not produced in Iran because it is not economically viable, Hamidreza Edraki, head of Iran’s Rare Diseases Foundation, told ILNA last month. Imports are stuck in customs for so long that they often expire before reaching patients, he added.
Those in charge are yet to address the situation despite warnings from all stakeholders.
On January 28, Iran’s Health Minister Mohammad Reza Zafarghandi announced that the price cap on several drugs would have to be raised because pharmaceutical companies could no longer afford production costs.
This policy may help increase supply gradually. The impact it had on prices, however, was immediate. For those Iranians in urgent need of treatment, things are looking to get a lot worse before getting any better.