Iran Regional Ties And Economy Need A Nuclear Deal - Tehran Media
Iranian media have been expressing renewed concerns lately over the unclear fate of the country's 2015 nuclear deal with world powers.
Iranian media have been expressing renewed concerns lately over the unclear fate of the country's 2015 nuclear deal with world powers.
Reformist daily Shargh wrote in a commentary on April 20 that economic, political and social conditions in Iran are fragile and the three challenges of Iran's involvement in the Ukraine war, differences with International Atomic Agency (IAEA) over "safeguard" issues and the Iranian regime's human rights record cast a shadow of doubt over the future of the nuclear deal (JCPOA).
Media commentator and former diplomat Ali Bigdeli wrote in a commentary in Etemad Online that the revival of the nuclear deal is the prerequisite for maintaining relations with all the of the regional countries. Bigdeli added that "although Saudi Arabia has said that it is prepared to invest in Iran, no investment will be possible without first solving the problem of the JCPOA."
During the past six weeks, media in Tehran have been discussing the implications of Iran's rapprochement with Saudi Arabia on the future of Tehran's foreign policy and developments in West Asia and beyond. The media generally believe that the resumption of ties between Tehran and Riyadh is a prelude to a wider range of developments in Yemen and Syria and will also positively affect ties between Saudi Arabia and Palestinian groups, Shargh wrote.
Shargh newspaper argued that the improved relations with Riyadh can also lead to the mending of Iran's regional ties with countries such as Bahrain, Jordan and Egypt.
However, the significance of the rapprochement with Saudi Arabia has even overshadowed by other issues such as the fate of Iran's nuclear program and Tehran's negotiations with the United States to revive the JCPOA. But a key question is whether Iran now believes it no longer needs to settle its differences with the IAEA and revive the nuclear deal.
The spokesman for the Iranian Foreign Ministry Naser Kanaani has responded to the same question by reiterating that the current government in Iran will not mix the issue of a nuclear agreement with key economic issues or diplomacy in other areas.
Kanaani further said that Tehran will benefit from the rapprochement with Riyadh to serve its interests and enhance its coordination with regional countries and beyond.
Regardless of how consistent the spokesman's statement is with what is taking place on the ground, Shargh noted, that Iran's relations with Saudi Arabia are affected by international developments. Shargh argued in the commentary that Iran cannot ignore the significance of reviving the JCOA in its international relations. If Tehran mends its ties with the big powers, its regional relations will also be put on the right track.
Bigdeli in his commentary maintained that Saudi Arabia's first motivation for the rapprochement with Iran was end the Yemeni crisis. Riyadh needed to end the conflict in Yemen to be able to further major development projects on the shores of the Red Sea. Riyadh also needed security for its $500 billion project to build a new city. Bigdeli added that Riyadh has undertaken to reconstruct Yemen, pay the government employees’ deferred salaries and create a central government in Sana.
For Iran, the benefit was to end it isolation in the region. Nonetheless, Iran is eyeing the diplomatic rather than the economic benefits of the restoration of its ties with Saudi Arabia. Without resolving the JCPOA issue and opening the international banking system shut off by US sanctions, no one can invest in Iran. Bigdeli added that even an interim agreement with the United States will not solve Iran's problems although it may instil hope in Tehran.
According to the research conducted in 2022 across 13 Muslim-majority countries by the US-based pollsters, Saudi Arabia's leadership received the approval of 39% of those surveyed, against just 14% for Iran.
The Kingdom showed sharply higher support still both in Kuwait, where a 47%-point approval difference illustrates close ties between Gulf Cooperation Council countries and OPEC partners, and also Libya, where Saudi Arabia enjoys a 41-point advantage in popularity.
Saudi Arabia has greater popularity in all countries polled, stretching from Morocco to Pakistan. The difference is most muted in Turkey, where the advantage is just three points.
There is a relatively small approval gap in the Palestinian Territories of 12 points, but still Saudi Arabia is more popular there despite Iran’s all-out support for the resistance groups.
Most countries where Iran has had the greatest influence give Tehran low marks, including Iraq (86% disapproval), Yemen (80%) and Lebanon (73%).
After the 1979 revolution, the theocratic government of Iran quickly formed enemies throughout the Middle East when it demanded overthrow of Gulf monarchies and secular Arab governments. The Islamic Republic’s support for Shia minorities in Sunni-majority countries placed it at odds with the countries in the Middle East.
After seven years of hostility that fueled conflicts across the Middle East, Tehran and Riyadh agreed to end their diplomatic rift and reopen their diplomatic missions in March.
Middle east expert Ghasem Mohebali told moderate conservative news website Khabar Online on April 18 that the agreement does not mean disputes between Tehran and Riyadh have been settled. The effectiveness of the agreement will be tested only after the two countries' embassies reopen in May after seven years.
In the meantime, Iran's President Ebrahim Raisi has welcomed an invitation to visit Riyadh and has on his part invited King Salman to visit Iran, which is yet another sign to indicate willingness of both sides for détente.
Mohebali says the Tehran-Riyadh agreement only shows that relations are back on track for normalization. The two sides, he said, have many differences. The conflict in Yemen is only one of them. The two countries also have their differences over Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the Persian Gulf, and, of course, Iran's nuclear program. They also need to discuss their regional rivalries in a way to prevent further tensions in the future.
Both Iran and Saudi Arabia can help establish a stable government in Yemen, the Iranian analyst said. As regards Syria, Saudi Arabia needs to bring back Damascus to the Arab League. The impact of this return on the region is also important. And then we need to see what happens to foreign forces in Syria.
Mohebali said the issue of Bahrain is also one of the main challenges facing Iran and Saudi Arabia, with the latter concerned about Iran's influence over Shias in the small kingdom and its interference in that country. Bahrain is next door to Saudi Arabia and developments there affect its security.
However, the two countries have also some shared interests in the areas of oil, energy and security. These can be the topics of the next round of talks between Tehran and Riyadh.
Mohebali added that the revival of ties will also impact regional countries' attempts to settle the post-Arab Spring problems. For all of those countries security is the most important issue. The region's security is also equally important for the United States, Europe and China.
Meanwhile, according to a report published on the moderate Entekhab news website, many questions have been raised about the impact of the Iran-Saudi deal on Iran's foreign policy. How it will affect Iran's other international dossiers including the revival of the 2015 nuclear deal, the JCPOA. The rapprochement can affect Iran’s key foreign policy issues in two different ways, the report said.
The first possibility is rationality extending to other matters in the regime's decision-making system, and leading to major steps toward settling the nuclear issue, negotiations with the United States, and even reaching détente. This is a desirable scenario that could put Tehran back on the right track and even lead to an improvement in governance and restoring the broken ties between the regime and the people.
This is possible only if the regime follows a realistic approach based on national interests. It will mark a serious change in Iran's approach to domestic and international issues.
The other scenario, which is probably more likely within the Iranian government is to interpret the ties with Saudi Arabia within an unrealistic framework. The advocates of this scenario will interpret the restoration of ties based on their own ideological points of reference, and as they have done so far, reiterate that Iran has imposed its will on Saudi Arabia and see the whole dynamics as Riyadh's alliance with Tehran against the United States. They might even think that Iran no longer needs to return to the JCPOA. According to Entekhab, this would be yet another miscalculation by the Iranian regime.
In other words, while Saudi Arabia uses the rapprochement with Iran as part of its strategy of moving toward sustainable development in the digital age by reducing unnecessary regional tensions, Tehran might mistake the restoration of ties with Riyadh for an ideological alliance.