Price Caps, Discounts, Turmoil: The Outlook For Iran’s Oil Exports
As Iran last week began enriching uranium to 60 percent at a second site, its chief nuclear negotiator Ali Bagheri-Kani was in India talking economics.
As Iran last week began enriching uranium to 60 percent at a second site, its chief nuclear negotiator Ali Bagheri-Kani was in India talking economics.
High on the agenda for the Iranian deputy foreign minister was energy, which increasingly figures in diplomatic or ‘political’ talk as the December 5 deadline looms for an international price cap on Russian oil. Proposed by the United States through the G7, this will bar European and British services, including insurance and tankers, to any worldwide purchaser of Moscow’s crude paying above the cap.
Indian politicians are aware their country has increased oil imports from Russia this year to around 750,000 barrels a day (bpd). There is little prospect of New Delhi resuming imports of Iranian oil, which it stopped in 2019 in fear of US ‘maximum pressure’ sanctions after Washington in 2018 left the Iran nuclear deal, the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action). In 2017-18, India had taken 10 percent of its oil imports from Iran.
India, which abstained on the November 17 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) vote censuring Iran over its nuclear program, is among countries in the ‘global south’ uneasy over US and EU measures against Russia disrupting energy and food supplies. As Europe cuts back links with Moscow, Pakistan, another abstainer at the IAEA, is in talks with Moscow over buying oil with delayed payments.
True, Indian officials know the price cap is unlikely to choke their supply. Discussions have centered on setting it at $65-70 a barrel. The cap is likely to be above the price Russia now sells at, with benchmark Urals at $52 a barrel Thursday, Argus Media reported. The cap would therefore stem the flow only if oil prices rally.
Even so, the Russian economy is reeling from the consequences of the Ukraine war. By December 5 the EU itself will stop taking seaborne Russian oil. Russia’s exports to Europe – seaborne and pipeline – have already fallen from 3.5 million to 1.5 million bpd, and its GDP, says the International Monetary Fund, will slump 3.5 percent this year. Official figures had $14.7 billion withdrawn from Russia’s banking system in October as anxiety mounted.
Moscow’s efforts to compensate for lost oil exports in Europe by increasing sales to Beijing have been hampered by the sluggish state of a Chinese economy under Covid restrictions. Chinese buyers have also gained a discount put by Rapidan Energy Group at around $15 a barrel.
This has hit Iran’s own sales to China. While Iranian exports have become increasingly opaque in order to hide them from US eyes, Tehran’s oil sales of 500,000-1 million barrels a day (bpd), going almost entirely to China, have been undercut by Russia.
Given the growing lack of transparency, Iran’s ministers have made vague but generally optimistic claims, often banding together crude, gas condensate, petrochemicals and petrochemical products.
Middlemen, barter, uncertain prospects
Iran’s earnings figures are further blurred by payments to middle-men and barter, as was recently highlighted by Fararu. The privately-owned website judged it “unlikely that the Iranian government has succeeded in increasing its export volume,” and chided oil minister Jawad Owji for apparently suggesting exports were somehow higher than the 2.8 million bpd before US ‘maximum pressure.’
Fararu noted that “several experts” had argued the Iranian budget for the year beginning March 2023 should assume an oil price of $40-$50 per barrel on sales of 600,000 bpd. This compares to the $70 figure underlying the 2022-3 budget, and marks a further sign of Iranian media and analysts assuming that talks to revive the JCPOA are going nowhere and that US sanctions will therefore remain at least for the medium term.
Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi has trumpeted success in surviving maximum pressure in the face of depleted foreign revenue. The economy’s halting recovery from two years of recession to low economic growth 2020-22 has been based on domestic industry benefiting from the lower rial and reduced foreign competition in the home market.
But anxieties in Iran reflect not only diminishing JCPOA prospects and the internal instability sharpened with current protests. Iran still needs foreign earnings to pay for imports and rally the rial. The shift in geopolitics and energy supplies with the Ukraine crisis, as well as a rising dollar, aligns Iran not so much with energy exporters, as with so much of Africa and poorer Middle Eastern countries facing rising inflation and uncertainty.
Citing Interfax Friday, Iran’s semi-official news agency ISNA reported that Azerbaijan’s President Iham Aliyev cancelled a December 7 meeting in Brussels with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan aimed at easing tensions after September-October clashes killed around 200 Armenian and 80 Azerbaijani soldiers.
Earlier Friday, at a Baku conference ‘Along the Middle Corridor,’ Aliyev launched a broadside against Iran, his toughest so far since relations soured over Iran’s role in the 2020 Azerbaijan-Armenia war, when adjacent Iranian military exercises followed the Azerbaijanis capturing areas around the disputed Nagorno-Karabagh enclave and along the Iran border.
Stepping Friday on ground he previously avoided, Aliyev said his government would do “our best to preserve our secular lifestyle…as well as Azerbaijanis living in Iran,” whom he called “part of our people.” The president said that in Azerbaijan 340 schools taught in Russian and ten in Georgian, while none in Iran taught in Azeri. Around a quarter of Iran’s population is Azari, with analysts and activists disagreeing over the closeness of their cultural-linguistic links to their neighbors to the north.
“We worked with three presidents of Iran, [Mohammad] Khatami, [Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad, and [Hassan] Rouhani,” Aliyev said. “For all these years there was no situation similar to the current one. Never has Iran had two military exercises near our borders within a few months. There have never been such hateful and threatening statements against Azerbaijan.”
‘Hateful statements’ referred to warnings from President Ebrahim Raisi and other leaders against any border changes or threats to Iran’s transit route to Armenia, which is vulnerable since 2020 changes. Iran carried out more military drills along the border October, when Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian also visited Yerevan.
But Tehran-Baku tensions have simmered since the 2020 war, when Iran moderated its past support for mainly Christian Armenia due partly to domestic pressures from both ethnic Azeri and Shia clerics supporting fellow Muslims.
Brussels mediation meeting cancelled?
Armenia’s frustration at what they feel is a lack of support from Russia – which has been engrossed in the Ukraine war – lay behind the news early Friday that Pashinyan had involved French President Emmanuel Macron as a possible mediator to build on the current ceasefire.
This prompted Aliyev’s announcement refusing a French role – and Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov to immediately offer Moscow’s support as a broker.
Analysts generally see the Azerbaijan-Armenia balance tilting in Baku’s favor since 2020. This has come with Aliyev making statements seen as provocative in Tehran. On November 11, at a summit of Turkic states of central Asia, the president said the “geographical borders of the Turkic world are wider than the Turkic states.” In Baku, state media has recently referred to north-western Iran, where most Iranian Azari live, as ‘south Azerbaijan.’
‘Persian fascist mullah regime’
Mahmudali Chehregani, Washington-based leader of the South Azerbaijan National Awakening Movement, appeared on Azerbaijani state television November 4 to promise the end of the “Persian fascist mullah regime.” Once considered persona not grata in Baku, Chehregani has lately criticized relations between Tehran and Yerevan, the “enemy of Azerbaijanis,” and said that an Armenian consulate due in Tabriz would be “razed to the ground.”
Iran’s options are limited. In mid-November, it summoned ambassador Ali Alizadeh over “unfriendly statements” by leading Baku officials, referring for example to Aliyev November 8 warning Iran, indirectly, against further military exercises.
While Iran’s main concern is fragile land corridor to Armenia – and fears a move to connect Turkey with mainland Azerbaijan and on to central Asia – it may also see Aliyev as exploiting protests in Iran. Such edginess might explain an Iranian suggestion of Azerbaijani involvement in the October 26 attack in Shiraz claimed by the Islamic State group (Isis-Daesh).
Raisi is unlikely, as yet, to take the advice from some commentators, including Shargh newspaper November 12, to downgrade relations with Baku or introduce trade sanctions. But Iran’s recent targeting of Iranian Kurdish groups in northern Iraq may be in part a message to Baku.
Ceyhun Sadlinski at a conference organized by Azerbaijan’s Security Council, where he is first deputy chairman, said Thursday Iran’s “special services are actively carrying out intelligence and subversive activities” against Baku, the official Azerbaijani Press Agency reported. “Drastic measures” were being taken in response, Sadlinski said.