Revenge rhetoric dominates Khamenei funeral despite US talks push

Images and videos from Tehran's prayer ground complex prompted widespread discussion among Iranians, with many saying attendance fell short despite an extensive state mobilization effort.

Messages sent to Iran International argued authorities relied on government employees, security forces, organized transportation, free meals and public holidays to maximize turnout, yet still failed to fill the designated venue.

For many, the relatively sparse gathering represented more than a logistical disappointment. They viewed it as evidence of a widening gap between the establishment and society, arguing the Islamic Republic could no longer convincingly stage large public displays of popular support.

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  Funeral expenses deepen anger over Ali Khamenei's week-long burial

Several citizens contrasted the official portrayal of the funeral as a demonstration of national unity with what they described as a subdued public response after nearly five decades of clerical rule.

Symbolism meets economic hardship

Many reactions focused on the economic contrast between the scale of the ceremony and the financial pressures facing ordinary Iranians.

Iranians questioned the use of public resources for an elaborate state funeral at a time when inflation, declining purchasing power and rising living costs continue to dominate daily life.

Several described households that have reduced or eliminated meat and other protein from their diets, arguing that spending on ceremonial events appeared disconnected from the country's economic realities.

Others said successive crises – including war, sanctions, regional isolation and economic decline – had not altered what they viewed as the system's priority of funding state institutions and political messaging ahead of public welfare.

Contradictory political messaging

Another frequently discussed issue involved videos circulating on social media showing participants symbolically pelting an image of US President Donald Trump with stones during the funeral events.

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Some citizens highlighted what they saw as a contradiction between anti-US demonstrations and expectations that Iranian and US officials could resume negotiations in the near future.

They argued that confrontational domestic messaging has repeatedly existed alongside diplomatic engagement, reflecting what they described as two parallel tracks in the Islamic Republic's foreign policy.

Questions over the cost

No official estimate has been released for the total cost of the funeral and burial ceremonies.

Nevertheless, many messages attempted to estimate the overall expenditure by citing security deployments, temporary infrastructure, transportation, accommodation, food distribution, ceremonial preparations and construction work carried out along the procession route.

Some suggested the total bill could approach $800 million, although no official evidence has been presented to support that figure.

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  Behind the funeral: Khamenei’s coffin becomes stage for Iran’s wounded power

The estimate prompted comparisons with recent funerals for other world leaders.

Several people pointed to the funeral of Elizabeth II in 2022, which the British government estimated cost around £162 million – roughly $200 million at contemporary exchange rates. The event included days of public lying-in-state, thousands of police and military personnel, extensive international participation and worldwide television coverage.

Others referred to the funerals of Omani Sultan Qaboos bin Said and Kuwaiti Emir Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, both of which followed Islamic tradition with relatively swift burial ceremonies. Although no comprehensive official costs were released, participants noted those events appeared considerably more modest despite taking place in wealthy Persian Gulf monarchies.

Debate over public priorities

Many also drew comparisons with the Islamic Republic's longstanding criticism of the lavish celebrations marking the 2,500th anniversary of the Persian Emire under the Pahlavi dynasty.

They questioned why authorities that had long condemned those celebrations as wasteful were now directing substantial public funds toward a funeral ceremony during a period of economic hardship.

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Several messages further said that the system has never devoted comparable financial and organizational resources to national celebrations such as Nowruz, Yalda Night or Chaharshanbe Suri, despite their broad cultural significance.

For many, the debate surrounding the funeral extended beyond attendance or cost. They said the ceremony reflected broader concerns about state priorities, economic management and political legitimacy.

Rather than reinforcing the image of a confident political system, citizens argued the funeral underscored the difficulties facing a regime confronting deep economic challenges and declining public trust, even as it sought to present the burial of its longtime leader as a demonstration of continuity and authority.

The rapid elevation of his son Mojtaba within ten days was intended to close that chapter. Instead, with the new Supreme Leader still absent from public view, it appears to have opened a new one.

Roughly twenty messages attributed to Mojtaba Khamenei since his succession have failed to convince many Iranians that he is truly exercising power.

Efforts by officials and supporters to prove his presence have often been contradictory, deepening rather than resolving the uncertainty.

A growing number of Iran analysts argue that, regardless of Mojtaba’s invisibility, Ali Khamenei has effectively been replaced by a constellation of elite networks built around family ties, wartime relationships dating back to the Iran–Iraq War, and geographic power bases in provinces such as Tehran, Isfahan, Khuzestan and Khorasan.

These networks, spanning civilian officials, senior IRGC commanders, clerics and younger ideological politicians, existed for decades but were ultimately contained by Ali Khamenei’s authority.

One example was the IRGC high command, which repeatedly shifted between officers from Khuzestan and Isfahan during Khamenei’s 38 years in power, before he appointed Hossein Salami from the Golpayegan region in April 2019 in what many saw as an attempt to contain an increasingly damaging rivalry.

The old reformist–conservative divide has largely faded. Following former President Ebrahim Raisi’s “purification” project, Iran’s political landscape is increasingly shaped by competition between what parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has described as “revolutionaries” and “super-revolutionaries.”

The shift has been so dramatic that even Hossein Shariatmadari, the outspoken editor of the hardline daily Kayhan and long seen as a symbol of uncompromising conservatism, is now warning against threats to national cohesion and criticizing hardliners opposing the agreement with the United States.

The struggle in Tehran is no longer over whether engagement with Washington is acceptable. Instead, competing factions are trying to claim ownership of the decision to negotiate.

Even some hardliners who until late June accused pragmatists such as Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi of seeking talks with “the killer of Khamenei” now argue that Iran must secure its financial interests through an understanding with Washington, even if that requires delaying decisions on parts of its nuclear program.

The most uncompromising factions inside and around the IRGC have argued that Iran’s priority should now be preserving its missile program as its remaining strategic asset.

Yet figures including MP Esmail Kowsary and Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr continue to insist Iran must also seek revenge for Khamenei’s killing.

In Mojtaba Khamenei’s continued absence, networks that once operated beneath Ali Khamenei’s centralized and uncompromising decision-making appear to be competing to define the future direction of the Islamic Republic — and to claim ownership of the very diplomatic opening many of them opposed only days earlier.

Organizers did not explain why different Quranic passages were recited for each delegation. However, several Iranian media outlets portrayed the selections as deliberate rather than routine religious readings.

The news website Fararu wrote that the verses appeared to have been chosen "not randomly, but deliberately." Conservative outlet Tabnak described the practice as "an innovation in public diplomacy," saying the tailored recitations could be interpreted as ethical and political messages to each delegation.

The verse that drew the greatest attention was recited as Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Waleed bin Abdulkarim approached Khamenei's coffin.

The passage, Verse 13 of Surah Al Imran, recalls the Battle of Badr, in which the Prophet Muhammad's followers defeated a much larger force. It concludes: "God supports whom He wills with His help. Surely in this is a lesson for those with insight."

Some linked the choice to Iran's recent conflict with Israel and the United States, during which Saudi Arabia was reported to have allowed US military operations from its territory while also urging Washington to avoid a wider regional war.

The verse recited for Turkey's delegation highlighted the superiority of believers who fight in God's cause over those who stay behind without valid reason. Some commentators interpreted it as a reference to Ankara's cautious approach during the recent conflict and broader regional crises.

Lebanon's official delegation and a separate delegation from Hezbollah received different passages. The Lebanese state delegation heard a verse suggesting that following divine guidance and making sacrifices in God's cause would have been better for them. Hezbollah, whose name means "Party of God," was greeted with a verse promising victory for the "Party of God."

The Hamas delegation received a verse praising believers "who have remained true to the covenant they made with God" and never broke their pledge.

Khomeini’s grandson draws attention

Another widely discussed moment came when members of the family of Islamic Republic founder Ruhollah Khomeini approached the coffin.

Verse 95 of Surah An-Nisa, which contrasts believers who stay at home with those who strive "with their wealth and their lives" in God's cause, began to be recited as former leader’s grandson Hassan Khomeini approached.

Videos circulating online appeared to show him leaving the ceremony shortly after the recitation began, prompting criticism from some conservatives.

Hassan Khomeini is generally associated with Iran's reformist camp.

Mixed reactions

The choice of Quranic passages prompted widespread discussion on Persian and Arabic-language social media.

Supporters argued the selections reflected the recent conduct of regional governments rather than personal criticism.

One Persian-language user wrote that reminding neighboring countries of the consequences of their policies during the war was "a reminder of responsibility, not an insult."

Others argued that using Quranic verses to criticize official mourners was inappropriate.

"If the selection of the verses recited during yesterday's ceremony was intentional, then it was a mistake," one user wrote. "Taunting a guest who has come to offer condolences is consistent neither with our cultural traditions nor with religious teachings."

Another user wrote: "I do not agree with reciting Quranic verses to criticize anyone who has come to pay their respects. It is inappropriate. As far as I know, reproaching guests was never the practice of the prophets, the Prophet Muhammad, the Imams, or the martyred leader."

The discussion also spread across Arabic-language social media. Iraqi commentator Yaseen Aziz described the verses recited for the Saudi delegation as "an indicator of the existing hatred and the diplomatic stupidity of the current leadership in Iran."

In the days since the fighting subsided, Iran's political establishment has offered an unusually public glimpse into divisions that have long remained largely behind closed doors.

State television abruptly cut short a pre-recorded interview with Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf as he discussed the use of blocked Iranian funds abroad, prompting accusations that politically sensitive remarks had been censored. State broadcaster IRIB insisted the interview had always been scheduled to air in two parts.

Elsewhere, hardliners heckled Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi during a visit to Karbala, chanting "death to the appeaser" and "we don't want pretense" as Tehran pursues negotiations with Washington. Establishment commentators have also begun openly discussing ideas that, until recently, would have been politically difficult to imagine entering the public conversation.

Individually, each episode could be dismissed as another example of factional politics inside the Islamic Republic.

Taken together, however, they point to something more significant.

They suggest the post-war debate inside Tehran is no longer simply about diplomacy, sanctions or military strategy.

It is increasingly about how the Islamic Republic must adapt if it is to preserve power in the wake of one of the greatest shocks in its 47-year history.

"The question isn't whether they're engaging in soul-searching," Alex Vatanka, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, told Eye for Iran. "They have to."

For Vatanka, the significance of this moment is not that the Islamic Republic has suddenly embraced reform.

It is that the war appears to have stripped away old assumptions.

"I think there is a lot more clarity today than there was before the war," he said. "The regime knows the old model failed. The question now is what comes next."

He believes survival—not reform—is driving the conversation.

"If you're in the business of surviving, you don't want this to happen to you again," he said. "Maybe this is the moment you change course."

That should not be mistaken for moderation.

"You don't do it because you love the people of Iran," Vatanka said. "You do it because you want to survive."

The debate itself could prove destabilizing.

"When the knives are out within the regime, they go after each other in vicious ways," Vatanka warned, arguing that competition between rival factions could intensify as different camps attempt to shape the Islamic Republic's post-war future.

Behnam Ben Taleblu, senior director of the Iran Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, argues that understanding those debates first requires understanding the nature of the political system itself.

"It is not straight-up Islamic theocracy," he said.

Instead, he described the Islamic Republic as a political project drawing on multiple ideological traditions.

"A traditional Shia marja has basically taken Karl Marx, the Quran and Plato and put it together and created a political system on top of that."

That, Taleblu argues, is why outsiders should be careful not to confuse adaptation with transformation.

"I think it is a real battle within this regime of how best to preserve the prerogatives and the privileges of power while also sacrificing as little as possible on the ideology."

Even if institutions evolve, he says, the guiding principles may not.

"Real transformation comes with behavior. It comes with substance—not style."

Historian Shahram Kholdi remains skeptical that the current debate represents a genuine break with the past.

"Any difference that has existed between any of these people, in my opinion, has always been one of degree rather than in kind," he said. "Tactics are different. Worldviews, strategies, expectations and demands are all the same."

Rather than seeing reform, Kholdi sees a political elite trying to preserve the system after one of its most serious crises.

But he also believes the post-war period could intensify competition among rival centers of power.

"If Ghalibaf and his ilk manage to get the upper hand... the rest of the gang would feel completely insecure, and that intra-conflict then would materialize into a hot conflict within them," he said.

"And that may very well spell their final doom once and for all."

Whether that prediction proves correct remains to be seen.

What is already clear is that the conversation unfolding inside Tehran has moved beyond the immediate consequences of the war.

It has become a debate about the future of the Islamic Republic itself.

In July 2006, Henry Kissinger argued that Iran's leaders would eventually have to decide whether they were governing "a cause or a nation."

Today, that question is no longer being asked only by foreign observers. Increasingly, it appears to be one the Islamic Republic is asking itself.

Opponents of the Iran-US understanding have launched a fierce campaign against Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, described as the agreement's chief negotiator, and President Masoud Pezeshkian, accusing them of surrendering Iran's authority over the Strait of Hormuz, thereby allowing the establishment of an Oman-American shipping corridor.

The criticism intensified after a televised interview with Ghalibaf aired on Tuesday, during which he appeared to reject calls by hardliners to close the strategic waterway.

"We must not turn the Strait against itself. The Strait is valuable only if traffic through it increases day by day, not decreases," he said.

His remarks were interpreted by conservative critics as a signal that Tehran has accepted Washington’s preferred arrangements governing maritime traffic through the Strait.

Focus shifts to Omani route

The controversy was fueled by satellite-based vessel tracking videos recently published by Kpler, which appeared to show that many non-Iranian commercial vessels have recently transited the Omani side of the Strait apparently accompanied by US naval vessels, while only a limited number of Iranian vessels were using the Iranian side. Hardliners argue that this reflects a de facto shift away from Iran's jurisdiction.

Ehsan Hosseini, editor-in-chief of the conservative economic website Khat-e Energy, claimed in a video posted online that both "the naval blockade and the Omani corridor are products of negotiations with the United States."

"At this very moment, groups of ships are passing through this corridor under US military escort. Your grave mistake is unforgivable."

In a separate social media post, Hosseini wrote that Iran's diplomats had "not only failed to collect any fees, but also created the conditions for establishing an Omani corridor through the Strait." He questioned whether Iran lacked the military capability to prevent the arrangement or whether "someone has tied the hands of the armed forces."

Military issues warning

Amid the growing debate, the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters issued a strongly worded statement on Thursday amid hardliner pressure, without explicitly referring to the alleged Omani corridor.

The military command said all commercial and oil tankers were required to navigate through routes designated by Iran and warned that any vessel departing from those routes or disregarding “Iranian navigation protocols” in the Strait would face "an immediate and decisive response by the armed forces," placing the security of non-compliant ships at risk.

Several Friday prayer leaders also addressed the issue.

Hassan Ameli, Friday prayer leader of Ardabil, claimed the United States had violated the agreement by establishing "a new waterway alongside Oman."

Mohammad-Nabi Mousavifard, the Friday prayer leader of Ahvaz, issued an even stronger warning.

"If any ship passes through this waterway without permission and without observing the laws of the Islamic Republic, it will be sunk in the depths of the Persian Gulf."

Dispute over Strait management fees

According to The Wall Street Journal, US officials proposed during talks in Doha earlier this week that Iran abandon its demand to collect transit charges from ships crossing the Strait in exchange for access to frozen Iranian assets abroad. Tehran reportedly continues to insist on charging vessels for passage.

Hardliners argue that revenue generated from shipping fees could rival Iran's oil income.

They also accuse Ghalibaf of keeping parliament inactive to allow the agreement with Washington to proceed without interference from lawmakers affiliated with the ultra-hardliner Paydari (Steadfastness) Party, who are reportedly preparing draft legislation on a new legal framework for administering the Strait.

Iranian officials have maintained that the payments would be "management fees" rather than transit tolls, which could raise legal objections under international maritime law.

In his interview, Ghalibaf said ships would be allowed to pass without charge for only 60 days under the signed understanding, although he did not specify the type or amount of the fees that would eventually be imposed.

Social media backlash

Hardliner social media users also directed their criticism at Ghalibaf and the Pezeshkian administration.

One X user, Reza Valizadeh, referred to the Kpler tracking footage and wrote: “This is the doing of Ghalibaf and Pezeshkian. Nobody is passing through the Iranian section of the Strait of Hormuz."

Another user, Mohammad-Hossein Chavoshi, claimed that "part of the Strait of Hormuz has effectively slipped out of Iran's control" because international vessels were using a route designated by Oman.

He argued that the sovereign rights over the Strait emphasized by Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had effectively been abandoned and warned that "no one knows what will happen in two months if this continues."