UNESCO warns of rising risks to Iran’s historic sites

Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood approved a Metropolitan Police request to prohibit the march and any associated counter-marches for one month from 1600 GMT on Wednesday, while allowing only a static protest under strict conditions.

Police said it was the first time such powers had been used since 2012 and said ordinary protest conditions would not be enough given the scale of the event, expected counter-protests and heightened tensions linked to the Middle East conflict and Tehran’s threats to British allies and bases overseas.

The Met said the London march was “uniquely contentious” because it originated in Iran and is organized by the Islamic Human Rights Commission, which police described as supportive of the Iranian regime.

Officers also pointed to security service warnings about Iranian state-backed threats in Britain, saying MI5 and counterterrorism police had foiled more than 20 such plots over the past year.

Previous Quds marches in London have led to arrests for support for proscribed groups and antisemitic hate crimes, police said, though they stressed this year’s ban was based on a specific risk assessment rather than politics.

The IHRC condemned the ban as politically motivated and said a static protest would still go ahead. Its spokesman Faisal Bodi told British media the march had taken place peacefully for decades, but he also openly praised Iran’s former supreme leader Ali Khamenei and said he would “happily” hold his picture.

Britain is not the first European country to move against such rallies. Berlin banned its annual Quds march in 2021 after years of controversy over Hezbollah-linked symbols and antisemitic messaging, although German courts and local authorities have continued to wrestle with similar cases since then.

Following US and Israeli attacks on the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Iran’s leadership followed through with a long-standing threat: expanding the conflict beyond its borders and drawing neighboring states into the confrontation.

One notable example came on February 1, roughly a month before Khamenei was killed in a joint US–Israeli missile strike on February 28, when he said that if the United States attacked Iran militarily, the conflict would become “regional.”

Today, the armed forces of the Islamic Republic—led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—appear to be implementing that doctrine by expanding hostilities beyond Iran’s borders.

The logic is to link the fate of the Islamic Republic to the stability of the wider region: as the state faces mounting internal and external pressures, it seeks to entangle neighboring countries in the crisis, raising the costs of continued confrontation.

This approach resembles elements of Nixon’s “madman theory” and Israel’s “Samson option,” reflecting a strategic logic akin to mutually assured destruction. Whether such a strategy can deter adversaries—or instead isolate Tehran further—remains uncertain.

Several neighboring countries have now been drawn into the conflict. States along the Persian Gulf have been targeted, and missile and drone strikes have also been directed toward Azerbaijan and Turkey.

In some cases, countries that previously maintained relatively cooperative relations with Tehran, including Qatar, have found themselves on the receiving end of these attacks.

The responses of neighboring governments suggest that widening the conflict could ultimately produce stronger regional opposition rather than easing pressure on Tehran. From their perspective, the concern is precedent: if such attacks occur once, what guarantees exist that they will not happen again?

This concern increases the likelihood of coordinated responses designed to prevent further escalation.

The strategy also reflects long-running domestic pressures on the system. Over the course of its existence, the Islamic Republic occasionally managed to regain some degree of public support at critical moments—including the elections of Mohammad Khatami in 1997 and 2001, the high participation in the 2009 election, and the victories of Hassan Rouhani in 2013 and 2017.

But the broader trajectory has been one of declining engagement and growing disillusionment. By the time of the 2024 presidential election—officially won by Masoud Pezeshkian—turnout had fallen sharply, reflecting wider frustration shaped by years of repression and repeated cycles of protest.

Demonstrations in 1999, 2009, 2019 and 2022 were met with force, while the downing of the Ukrainian passenger plane and the large-scale crackdown in January 2026 further deepened mistrust between the state and society.

At the same time, nearly five decades of governance have left Iran confronting multiple structural crises, including environmental degradation, water scarcity, energy shortages, mounting economic pressure on households, systemic corruption and widening inequality.

Together, these pressures have steadily eroded confidence in the system and narrowed expectations for reform from within.

Against this backdrop, widening the conflict may appear to the leadership less a choice than a calculation: that survival at home increasingly depends on raising the stakes abroad. Yet this logic carries obvious risks.

Attempts to regionalize the confrontation could deepen Iran’s isolation and accelerate pressures already bearing down on the system.

Taking into account both long-term domestic trends and the current military situation—including damage to Iran’s military capabilities and the widening of hostilities—the future of the Islamic Republic remains uncertain.

International politics rarely unfolds along a single predictable path, and multiple outcomes remain conceivable. Still, history suggests that political systems under sustained internal strain and external pressure often appear stable until they do not.

As Iran confronts war with the United States and Israel abroad while continuing to face mistrust and periodic unrest at home, the strategy of widening the conflict may prove less a path to survival than a reflection of the system’s mounting vulnerability.

Early volatility has been sharp but manageable, yet the longer the disruption lasts, the greater the risk that physical shortages—rather than price swings—will drive the crisis.

In recent days, Iranian attacks have expanded to energy infrastructure across Arab Gulf states alongside the continued closure of Hormuz.

On March 9, an oil refinery in the United Arab Emirates was targeted. Qatar has halted liquefied natural gas production, while Iraq and Kuwait have each reduced oil output by roughly 70 percent.

Brent crude briefly surged more than 25 percent to $115 a barrel as markets opened Monday before retreating after the Group of Seven said it was considering releasing 300–400 million barrels from strategic reserves.

Prices later eased to about $98—still roughly 30 percent above prewar levels—suggesting markets are bracing less for an immediate collapse than for a sustained disruption.

Before traffic through Hormuz was disrupted, roughly 20 million barrels per day of oil and petroleum products passed through the corridor, most of it bound for Asia. In addition, about 330 million cubic meters of liquefied gas moved through the same route daily.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have diverted part of their exports through alternative pipeline routes, but those volumes remain well below what previously moved through the strait.

Energy consultancies including Wood Mackenzie and Kpler warned early that global markets could withstand severe volatility for only three to four weeks without a reopening of the waterway.

Strategic reserve releases could cushion the shock temporarily, but even a 300–400 million barrel release would offer only limited relief—particularly if attacks continue to damage infrastructure or delay the restoration of export capacity.

Released reserves would also need to be replenished relatively quickly, limiting their long-term utility as a buffer.

The gas market is even more exposed. About one-fifth of global LNG trade previously passed through Hormuz, and there are few viable substitutes for QatarEnergy’s supplies. Global gas prices have nearly doubled at a moment when European storage levels are at their lowest since 2022, with facilities less than 30 percent full.

Hormuz also carries a substantial share of global trade in sulfur and chemical fertilizers—a reminder that prolonged disruption could have broader consequences for food prices and inflation beyond the immediate energy shock.

The strategic stakes are becoming increasingly explicit. On Monday night, President Donald Trump warned that the United States would respond “20 times harder” if shipping through Hormuz were not restored.

On Tuesday, Iran’s security chief Ali Larijani responded on X with a defiant message: “The Strait of Hormuz will either be a strait of peace and prosperity for all or will be a strait of defeat and suffering for warmongers,” adding, “beware lest you be the ones to vanish.”

For now, markets are absorbing the shock. But the longer disruption persists, the less the outcome will depend on price volatility and the more it will hinge on physical supply—a shift that strategic reserves and alternative routes alone cannot offset.

Supporters of the Islamic Republic have gathered in several cities to show loyalty to the new leader. The officialdom has congratulated him in unison. But Khamenei Jr is yet to appear.

There has been no speech, no televised address and very few photos or videos of the new leader. The only recording attributed to him so far is a short old video announcing that his religious classes have been canceled.

The lack of information has been so striking that even state media appears uncertain about how to present him to the public.

Older photographs have been circulated, stylized illustrations or AI-generated renderings have appeared online to fill the visual vacuum. These images are not presented as authentic photos but symbolic representations.

The situation raises a central question: what scenario may explain the unusual debut of Iran’s new Supreme Leader?

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  The ascendency of Khamenei Jr was a long-planned improvisation

Scenario one: delayed unveiling

The simplest explanation is that the Islamic Republic intends to introduce Mojtaba through a carefully managed televised address or recorded message once security conditions allow.

In this scenario, the leadership transition would be framed as orderly and unified, with Mojtaba reiterating familiar themes of resistance, continuity and cohesion under wartime pressure.

Even so, the delay itself invites scrutiny. Authorities could cite security concerns, but the absence of even a brief recorded message—particularly after the steady stream of congratulatory statements from senior officials—has raised questions about the pace and choreography of the transition.

For now, the silence has only heightened curiosity about how and when the new leader will first address the public.

Scenario two: leadership by statement

A second possibility is that Mojtaba may initially govern largely through written statements rather than public appearances. Such an approach would allow the system to project continuity while limiting exposure during a volatile security moment.

Iran’s leadership has long relied on tightly managed messaging, and written statements attributed to Mojtaba could reiterate established positions while reinforcing the central role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which appears to wield growing influence over wartime decision-making.

State television has already described Mojtaba as a veteran of the “Ramadan war,” part of an emerging narrative that presents him as shaped by wartime experience. Under this scenario, his absence would reflect caution rather than weakness.

Scenario three: managed vacuum

A third possibility is that Mojtaba’s continued absence reflects deeper uncertainty within the leadership itself.

The Islamic Republic is operating under sustained Israeli and US strikes, and the rapid announcement of his succession may have served primarily to prevent internal competition at a moment of acute vulnerability.

Another explanation is that Mojtaba may have been injured in the same attacks that killed his father and other senior figures—a scenario that would help explain both the speed of his appointment and his continued absence.

Naming him quickly could have forestalled rivalries among powerful factions while allowing the Revolutionary Guards and other security institutions to consolidate operational control.

In such circumstances, Mojtaba would function largely as a symbolic leader while practical authority remained concentrated within the security establishment, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in particular.

Presenting an absent or wounded successor could also suppress dissent by discouraging open criticism of someone portrayed as a victim of the same war that killed the previous Supreme Leader.

Continuity and risk

Such a strategy, however, carries risks. If the leader continues to remain unseen for an extended period, public skepticism could deepen further, particularly among a population already wary of official narratives.

The lack of clarity may also reinforce uncertainty within the elite at a time when the system is under exceptional strain.

In the short term, projecting continuity appears to be the system’s priority. By naming a successor quickly, even if still absent, the establishment in Tehran may hope to signal stability to both domestic and international audiences.

Whether that image can be sustained, however, may ultimately depend on one simple question: when and if Iran’s new Supreme Leader finally appears.

The longer he remains unseen, the more his absence risks becoming a political fact in its own right—one that could deepen uncertainty at a moment when Tehran can least afford it.

Rather than confronting the official narrative head-on, many posts mocked the opaque and unusual circumstances of Mojtaba’s rise – especially the emergence of a leader who, for many Iranians, remains almost entirely unseen.

The jokes fall broadly into several recurring themes.

‘A leader no one has seen'

Many jokes focus on Mojtaba Khamenei’s near-total absence from public life.

Unlike most senior political figures, Mojtaba has rarely appeared in speeches or interviews, and only a handful of recordings of his voice are publicly known.

Some users turned this into a technological joke. One widely shared post said:

“There isn’t even enough audio of Mojtaba Khamenei for AI to train on to make a fake voice of him.”

Others simply pointed to the unusual situation more directly.

“We are entering the second day of Mojtaba Khamenei's leadership, and still nobody has seen him.”

Several posts framed the absence through humor about remote work – a concept familiar to many younger Iranian users.

“If you like working remotely, the best job is Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. Nobody asks where you are, what you’re doing, or even whether you’re alive.”

Another post used religious imagery to exaggerate the idea that he has remained invisible.

“We’re in a situation where the appearance of Mahdi is more likely than the appearance of Mojtaba.”

Mahdi – the messianic figure awaited in Shiite Islam – frequently appears in Iranian satire as a way of describing events considered extremely unlikely.

Another viral joke suggested Mojtaba’s leadership was almost abstract.

“In the phrase ‘Mojtaba’s leadership,’ the literary device being used is personification.”

The remark plays on a Persian rhetorical term used in literature classes, implying that leadership is being attributed to something that has not visibly acted.

'The only known quote'

Another recurring joke centers on how little Mojtaba Khamenei has publicly said.

One of the few widely circulated videos attributed to him shows him announcing that his religious classes would be canceled.

That short clip has now become a punchline.

One post summarized the situation: “The only existing quote from Imam Mojtaba Khamenei: ‘Next week there will be no class.’”

The post was accompanied by a parody image styled like the decorative wall murals commonly seen on schools and public buildings in Iran, where passages from religious figures and political leaders are often painted alongside floral designs.

In the satirical version circulating online, however, the wall bears only the mundane line about next week’s class being canceled – recasting an ordinary notice as the supposedly defining quotation of a newly appointed Supreme Leader.

Other jokes focused on Mojtaba’s lack of a public résumé. One post mocked the situation using corporate language:

“You don’t have a résumé, you want to work remotely, you got the job through connections – and you don’t even have a photo for your CV so they have to generate one with AI.”

Another user suggested that even performing a simple task could count as experience.

“At least bury your father so you can have one executive job on your résumé.”

‘Schrödinger’s Khamenei’

A darker strand of satire reflects the uncertainty and speculation that often accompany major political events in Iran.

Some jokes played with the idea that Mojtaba’s status remains ambiguous because he has not appeared publicly.

One widely shared post referenced the famous physics thought experiment known as Schrödinger’s cat:

“I think instead of Schrödinger’s cat we’re dealing with Schrödinger’s Khamenei. Until they show him, we don’t know whether he’s alive or dead.”

Some posts jokingly suggested that naming Mojtaba as leader could solve several political problems at once.

“Announcing Mojtaba as leader was actually smart. You can’t kill someone who’s already dead.”

Another post used similarly blunt humor:

“You know what’s better than one dead Khamenei? Two dead Khameneis.”

Other jokes focused on the strange overlap between the funeral of the late leader and the introduction of the new one. One user wrote sarcastically:

“Right now the Islamic Republic has two leaders on earth – one they won’t bury and another they won’t reveal.”

Even the burial itself became a subject of dark humor.

“The only reason they haven’t buried Khamenei yet is to save funeral costs – they’re waiting a few days to bury Mojtaba too.”