Five IRGC members killed in US-Israeli strikes in south Iran - state media

US President Donald Trump said on Tuesday that US munitions stockpiles in medium and upper-medium grades were at their highest levels and that Washington had a “virtually unlimited supply” of those weapons.

"Wars can be fought 'forever,' and very successfully, using just these supplies (which are better than other countries finest arms!). At the highest end, we have a good supply, but are not where we want to be. Much additional high grade weaponry is stored for us in outlying countries," he wrote on Truth Social.

“The United States is stocked, and ready to WIN, BIG!!!” the US president added.

Democratic Senator John Fetterman of Pennsylvania on Monday defended President Donald Trump’s Operation Epic Fury strikes on Iran, breaking with many in his party to argue the action was necessary to prevent Tehran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

“Every single member of the Senate has agreed that we can never allow Iran to acquire a nuclear bomb. … Now look at the situation after what the president decided to do. I truly don’t understand why people can’t just be energized and actually celebrate. … For me, it’s country over party. I’m proud to stand with our military," Fetterman said on Fox.

Over the past several days, Iranian missiles have targeted three oil tankers and several oil and gas facilities in neighboring countries while also obstructing maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

The immediate market reaction was sharp but limited. On Monday, Brent crude surged more than 8 percent to $79 per barrel. Yet this level remains well below earlier projections tied to a potential full closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

So far, Tehran has failed to generate sufficient pressure on Washington by attacking tankers and regional energy infrastructure. On March 2, following two drone strikes on its gas facilities, Qatar announced a temporary suspension of liquefied natural gas (LNG) production.

The Strait of Hormuz accounts for roughly 20 percent of global LNG trade and a similar share of global oil and petroleum product consumption.

Last year, over 80 percent of the crude oil and LNG passing through the strait was destined for Asian markets. Still, Qatar’s LNG suspension triggered a 45 percent surge in European gas prices—underscoring the fragility of global energy interdependence.

Why haven’t oil prices spiked further?

The muted market response, despite near-disruptions to Hormuz transit, has several structural explanations.

First, according to the International Energy Agency, global oil markets were already oversupplied last year. If tanker disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz persist over the medium term, however, market conditions could tighten considerably.

Second, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates possess alternative pipeline routes capable of bypassing the strait. Combined, these pipelines can transport an additional 2.6 million barrels per day to global markets. This represents about 40 percent of their normal crude exports but remains a significant mitigating factor.

Iran has previously demonstrated its willingness to target critical infrastructure. In 2019, it struck Saudi facilities in Ras Tanura and the Abqaiq oil processing hub—located roughly 55 miles away—which is connected via a 1,200-kilometer pipeline to the Red Sea. On March 2, Iran again targeted the Ras Tanura refinery.

Thus far, however, Tehran has not attacked the Saudi and Emirati pipelines designed to bypass Hormuz. Should it do so, oil prices would likely rise again—but probably not to levels that would trigger severe market dislocation given current supply buffers.

Inventory data reinforce this point. OECD members—including the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Japan and Canada—hold commercial oil stocks of about 2.8 billion barrels. These reserves provide weeks of supply flexibility in the event of temporary disruption.

Iran itself reportedly holds around 200 million barrels of oil in floating storage in Asian waters and could continue deliveries to Chinese buyers for several months.

Taken together, these factors suggest that in the short term Iran’s oil weapon is unlikely to prove an effective instrument for destabilizing global markets or compelling Washington to halt its military operations.

Tehran’s apparent objective may instead be to pressure US-aligned Arab states into urging Washington to cease its attacks.

This strategy, however, carries significant risks. On March 1, Saudi Arabia signaled it would respond to Iranian attacks and placed its armed forces on heightened alert. Continued escalation could push the kingdom and other Arab states to join the US-Israeli military campaign.

The risk of a protracted conflict

US and Israeli officials have indicated that operations against Iran could continue for several weeks. The key question is whether Tehran can sustain a prolonged war of attrition.

Around 70 percent of Iran’s non-oil trade passes through ports that depend on access via the Strait of Hormuz. While Tehran may be able to disrupt the strait in the short term, sustained interference would disproportionately harm its own economy.

Thus far, the United States and Israel have not targeted Iran’s oil facilities or broader industrial and economic infrastructure, and they may prefer to avoid doing so. But that could change if Iran continues attacking regional energy assets and obstructing Hormuz transit.

Any such escalation could severely damage the country’s already fragile economy.

Another possible countermeasure would be the formation of an international coalition to secure maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz—effectively neutralizing Tehran’s leverage over global energy trade.

Finally, it is important to note that the Islamic Republic faces a severe domestic legitimacy deficit. Further weakening of the state could increase the likelihood of widespread unrest similar to the protests of January 2026, potentially raising the prospect of regime collapse from within.

All in all, Iran’s oil weapon appears structurally constrained. While capable of generating volatility, it is unlikely to deliver decisive strategic leverage.

Steve Witkoff, the US special envoy for Middle East negotiations, said on Monday Iran attempted to strong-arm the American delegation during recent nuclear talks, underestimating President Trump’s team.

“It was pretty silly, but they thought they could strong-arm us. You know, President Trump sent me and Jared there to really determine on his behalf whether they were serious about doing a deal that addressed his objectives, which are: elimination of their missile program; elimination of their advocacy and support for proxies, which is destabilizing the entire Middle East; elimination of their navy so we can have freedom of the seas and not be threatened with the shutdown of the Gulf of Hormuz; and finally, no nuclear enrichment that can get them to weapons grade, which means no nuclear bomb," Witkoff said.

"We went in there and tried to make a fair deal with them. It was very, very clear that it was going to be impossible, probably by the end of the second meeting, but we then went back for the third meeting just to give it the last college try. Of course, they thought they wanted us to report positivity. It was not a positive meeting," he added.

The United States’ special envoy for Middle East negotiations, Steve Witkoff, said Iran opened recent nuclear talks by asserting an “inalienable right” to enrich all of its nuclear fuel, a stance that surprised the US delegation and underscored the difficulty of reaching a deal.

"We discussed with them 10 years of no enrichment whatsoever, and we would pay for the fuel, and it was flatly rejected, and the President seemed to have a good faith negotiation," Witkoff said. "And they rejected that, which told us at that very moment that they had no notion of doing anything other than retaining enrichment for the purpose of weaponizing."

"They have 10,000 roughly kilograms of fissionable material that's broken up into roughly 460 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium, another 1000 kilograms of 20% enriched uranium, and the balance is at 3.67 they manufacture their own centrifuges to enrich this material. So there's almost no stopping them," Witkoff added.

"And let me say this because I forgot this small little detail in that first meeting the both the Iranian negotiators said to us directly with you know with no shame that they controlled 460 kilograms of 60% and they're aware that that could make 11 nuclear bombs. And that was the beginning of their negotiating stance. So that's, that's they were. They were proud of it. They were proud that they had evaded all sorts of oversight protocols to get to a place where they could deliver 11 nuclear bombs," he said.