A pivotal aspect in choosing a successor to Ali Khamenei, the ultimate authority in Iran and Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, will involve assessing the candidates' religious knowledge and credentials.
Khamenei’s successor as the state's Supreme Jurist (Vali-ye Faqih) must be a "mujtahid," someone qualified to issue independent religious rulings (Ijtihad).
Determining the religious knowledge and credentials of potential candidates could prove challenging for the Assembly of Experts, especially given the decentralized nature of Shia clerical hierarchies and seminaries.
This could result in disputes among the Assembly's 88 members, all recognized as "mujtahid," except for its only lay member, Mohsen Esmaili, who represents Tehran.
Q: How does one gain recognition as a "mujtahid"?
In Shia tradition, a cleric's standing is largely determined by peer recognition rather than solely by completing formal coursework.
Gaining recognition as a "mujtahid" goes beyond merely attending advanced lectures from esteemed scholars. It also requires endorsement or certification from one or more high-ranking clerics, referred to as "sources of emulation" (marja-e taqlid), or other highly respected "mujtahids."
Teaching the highest level of instruction in Shia seminaries, known as "Kharij," is a privilege reserved exclusively for "mujtahids." Although all ayatollahs are, by definition, "mujtahids," attaining the status of "mujtahid" does not automatically confer the title of ayatollah.
Q: How does the Guardian Council challenge the established seminary tradition?
In 2015, the hardline Guardian Council, responsible for election oversight, ruled that mere recognition as a "mujtahid" was insufficient to qualify for candidacy in the Assembly of Experts elections.
The Council mandated that several candidates, including Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of the Islamic Republic's founder Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, take exams to prove their qualifications.
This decision was broadly interpreted by many analysts as an attempt to marginalize political rivals and shape the selection process for Khamenei's successor.
Q: How do religious qualifications stand in the face of political realities?
Khamenei's appointment in 1989 demonstrated that elements beyond mere religious qualifications can significantly influence the choice of a Supreme Leader.
After Khomeini's death on June 3 of that year, the Assembly of Experts met swiftly, electing Khamenei as his successor by June 4.
At the time of his appointment, Khamenei was not recognized as a senior religious "source of emulation" — the traditional prerequisite for the position of Supreme Leader.
This requirement was subsequently eliminated from the Constitution via an amendment three months later.
However, it wasn't until December 1994—following the death of Ayatollah Mohsen Araki, Qom's most senior source of emulation—that some Qom clerics formally recognized Khamenei as a source of emulation.
Q: Who are some of Khamenei’s potential successors?
A specialized three-member committee within the Assembly of Experts is charged with identifying potential successors to the Supreme Leader.
This committee, believed to be operating with Khamenei's knowledge, has reportedly chosen three candidates. Their identities remain confidential, undisclosed to both the public and other Assembly members.
The scholarly profiles of these candidates likely played an important role in their selection for this secretive list.
Mojtaba Khamenei
Mojtaba Khamenei, the 55-year-old son of the Supreme Leader, is commonly regarded as a prime candidate or heir apparent, yet he might face significant challenges in establishing and gaining acceptance for his "ijtihad" authority.
Although he has studied under several notable sources of emulation in Qom, there is no public record of any of these figures having officially recognized him as a "mujtahid."
In August 2022, Rasa, the news outlet associated with Qom's seminary, notably referred to Mojtaba Khamenei as "Ayatollah" for the first time, elevating him from the previously used title of Hojjat ol-eslam. Rasa further claimed that he had been teaching "kharij" lessons for thirteen years. However, no recordings or footage of these "kharij" lectures have come to light.
In a video message released in September, Mojtaba Khamenei declared that he had decided to suspend his teaching, saying that this decision was made without his father's knowledge. He provided no additional explanation for his choice.
In September 2022, widespread protests swept Iran, with chants not only attacking the very foundation of the Islamic Republic and calling for its downfall but also specifically targeting Mojtaba Khamenei with slogans like, "Mojtaba, We'll See You Die Before Becoming a Leader."
Some Iranian politicians and media assert that Khamenei is against his son's appointment as future leader.
This month, the Tehran Times, a news outlet linked to the state-run Islamic Propaganda Organization, published an article titled "Why is Western Media Constantly Lying About Mojtaba Khamenei?" where it was claimed that, based on their sources, Khamenei "remains resolute in his opposition to any of his sons’ succession, and the Assembly of Experts is respecting that."
Alireza Arafi
Ayatollah Alireza Arafi, at 65, is another prominent figure and one of Khamenei's trusted associates. He is a recognized "mujtahid" and has long held the title of ayatollah.
Arafi currently serves as the second deputy chairman of the Assembly of Experts and holds several other high-profile positions, including head of the organization overseeing the state's Shia seminaries, one of the Friday prayer leaders of Qom (appointed by Khamenei), and a member of the Guardian Council (also appointed by Khamenei).
His status as a "mujtahid" is unlikely to be contested by assembly members.
Hashem Hosseini-Bushehri
Ayatollah Hashem Hosseini-Bushehri, at 67, is a recognized "mujtahid" whose credentials are unlikely to be questioned by the Assembly's members.
Bushehri serves as the first deputy chairman of the Assembly of Experts. Similar to Arafi, he holds multiple high-ranking roles in Qom seminaries and is one of the Friday prayer leaders of Qom, appointed by Khamenei.
Mohammad-Mehdi Mirbagheri
Ayatollah Mohammad-Mehdi Mirbagheri, aged 63, is an established "mujtahid" who has been teaching "kharij" lessons for over two decades. He is known by the title of ayatollah.
Mirbagheri remains a somehwat shadowy figure, having never held a government position.
Within Iran's political and religious circles, he is widely regarded as the ideological successor to the late Ayatollah Mohammad-Taghi Mesbah-Yazdi, who was the spiritual leader of Iran's ultraconservatives. He has been part of the Assembly of Experts since 2016.
Mirbagheri enjoys the support and loyalty the ultra-hardliner Paydari (Steadfastness) Party and the newly formed Jebhe-ye Sobh-e Iran (MASAF). He backed Saeed Jalili in the 2013 presidential elections and Ebrahim Raisi in 2017 against the moderate candidate Hassan Rouhani.
Additionally, he supported Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidential campaigns in 2005 and 2009, but distanced himself when Ahmadinejad lost Khamenei's support in 2011.
Hassan Khomeini
Many view Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of the Islamic Republic's founder, as the least probable candidate for leadership.
Nevertheless, he cannot be entirely dismissed as a potential candidate, given his high recognition as a "mujtahid" by several esteemed sources of emulation, including Ayatollah Ebrahim Amini and Ayatollah Abdollah Javadi-Amoli.
Hassan Khomeini holds the role of custodian for his grandfather's mausoleum. He started teaching "kharij" lessons in 2008, and unlike the lectures of Mojtaba Khamenei, the audio files of his teachings are available on his personal website.
In 2015, the Guardian Council disqualified him from participating in the Assembly of Experts election, asserting that they could not verify his "ijtihad" capabilities. However, Hassan Khomeini countered that the Council had never extended an invitation for an interview to assess his qualifications as a "mujtahid".
Within two weeks, the number rose to at least 46—that is one life taken every 8 hours. Human rights groups believe the real toll is even higher.
It was clear that the Islamic Republic had no intention of slowing down after it executed more than 900 in 2024, a record since 2015, as reported by the United Nations human rights office.
On January 30, 2024, a Tuesday, political prisoners in the women’s ward of Tehran’s Evin prison announced that they would go on hunger strike every Tuesday to protest the rising executions, and in solidarity with ten others who had done so in Ghezel Hesar prison.
The move was triggered by the execution of Mohammad Qobadlou and Farhad Salimi just a week prior. A new campaign was born: No to Execution Tuesdays. Nobel Peace Prize laureate Narges Mohammadi backed the move on Instagram.
In the one year since that Tuesday, hundreds of political prisoners from over 30 prisons have joined the campaign, refusing to eat or drink on Tuesday. They accuse the Islamic Republic of weaponizing the death penalty to silence dissent.
Their demand? The abolition of what they call "state-sponsored premeditated murder”.
“This is the first time prisoners from diverse political backgrounds have united to consistently protest executions,” Mahmood Amiry-Moghaddam, Director of IHR NGO told Iran International, hailing the campaign as a “milestone” in Iran’s fight against the death penalty and calling on Iranian civil society to join the campaign and express opposition to executions every Tuesday.
The long death row
At least 54 political prisoners are currently on death row in Iran, according to the Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), with 19 having their convictions upheld by higher courts of the Islamic Republic.
One is Pakhshan Azizi, a Kurdish-Iranian human rights activist and social worker, who has been sentenced to death for "armed rebellion against the state." Amnesty International has condemned her sentence, calling it another example of a broader pattern targeting minorities and activists.
Leading in capital punishments
The Islamic Republic of Iran carries out three-quarters of all executions globally—outside China, which classifies capital punishment numbers as state secret, according to Amnesty International. It’s worth noting that Iran holds around 1 percent of the world’s population.
In 2024, a total of 31 women were executed in Iran, the highest annual number in 17 years. Many were convicted of murder in cases stemming from domestic violence or forced marriage. Iran also leads in executions of ethnic minorities, who often face systemic discrimination and lack access to fair trials.
Executions for drug-related offenses have surged since 2020, reversing a brief decline following the 2017 Amendment to the Anti-Narcotics Law. IHR NGO reported that drug-related executions in 2023 were 18 times higher than the annual average between 2018 and 2020. Ethnic minorities disproportionately bear the brunt of these executions.
In December 2024, political prisoner Ahmadreza Haeri issued a chilling warning from Ghezel Hesar prison about an impending "massacre" of drug offenders.
“Prosecutors in Tehran’s surrounding areas have decided to execute ALL drug offenders with final death sentences before Norouz [Iranian New Year, March 21],” Haeri warned, highlighting that the prison holds three times its official capacity.
Road ahead: collective responsibility
The campaign No to Execution Tuesdays represents an act of resistance by political prisoners and a step in the long march to the abolition of the death penalty in Iran.
But stopping, even slowing, Tehran’s execution machine requires an urgent and unified response from various players, according to Amiry-Moghadam.
Political advocacy, public awareness campaigns, and targeted sanctions on judicial officials could all be part of a collective effort to challenge the Islamic Republic on its continued executions.
Iranian political prisoners have sparked a movement of hope and defiance. But ending the death penalty in Iran is a tall order that those involved in the campaign say requires sustained efforts at every level—domestic, regional, and international.
Whether or not they can attract the widespread solidarity they seek remains to be seen.
