Iran International political analyst
In the week since Donald Trump won the US election, Iran’s president Masoud Pezeshkian and his foreign policy chiefs have talked about the importance of engaging with Washington. Their wording may vary, but the message is one: that tensions with the US must be managed.
Pezeshkian, his right-hand man Javad Zarif, and Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi appear to have recognized that the era of American leniency toward Tehran under president Joe Biden is nearing its end.
In most countries, comments from a president and a foreign minister would be the ultimate reflection of that state’s foreign policy. Not in Iran.
On the biggest and most consequential questions in Tehran—whether or not to attack Israel, whether or not to support Hezbollah, whether or not to move toward nuclear weaponization, and of course, whether or not to talk to the Americans—on all these questions, Pezeshkian and his team hold little or now sway.
Their role is to present a civilized, more relatable face to the outside world. But the real face of power in the Islamic Republic is the supreme leader Ali Khamenei and the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who can hardly be clearer when voicing their anti-American and anti-Israeli agenda.
A few days ago, FM Araghchi suggested on X that US president-elect Donald Trump should adopt “Maximum Rationality" instead of returning to his “Maximum Pressure”, which in the eyes of Araghchi will lead to “Maximum Defeat” for America.
The irony of Iran calling for rational behavior aside, it seems unlikely that Trump would heed Araghchi’s advice or pay particular attention to similar comments from Zarif and Pezeshkian. The president-elect is much more likely to take note of Tehran’s attempt to hurt American interests and alleged attempts to assassinate him.
President Biden was relatively lenient in dealing with Iran. His team tried not to aggravate the ayatollahs and prevent an all-out war in the Middle East. This approach made Iran more aggressive, in fact. Regional armed groups aligned with the IRGC were emboldened..
Thus, it seems unlikely that the Iranian charm offensive, spearheaded by Araghchi, will alter the incoming Trump administration’s hawkish approach against the Islamic Republic. It’s also unlikely that Trump will engage in direct confrontation with Iran early in his term.
The president-elect said during his campaign that all he wants from Iran is not to make a nuclear weapon. It cannot be ruled out that he offers broader talks that include not just Iran’s nuclear program but missile capabilities. The latter is something Khamenei and IRGC commanders are unlikely to entertain.
The complicating factor in all this is that Tehran is closer to a nuclear weapon than it has ever been. And it has been suggesting for some time that it might reconsider its long-standing position against weaponization.
It’s hard to tell if this is just a bluff or a serious threat. Given Trump’s clear message about a nuclear Iran, and glancing over what Israel has been willing to do across the Middle East in the past year, Khamenei would be risking all if he were to follow with that threat.
Ali Larijani was meeting with the head of Syria's Supreme National Security Council when a nearby building was hit with three air strikes, according to an unconfirmed report by the Jamaran news website in Iran, which added that Larijani was unhurt.
Several people were killed and injured on Thursday in Israeli airstrikes targeting two residential buildings in the suburbs of Syria's capital, Damascus, according to the state news agency SANA.
Israel's military radio reported that the strikes targeted assets and the headquarters of the Palestinian militant group Islamic Jihad.
While Israel has conducted airstrikes on Iran-linked targets in Syria for years, it has significantly intensified these operations following the October 7 attack last year by the Palestinian group Hamas, which ignited the Gaza war.
Larijani held talks with Hammouda Sabbagh, the Speaker of the Syrian People's Assembly on Thursday afternoon but Iran’s foreign ministry gave no detailed explanation of the itinerary and goals of his trip.
The special envoy, a senior advisor to Khamenei and a former parliament speaker, is no stranger to unofficial diplomacy. He previously played a central role in securing the 25-Year Iran-China Agreement, a controversial deal whose full terms were never publicly disclosed.
During that effort, he bypassed Iran’s formal governmental structures to deliver Khamenei’s message directly to Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Now, operating outside Iran’s traditional diplomatic framework, his Syria visit may be a sign that Khamenei is again relying on direct emissaries to manage critical foreign policy matters.
Bashar al-Assad, whose government survived a rebellion beginning in 2011 largely due to Iranian military and financial backing, occupies a pivotal position in Tehran’s regional security calculus.
Syria’s geographic proximity to Israel and Lebanon makes it a key base for Iran's Lebanese ally Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel.
Over the past year, Israeli strikes have repeatedly targeted Iranian-linked forces and infrastructure in Syria, with high-ranking Iranian and Hezbollah commanders among those killed.
Although Assad has maintained close ties with Iran, he has occasionally distanced himself from Tehran’s broader regional conflicts. Notably, he has managed to mend relations with Saudi Arabia and rejoined the Arab League in 2023 after years of diplomatic isolation.
Assad’s restrained response to the recent escalation following Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel suggests a cautious approach, even as Syria remains a key theater in Iran’s regional strategy.
The envoy’s meeting with Assad and other officials is being seen as part of Iran’s efforts to consolidate its position in Syria amid heightened regional tensions.
Iranian officials have repeatedly signaled plans for retaliation against Israel for its attack on Iran on October 26 but have refrained from detailing their timeline or approach.
In April and October 2024, Iran launched unprecedented missile attacks on Israel, with the October 1 assault involving around 200 ballistic missiles targeting military installations and urban centers, marking the largest direct attack by Iran on Israel.
These strikes were retaliatory responses to earlier Israeli operations, including airstrikes on Iranian-linked targets in Syria.
In response, on October 26 Israel launched a series of airstrikes against Iranian military assets, including missile facilities and Revolutionary Guard units, aiming to weaken Iran’s capabilities and deter further aggression.
This escalation marked a shift from proxy warfare to direct confrontation between the two nations.
Larijani's visit will mark his second meeting with Assad. The first occurred in February 2020, shortly after the assassination of Qassem Soleimani by US forces in Iraq, a trip that underscored his role as Khamenei’s trusted emissary during critical periods.
As the region braces for further developments, the visit signals Iran’s intent to strengthen its coordination with Syria and reassert its influence in the face of mounting challenges.