IRGC officer, four gunmen killed in attack on military drill

The reported involvement of Trump’s former Special Envoy for Iran, Brian Hook, on the State Department transition team has drawn attention from Iran watchers and Iranian Americans, who view it as a signal of a tougher stance toward Tehran following four years of more lenient policies under the Biden administration. However, Hook is not the only “Iran hawk” being considered for Trump’s senior policy team.

Former Ambassador Richard Grenell

Richard Grenell, former US ambassador to Germany during Trump’s first term, had an active role during his recent campaign and joined candidate Trump in his meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymir Zelensky, when he visited the US in September. Grenell’s name is being mentioned in the US media as a possible leading figure in Trump’s foreign policy team, either to lead the State Department or be a top presidential advisor.

Although Grenell is a staunch supporter of Trump’s policies, he is also an experienced diplomat, who is well familiar with Europe and their relations with Iran. In a recent interview with Newsmax, Grenell was cautious not to echo calls by some Trump supporters to cede Ukrainian territory to Russia. He told the interviewer that Ukraine’s territorial integrity is important, when asked if land concessions to Russia can stop the war. In the same interview, he criticized the US decision to allow Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian to visit New York for the UN General Assembly, although he pointed out that Pezeshkian faced daily protests outside his hotel.

Grenell has also been a strong critic of Iran not just for its nuclear program and military and foreign policies, but also for its human rights record, particularly on LGBTQ rights. In April 2022, he told Iran International TV, “We know that they deny systemically, every single day, basic human rights for women, for gays and lesbians, for the general population”.

In April 2022, the former ambassador was sanctioned, along with 23 other US figures by Iran for “terrorist activity and human rights violations.” In his interview, Grenell argued that Tehran does not sanction Democrats because they “are darting towards the Iranian regime.” He went on to say, “The Biden administration is filled with total hypocrisy. They pretend to talk about human rights, but it doesn't come into their calculus… they're talking about giving money to the Iranian regime, they dropped the sanctions on the Iranian regime.”

Former National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien

Another former senior Trump national security aide being considered possibly for Secretary of State is Robert O’Brien, who previously served as Trump’s hostage negotiator and later as national security advisor. He played a key role in 2019 in releasing a Princeton graduate student, Xiyue Wang, imprisoned in Iran on a ten-year sentence, after a secret trial without due process. In fact it was a prisoner exchange without any monetary ransom being paid, compared to a deal the Biden administration made in 2023, when $6 billion of Iran’s frozen funds were released in exchange for five hostages.

O’Brien, a lawyer with extensive experience in foreign affairs, would add stability and depth to Trump’s national security and foreign policy team. He is well-versed in Iran-related issues and, in a December 2022 talk at the Council on Foreign Relations, strongly defended the stance of those opposing President Obama’s 2015 nuclear deal, criticizing it as a “$150 billion gift” to Tehran in exchange for a weak agreement.

“I remember at the time President Obama had a very eloquent inauguration speech when he said: We’ll reach out our hand if you’ll unclench your fist. Well, we reached out our hand with 150 billion (dollars) in it, and they took the 150 billion (dollars) and spent it on Kata’ib Hezbollah and on the Houthis and on Hamas and on the Assad regime and created death and mayhem all over the Middle East,” he argued.

O’Brien does not perceive Iran’s Islamic government as pliable to change its ideological essence. Criticizing Western liberal notions that financial enrichment can lead to political liberalization, he said, “Well…if we trade with them, and we give them concessions, they’ll become rich, they’ll become more like us, they’ll become more democratic. The Iranian regime became more autocratic, exported more terrorism, created more mayhem in the world, killed more Americans and others. So bad idea from the start.”

The former national security advisor holds the view that Iran must make major concessions not just on its nuclear program, but also its ballistic missiles and its regional interventions – crucial points in Trump’s demands when he withdrew from the JCPOA. Agreeing that eventually there should be a deal with Iran, O’Brien has said, “There’s a ballistic missile program that holds Israel at risk, but all of our allies in Europe and eventually will hold us at risk, should be curtailed and stopped. The nuclear program should be stopped. And support of terrorism in the region should be stopped. And the attempts to assassinate former government officials and dissidents in America and Europe should stop.”

Sen. Bill Hagerty (R-Tenn.)

US media also mention Republican Senator Bill Hagerty as a possible Secretary of State, Treasury or Commerce. He served as trump’s ambassador to Japan and was an economic advisor in the George W. Bush White House.

Hagerty has been outspoken on Iran related issues in the Senate, often criticizing the Biden administration’s policies and conduct regarding the Middle East and joining other Republicans demanding more pressure on Tehran.

He sharply criticized the administration earlier this year for not being candid about its Iran envoy Robert Malley who was suspended in 2023 for alleged security breaches at his job. He also accused Malley of being behind lack of sanctions enforcement by the administration. He told a Senate panel that the Iran envoy convinced the US government “to look the other way,” so that Iran could sell more oil to China in exchange for limiting its nuclear activities. “It is a disgrace,” he told the panel.

Hagerty also slammed the $6 billion deal that led to the release of five prisoners held by Iran, and on many occasions criticized Tehran’s human rights violations.

Another major political figure being mentioned as a possible Secretary of State is Florida Senator Marco Rubio, who holds strong pro-Israel views and has regularly blamed Iran for creating mayhem in the region. In April, after an Iranian missile attack on Israel, Rubio told the CNN, “Iran knows it cannot beat Israel militarily. But what it does aspire to do is make Israel an impossible place to live in and a place no one wants to visit.”

Following Iran's ballistic missile strikes on Israel on October 1, and the likelihood of Israeli retaliatory strikes on Iranian oil facilities, especially the Kharg oil terminal, Iran’s oil loadings sharply declined.

Arman Azizian, a senior analyst at the energy consulting firm Vortexa, told Iran International that Iran's loadings of crude and biproducts dropped to 1.5 million barrels per day in October, with most of this decline occurring in the first half of the month.

Homayoun Falakshahi, a senior analyst at the commodity data intelligence firm, Kpler, told Iran International that Iran's loadings fell from 1.826 mb/d in September to 1.473 mb/d last month, marking a daily decline of around 350,000 barrels, which equates to a loss of $800 million in oil export value during the month.

In 2018, then President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), leading to a rapid drop in Iran’s oil exports—from 2.5 million barrels per day (mb/d) to just 350,000 barrels within two years. As a result, Iran’s oil revenue in 2020 fell to less than one-tenth of its 2017 levels.

With the Biden administration’s lenient approach, Iran’s daily oil exports saw a significant increase each year, peaking at a record 1.85 mb/d in September of this year, the highest level in five years.

China is the main buyer of Iranian crude oil, having imported an average of over 1.5 million barrels per day from Iran in the first ten months of this year, accounting for 94% of Iran's total oil exports. During the same period, Iran also sent around 46,000 barrels per day to Syria and about 20,000 barrels to Brunei and unknown destinations.

Trump’s Return

Donald Trump’s return to the White House might endanger the Iranian government’s daily crude oil export target of 1.85 million barrels in next year’s budget—250,000 barrels more than Iran’s average oil exports this year and 550,000 barrels more than last year.

With Trump’s return, Iran’s oil exports are not expected to plummet suddenly to 2020 levels (350,000 barrels per day). However, the growth will certainly not continue and will likely experience a gradual decline.

Iran’s oil buyers in China are mostly small, independent refineries, which might resist US pressure for a while. Ultimately, however, given the $575 billion annual trade between China and the US, it seems unlikely that Beijing will withstand demands for a significant reduction in Iranian oil imports.

Moreover, Iran’s expanded ability to export more oil to China due to weak US sanctions enforcement since 2021 has led to a reduction in the discount it offers Chinese refineries—from $13 in 2023 to under $4 in recent months. However, a tougher US approach under the upcoming administration could prompt Chinese refineries to cut their Iranian oil purchases and demand larger discounts to continue buying.

Additionally, almost all Iranian oil exports to China are facilitated through intermediaries in Iraq, Oman, and especially Malaysia, incurring significant costs for Iran to evade sanctions. With Trump poised to enforce stricter measures, these intermediary costs are expected to increase substantially.

Israel's prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose country is bracing for a potential Iranian retaliatory attack any day, was one of the first world leaders to call Trump and congratulate him after his victory.

The two leaders discussed Iran as a key security issue, according to Netanyahu's office. They "agreed to work together for Israel's security as well as the threat posed by Iran."

The president-elect's hard line on Iran was indicated by Brian Hook, Trump's former Iran envoy who is leading the transition team at the State Department according to several media reports.

Trump’s policy aims to isolate Iran diplomatically and weaken its economy, Hook told CNN on Thursday, adding that, though regime change is not the goal.

"President Trump has no interest in regime change in Iran. The future of Iran will be decided by the Iranian people," he said. "But Trump would isolate Iran diplomatically and weaken them economically so that they can't fund all of the violence that's going with the Houthis in Yemen, Hamas, Hezbollah and these proxies that run around Iraq and Syria today, all of whom destabilize Israel and our (Persian) Gulf partners."

Hook called Iran the chief driver of instability in the region and said if the Trump administration decides to deter Tehran, regional countries harmed by Iranian policies will do everything they can to be part of those efforts.

In the previous Trump administration, Hook served as the US special envoy for Iran. During his tenure in office, the US assassinated Qassem Soleimani, a top Iranian military commander who had led the Islamic Republic's foreign military operations. That turned him as well as Trump and his state secretary, Mike Pompeo, into targets of Iran's assassination plots, according to the FBI.

Iran says 'not swayed by threats'

Following Trump's election victory, Iran's Vice President for Strategic Affairs Javad Zarif expressed hope that President-elect Trump and Vice-president-elect Vance "will stand against war as pledged and will heed the clear lesson given by the American electorate to end wars and prevent new ones."

"Iran, having shown its resolve and ability to stand up to any aggression, will not be swayed by threats, but will be cognizant of respect," Zarif said.

The Trump administration, however, is not expected to accept the Iranian vice-president's olive branch. Hook said in 2019 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps's actions, rather than Zarif's words, are the true marks of Iran's intentions.

"Zarif is very good at talking. This is essentially his stock in trade. And so Foreign Minister Zarif is a man without much power. The real foreign minister of Iran is Qassem Soleimani, the general of the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps" Hook said at a Center for Strategic and International Studies event.

"Zarif presents a very seductive storefront of this administration".

On Thursday, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei made no mention of the US elections in his first public speech following Donald Trump’s victory.

Instead, speaking to the members of the Experts Assembly, a council responsible for appointing his successor, he warned about the danger of “deviation” in revolutions, the current crisis in the Middle East, and promised Israel’s eventual defeat.

Khamenei repeatedly asserted in the past that the Islamic Republic would not engage in negotiations with the Trump administration. He also declined to respond to a message from Trump, delivered by the late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in June 2019.

Some observers suggest in the media that Khamenei may now recognize the need for direct negotiations and, as a result, could adopt a more cautious tone regarding the incoming US President. This shift may stem from Iran’s severe economic challenges, a frustrated population nearing a breaking point, and escalating tensions with Israel.

“[Ruhollah] Khomeini was just as insistent on continuing the war with Iraq, but he eventually had to accept the UN Resolution that ended the war,” Mehdi, an Iranian businessman in Tehran who voted for Pezeshkian in the hope that he may succeed in lifting the Trump-imposed sanctions told Iran International.

"But for now, he will likely maintain that nothing has changed, awaiting further details on Trump’s appointments for national security adviser, secretary of state, and Iran envoy," he added. "Their significant challenge remains the vow to avenge [Qassem] Soleimani’s death."

Khomeini referred to his acceptance of Resolution 598 to end the eight-year Iran-Iraq war in 1988 as drinking a “chalice of poison”. “Khamenei has to drink the poison, too,” Mehdi said.

President Masoud Pezeshkian briefly referred to the US elections in a meeting with his campaign members Thursday. “It will never make any difference to us who wins in the US elections because our country and system rely on our internal power and our proud and great nation.”

Nevertheless, Pezeshkian emphasized that, while his government prioritizes strengthening relations with Islamic and neighboring countries, it does not hold a "closed or limited outlook" on expanding ties with other nations.

Pezeshkian’s Strategic Affairs Deputy and former foreign minister, Mohammad-Javad Zarif, who led the US negotiations resulting in the 2015 nuclear deal, expressed hope in a tweet Thursday evening that the incoming Trump and J.D. Vance administration would “stand against war as pledged” and “heed the clear lesson given by the American electorate to end wars and prevent new ones.”

In his tweet, Zarif addressed Trump and Vance directly by tagging their accounts.

“Iran, having shown its resolve and ability to stand up to any aggression, will not be swayed by threats, but will be cognizant of respect,” he wrote without mentioning Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018, the draconian sanctions that he consequently imposed on Iran, or prospects for direct talks with the US.

Quoting Khamenei’s statements about Trump, ultra-hardliners have sternly warned Zarif on social media in the past two days that he must get the thought of negotiating with “Soleimani’s murderer” out of his head.

While stressing that the Islamic Republic has had “profoundly bitter experiences” with various US administrations, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Esmail Baghaei said Thursday that the US elections presented an opportunity for “revisiting and revision of misguided previous approaches”.

“What is important to Iran, and an assessment criterion, is the conduct of the US government,” he added.

The President-elect has pledged to leap into action between his election on November 5 and inauguration on January 20, 2025. Traditionally, this “lame-duck” period has been one of inaction, yet the pressing military crises—one in Eastern Europe, the other in the Middle East—compel both the outgoing Biden and incoming Trump administrations to coordinate with a shared sense of urgency.

Trump’s return could signal an era of decisive US diplomacy. He has vowed to stand resolutely by Israel while assuring America’s Arab allies of their security against Iran’s regional ambitions. The ongoing conflict, ignited by Hamas’s assault on Israel on October 7, 2023, has dragged on into its thirteenth month. Trump’s pledge to “end the conflict” has left all actors, save perhaps Israel’s Netanyahu, in a state of suspense, watching keenly to see how his foreign policy could reshape the volatile dynamics of this troubled region.

Indeed, the possibility of Trump’s return to the White House has been on the minds of all factions involved in this conflict. Analysts, too, have speculated on what Trump might achieve in the Middle East. In my previous piece, What Would a Re-elected Trump Do with Iran?, I argued that his handling of the “Iran Question” would require a strategy of global engagement, one that enlists cooperation from Russia and China. Now, the key question is: How would Trump tackle Iran and its proxies in his first hundred days?

The Middle East since 2016

When Trump first took office in 2016, Iran enjoyed unmatched ascendancy in the region. Under Obama, conciliatory policies and efforts to establish the JCPOA allowed Iran to consolidate regional power, expanding influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen under the guise of fighting ISIS. By Trump’s departure in 2020, the Middle East, though not fully at peace, was on a trajectory shaped by his policies: Iran and its proxies faced sanctions and the threat of decisive strikes, such as the killing of Qasem Soleimani. The Abraham Accords, spearheaded by Trump, brought Arab states like Bahrain and the UAE into peace with Israel.

Biden’s term, by contrast, focused on attempts to negotiate with Iran and address Israeli-Palestinian tensions, with no success. Iran exploited lax sanctions enforcement to arm proxies like the Houthis, Hamas, and Hezbollah with drones and missiles. Biden’s mediation of a Saudi-Israeli accord, rooted in the Abraham Accords, showed diplomatic promise but was undermined by Hamas’s October 7 attack, backed by Iran.

A year later, Israel’s efforts to dismantle Hamas and Hezbollah have inflicted heavy damage on their resources, leaders, and infrastructure, dealing a significant blow to Iran’s regional ambitions, if more gradually than desired.

Between Biden’s lame duck period and Trump’s first 100 days

Trump’s re-emergence is an unsettling development for Iran and its proxies, while it can embolden certain leaders who, until now, were wary of Tehran’s wrath. Khamenei and his associates have responded by exhibiting a curious blend of defiance and indifference. Among Iran’s proxies, the reaction has varied: Hezbollah’s new Secretary-General, Naim Qassem, has pledged to continue the struggle against Israel while hinting at indirect ceasefire talks. Meanwhile, Iran’s IRGC deputy chief renewed Iran’s vow to retaliate recent Israeli strikes, irrespective of Trump’s victory. In the days leading up to November 5, reports emerged of Iran moving ballistic missiles to Iraq, seemingly in preparation for attacks on Israel from Iraqi soil.

Trump’s return may also inspire leaders in nations where Iran’s influence has rendered governance nearly impossible. His firm support for Israel and conservative Arab monarchies may offer vital backing to those in Iraq and Lebanon striving to throw off Iran’s yoke. Senior Shia cleric Ayatollah Ali Sistani in Iraq has issued a powerful declaration stating that only the Iraqi army has the right to bear arms, effectively rebuking Iranian-backed militias and denouncing Iran’s use of Iraqi soil to target Israel. In Lebanon, as of three weeks ago, the Lebanese Prime Minister had already rebuked Iran’s interference in Lebanese affairs, and some in the Lebanese political establishment have called for enforcing UN Security Council Resolutions 1701 and 1559, which mandate the disarmament of all militias—implicitly challenging Hezbollah’s powerful presence.

Should Trump follow through on his promise, and if the Biden administration remains committed to counter any Iranian escalation, the united resolve of both administrations may well give Iran pause. Khamenei, though far from an ideal rational actor, understands Biden’s outgoing team has little to lose by striking Iran decisively if provoked. Indeed, Iranian officials have reiterated Tehran’s ability to produce nuclear weapons at short notice.

If Khamenei were to gamble on developing and deploying nuclear weapons in the coming months, Trump would face a grave dilemma. On one hand, he has promised the American people to avoid foreign entanglements; on the other, he has vowed to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and has assured security for Israel and Arab allies. Trump has both diplomatic and military options at his disposal, including pressuring Iran via Russia to dismantle any nuclear weapons or turn them over to Russian custody, or use advanced bombers equipped to penetrate Iran’s nuclear bunkers. However risky, such measures could likely gain Congressional support, especially from a Republican-led majority.

In conclusion, although irrational reprisals from Iran’s mullahs or their Hezbollah allies cannot be ruled out, Trump stands poised to act. With Congress behind him and the potential to broker peace between Russia and Ukraine, Trump is a formidable foe—one whom Khamenei would be wise not to underestimate. Trump’s greatest weapon remains his unpredictability, a force he wielded against Iran before and may once again deploy with lethal precision. Should Khamenei persist in his antagonism, Trump shall see him stand corrected, and in this contest, it may well be game, set, and match.

This opinion article was submitted on Nov. 6. Opinions expressed by the author are not necessarily the views of Iran International.