Israel attacks targets in Syria and Lebanon as air campaign continues

On Wednesday, Israeli authorities warned all citizens to leave Sri Lanka with immediate effect after the plot was uncovered targeting Israelis holidaying in the country.

Two people have been arrested, one of whom Iraqi, with others believed to have been involved, according to a source inside Israel, speaking to Iran International anonymously.

A police source in Sri Lanka told Iran International that currently, 577 Israelis are being given "maximum security" in an operation which spans the police and military.

"They are safe," he said. "But they are targeting Israelis because of the Iran and Israel issue." The investigation is ongoing with fears others involved are yet to be found, he said.

Israel's former head of Interpol, Asher Ben Arzi, said Sri Lanka has become a popular holiday destination for Israelis.

However, he told Iran International that "it's a very easy place for Iran, because Iranian agents can meet Israelis and make them a target there". He added: "Until now, there was never such a security problem relating to Israelis in Sri Lanka."

The US Embassy also warned citizens that they had received “received credible information" warning of an attack targeting popular tourist locations in the Arugam Bay area.

“Due to the serious risk posed by this threat, the Embassy imposed a travel restriction on Embassy personnel for Arugam Bay effective immediately and until further notice,” a statement said.

US citizens were "strongly urged to avoid the Arugam Bay area until further notice.”

Iran expert Ronen Solomon, an Israeli intelligence analyst, said Malaysia has traditionally been a key base for Iran to carry out attacks around Asia, and even allowed them to springboard across to Europe.

"But north India has also harbored Shia groups recruited by Iran," he said.

Since the November 27, 2020, assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the head of Iran's military nuclear program, an act attributed to Israel, Iranian security forces have orchestrated attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets across four continents: Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe.

Cash for killing plots under the command of specific units in the Quds Force and Ministry of Intelligence who recruited and operated Iranian agents alongside local recruits, have since become common, most recently, even inside Israel.

In 2022, an operation against the Israeli embassy in India led to weeks of security alerts in the country, with dozens more plots uncovered since in countries from Azerbaijan to the UK and Cyprus.

“Iranian groups tasked with targeting the US elections may make an effort—as they have in the past—to run influence operations both shortly before and soon after the election by leveraging cyber intrusions from weeks to months prior,” the report said.

On October 14, the report showed that the MTAC’s findings uncovered an online persona operated by Iran began falsely posing as an American. The online persona had called on Americans to boycott the elections due to both candidates’ support for Israel’s military operations.

A spokesperson for Iran's mission to the United Nations strongly rejected Iran's interference with the US presidential elections Wednesday. "Such allegations are fundamentally unfounded and wholly inadmissible," the spokesperson said.

The spokesperson added that "Iran neither has any motive nor intent to interfere in the US election" and contended that the allegations brought against Iran would only cause the US government to be discredited.

Two weeks ahead of the 2020 US elections, an Iranian hacker group called Cotton Sandstorm, also known as Emennet Pasargad, launched its first cyber-enabled influence operations, the Microsoft report said. It performed reconnaissance and limited probing of election-related websites in some swing states in April and reconnaissance of major US media outlets in May.

Cotton Sandstorm is directed by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), the Microsoft report said, adding that the MTAC has yet not observed activity suggesting that the group has launched influence operations targeting the upcoming elections but expects it to increase its activity closer to the elections.

According to the report, the group ran an email campaign in 2020 posing as the right-wing “Proud Boys”, threatening Florida residents to “vote for Trump or else!”.

This, the report said, was followed by a separate operation following the election which called for violence against election officials who claimed the elections were secure or denied claims of widespread fraud.

Senior US officials told Reuters in 2020 that the hacker group’s email campaign did not affect individual voting systems but aimed to create chaos, confusion, and doubt.

US officials also told Reuters that a mistake the hackers made in a video that they attached to some of the emails helped government analysts and private sector investigators to quickly attribute the cyber operations to Iranian hackers.

Microsoft detected Cotton Sandstorm running its last operation targeting Israel’s participation in the Paris Olympics in late July 2024, the MTAC report said.

Naser Naqavian, once a prominent figure on state TV, has been barred from both speaking on air and teaching at universities. He has spoken about the declining role and status of Muslim clerics in Iranian society, despite the country being officially governed by Shiite clergy.

In an extensive interview with the Khabar Online website, Naser Naqavian said that clerics were increasingly isolated from Iranian society. He remarked that some clerics are so affluent that many people believe their pockets are directly connected to the country’s oil pipelines.

Speaking about his own financial situation, Naqavian said that he had to move from the affluent Pasdaran Avenue in northern Tehran to Fardis, a district outside the industrial town of Karaj some 50 kilometers West of Tehran.

He noted that clerics who became government officials have lost their standing with the broader population, as they no longer speak for the people. He pointed to their hardline stance on enforcing compulsory hijab as a key issue, likening their position to that of the Taliban, which has further alienated them from mainstream Iranian society.

Naqavian stressed, however, that he is not a "counter-revolutionary" or a member of the opposition. "I simply oppose the policies I believe are wrong and want those policies to be corrected."

The growing divide between the Iranian public and the ruling clerics has been acknowledged by the country’s seminaries as far back as 2017. A major media outlet from the Qom Seminary, Mobahesat (Discussions), explored this issue and its underlying causes. Studies published by Mobahesat revealed that clerics' popularity has been in decline since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Several debates involving prominent Muslim scholars were sparked by the publication, during which high-ranking seminarians concluded that the public’s increasingly negative view of the clergy stems largely from the behavior of clerics who serve as state officials.

In 2023, following a series of physical attacks on clerics in the wake of the 2022 nationwide protests, Ayatollah Mohammad Javad Alavi Boroujerdi argued that these assaults were a direct result of the widening divide between the public and the clerical establishment. He urged officials to avoid further alienating the people by making hardline statements that fuel public resentment.

However, to shield himself from potential government reprisals, Boroujerdi also attributed the growing hostility toward clerics to foreign media "fanning the flames" of discontent.

In contrast, female religious scholar Sedigheh Vasmaghi, a vocal critic of the regime’s compulsory hijab policy, argued that it was already too late to bridge the gap between clerics and the people. She asserted that the clerics’ fundamentalist views had fostered insecurity in Iranian society, adding that they should have anticipated the consequences of their hardline stances and behavior.

In his interview, Naqavian noted that the government labels reformist clerics as counter-revolutionaries. He also revealed that, due to the public's increasingly negative perception of clerics, he often refrains from wearing his traditional clerical robe and turban when going about his daily life.

When asked about the difference in how people react to him in clerical versus non-clerical attire, Naqavian explained, "For those who know me, their reaction doesn’t change regardless of what I wear. But for others, it’s different. When they see me in my clerical robe and turban, they treat me the same way they treat other clerics."

During and for some time after the 2022 protest in Iran "turban tossing" or "turban flipping" was popular among young protesters. Young disgruntled people used to take the turban off the clerics' head and toss it in the street. Compared to violent attacks on clerics at that time, turban tossing was a light-hearted reaction.

According to the budget bill, the Iranian government is projected to receive approximately 37.5% of the country’s total oil and gas export revenues, amounting to around €24 billion.

Of this amount, 51%—approximately €12 billion—will be allocated to military funding.

Officially known as the Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Forces, they consist of the Army, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the Law Enforcement Forces (LEF).

From the remaining funds, 42.5% will go toward the government’s operating budget, and 6.5% will be earmarked for "special projects."

In the budget bill, the official exchange rate for the euro has increased from 310,000 rials this year to about 502,000 rials next year. Because of this change, the armed forces’ income from the government’s oil revenues will rise sharply. Next year, their income will exceed €12 billion, compared to €4.3 billion this year and €3 billion the previous year.

In practice, the government will provide the Armed Forces with oil valued in euros, which they can then sell to foreign buyers.

With the price of oil set at €57.5 per barrel in next year's budget, this allocation amounts to a daily delivery of 583,000 barrels to the military.

Tanker tracking data indicate that the IRGC exports around 85,000 barrels of oil per day to Syria. As a result, most of the oil allocated to the Armed Forces is expected to be directed to China – which accounts for 95% of the country’s total oil exports.

This year, the Armed Forces' share of oil exports exceeds 200,000 barrels per day, with less than half going to Syria and the remainder directed to Chinese markets.

In addition to other measures targeting the IRGC, the US has repeatedly imposed sanctions on networks affiliated with the state’s paramilitary forces for smuggling oil.

Some of these networks operate out of the UAE and East Asian countries, particularly China and Hong Kong.

In addition to the share from the government’s oil exports, the Armed Forces also receive financial resources from other lines within the total state budget.

This year, the total budget allocated to Iran's Armed Forces is estimated at around $17 billion, including $4.5 billion worth of oil cargoes.

The draft of next year's budget, made available to the media, does not mention other budget lines related to the Armed Forces.

Government's reliance on oil and gas revenues to finance budget

In total, based on figures from the budget bill, the government expects €64 billion in oil and gas export revenues for the country.

Of this amount, €4.8 billion is expected to come from gas exports (16 billion cubic meters at a price of 30 cents per cubic meter), and €59 billion from oil and petroleum product exports.

According to Iran's customs reports, the country’s total revenue from oil and petroleum product exports last year was approximately $37 billion, and in the first half of this year, it has already reached $24 billion.

The budget bill does not specify the expected oil export volume, but it indicates that the government plans to increase daily crude oil production by 350,000 barrels year-on-year, bringing it to 3.75 million barrels per day next year.

Since Iran will not be launching any new oil refineries in the next two years, the entire increase in oil production is intended for export.

The government has also stated in the budget bill that, although the National Development Fund’s share of oil export revenues is 48%, the actual share will be 20%, with the remaining 28% (€17.9 billion) loaned to the government.

As a result, next year, 65.5% of oil and gas export revenues will flow into the government budget, 14.5% will go to the National Oil and Gas Companies, and 20% will be allocated to the National Development Fund.

To cover the budget deficit, the government has borrowed over $100 billion from the National Development Fund and has been unable to repay it. This continued borrowing jeopardizes the future of the Fund’s assets, which were primarily intended for lending to the private sector.

Recently, the head of Iran's National Development Fund revealed that the foreign currency reserves of this financial institution have nearly been depleted, and the government is unable to repay its debts.

The government is also expected to earn €4.5 billion from the internal sale of petroleum products and gas.

Year after year, the sale of bootleg alcohol in Iran has remained a persistent crisis, with at least thousands of Iranians falling victim to poisonings.

According to Iranian medical authorities, 768 people were poisoned by methanol-laced alcohol in just one month in 2018, resulting in 96 deaths across eight of Iran’s 31 provinces.

More recently, in the first 10 days of October, 343 people were poisoned, with 41 deaths reported in the provinces of Mazandaran, Gilan, Hamedan, and Kurdistan.

Alcohol has been banned in Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, with consumption, production, or sale of alcoholic beverages punishable by imprisonment, flogging, or fines. Repeat offenders can even face the death penalty. Despite this, alcohol consumption continues, with both imported and homemade drinks readily available on the black market.

This week, the state's judiciary oversaw the execution of four people, over the purported sale of alcoholic beverages laced with methanol.

Iranian authorities have labeled this incident -- and previous ones -- as a profit-driven criminal operation. The judiciary echoed that characterization, saying that the individuals executed on Wednesday intentionally sold methanol-laced alcohol for financial gain.

The judiciary-controlled Mizan outlet reported that the individuals involved "purchased methanol at one-eighth of the market price of ethanol and sold it at approximately one-third of the market rate."

That narrative was repeated by the hardline newspaper Iran, which quoted a clinical toxicology expert as saying, "No seller or ‘dealer’ deliberately endangers their customers, but when profits and higher income are at stake, such incidents become unavoidable."

However, some experts question whether this is merely a matter of greed or if more complex motives are at play.

According to Dr. Maziar Ashrafian Bonab, a PhD graduate from Cambridge University, the nature of these poisoning cases defies the notion of a random or accidental occurrence. Speaking in an interview with Iran International, he said:

"We expect to see a uniform spread of deaths across the country due to the occasional use of counterfeit alcohol. But the data reveals concentrated spikes in specific provinces at certain times, which suggests a more organized and deliberate effort rather than random errors."

Dr. Bonab, a former Director General of the Forensic Medicine Center of Iran’s Hormozgan Province, said that while small-scale producers might inadvertently mix methanol into their products, the scale and coordination of these poisoning incidents point to larger networks with access to industrial alcohol or methanol. He further argued that it's unlikely that those selling counterfeit alcohol would intentionally poison their customers:

"If anything, poisoning your customers would harm your business in the long run. This doesn’t seem like a profit-driven mistake but rather a more sinister act."

When asked who might be behind these incidents, Dr. Bonab hypothesized that some organizations involved in methanol production could be connected to powerful state institutions:

"There is reason to believe that those responsible have access to large quantities of industrial methanol, which isn’t easily available to small producers. Some of these operations could involve pharmaceutical companies or other institutions with government links. I have even heard rumors that certain networks, possibly tied to powerful entities, may be behind these poisonings, operating with a level of impunity."

The former aide to Iran's Health Ministry also highlighted the involvement of "fire-at-will" groups—radical elements that act independently or with implicit approval from factions within the government:

"Some of these groups believe it’s their duty to impose their ideological beliefs on society, even if it means using lethal force. They see alcohol consumption as a vice and might be deliberately targeting consumers."

The so-called moderate outlet Etemad similarly highlighted these suspicions in a recent report, featuring addiction specialists and alcohol distributors who questioned the scale and coordination of the methanol poisonings.

An anonymous addiction specialist from Gilan Province suggested the incidents indicate more than just a technical error:

"When poisonings occur simultaneously in four provinces, it becomes clear this goes beyond production issues. Even if deliberate poisoning is assumed, it’s unlikely that four different producers in separate provinces would simultaneously produce tainted alcohol. This raises concerns that something more organized is at play."

Likewise, Ali Salarian, an addiction specialist from Mazandaran Province and a member of the National Medical Council, echoed these concerns, stressing that the scope and frequency suggest something far more deliberate than a mere production error:

"Food and drink poisonings, whether legal or illegal, are usually due to isolated technical errors. But given the scale and impact of these cases, it’s clear this is not accidental. Malicious intent seems likely."

Etemad also spoke to an anonymous producer of alcoholic beverages to address the theory of rivalry-driven revenge between sellers.

The source dismissed this notion, saying, "This isn’t the work of a typical vendor. A vendor is someone who has been producing and selling for years, building a reputation for their product. They know they’re operating outside the law, as alcohol production and sales are illegal in Iran, but they’re not murderers".

"While there are dangerous criminals in the alcohol trade, none would kill their customers to outcompete others. Their livelihoods depend on keeping their customers, not eliminating them," he added.

Etemad also pointed to a past pattern, stating, "Years ago, similar incidents occurred in some provinces, where a specific group deliberately inflicted severe, irreversible physical harm on certain citizens, but the identity of these individuals was never revealed to the public."

While Etemad doesn’t specify which incidents they are referring to, it appeared to draw parallels to the school poisonings during the 2022 nationwide protests against the state -- dubbed the Woman, Life, Freedom movement.

These poisonings, which primarily affected girls' schools across Iran, began during the protests and continued until April 2023. Schoolgirls experienced symptoms like shortness of breath and lethargy.

Initially dismissed by authorities as "children's pranks" or attributed to faulty heating, the government later admitted that at least 1,200 students had been affected by mysterious fumes.

At the time, suspicions pointed toward hardliners or religious extremists, possibly punishing girls for speaking out during the protests. Other activists described the poisonings as "state terrorism" and "gender-based" -- pointing the finger at state authorities citing the organized scale of the attacks.