Following Israel's October 4, 2024, strike on Beirut, which targeted Hashem Safiuddin, a potential successor to Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, speculation has also arisen regarding the status of Ismail Qa’ani, the chief commander of the Quds Force.
Although his deputy stated on Monday that Ismail Qa’ani is safe, the IRGC's public relations department has remained silent, releasing no official updates. Also, Tasnim News affiliated with the IRGC stated on Monday that Qa’ani sent a letter on the occasion of Hamas’s October 7 attack. However, according to Iran International sources, even his family was unaware of his status as of Sunday.
There are reports suggesting that Qa’ani traveled to Lebanon and was likely with Hashem Safiuddin when Israel launched its strike. Hezbollah has also stayed quiet on the outcome of this bombing, following a similar pattern as with Hassan Nasrallah, where the group only confirmed his safety 24 hours after an earlier Israeli bombardment.
Two Iranian officials told Reuters that Qa’ani traveled to Lebanon after Hassan Nasrallah was killed and has not been heard from since the recent Israeli attacks on southern Beirut. In response to a question about the status of Ismail Qa’ani, Mahmoud Qomati, a member of the political council of Lebanon's Hezbollah said: "I have no information."
Bragging vs. silence
The Islamic Republic is quick to publicize events it deems successful, often broadcasting them live. For instance, Friday prayers and war room directives to attack Israel are shown on state media, with foreign coverage re-aired on Farsi outlets. However, when incidents result in failure or embarrassment, the propaganda machine remains silent. A clear example is the conflicting reports following the crash of former President Ebrahim Raisi's helicopter, which remained unclear for 24 hours. Similarly, after the IRGC downed Ukrainian flight PS752, it took three days for officials to admit responsibility, despite their initial denials.
This model of no-information or disinformation has had a history in other totalitarian regimes. The Soviet government closed all channels of information about the Chornobyl nuclear reactor explosion for days in 1986. The Soviet government issued top-secret orders to classify all data related to the accident, especially information about the health of the affected population.
What does this behavior tell us about the propaganda apparatus of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes and even authoritarian parties in democratic systems?
People have no right to know
In authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, those in power often view government and public information as their exclusive property, treating the act of sharing information with citizens as a discretionary privilege rather than a fundamental duty. These systems routinely deny citizens the right to access details about government actions and decisions. For example, Ali Khamenei and the IRGC oversee vast economic enterprises, yet they consistently withhold financial statements, refusing to disclose their annual income and expenditures to the public.
In the Islamic Republic, people do not have the right to know what the officials do in their jobs. The Iranians have been curious why Ismail Qa’ani has been absent from the public arena, including the high-profile Friday prayer on October 4, led by Khamenei. The Revolutionary Guards did not provide any information about his whereabouts if he was with Sheikh Safiuddin during the attack on the Hezbollah building.
Internet disruption and low-quality connection in Iran, which constantly occurs in the conditions of a popular uprising, is to cut off the communication of political activists. In non-protest conditions, it is to prevent information-sharing on social networks, which today about 60 million smartphone owners use to get information. On October 6th, there was an Internet disruption by major providers in the country.
Why the government’s non-information policy?
The Islamic Republic does not consider information a tool to gain public trust. Four reasons can be mentioned for the Islamist government’s misinformation and disinformation policy:
1. Fear of public reactions: The government is wary of public celebrations or displays of enthusiasm following certain news events. Opponents have often reacted in stark contrast to the regime's sentiments—mourning when the government celebrates, as in the aftermath of 9/11, and celebrating when the government mourns, such as during rumors of Nasrallah's death. To control public sentiment, the government delays releasing information until emotions subside. For instance, news of Raisi's helicopter crash was announced early in the morning possibly to minimize potential celebrations. It was even falsely reported that his motorcade continued to Tabriz after an emergency landing to downplay the incident.
2. Fear of rebellion: The government fears that any display of weakness could spark rebellion, knowing that millions of Iranians are ready to rise up against the government. Major events, like Mahsa Amini’s murder, or any significant blow to the government, could act as a trigger. To avoid this, the authorities suppress information that might fuel dissent.
3. Spreading rumors to pollute public discourse: By withholding information, authorities create a vacuum filled with rumors, causing confusion and distrust. This tactic is aimed at undermining the credibility of foreign Persian-language media and social networks. Over the past 45 years, public officials have not only ignored the spread of rumors but have at times actively fueled them. Some government-affiliated or pseudo-independent outlets even have dedicated "rumor" columns.
4. Overloading the media space: The Islamic Republic uses its vast network of state-controlled outlets to flood the news sphere with contradictory messages. This deliberate saturation leaves the public bewildered and uncertain, making it easier for the government to evade accountability. The conflicting narratives serve to confuse rather than inform, reducing the possibility of coherent opposition.
While honoring the fallen, including hundreds of IDF soldiers lost in the war in both Gaza and south Lebanon in Israel’s war against Iran’s proxies, the country still wonders when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will wreak the revenge promised for last week’s 181 ballistic missiles, an underlying topic which bubbles beneath the surface.
The assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah boosted the premier in public opinion amidst the country’s longest war, and now, Israelis want more. The mood was dampened soon after, however, as at least nine soldiers fell in Israel’s ground operation in southern Lebanon.
Just like Iran’s delayed retaliation to the July 31 killing of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, Israel is biding its time, allowing the country to enjoy celebrations, albeit muted, for the new year, and now, the commemorations of October 7, in peace.
Not only is this a psychological war, but Israel must now weigh its options along with its powerful ally, the US, which has warned the response must be “proportional”.
President Joe Biden, known for his softly softly approach to Iran, still wields power over the Jewish state, with Israel’s Defense Minister, Yoav Gallant, scheduled to visit the US to discuss strategy on Wednesday.
On Monday, marking one year since the bloodshed of October 7, when Iran-backed Hamas launched an air, land, and sea invasion of Israel, Israeli media focused on those lost in the deadliest single day for Jews since the Holocaust. The attack shocked the world, targeting one of the most militarily advanced nations.
But Iran is always lurking behind the scenes. Danielle Edelstein, a mother of four who lives in Tel Aviv, told Iran International: “Of course none of us knows what’s going to happen, but something has to happen. Last week’s attack was something no state can tolerate.”
For Netanyahu, whose popularity fluctuates almost daily, the response is crucial to his political survival. With each reminder of the horrors of October 7, the growing resentment toward Israel’s longest-serving premier becomes increasingly evident.
Israel’s Maariv newspaper surveyed the country last month, finding 47% felt he was most suitable for Prime Minister, even before the assassination of Nasrallah. That was a huge boost from polls in the wake of October 7 when around 70% of the country called for his resignation.
Last week, a Channel 12 poll also showed that Netanyahu’s Likud party would win a new election.
It has been the result of a series of killings, including leader of Hamas’s military wing, Mohammed Deif, in Gaza, the brazen killing of Haniyeh in Tehran, though Israel did not admit responsibility, and most recently, Nasrallah.
The IDF has been steadily wiping out the leadership of Hezbollah as airstrikes pound the group designated in countries such as the UK, US and Europe.
“We needed to see he was doing something,” said Ruthy Tuito, whose son is in the reserves. “We had so much inaction for such a long time, that these things give us hope that the government is standing up to the threats,” she told Iran International.
On Monday morning, marking the one-year anniversary, while commemorations were held at killing sites, Hamas launched more missiles at the time of the attacks last year, sirens first heard at 06:29.
Meanwhile, Hezbollah continued its assault on Israel’s north as the IDF pounds military infrastructure and advances airstrikes in Hezbollah infrastructure in Beirut.
Iran’s proxy in Iraq also sent projectiles in the early hours of Monday morning, intercepted by the IDF, identifying the source only as “from the East”, usually reflective of those coming from Iraq.
“This isn’t going to end without some kind of more affirmative action,” said Roni Avrahami, who has been serving in the reserves since the beginning of the war. “No country can live like this. Nobody wants more war, but we need to take action and we need our allies to stand by us in the process. This is not an enemy which deals with diplomatic solutions.”
Israel is already battling threats on all its borders, the Iran-backed Houthis in the south on the Red Sea coast, and proxies in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, the West Bank, and Iraq.
But for now, the question is when, not if, the country will retaliate for the second attack from Iran this year, and one which no nation would be able to let pass.
