Nobel laureate urges UN to take action against gender apartheid in Iran

These protests mark the second anniversary of Mahsa Amini's tragic death in police custody, which sparked the 2022 “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising in Iran.

Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Kurdish-Iranian woman, died after receiving fatal injuries in the custody of Iran's so-called "morality police" on September 16, 2022. She had been arrested in Tehran for allegedly violating the country's mandatory hijab law. Her death, which came amid allegations of police brutality, ignited months of nationwide protests in Iran, led predominantly by women and young people demanding greater rights and freedoms. The protests rapidly spread across the country, calling for the end of mandatory hijab laws and the broader Islamic Republic system.

Sunday's protests serve as both a tribute to Amini and a continuation of the calls for justice that arose from her death. Demonstrators gathered in major European cities, including Berlin, Paris, Hamburg, and the Hague to name a few. They carried photos of Amini, raised banners that read “Woman, Life, Freedom,” and chanted slogans against Islamic Republic, condemning its repressive tactics and ongoing human rights abuses. Protests were also held in London and Sydney, Australia.

Protesters filled the streets, waving the lion and sun pre-Islamic Republic national flag and calling for governments to increase pressure on Tehran. Protestors also demanded from International leaders to list Iran's Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) as a terrorist entity in Europe, United Kingdom and Australia.

Similar global rallies were held on Saturday ahead of Amini's anniversary.

Meanwhile in Iran, strikes were held across at least 11 cities in Western Azarbaijan and Kurdistan provinces.

Security forces banned Amini's family from leaving their home to visit her burial site on her anniversary, and threatened them with arrest.

There was heavy security in many cities in western Iran to prevent any street gatherings. The government arrested 22,000 people during the protests after Mini's death and executed several young men who had taken part in the street rallies in 2022.

The Mahsa Movement, despite its achievements and shortcomings, prompts a critical examination of the regime’s resilience. It is essential to understand why a transition to a new political system has not occurred, given the movement’s strong intentions and broad domestic and international support. The persistence of authoritarian regimes like Iran's and their ability to maintain power has become a key topic of discussion among political experts and activists in recent decades.

Understanding the new generation of authoritarians

To grasp the Islamic Republic’s durability, it is essential to understand the new generation of authoritarian leaders and regimes.

Emerging in the latter half of the 20th century, these regimes differ markedly from classic dictatorships, totalitarian states, and monarchies. They lack overtly undemocratic structures but do not operate with the transparency and popular consent of genuine democracies. Many regimes worldwide—spanning Latin America, Eastern Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East—fall somewhere between democracy and dictatorship. This is why it should come as no surprise that both Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei, the previous and current leaders of the Islamic Republic, despite their fundamentalist, totalitarian discourse, often speak highly of democracy in their speeches.

These regimes adopt techniques and institutions from both democratic and authoritarian systems to consolidate power. By maintaining a veneer of legitimacy through engineered elections and limited power rotation among loyal elites, they present a facade of democracy. In Iran, this facade fosters some hope for reform while discouraging outright revolution. Understanding this arrangement is crucial when discussing how to challenge and confront such regimes.

The leaders’ strategies in this type of states range from overt violence, such as repression, imprisonment, and torture, to more subtle measures like election manipulation, media propaganda, and the distribution of political and economic favors.

This is why, in the Islamic Republic, we see both the killing of 1,500 people within a week during the 2019 protest crackdown and, five years later, a presidential election billed as a reformist move by the top ruler. It is a striking and paradoxical blend of state-managed ballot boxes and batons versus the society.

Political engineering: Crafting legitimacy

A key factor in the survival of these political systems is their use of clientelism to cultivate loyalist forces. This strategy has evolved from simply offering money or government positions to providing economic privileges, licenses, and various favors. In such a patrimonial system, the state machinery and public resources are seen as the ruler’s personal assets used to manage and control society.

In this environment, informal relationships often override formal laws and regulations, shaping political norms and behaviors. This leads to a persistent absence of the rule of law and reinforces authoritarianism, where economic corruption and political repression become essential for the regime's survival.

In modern authoritarian regimes, loyalist forces have become more complex and insidious. They often blend into society, masquerading as ordinary citizens, dissidents, or protesters, which undermines efforts to mobilize societal pressure and complicates political opposition.

The Islamic Republic: A unique system

After a tumultuous decade in the 1980s, the Islamic Republic has spent the following decades institutionalizing a modern authoritarian Islamic state. It has skillfully built a vast network of loyalist forces across political, social, and economic spheres.

This network is maintained through hundreds of religious organizations, cultural foundations, paramilitary groups, state institutions, and other entities. Loyalist forces fall into two categories: those with formal roles, such as military personnel and clerics, and those with covert functions, such as pro-government activists and economic oligarchs. These forces support the regime by suppressing protests during unrest and advancing government interests during quieter periods, often at the expense of independent groups.

Sowing division through loyalist groups

The Islamic Republic has long utilized loyalist groups to create societal divisions. Even during reformist periods, such as President Mohammad Khatami’s tenure (1997-2005), the regime expanded its network of loyalist civil society groups, including religious, cultural, and charitable NGOs. Financially and politically dependent on the government, these groups have often opposed protest tactics and sought to undermine genuine opposition efforts. This "divide and rule" strategy has been a cornerstone of the regime’s survival.

For example, during recent parliamentary and presidential elections, opposition calls for boycotts were actively countered by regime-aligned ‘reformists’ and their affiliates. Despite these efforts, loyalists failed to meet the regime’s goals, with voter turnout in all elections over the past five years remaining below 50 percent.

Loyalist groups within religious and ideological institutions—such as Islamic seminaries, mosques, and religious organizations—aid the regime in maintaining ideological control over society. Additionally, economic organizations play a key role in sustaining loyalty by providing financial and professional rewards to align activists with government interests.

Investment in military and bureaucracy

Understanding the complex government-society structure raises a critical question: How do loyalist forces contribute to the regime's preservation?

The Islamic Republic’s survival relies heavily on its military and security apparatus, which protect the regime, and the economic dependence of millions of Iranians on state wages and benefits. This economic entanglement severely hampers revolutionary efforts and limits opposition support.

Dr. Abel Escriba-Folch, a political scientist at Pompeu Fabra University, highlighted in an interview with Iran International that Iran’s military personnel make up over 2.2% of the workforce, significantly higher than the global average of 0.8%. This underscores the regime’s heavy reliance on its security apparatus for societal control.

While the military plays a crucial role, the state machinery is highly effective in sustaining authoritarianism. Escriba-Folch notes that the state's power is a formidable tool of authoritarianism, with government institutions excelling in tasks such as coercing rivals, extracting revenue, managing citizen registration, and fostering dependency. This effectiveness enhances the durability of authoritarianism in ways unmatched by other institutions.

The professor explains that the dependence of a large segment of society on state-provided salaries, financial aid, and other benefits diminishes their motivation and capacity to challenge the state.

Preventive and Reactive Repression

Regime preservation and repression extend beyond periods of unrest. The Islamic Republic employs its network of religious, administrative, political, cultural, and economic institutions to sustain its legitimacy and effectiveness.

In this area, Dr. Escriba-Folch distinguishes between preventive repression, which aims to thwart opposition organization, and reactive repression, which addresses protests after they occur. Both forms of repression involve the state’s bureaucratic apparatus and security machinery.

Government employees and the large bureaucracy act as tools of preventive repression by maintaining the network of loyalists.

Escriba-Folch highlights that digital technologies have enhanced the state bureaucracy’s ability to monitor and control the population, further entrenching its power. The regime uses extensive administrative systems and advanced communication technologies to oversee various aspects of citizens' lives, from salaries and assets to daily transactions and cultural activities, aiming to adjust these elements to ensure societal compliance.

The trigger for change

Professor Francesco Cavatorta of Laval University refers to the role of crises, such as the death of a leader, in shaping transition agreements in some Latin American countries or leading to regime changes in others.

However, when discussing the potential death of a dictator in Iran, Cavatorta points out that the Islamic Republic has already navigated the death of its leader once before. He remarks, "I am confident that the Iranian regime believes that since we’ve managed this situation once before, we can overcome it again [the death of Khamenei]."

Over the past 35 years, however, both the Islamic government and Iranian society have undergone significant changes. The regime has lost much of its legitimacy, while the population has experienced the power of protest.

Winning over loyalists: A path to change

On the second anniversary of Mahsa-Jina Amini’s death, which sparked the 2022 protests, opposition groups must address the segment of society dependent on the government—about 8 million people, or 10% of the population.

Dr. Escriba-Folch argues that as the government’s administrative and military apparatus grows, increasing economic dependence on the state weakens the public’s willingness to challenge it. This dependence stifles revolutionary momentum and complicates organizing opposition.

Professor Cavatorta suggests that real political change in authoritarian regimes occurs when moderates from both the regime and opposition engage in dialogue. He emphasizes the importance of prominent figures and civil leaders in shaping transition agreements. However, the mass exile of opposition figures and intellectuals in recent decades complicates this process, making it harder to bridge the divide.

Whether through violent revolution or peaceful reform, the entrenched network of loyalist forces, clientelism, and economic dependence presents substantial challenges to those seeking change. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for devising effective strategies to confront and overcome the regime’s entrenched power.

"We are in a multi-front campaign against Iran's axis of evil, which is striving for our destruction," he said.

"This morning, the Houthis launched a surface-to-surface missile from Yemen at our territory. They should know that we exact a high price for any attempt to attack us."

Vowing a strong response, he pointed to the country's recent strikes against the Iran-backed terror group.

"Whoever needs a reminder of this, is invited to visit the port of Hodeidah," he said, referring to a retaliatory attack for a drone which hit a civilian building in Tel Aviv in July. The strike hit infrastructure such as electrical installations and an oil depot.

Netanyahu warned: "Whoever attacks us will not evade our strike." Pointing to the war in Gaza where Israel has been fighting Iran-backed Hamas after the deadly invasion of October 7, he added: "Hamas is already learning this through our determined action, which will bring about its destruction and the release of all of our hostages."

In Israel's north, 60,000 civilians have been displaced since the Gaza war began, Iran's biggest proxy Hezbollah firing over 6,000 projectiles towards Israel in allegiance with Hamas in Gaza.

Iran's proxies in Syria and Iraq have also been involved in attempted attacks against Israel, including a direct attack from Iran in April, the first of its kind from Tehran.

Nasruddin Amer, the deputy head of the Houthi's media office, said in a post on X on Sunday that there had been "a qualitative shift in targeting Israel with hypersonic missiles".

He wrote: "This missile is characterized by its super-speed, which exceeds the speed of sound by several times, making it able to easily bypass traditional defense systems, including air defense systems such as the Patriot."

Sunday's missile had crossed a distance of 2040 km in 11 and a half minutes, he said. Nobody was injured in the attack, according to the Israeli military, though shrapnel caused damage to a train station in Modiin, central Israel.

Through their Telegram channel, the group said its military spokesman would soon give details about a "qualitative operation that targeted the depth of the Zionist entity”.

It comes as the Iran-backed terror group continue the Red Sea region blockade, launched in November on the instruction of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei.

Initially intended to attack and hijack Israeli-linked vessels in a bid to force a ceasefire in Gaza, it has since expanded to target global shipping on the trade route with direct strikes on Yemen from the US and UK as a result.

Dozens of hostages from across the world have been taken and missiles launched at multiple international vessels.

According to reports obtained by Iran International, Iranian intelligence agents have banned the family from leaving home to prevent them visiting the grave at Aichi Cemetery in Saqqez.

Security forces have also barred other relatives from visiting the family home.

Amini’s death on September 16, 2022, after being detained by Iran’s "morality police" for allegedly violating the country's mandatory hijab laws, sparked the nationwide Woman, Life, Freedom protests.

The protests, during which time state security forces killed at least 550 protestors, became a symbol of resistance against state repression and a call for greater rights, especially for women.

On the second anniversary of her death, businesses and shop owners in several cities across Iran’s Kurdistan and West Azarbaijan provinces, including Sanandaj, Saqqez, Divandarreh, Mahabad, and Bukan, have joined in a general strike in remembrance of Amini and the start of the uprising.

A number of shopkeepers and business owners in Kurdistan province, including the cities of Marivan, Dehgolan, and Kamyaran, have also joined the strikes. In West Azarbaijan province, additional strikes were reported in Piranshahr and Oshnavieh, while businesses in Kermanshah also participated.

The Iranian government has heightened its security presence, particularly in Saqqez, Mahsa Amini’s hometown. In addition to roadblocks and restrictions around Aichi Cemetery, reports indicate that Revolutionary Guards have been deployed to enforce the restrictions, preventing gatherings and visits by mourners.

The threats against Amini’s family come as part of a broader effort by the Iranian authorities to suppress public commemoration of her death, fearing a resurgence of protests similar to those that followed her death in 2022.

Iran’s security agencies have also warned media outlets not to publish anything about Mahsa Amini on Sunday, according to information received by Iran Internationals. Journalists have been threatened not to post anything on their social media accounts regarding this matter.

The reported death toll of 550 protesters far exceeds the regime's claims of slain special forces and Basij members, whose actual number has never been officially disclosed. In some cases, slain protesters were misreported as Basij members. The protests did not target businesses or government institutions, except for police cars that fired on people.

The government managed to suppress the movement by arresting up to 22,000 individuals, using birdshot against protesters blinding many, killing children and teenagers. Vigilantes or government agents also deployed unexplained chemical substances against schools, sending thousands of teenagers to hospitals. The Mahsa movement, driven by anger from the 2017 and 2019 uprisings, saw the Islamic government and its auxiliaries respond with extreme measures, including kidnapping, killing, executing, and torturing its most defiant participants.

After two years of repression, rising tensions with Israel, and the removal of the Raisi administration, what is the current state of the “woman, life, freedom” movement? Is it in a coma, hibernation, or bubbling like lava under a volcano?

Desperation, despair, or hidden anger?

Iranian society exhibits signs of all three conditions: desperation, despair, and hidden anger. The migration of educated and skilled professionals, including doctors and nurses, has surged. The low voter turnout for Pezeshkian, a candidate promising more of Khamenei's policies, reflects a sense of desperation rather than hope.

In national strikes by oil, gas, and steel workers, as well as nurses, teachers, and retirees, the prevalent sentiment is one of despair over current conditions rather than active anger. Social media discussions also show less anger.

This suggests that the Mahsa movement's protesters have come to terms with the regime’s persistence and the improbability of overthrowing it through their current methods. Incidents like the murder of Armita Gravand killed during a confrontation with hijab enforcers, Arzoo Badri’s severe injury, the brutal killing of Mohammad Mir Mousavi, and numerous other acts of police brutality have failed to spark street protests, as government opponents have accepted the reality of their situation.

Disappointed but realistic society

A 2023 nationwide government survey, shared with select correspondents, reveals that 91.8 percent of people are dissatisfied with the country's current conditions and direction. While the failure of the Mahsa movement to overthrow the government is acknowledged, this does not imply that the populace has forgotten their demands or their dire situation. The survey also indicates that at least 30.2 percent of respondents view the current situation as irreparable under the Islamic Republic, suggesting that, despite the obstacles, they see regime change as the only path to improvement.

Two different kinds of hope

The 60.6 percent of people currently hoping for change, according to the government survey, differs from the 70 percent who supported reformist president Mohammad Khatami in 1996. Khatami's support stemmed from hopes for stability and economic relief after the upheaval of the revolution and the Iran-Iraq war. In contrast, today’s hope is not connected to the Pezeshkian administration. The current desire for reform focuses on substantial and real transformation. Given the failure of partial and gradual reforms over the past 45 years, many believe that meaningful change through such methods is no longer feasible and aim for a fundamental change in the role of the government and its treatment of citizens. The severe suppression of the Mahsa movement has further diminished hopes for realistic reform.

Obstacles to popular action

There are major obstacles that hinder the unification of the 60% seeking significant change with the 30% advocating for regime change.

Social activism among Iranians has given way to individualism because of the authoritarian nature of the Islamic system. The government is suspicious of non-religious activism, which is not under its control. While during sudden waves of protests crowds spontaneously congregate, organized opposition is rare. Security organs systematically crack down on any signs of organization and many opponents have turned to hopes of seeing a savior, or a major regional conflict or military attack that can topple the regime.

Even charity work has declined in the country, because of constant government crackdowns on independent NGOs.

The protests in 2017, 2019, and 2021 were triggered by specific events, such as the rise in gasoline prices and the killing of Mahsa Amini by the morality police. This suggests that societal movements are driven by immediate sparks and waves rather than a cohesive, long-term strategy to address Iran's decline. Additionally, effective leadership is lacking.

The underlying discontent within society is like lava beneath the surface, which is why the government has hesitated to again raise gasoline prices. However, the absence of independent organizations and media to channel this dissatisfaction into street protests has left society in a state of political inaction. The constant emigration of protesting youth further weakens the protest movement. The government neither has the means to address the brain drain and skilled labor emigration nor views it as a security threat. In some instances, interrogators even encourage detainees to emigrate.