Pezeshkian sidesteps major foreign policy issues in interview

In his first televised interview as President, Masoud Pezeshkian attempted to maintain the persona of a relatively candid politician but carefully sidestepped major issues and questions.
Iran International

In his first televised interview as President, Masoud Pezeshkian attempted to maintain the persona of a relatively candid politician but carefully sidestepped major issues and questions.
Pezeshkian made only brief mention of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy, including its significant dispute with the West over its nuclear program—a conflict that has positioned Iran as a nuclear threshold power but has also impoverished the nation economically. The president merely acknowledged, in a single sentence, that the economic crisis was tied to both domestic and foreign factors.
Notably, Pezeshkian refrained from mentioning Israel, the United States, or the Middle East crisis, thereby avoiding the usual ideological rhetoric against "the enemies."
Five weeks into his presidency, Pezeshkian was somewhat candid in listing the symptoms of Iran's current challenges but stopped short of addressing the fundamental causes. He highlighted issues such as delayed payments to wheat farmers, energy shortages, environmental crises, and the underpayment of teachers and nurses—symptoms of the country’s deeper problems.
While he emphasized the need for national accord, Pezeshkian did not discuss the importance of media freedom or the release of political prisoners. He spoke of respecting diverse opinions but overlooked the harsh sentences handed out for even mild criticism of the clerical government.
Rouydad 24, a major reformist-leaning news website in Tehran, published a critical analysis of Pezeshkian’s interview, stating, "The president's first address to the public can hardly be described as a success in terms of appeal, though it wasn't a failure either. He candidly addressed some of the country's most pressing issues, focusing on justice, while skillfully avoiding topics related to problems surrounding the concept of freedom."
Pezeshkian also failed to mention the recent death of Mohammad Mir-Mousavi, an Iranian citizen who died from beatings while in police custody in Lahijan. He skirted around issues such as the hijab mandate and severe internet restrictions, insisting that such policy matters are under discussion and that experts will devise solutions. This led Rouydad 24 to conclude that the president’s remarks were "short on freedom."
On foreign policy, Pezeshkian largely avoided the topic, neglecting both its role as a primary cause of Iran’s economic woes and its reinforcement of the regime’s anti-Israel and anti-West rhetoric. Although Pezeshkian is scheduled to attend the UN General Assembly in New York later in September, he offered no hints about any specific diplomatic plans.
He did emphasize the importance of engaging the Iranian diaspora, who could potentially invest billions of dollars in the country, helping to alleviate the current fiscal crisis. However, he failed to address the regime’s policies that have driven millions of the most educated and financially capable Iranians out of the country.

Lovingly restored luxury classic and vintage cars, often showcased at events across the country, evoke nostalgia for many Iranians, reminding them of the 'good old days' when a Western lifestyle was within easy reach.
Unlike Cuba where classic cars are almost exclusively American-made imports before the country’s 1959 Revolution, there are around 7,000 classic American, British, and other cars in Iran most of which date back to the 1960s and as late as the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
To the enthusiasts, these cars and vintage imported home appliances such as fridges evoke nostalgic memories of the 1970s oil boom and huge imports of luxury items.
While Western exporters and manufacturers rushed to get a market share in the 1970s Iran with a booming economy and open-door economy, things drastically changed in 1979 when a coalition of Islamist clerics and anti-West leftists took over the country.

Many classic and vintage cars have been meticulously restored and are often displayed in various cities at special events organized by enthusiasts’ clubs. Almost none, however, are in active use because of a 2007 pollution ban and fuel restrictions resulting from fuel rationing.
Owners of a few hundred of these cars have managed to obtain “historical” plate numbers that allow them to drive them at special events or to sell them on but many can neither be used nor sold.

The Islamic Republic also has a Classic Car Museum where the luxury and several truly one-of-a-kind cars belonging to the former royal family are on display. These include a gilded Pierce Arrow A built for the founder of the Pahlavi Dynasty, Reza Shah, and a gilded Chrysler K-300 made for his son Mohammad-Reza Shah.
In the 1970s, the streets of major Iranian cities were lined with Cadillacs, Chevrolets, Mercedes, Jaguars, Alfa Romeos, and other luxury cars, while ordinary citizens drove their affordable, locally assembled Paykans (Hillman Hunters), purchased on credit with small monthly payments.

Many luxury foreign cars pre-dating the Islamic Revolution were shipped to the country during the oil boom of the 1970s by students studying abroad and government officials. These people were allowed to ship a car home tax-free when they returned home, for personal use or to sell at a good profit. In the late 1970s, those who traveled to Europe could also buy a car and drive back to avoid full import taxes.
In May 2022, Iran's Motorcycle and Automobile Federation became the 30th country to register its vintage cars with the Federation International des Vehicules Anciens (FIVA), a partner of UNESCO with consultative status, making it possible for the owners to use the federation’s international identification facilities for global registration of vintage cars in Iran.

But when it came to American cars, besides imports, several models of Cadillacs, Buicks, and Chevrolets were assembled in Iran by Iranian manufacturers in the 70s.
Buick Sky Lark sedan, for instance, was assembled by General Motors Iran (now Pars Khodro) between 1975 and 1979. The same company also rolled out its first Chevrolet Nova in 1976.
It was nearly two decades and a revolution later that Japanese, German, Korean, and French companies began producing Nissan, Mazda, Mercedes Benz, Kia, Hyundai, Peugeot, and Renault in Iran.
The UN sanctions imposed on Iran since 2005 brought these to a standstill. Despite the lifting of these sanctions in 2016, European and East Asian manufacturers have avoided investment in Iran and only Chinese car manufacturers have been active in the country.

Iran's Judiciary on Saturday handed a total of 12 years in prison to Iranian blogger Hossein Shanbehzadeh who was arrested in June after posting a single dot in response to a tweet by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Shanbehzadeh posted the dot in May in a seemingly innocuous move but was arrested a few weeks later, after his reply garnered significantly more likes than Khamenei's original tweet, drawing widespread attention. His temporary detention order was extended in July for another month.
On August 31, his lawyer announced he has been sentenced to a total of 12 years in prison for spurious charges that are usually leveled by the Islamic Republic's Judiciary against activists to keep them jailed for long terms and intimidate others.
Shanbehzadeh, known for his candid critiques and social media presence, has been sentenced to five years in jail for "pro-Israel propaganda activity," four years for "insulting Islamic sanctities," two years for "spreading falsehoods" on social media, and one year for "anti-regime propaganda activity," his lawyer Amir Raisian told Shargh newspaper on Saturday.
Although sentenced to a total of 12 years, he is required to serve the longest term, which is five years, Raisian explained.
According to the lawyer, the Judiciary has not provided any evidence to prove that the defendant committed "pro-Israel propaganda activity". Raisian says the charge has been leveled against him based on his "private chats".
For his other charges, Raisian said the court cited his support for other political prisoners, portraying the country's situation negatively, using the hashtag "No to Execution," supporting the removal of mandatory hijab, creating a negative media atmosphere against Iran's elections, and expressing joy at the death of Iran's former president, Ebrahim Raisi, as evidence.
The lawyer says he will consider appealing the sentence after discussing it with his client in prison.
Shortly after his arrest in May, Shanbehzadeh's X account was deactivated, likely to prevent its misuse by security agencies, but his name trended on Persian-language X for hours as users highlighted his influence and fearless commentary.
Shanbehzadeh had previously been imprisoned in connection with the 2019 protests on charges of "insulting the sanctities and the leader of the Islamic Republic." His arrest this time led to accusations by IRGC-linked media, with reports claiming he was a "fugitive Mossad agent" with ties to Israeli intelligence and a history of insulting religious figures. The Ardabil prosecutor's office further alleged that Shanbehzadeh had been in contact with high-ranking Mossad officers and was arrested when trying to flee the country through northwestern borders.
In response to these accusations, Shanbehzadeh's family refuted the claims as "unjustifiable," emphasizing that he has always used his real identity on social media. They also pointed out that the charges were leveled just 24 hours after his arrest, without him having access to a lawyer.
The arrest has drawn outrage from social media users, many of whom link it directly to the viral comment Shanbehzadeh made under Khamenei's tweet. Chess grandmaster and Putin critic Garry Kasparov even responded to the news with a single dot on his X account.
Shanbehzadeh's case has raised alarms about Iran's history of using espionage charges against its critics, drawing comparisons to other high-profile cases, such as that of Maziar Ebrahimi, a businessman falsely accused of spying for Israel.

In recent weeks, Iran has been consumed by concerns over a potential gasoline price hike. This anxiety stems not only from economic fears but also from the deep-seated distrust many Iranians have toward their government.
At the center of this storm is the newly installed Pezeshkian administration, which has sent mixed signals about its intentions, further exacerbating the public's concern.
Abdolnaser Hemmati, the Minister of Economy, has tried to calm the waters, stating in a televised interview that no shocking economic measures should be taken, as society cannot bear the brunt of a gasoline price hike or other economic shocks. He emphasized that “any decision to raise gasoline prices must take into account its inevitable inflationary effects.”
But how long can the government spend billions of dollars, selling the cheapest gasoline at around 2 cents a liter or less than 10 cents a gallon, especially when it must import some of it to make up for the shortfall in domestic production.
Yet, Hemmati's words stand in contrast to those of the head of government, Massoud Pezeshkian. In a meeting just days earlier, the new president made it clear that he sees no logic in continuing to subsidize gasoline. “There is no logic in buying gasoline at the open market dollar rate and selling it at a subsidized price,” he said, questioning whether the current policy could continue. His comments only deepened the sense of uncertainty and fear that a price increase might be imminent.
These contradictory remarks have left Iranians wondering what to expect. On one hand, Mohammadreza Aref, First Vice President, reassured the public that the government would not make “any hasty decisions” regarding a gasoline price increase. On the other, Pezeshkian's previous statements, including those made during his election campaign, indicate a belief that the current subsidy system is untenable. In a conversation with Ali Khamenei's website, Pezeshkian argued that Iran’s energy imbalance, where gasoline is purchased for billions of dollars and sold at a fraction of its cost, cannot continue indefinitely.

Pezeshkian’s inconsistent messaging, particularly during the election debates, has only added to the confusion. While he initially supported removing subsidies and raising prices to 250,000 rials (about 42 cents) per liter, he later backtracked, saying that his remarks were taken out of context and that, in governance, such decisions must be left to experts. However, these contradictions have done little to quell public fear, especially given Iran’s recent history.
The specter of past fuel protests looms large. Under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the quadrupling of fuel prices led to widespread unrest, with angry citizens setting fire to gas stations in Tehran. Similarly, Hassan Rouhani’s decision to triple gasoline prices sparked protests across the country, resulting in the deaths of nearly 1,500 people as the government suppressed dissent.
Currently, rationed gasoline is sold at 15,000 rials (2.5 cents) per liter, while non-rationed gasoline is sold at 30,000 rials (5 cents) per liter. For many, who earn less than 200 dollars per month a large increase could push an already struggling population to the brink.
Some believe that the Pezeshkian administration’s indecision is not just a political misstep; but it is a recipe for disaster. The country’s economic situation is dire, and people’s livelihoods are hanging by a thread. Rouydad24 news website in Tehran wrote on Saturday that “Any sudden price hike could lead to irreparable damage.”
As economic expert Mehdi Robati noted in a recent tweet, “Analyses based on the increase in gasoline prices and seeing this issue from a one-dimensional perspective are a banana peel under the feet of the Islamic Republic and will not bring any benefit to the country.”
Moreover, public trust in the government is at an all-time low. Many Iranians believe that if there were no fire, there would be no smoke—meaning if the government truly had no plans to raise gasoline prices, there would be no reason to discuss it. Instead, as reported by Rouydad 24, it appears that some advisors are attempting to prepare the public: shock them with the prospect of a significant price hike, only to then offer a gradual increase as a “compromise.”
This strategy is unlikely to succeed. The anger is palpable, with people expressing their discontent on social media. One viral video shows a farmer lambasting Pezeshkian’s comments, saying, “It’s not logical for you to increase gasoline prices and make us villagers and farmers poorer and more desperate by the day.”
Observers say the contradictions within the Pezeshkian administration are more than just political blunders—they are fuel for a fire that, if ignited, could engulf the nation in unrest once again.

Iran's domestic economic issues, marked by fragmented growth and the dominance of powerful "mafias," are deterring investment, according to Sirous Talari, a board member of the Iranian & Foreign Joint Venture Investments Association (IFJIA).
"The economic mafia in this country swallows all resources, infiltrating every industry," Talari told the state-affiliated ILNA news agency, emphasizing that these internal challenges, alongside international sanctions, are significant barriers to private sector investment.
Talari also pointed out that while some Afghan nationals are making relatively small investments between $200,000 and $15 million, "they are doing so primarily to secure residence permits in Iran." He added, "Beyond these cases, we have not seen significant demand for larger or more substantial foreign investments in Iran.”
Up to 80 percent of Iran's economy is controlled by the state, in conjunction with the religious establishment. This has bred nepotism, inefficiencies and corruption at all levels. At the same time US economic sanctions have handicapped oil exports and international banking relations, drastically reducing the government's revenues from foreign trade.
In recent years, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international financial watchdog, has blacklisted Iran for failing to meet transparency standards and prevent money laundering and terrorism financing.
However, in May, Mohammad Khazaei, Secretary-General of the Iranian Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), acknowledged that while issues like FATF are important, they are not the only obstacles to foreign investment in Iran.
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Iran attracted only $1.5 billion in foreign direct investment in 2022.
During Iran’s presidential debates in June, President Masoud Pezeshkian argued that Iran's international isolation must end and that foreign investment is essential for economic improvement.
Pezeshkian emphasized that Iran needed $200 billion in foreign investment to pull its battered economy out of a crisis that has worsened in the past six years.
However, according to Talari, Pezeshkian's administration may face significant challenges in achieving these goals, noting that they "cannot be implemented in the short term."

The relationship between Iran and Russia is built on mutual benefits, and the strategic partnership formed in 2022 after Russia's invasion of Ukraine is now influencing Tehran and Moscow's foreign policies in their respective conflicts with Kyiv and Israel.
In this week's episode of Eye for Iran, Greg Brew, a senior analyst on Iran and Energy with the Eurasia Group, speaks to the connection between the two conflicts spanning two continents yet intricately intertwined.
Iran, a country that has had a bitter past with Russia and even experienced occupation at the hands of its powerful neighbor, has involved itself in the Ukraine war by becoming a military enabler for Russia and providing diplomatic support.
With the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Kremlin saw Tehran's support as a necessity and the Islamic Republic saw long-term strategic payoffs.
With Russia's isolation from the West and the US and NATO's support for Ukraine, Iran seemed like the likely rogue, anti- US nation to turn to.
"Russia's war in Ukraine and Russia's increasing isolation from the international community, the weight of Western sanctions, US support for Ukraine, and Russia's need for weapons, increased arms for its war in Ukraine has offered Iran a way to increase its leverage, get a closer relationship with Moscow largely through by serving as Russia's sort of new source of armaments," said Brew.
"There of course have been multiple reports of Iran selling drones to Russia assisting Russia in establishing a drone factory. There have been recent reports of Iran potentially selling ballistic missiles to Russia, although these remain somewhat unconfirmed," he added.
How Ukraine-Russia is related to Israel-Iran
But what does this all have to do with the spiraling, unprecedented conflict being seen in the Mideast at present?
In 2022, Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brigadier General Pat Ryder said there were Iranian military personnel on the ground in Crimea assisting Russia.
On Monday Andriy Kostin, Ukraine's Prosecutor General, announced that a case has been opened against an IRGC brigadier general, Abbas Mousavi Sharifi Mollasaraei, on suspicion of aiding Russia in war and war crimes against Ukrainian. Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesperson dismissed the claims.
Moscow also receives hundreds of Iranian-made drones that has been used in its war against Ukraine and there are also reports that Iran is sending ballistic missiles to Russia as well.
Iran, which has a clear deficit in its air force and air defense systems is eyeing Russia’s S-400 advanced air defense system, which would offer an upgrade to the S-300 system Iran currently possesses. Iran also has Russian Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets on its wish list. Its air force has been relying on aging American fighter jets bought before the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
There were also reports in August that Russia had transferred Iskander short-range ballistic missile systems and Murmansk-BN electronic warfare systems to Iran, but Iran International has not been able to verify that.
Nevertheless, it is evident that as Iran gains a stronger partnership with Russia and more procurement, the threat only increases to Israel and the United States interests in the Middle East.
Deterrence is part of the strategy, said Brew, who believes Iran's budding relationship with Russia would help it to have more leverage against its foe, Israel.
"From the point of view of Iran, this does affect its confrontation with Israel and the ongoing Middle East crisis that began on October 7th with the Hamas attack against Israel. Iran is conscious that it faces a conventional mismatch, if you like, in terms of military capabilities. Israel and the United States have much more powerful conventional militaries than Iran, so Iran is always looking for sources of additional deterrence, additional support. And one potential source of support is Russia, " said Brew.
"That's how these two conflicts are connected. That's how they form part of Iran's broader foreign policy."
Iran's role in Hamas' Oct 7 attack on Israel in some ways provided a distraction of the atrocities being committed by Russia in Ukraine.
The Islamic Republic's unprecedented and first-ever direct attack on Israel in April involved hundreds of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and about 170 drones, lasting for about 5 hours according to Israel's Defense Forces (IDF).
Ukranian President Volodymyr Zelensky condemned Iran for that, stating that his country is familiar with "the horror of similar attacks." Ukrainians have suffered from Iran-made Shahed-136 drones, the same model reportedly used on Israel that night.
Ukraine’s sudden counterattack in Russia’s Kursk region has increased pressure on the Kremlin and President Vladimir Putin, but Russia is still making gains in Ukraine, and there appears to be no end to the war much like there appears to be no end to the conflict in the Middle East and the war against Hamas in Gaza.
While the Iran-Russia partnership is not a full alliance, it hangs on a balance of fragility, with neither of their interests always aligning and a troubled history between the two nations.
Just what will unfold in 2025 will in large part depend on what happens in the war in Ukraine and the Mideast, said Brew.
To find out more, and to see how the Houthis and Gulf States fit into the equation, watch the full episode of Eye for Iran featuring Greg Brew on YouTube, or you can listen on Spotify, Apple, Castbox or Amazon.






