Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, was scheduled to present the core of his executive plan during a 2.5-hour speech on the first day of the parliament proceedings to review his plan and cabinet.
However, due to the commotion and disorder in the parliamentary session, he reduced his speech to just 53 minutes, struggling to even read his notes correctly. He ceded the remainder of his time to parliament members to defend him, despite there being ample time under parliamentary rules for both support and opposition.
In his speech, Pezeshkian did not outline a specific plan, contrary to the parliament's expectations. Instead, he stated that his plan is the Seventh Development Plan (approved by the parliament) and the policies endorsed by Ali Khamenei—documents that no one in the current parliament would dare to review or criticize. Moreover, Khamenei’s declared policies and the development plan are general wish lists, not road maps to get things done.
Yet, his remarks, much like his statements during the debates, reveal four key confusions and contradictions that are likely to trouble his administration over the next four years, some of which are already evident in the composition of his cabinet.
Tribe or nation-state
To persuade his Islamist audience, Pezeshkian frequently cites passages from the Qur'an and centuries-old Shiite texts to justify his decision-making process. However, he seems unaware that the words of the Prophet of Islam and the First Shia Imam were articulated within the context of a tribal society in Hijaz, Arabia, 14 centuries ago. Even if these teachings were effective in that era, they cannot serve as a roadmap for the present day. Pezeshkian fails to grasp that Islamism and strict textualism reduce the worldview of Islamists to that of a single Arab tribe, the Quraish, which no longer reflects the complexities of modern life.
Religious texts offer guidance and sermons, not blueprints for effective governance. They do not address the complexities of legislative processes, policy-making, or decision-making in response to evolving needs, principles, institutional contributions, and public opinion.
Foreign enemy or internal ruling class?
Pezeshkian frequently oscillates between blaming imperialism and sanctions for hindering "Islamic rights and justice" and acknowledging the weaknesses, problems, and incompetence of Iran’s rulers. This back-and-forth leaves his administration's direction unclear—whether its focus will be on combating the "system of global domination" or addressing corruption, inefficiency, discrimination, and waste within the ruling class.
As a result of this back and forth, Pezeshkian sidesteps the root causes of the country's problems—namely, anti-Western foreign policy, regional expansionism, and the nuclear agenda. He avoids addressing the diversion and expenditure of resources toward international conflicts and propaganda, the more than one trillion dollars lost due to the nuclear program, and the economic isolation that has shuttered trade opportunities with the world. These issues go far beyond mere differences or incompetence within the ruling class; they are systemic flaws that cannot be ignored.
National unity or gang cohesion
In defending his cabinet and governance approach, Pezeshkian portrays his administration as a government of national unity. However, his unwavering adherence to the opinions and policies of Ali Khamenei and the composition of the cabinet suggest a factional and clique-driven government. Ali Khamenei has consistently represented the interests of Iran's most totalitarian and authoritarian factions, never playing a cross-factional role.
In Pezeshkian’s proposed cabinet, influential factions and mafias within the government have been allocated power in proportion to their influence within Khamenei’s office and the IRGC’s economic empires, military-industrial complexes, and the repression and propaganda apparatus. As a result, Pezeshkian’s administration is neither a government of national unity nor one representing the unity of the Islamic Ummah; rather, it is a government of factional cohesion. In this view, the "nation" is synonymous with the ruling elite and the factions within its ranks.
Implementation or non-implementation: that's the question
Whenever Pezeshkian addresses the country's problems and crises, he retreats to the Islamic idealism of the 1970s. This idealism holds that all issues stem from neglecting Islamic principles, which lead to "wrong and injustice." Khamenei paved the way for Pezeshkian to assume the presidency and secure victory in the engineered elections, aiming to revive this failed Islamic idealism.
In Pezeshkian’s view, the ultimate remedy lies in the word of God, as conveyed by the Prophet, the first Shia Imam, and today, by the Supreme Leader whose decrees are enforced by the state. However, the lived experience under the Islamic Republic has demonstrated that Iran’s current problems and crises are rooted in a government that enforces Sharia orders and rulings to secure absolute, unaccountable power. This approach is at odds with modern common sense, meritocracy, the rule of law, and the principles of limited government.
