US privately warned Iran over 'suspicious' nuclear activities: Report

The main reason for the pressures is yet to be known, although those who exert these pressures have offered enough arguments to back their initiative.

Presidential candidate Alireza Zakani, the mayor of Tehran has come under attack by the city councilors for leaving the city at the mercy of profiteers. They accuse him of allowing high municipal positions to be sold to those willing to pay hefty bribes for lucrative jobs in local councils around Tehran.

His main critic enjoys a special position that cannot be ignored. She is Narjess Soleimani, the daughter of former IRGC Qods Force Commander Qasem Soleimani who has left his legacy of reverence and influence to his children within the Islamic Republic’s political establishment. However, Ms. Soleimani is not alone in her campaign against Zakani. Some seven of Tehran's councilors are said to be backing a motion to unseat Zakani.

Another former candidate under fire is ultraconservative Saeed Jalili who appears to be losing his influence among Iran's conservatives after his defeat by President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian. The main argument brought against him is about his lack of transparency about the funding of his self-declared shadow government and the hefty sums his campaign spent.

Several politicians, including former President Hassan Rouhani and former Justice Minister Mostafa Pourmohammadi, who was also a presidential candidate, have recently disclosed that Saeed Jalili obstructed Iran's negotiations with the United States and blocked the country's joining the FATF conventions for personal political gain. Jalili did this in his role as the secretary of the influential Supreme Council of National Security.

Both Rouhani and Pourmohammadi have said that everyone else at the Security Council was in favor of the negotiations that were close to be finalized in a bid to reduce the pressure of sanctions on Iran. Pourmohammadi added that Jalili told him he would have endorsed the FATF membership motion if someone other than Rouhani was the President at the time.

The FATF is an international financial watchdog that spearheads efforts to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and the financing of weapons proliferation. In recent years, Iran has been placed on the financial watchdog’s “blacklist” due to its failure to adhere to transparency standards and international conventions against money laundering and terrorism financing.

Saeed Jalili's resistance to adopting the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations had emerged as a pivotal topic in the sudden presidential election debates in Iran.

For more than a decade, the debate over FATF compliance, intertwined with the persistent challenge of international sanctions, has dominated Iran's foreign relations discourse.

In an interview with Khabar Online, conservative politician Mahmoud Naqavi Hosseini called on Jalili to make transparent the budget of his shadow government and its source of income. He said that the shadow government's name has not been mentioned anywhere in the country's annual budget bill.Naqavi Hosseini said that Jalili should begin to move out of the shadow and come under the spotlight.

During the election, Jalili claimed his campaign was funded by the people but provided no evidence to support this. Other politicians, including former Tehran Mayor Gholamhossein Karbaschi and conservative Hossein Mozaffar, questioned Jalili's integrity, accusing him and the "shadow government" of undermining previous administrations.

Additionally, conservatives released a video in which Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei seemingly opposed the formation of a parallel body to the seated government. Former MP Gholamali Jafarzadeh Imanabadi warned that Jalili's shadow government could create problems for Iran's new administration under Pezeshkian, describing Jalili as a rude individual who persists in his shadow government activities despite Khamenei's remarks.

Ideological propagandist Ali Akbar Raefipour who leads the ultraconservative group Masaf [Combat] and groomed several hardliners, as well as helped win the parliamentary election in March has also been in trouble during recent weeks over lack transparency about hefty donations he claims to have received. Reports in Tehran say he has disbanded the group.

As the weakest link in the ultraconservative circle, he is facing dangerous allegations about portraying the Shiites's first imam, Imam Ali, in a bad light in a video that has gone viral on social media. He is said to be also facing a travel ban and probably an indictment.

Rumors have it that Majles Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf is at least behind the attacks on Raefipour. However, a higher authority, such as Khamenei's office or the Judiciary, might have decided that the trio have gone too far in their slogans and ambitions and that they need to be stopped before they put themselves and others in more trouble.

In a statement addressing Tuesday's United Nations Security Council meeting in New York, Bagheri-Kani stated, “His Excellency, Dr. Pezeshkian, the elected President, has recently outlined his primary foreign policy strategy, which aims to open new horizons and foster friendly relations with other nations based on dialogue, cooperation, equality, and mutual respect.”

In his speech, Kani also underscored the "legitimacy" of Iran's support for "Resistance” groups in the region, portraying it as a countermeasure to the “unilateralism” of the US and Israel.

"I wish to emphasize that Iran's support and solidarity with resistance groups in the region is legitimate under international law and aims to end aggression and occupation," Kani said.

"Resistance Forces" encompasses a network of proxy entities, including Palestinian militant groups such as Hamas, the Syrian regime, the Lebanese militant organization Hezbollah, and various other factions in Yemen, Iraq and elsewhere.

Meanwhile, the cornerstones of Iran's current foreign policy—funding and supporting militia groups and advancing its nuclear program—are seen by many countries as contradicting the principles of dialogue and cooperation. This approach has led to crippling Western sanctions.

Thus, it remains to be seen how President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian's foreign policy will reconcile the paradox of advocating a "new approach" while maintaining the existing strategy.

Additionally, Pezeshkian has vowed to follow strategies and goals proclaimed by Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who has so far advocated defying the West. Any minor adjustments could indicate Khamenei's desire to adopt a more flexible approach, similar to how Khamenei allowed nuclear talks a decade ago.

These negotiations resulted in the JCPOA nuclear deal in 2015, between Iran and major global powers, including the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. As part of the agreement, Iran agreed to curtail its nuclear capabilities in return for reducing UN economic sanctions. Nevertheless, the US withdrawal from the deal in 2018 by President Donald Trump, coupled with the reimposition of stringent sanctions, severely strained diplomatic ties and debilitated Iran's economy.

Meanwhile, the current US administration has declared reluctance to resume nuclear negotiations with Tehran under the new president precisely for Iran's ongoing "support for terrorist organizations Hamas and Hezbollah".

Additionally, even in the event of an administration change in the US in November, Iran will face possibly even more pressure regarding its funding of proxy groups and its nuclear deal program.

Nikki Haley, former US Ambassador to the UN under Donald Trump, asserted on Tuesday that she attributes the instability in the Middle East to Iran. She also praised Trump's decision to withdraw from the JCPOA.

"Every problem in the Middle East can be laid at the feet of Iran. The dictators who chant Death to America are the bankrollers and weapons suppliers for Hamas and Hezbollah. They're behind barbaric massacres and the hostage-taking," the former South Carolina Governor said in her Republican National Convention speech.

Vance, who went from an Ohio Senator to Trump's running mate, has undergone a self-admitted significant shift—from a "never-Trumper" to a staunch ally. With their squabbles now seemingly behind them, Vance, by some called a "real Donald Trump junior," will serve as a perfect complement on the presidential ticket.

Given the current global landscape and their publicly stated positions, the reality of Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea forming a powerful bloc challenging the existing world order presents a serious challenge.

Will the Trump of 2016 reemerge in his next term, or will his approach adapt to the new set of today’s complexities?

Trump, who is widely believed to become the 47th president, will have to navigate a new reality: the ongoing war in Ukraine, China's growing influence, and conflicts in the Middle East.

While Trump became known for his “maximum pressure” policy on Iran and the assassination of the notorious Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani, it is unclear how he will approach Tehran during another term.

Vance has previously outlined his views on Iran on several occasions. Speaking before he was chosen as the VP candidate, Vance stated that he doesn’t see the use of force on the Iranian mainland as an option "right now."

He has criticized President Joe Biden’s handling of Iran and its proxy forces, advocating for a de-escalatory approach with Tehran - or strong retaliation in the event of any attacks on US interests. He has also critiqued the Obama-era Iran nuclear deal as a “disastrous” foreign policy decision, praising Trump’s move to withdraw from it as the best course of action.

Tehran, meanwhile, is relentlessly pursuing its destabilizing agenda in the Middle East. The Iranian state has also been implicated in assassination plots against opponents on American soil, including reported plots to kill Trump himself. Escalating its nuclear program, Tehran is violating international agreements and provoking global concern.

Tehran’s agenda, which is likely to persist under the country’s newly elected president, underscores the regime's determination to exert its influence and destabilize the region.

This not only heightens regional tensions but also pressures Trump to address a rapidly escalating geopolitical threat – that may require him to redefine his foreign policy strategy.

In a stark illustration of the wide array of national security threats posed by Iran, Russia, and China to the US, state-sponsored hackers from these nations have also targeted the country’s water utilities. These cyberattacks aimed to exploit vulnerabilities, creating strategic disruptions and sowing widespread panic.

Vance has also argued for more aid to Israel, stressing that Washington and the American taxpayers should not be funding both sides of the conflict, ensuring aid does not end up in Iran-backed Hamas' hands instead of the Palestinian people.

Arguing that Israelis and Sunni Muslims should manage their own region, Vance’s view of the world sees Europeans handling their region, and that Washington is then able to concentrate more on East Asia.

Yet, the challenges posed by Tehran have become increasingly complex for the US, as Iran has strengthened its position within the "axis of upheaval," also dubbed by some as the "Axis of Evil 2.0."

As a staunch ally to Russia in its war on Ukraine, Tehran has significantly bolstered Moscow's efforts by supplying destructive drones and other military aid. This support has been instrumental in Russia's continued aggression, further solidifying the strategic alliance between Tehran and Moscow.

Both Vance and Trump have expressed a strong desire for the war in Ukraine to end swiftly, hinting at a willingness to make concessions to Moscow. Vance's perceived indifference toward Ukraine's fate and Trump's interest in resetting relations with Russia raise alarm among European nations, who fear the message it sends to Putin.

If Trump and Vance push Ukraine to make peace with Putin through concessions, it could be seen as a victory by the members of the "axis of upheaval"—including Iran, encouraging it to continue its behavior.

This move might be perceived as a significant win by Russia and embolden China, which is already eyeing Taiwan, to take bolder actions.

Vance has also been forceful in arguing that aid to Ukraine should instead go to Taiwan, which has feared an invasion by Beijing for years. Trump recently argued that Taiwan should pay the US to defend it, likening the US to an insurance company and stating that Taiwan "doesn't give us anything."

In Vance's worldview, China is the paramount threat to the US, a position he made clear in one of his first interviews as Trump’s vice-presidential candidate. However, both Vance and Trump's approach to China appears to be largely trade-focused, with the possibility of high tariffs on imports potentially launching a more intense trade war between the nations.

In short, there are apparent contradictions in the Trump-Vance foreign policy, which seems to miss the point that Russia-China-Iran are one block when it comes to challenging US interests.

The threat of the "axis of upheaval" is not solely the US's problem. Recently, Lord Robertson, the former UK Labour defense secretary and ex-NATO chief, issued a stark warning that Britain's armed forces must be prepared to confront a "deadly quartet" consisting of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

The major question remains: Can a Trump-Vance administration signal to Russia that its behavior is accepted while trying to contain China, which they have identified as the biggest threat?

Furthermore, can the US appear lenient toward Russia, one of Iran's biggest allies, while simultaneously deterring Tehran’s nefarious behavior?

Will their isolationist and seemingly incoherent approach, which involves withdrawing from certain conflicts, reinforce US power internationally or weaken it overall – and ultimately fail in making the US strong again on the global stage?

According to a detailed report by cybersecurity firm Check Point, MuddyWater has employed BugSleep malware to allow hackers to execute remote commands and transfer files between infected systems and their servers with targets including government organizations, media outlets, and travel agencies.

International organizations, including the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, have attributed MuddyWater to Iran's ministry of intelligence. MuddyWater, also known as APT34 and OilRig, has been active for several years, focusing on cyber-espionage against private and governmental organizations in the Middle East and Western countries.

Their activities are characterized by a mix of strategic intelligence gathering and disruptive cyberattacks, aiming to further Iran's geopolitical interests.

The primary and most successful method of the new malware so far, also targeting countries such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, has been through phishing emails.

Since February 2024, over 50 such emails have been distributed to hundreds of recipients, crafted to deceive recipients into clicking malicious links or downloading infected attachments.

Cybersecurity company Sekoia has also highlighted a surge in MuddyWater's activities. One of the significant findings from Sequoia's investigation is a shift in the hackers' tactics.

Instead of embedding infected links directly in the text of phishing emails, MuddyWater now places these malicious links in PDF files attached to the emails, an attempt to bypass security filters that scrutinize email contents for suspicious links.

Iran has a long history of using cyberattacks, not least on its archenemy, Israel, targeting entities like the Israel Electric Corporation.

These attacks have stepped up since the outbreak of the Gaza war. In November, just weeks after the war began, a group going by the name of “Cyber Toufan” targeted Israeli companies and organizations and dumped huge troves of data online that it claims to have stolen.

Israel's National Institute for Security Studies says Iran was one of the first countries to develop a national cyber strategy. It has developed the institutions and infrastructure to ensure its proxy war could disrupt, sabotage and even destroy civil and commercial targets, critical national infrastructure and military capabilities.

Speaking on behalf of the coalition of reformist factions in Iran, Secretary Azar Mansouri’s statement did not signify merely avoiding undue interference in the executive branch's work.

Instead, it implies a refusal to take responsibility for an administration that came into office with the reformists' support, but falls short of addressing their demands from three decades ago.

Are the reformists now abandoning their quest for influence within an administration they heavily invested in, both materially and politically, and staked their remaining political capital on? The question remains: Why did they support Pezeshkian if they now choose to remain political spectators?

Reformists and the Khatami administration

Former President Mohammad Khatami's administration (1997-2005) was the first to receive full support from the reformists.

Despite some members, such as the ministers of foreign affairs, defense, commerce, information, and education, not being reformists, they did not openly oppose reformist agendas.

Consequently, reformist parties and the “Reform Front” regarded this administration as their own and felt obligated to defend it. They continue to defend its record despite failures that have been much discussed in the past two decades.

Reformists and Rouhani's administration

None of the prominent reformist parties and figures considered former President Hassan Rouhani to be a reformist, nor did he claim to be one.

As a member of the Moderation and Development Party, Rouhani presented himself as a moderate, particularly in foreign affairs.

For this reason, reformists saw his administration as a "surrogate womb," allowing them to remain within the establishment's structure with the hope of regaining power in the future. They adopted this tactic after forces loyal to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei sidelined them during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's second term, leaving them little chance of taking back the presidency.

Reformists and Pezeshkian’s administration

Now, as Pezeshkian's administration is about to be formed, the question arises: What do prominent reformist parties and figures like Mohammad Khatami expect from this administration, and what were their expectations when they supported him in the election?

The Pezeshkian administration does not have the stature of Khatami’s, which was backed by a massive social movement and 23 million votes.

Nor does it match Rouhani’s, who was one of the founders of the Islamic Republic. Therefore, they do not expect the new president to be a channel for the reformists to rise to power as they did in 1997.

The two finalists for the Vice President position are Mohammad Reza Aref, who served as Khatami’s VP, and Mohammad Shariatmadari, a minister in both the Khatami and Rouhani cabinets. Both candidates are loyal to and trusted by Khamenei.

The inclusion of former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and other so-called "reformists" and "moderates" in the transitional council responsible for introducing ministerial candidates to Pezeshkian highlights the likely composition of the new cabinet.

Several working groups have been established to compile a list of candidates for each ministry, allowing for reasonable predictions about the final selections. The future ministers, supposedly younger and without prior ministerial positions, will in all likelihood be drawn from five distinct groups:

One natural group would be officials personally chosen by Khamenei. Typically, the ministers of foreign affairs, intelligence, Islamic guidance, and the interior are chosen by Khamenei himself.

Another group would include the ministers of defense and justice, who are selected by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and the Judiciary, respectively.

People from the opposite faction will be added to the cabinet so that Pezeshkian can show that his cabinet is multi-factional.

The economic ministers will be determined according to the demands of Khamenei and the IRGC’s economic empires.

The remaining few will likely be determined by individuals who identify as “reformists” or “moderates” – though, the “reformist” social base in Iran typically does not view these individuals as good representatives of their agenda.

Based on Khamenei’s recommendation, Pezeshkian’s administration will follow Raisi’s path rather than pursuing a national unity agenda.

It would appear that “reformists” do not and cannot expect the new president to do much beyond offering them minimal support to keep their movement alive.

Thus, if the first week after the elections has not disappointed some of his supporters - with his meetings with military commanders and having night tours of religious mourning ceremonies – they will in near future when his admin will be introduced to Parliament.

In an op-ed, Rouhani's political advisor called the Pezeshkian’s foreign policy map "confused, without priority, dreamy, incoherent, with a lot of generalizations about everything and anything".

If the "We Regret" campaign of Rouhani's voters emerged six months after his second inauguration, it will likely arise much sooner for Pezeshkian. The composition of his cabinet is expected to reveal that no significant changes are forthcoming.

This time, the anticipated regret from the supporters of the new administration will be conveyed through silence and harsh criticism. Their regret won't be used as a tool to pressure the administration for change, unlike before, but rather to express mere hopelessness.